著者

木村 昌人

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.97, pp.14-31,L6, 1991-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

50

---

The purpose of this paper is to describe clearly the effects of the World Monetary and Economic Conference held in London in 1933 on Japan-United States relations.Generally speaking, the London Economic Conference was largest international economic conference between the Wars, but it was not successful because of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's opposition to the European nations'plan. That is, Roosevelt wanted freedom to devalue the dollar in order to raise domestic prices as a counter to the deflationary effects of the depression. The London Economic Conference could not rebuild the international monetary system. However, there have been few studies about this topic in connection with Japanese diplomatic history, but I believe the result of the conference had a tremendous effect on Japan-United States relations, and this analysis will illustrate Japan's cooperation towards the United States after leaving the League of Nations on March 27, 1933.Japan's response to the London Economic Conference was as follows:(1) Japan wanted freedom to carry out its own domestic economic policy. Therefore, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi was opposed to a return to the gold standard system and did not want to participate in any treaty which aimed at stabilizing the yen exchange rate.(2) Because Japan believed that tariff wars would prevent the recovery of industry and trade for each nation, government and businessmen were anxious to reduce high tariffs and to conclude an international treaty to sweep away limits and embargoes on exports and imports.As a result, the conference could not conclude international treaties not only on a monetary system, but also on trade issues.Japanese businessmen thought that the failure of the conferece became a common symbol of a basic change in the world economy. It brought unstable exchange rates and rampant protectionism. But the Japanese government was calm, because the United States also abandoned the gold standard system and President Roosevelt had exactly the same idea about economic policy, that is, both wanted a managed monetary system. Also, Secretary Cordell Hull's proposal for a reciprocity treaty fascinated Japan, when faced with the European nations' protectionism.In conclusion, the result of the London Economic Conference brought about a situation where Japan could cooperate with the United States economically.

著者

木村 昌人

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.92, pp.116-131,L13, 1989-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

38

---

The purpose of this paper is to describe clearly the Nippon Zaikai (Business Circles) 's role in the normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations during 1960-1965. In particular, I focused on the Kansai Zaikai which showed their zeal for this long-pending question. There have been few studies about this topic, but I believe this analysis will illustrate the Japanese non-governmental economic diplomacy towards South Korea after the World War II.The Kansai Zaikai's strong interest in Korea was generated by the Kansai area's geographical proximity to Korea and the traditional trade ties linking the two. This led the Kansai Zaikai to play a major role in the rebirth of economic ties between Japan and South Korea. The large number of Koreans living in the Kansai area led to the formation of the Zainichi Kankoku Shokokai (Korean Chamber of Commerce in Japan). This group took a vested interest in restimulating both cultural and economic exchange between Japan and South Korea. The normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations was viewed by the Kansai Zaikai as means of revitalizing the Kansai economy in the aftermath of World War II.When the Ikeda Cabinet appeared in 1960, Kansai Zaikai formed the Japan-Korea Economic Association with the Keizai Dantai Rengokai and Japanese Chamber of Commerce. The Korean Chamber of Commerce in Osaka also took part in this association and played an important role in linking the Japanese and South Korean economic circles.Subsequently, Michisuke Sugi, ex-president of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and one of the leaders of the Kansai Zaikai, was appointed as one of the chief-representatives in the Japan-South Korean talks held during 1961-64.In conclusion, an evaluation of the Zaikai's Activities during 1960-1965 as follows:(1) One of the most notable changes brought about by the Zaikai's efforts to normalize relations was the improvement in the Zaikai's image of South Korea.(2) As a result of the Zaikai's efforts, the establishment of a direct channel between the Pak Cabinet and Japan was established.(3) While the Kansai Zaikai took an interest in the reestablishment of economic and political ties because of its historically close ties with Korea, their interest in restoring economic activity to the Kansai area, and their pronounced rivalry of Tokyo sparked them into taking a leading role in the normalization efforts.

著者

天川 晃 我部 政男 木村 昌人 古関 彰一 福永 文夫 増田 弘 雨宮 昭一

出版者

横浜国立大学

雑誌

重点領域研究

巻号頁・発行日

1992

---

今年度は沖縄でのヒアリングを含め2度の合宿と4回の研究会を行ったほか、総括班主催のシンポジウムにも参加した。研究分担者ごとの研究進捗状況に若干の差異はあるが、総括班シンポジウムで増田・木村の2名が各自の研究報告を行なった。具体的活動成果として、第一に9月に沖縄で行なった沖縄占領関係者に対するヒヤリング調査をあげることができる。政治、経済、教育関係者とのヒアリングを行い、占領下の沖縄の実情を聴取し、沖縄と本土各府県の占領との比較研究に関する多くの示唆を与えられた。また我部のアレンジによって沖縄の研究者・研究機関との情報交換を行なうとともに現地での関係文献の収集も行なった。第二に、司法制度と法曹関係者の人的研究は政府間関係の観点からも追放の影響の観点からも重要な検討課題であり、古関を中心に司法制度と弁護士会関係の資料収集を行った。古関は9月にできなかった沖縄の司法関係者とのヒアリングも別個に行なった。第三に、地方レベルの占領関係資料の収集を継続し外務省・終連関係資料、内務省関係資料、府県知事の伝記資料などを収集・分析した。第四に、木村を中心に全国の商工会議所を中心とする調査を継続し地方経済エリートの交替を政治過程の関係をマクロ的に観察した。研究班としての研究成果のとりまとめは総括班の成果報告と調整を計りつつ行なう予定であるが、福永の民政局の政党政策に関する分析、増田の平野力三の公職追放過程の研究など、研究分担者が部分的に成果の公表を行うことができた。また、天川が『学術月報』に「府県から見た占領改革」を執筆し研究班の研究の一端を紹介した。