著者
新島 龍美
出版者
九州大学大学院比較社会文化学府
雑誌
比較社会文化 (ISSN:13411659)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, pp.51-64, 2010

本研究は、アリストテレス作と伝えられる『大道徳学』(Magna Moralia)のテキスト校訂に関わる作業の一環として、従来学問的に最も高く評価されてきたズーゼミール校訂のトイプナー版の検討を行うものである。本稿は、その最初の作業として、同版の「印刷ミス」、および、用いられた諸写本や印刷諸刊本の読み方並びに先行研究によって提案された推測(conjectures)の報告に関する誤りを指摘し、新たな批判校訂版の必要性を示す。This study aims to show the necessity for a new edition of the supposedly Aristotelian work, Magna Moralia, by considering the exacteness of its most reliable text that is edited by Franz Susemihl, published by Teubner.
著者
新島 龍美
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, pp.36-47, 1993

<p>This paper examines the so-called Protreptic parts of Plato's Euthydemus (Euthyd. 278E-283B[=PL(1)]; 288D-292E[= PL(2)]), and investigates the characteristics of wisdom or knowledge to show the basic misunderstanding of the traditional interpretation. I (1) The argument as a whole derives from the concern of Socrates' and others' that young Cleinias will become as good as possible (Euthyd. 275A) , so that the matter of 'becoming good' is meant to apply to us as well. The argument of PL(1) can be summarized as follows : (i) the realization of our happiness through possession of many good things; (ii) the demand that we use these things correctly to attain some benefit ; (iii) the requirement of wisdom or knowledge to guarantee correct use ; (iv) the necessity of searching for and loving wisdom or knowledge, namely philosophy. (2) From this summary, PL(1) seems to be Plato's real argument in favor of philosophy, and to indicate the Socratic eudaimonism. However, its more complicated figure is revealed as our investigations proceed : (a) The four 'cardinal' virtues are treated in the same way as wealth and other good things, namely as 'things' (πραγματα; 282A2). Meaning that they are supposed to be able to stand in some way independently from their owners, namely ourselves. (b) Such a treatment will almost inevitably invite these questions : what does using temperance, courage, or justice mean ; what is correct use ; what is the content of the benefit resulting from their correct use, and who are 'we' that supposedly benefit by their correct use. It is in the basic understanding of wisdom itself that these kinds of questions culminate. Yet they are unanswered and remain implicit in PL(1). Traditional interpretations believe that PL(1) shows Plato's real speech recommending the activity of philosophy. However, our scrutiny has shown that the situation plausibly suggests a problematic feature of Protreptic Logos, and if PL(1) ended with a declaration of the necessity of philosophical activity, such an interpretation could be sustained. Yet, in fact, PL(2) which clearly continues PL(1) finally ends with an anopia or impasse. II (1) PL(2) asks the question: if philosophy is the acquisition of some wisdom or knowledge, which wisdom or knowledge must we rightly acquire? The argument is still led by both the question of how we benefit and consideration of the context of acquisition or possession and use(cf. 288E1-2 ; 289B4-6 ; 290D5-7). PL(2) then proceeds to the test of kingship or royal art which is apparently the most plausible candidate, if it is knowledge that can achieve and supply our happiness. Consideration of knowledge, finally arrives at the question, in what respect are people good, and in what aspect are they useful. These remain unresolved. (2) We insist that we must take this ρπορια or impasse as such, and search for its significance and origin. (a) That final ironical situation signifies that 'being good' can not possibly be evaluated by connecting good things with ourselves through the context of possession and use. (b) The origin of this impasse can be traced back to the thought that we can be good or happy by possessing many good things. These things were, in fact, unreflectingly and unquestionedly presupposed to stand as good even outside ourselves. The final indecision within the most crucial point of determining in what respect we are good is undersood to suggest that our being good or happy, can not justly be considered by the presupposition of such a grasp on 'good' things. We could say that the more we are inclined to such a possessive thought, the more suggestive and significant the perplexing situation can be for all of us. Philosophy, when considered the acquisition of knowledge to obtain some type of benefit, remains empty and senseless. We can not, therefore, accept the</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>
著者
新島 龍美
出版者
九州大学大学院比較社会文化学府
雑誌
比較社会文化 : 九州大学大学院比較社会文化学府紀要 (ISSN:13411659)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.19, pp.19-37, 2013

本研究は、アリストテレス作と伝えられる『大道徳学』(Magna Moralia)が果たしてアリストテレスの真作か否かを考察するものである。考察方法は、同書の幾つかの箇所を取り上げ、そこに含まれる議論を分析し、明らかになった内容が、アリストテレスに帰属可能なものがどうかを判断するという、ある意味で最も正統的な方法である。結論は、同書はアリストテレスの作品ではない可能性が高いというものである。This study considers whether the supposedly Aristotelian Magna Moralia can be Aristotle's genuine work. Several parts of its texts are analyzed to see if this work can be attributed to Aristotle himself. The result is that it is highly probable that it is not his genuine work.
著者
新島 龍美
出版者
九州大学大学院比較社会文化学府
雑誌
比較社会文化 : 九州大学大学院比較社会文化学府紀要 (ISSN:13411659)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17, pp.51-75, 2011

本研究は、アリストテレス作と伝えられる『大道徳学』(Magna Moralia)1185 b 15 に見られる'ε~κ τω~ν η~θικω~ν' の三語の理解の詳細な検討である。先ず、A. この三語を写本の読みのまま受け取る選択肢については、1「人柄に関わる事柄から」と特定の領域の現象を指示すると解する解釈、2アリストテレスの倫理学書に言及する書名と解する解釈のいずれも問題を招来することを示し、次に、B. 写本修正の試みの内、3'ε~κ τω~ν αισθη~σεων' 修正する試み、及び、4'ε~κ τω~ν αισθητω~νと修正する試みはいずれも問題に逢着することを示した上で、C. 問題の三語を'εξω τω~ν η~θικω~ν'(「人柄に関わる事柄の外で」)と修正する試みが最も問題が少ないことを示す。This study considers several interpretations on three words 'ε~κ τω~ν η~θικω~ν' in the supposedly Aristotelian work, Magna Moralia 1185 b 15 , to show that the attempt to revise the relevant words into 'εξω τω~ν η~θικω~ν' would be least problematic.