著者

梅村 卓

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.2, pp.277-284, 2015

著者

梅村 卓

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.3-21, 2008-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

31

被引用文献数

1

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Studies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have not so far included much investigation of the Party’s media strategy. The radio broadcasts of the Chinese Nationalist Party have been the subject of much study, but there is little corresponding research about the CCP. This paper therefore examines the operating conditions of CCP broadcasting during the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War, and defines its characteristics in comparison with the radio broadcasts of other countries.In 1940, when the CCP started broadcasting, radio was the latest media. Radio, unlike printed media, can communicate with anyone, irrespective of literacy, and does not need to be physically delivered. These characteristics were very important for China, because most of the population were illiterate, and with no transport infrastructure it was very difficult to reach some regions—especially key CCP territories in remote mountainous lands such as the Shanganning district. For these reasons the CCP gave a great deal of thought to radio.At this time, as in Nazi Germany, the Japanese empire and the United States, radio as a propaganda tool played a major role in promoting national unity. When information was blockaded by the Nationalist Party and the Civil War, the CCP used radio for intelligence and psychological warfare. The main radio programs provided internal party communication and external propaganda to the enemy (black propaganda). The CCP noticed that there had been hostilities between Jiang Jie Shi and various regional armies. These armies surrendered, and in addition asked to surrender to the CCP. Historical material suggests that these discussions were made based on strategic considerations. Although it cannot be claimed that these propaganda programs aimed at the Nationalist Party turned the tide of the Civil War completely, once the tide of war turned against the Nationalist Party, the CCP broadcasts greatly influenced the Nationalist Party’s officers and men as they fought their last-ditch battles. Although the Nationalist army was better equipped than the CCP army, the Nationalist army soon collapsed.The CCP did not consider the general public to be their audience, because radio receivers were not widely available and standard Chinese had not spread. Most importantly, however, the CCP was not at the stage of considering national unity, because it had not yet come into power. Ironically, most of the people who met the requirements for listening to the radio were the Nationalist Party’s army and the residents of Nationalist-controlled areas. Other countries used radio to establish a system of total war, but the CCP did not follow this approach. The CCP mainly used radio as a tool for military activity.

著者

梅村 卓

出版者

一般社団法人中国研究所

雑誌

中国研究月報 (ISSN:09104348)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.4, pp.1-15, 2013-04-25

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本稿は,1983年末に中国で展開されたブルジョア精神汚染批判キャンペーンを,特にメディアを中心に考察したものである。胡喬木と胡績偉との間に「党性」「人民性」をめぐる論争が交わされ,メディアが「党の口舌」として世論をコントロールするのか,「人民の口舌」として世論による監督機能を果たすのかが争われた。この時期は中国共産党内においても保守派,改革派の間でメディア政策が揺れ動いていた。現在までのメディア統制を視野に入れた場合,この運動は党がメディア統制を構築する重要な過程となったと言える。そして「党性」「人民性」の問題は,メディアの監督者が誰であるべきかという点で,今日の中国においてもなお検討されるべき課題となっている。