文献一覧: 田村圭一 (著者)

3 0 0 0 OA 倫理学における表出主義とその成否

著者: 田村圭一
出版者: 北海道大学哲学会
雑誌: 哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.39, pp.1-18, 2003-07-20

2023-02-08 09:12:56
3 + 4 Twitter

http://hdl.handle.net/2115/48037

3 0 0 0 OA 倫理学における徳論の批判

著者: 田村圭一
出版者: 北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌: 哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.44, pp.137-152, 2008-02-29

2017-08-08 16:08:39
3 + 1 Twitter

http://hdl.handle.net/2115/35056

3 0 0 0 倫理における真理 (北海道哲学会・北大哲学会共催シンポジウム真理論の諸相)

著者: 田村圭一
出版者: 北海道哲学会
雑誌: 哲学年報 (ISSN:1344929X)
巻号頁・発行日: no.53, pp.25-40, 2006

2016-04-03 17:48:06
3 + 4 Twitter

https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110004847286

3 0 0 0 21pFCPS-8 岩石から出る放射線について : 岩石に含まれるウランの分布を視覚で確認(ポスター発表,日本物理学会第6回Jr.セッション)

著者: 木元拓小川大輔田村圭一郎新井清久前田有紀宮本愛理
出版者: 一般社団法人日本物理学会
雑誌: 日本物理學會誌 (ISSN:00290181)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.65, no.3, 2010-03-05

2012-03-19 07:40:09
3 + 3 Twitter

https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110007575008

2 0 0 0 OA 倫理学における認知主義とその帰結パティキュラリストの動機付けの理論

著者: 田村圭一
出版者: 日本哲学会
雑誌: 哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2004, no.55, pp.206-217,30, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数: 10

Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.

2 0 0 0 倫理学における認知主義とその帰結:パティキュラリストの動機付けの理論

著者: 田村圭一
出版者: The Philosophical Association of Japan
雑誌: 哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日: no.55, pp.206-217,30, 2004

Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent. Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.