著者
宮野 晃一郎
出版者
北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.57-71, 2004-07-18

Le texte de ses dernières années,nommé "Qu'est-ce que les Lumiéres?," nous montre que l'attitude critique et philosophique de M. Foucault était traversée par les idées des 'l'êthos philosophique' et 'l'ontologie historique de nous-memes' depuis l'archéologie et la généalogie. Nos positions sont qu'il est à la fois la reprise mêmede ses travaux et la charnièrede la theme du savoir, celle du pouvoir et celle de l'éthique,y trouvent-elles leur charnière, et donc qu'il est également au point de départ de envisager son éthique.
著者
Imoto Seiichi
出版者
北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.29-44, 2004-07-18

John R. Searle (1998) upholds what he calls "external realism" that there is a real world that exists independently of us, a world of mountains, trees, oceans, molecules, and soon. Some research findings in cognitive science, however, are compelling us to re-examine such a framework. In this essay I insist, from a cognitive science perspective, t hat the so-called external world we perceive as it is, is not independent of us, it is dependent on us in such a manner that those entities such as mountains and oceans are the end results of our perceptual processes, and as such they are in our phenomenal or mental space. It is a world as causes for our perceptual processes that is considered to be independent of us, though we have no direct, empirical access to the world as such.
著者
斉藤 健
出版者
北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, pp.15-33, 2006-07-18

Structuralism considers structures to be principal. According to in re structuralism, a structure resides in particular systems exemplifying the former. I characterize a schema for any mathematical entity as a pattern framed by its definition including its axioms in mathematics, no matter how described by set theory or category theory. The aim of this paper is to present in re structuralism by schema and to argue for it. In re structuralism commits less abstract entities than ante rem structuralism. From the presented position we can regard all the structures (including variable sets) as schemas framed by definitions in mathematics. Such schemas can be comprehended through mathematicians' communication in metalanguage.