著者
野本 和幸
出版者
北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.1-28, 2004-07-18

Firstly I sketch Frege's personal history, his academic career and his publications briefly, and secondly I try to give a general outline of the structural and methodological characteristics of his investigations as a whole. One can divide Frege's logico-philosophical investigations into the three parts as follows: (A) The invention of contemporary logic, its axiomatic systematization and the development of the logicist philosophy of arithmetic. (B) Philosophy of logic. (C) Controversies with his contemporary distinguished scholars concerning psychologism, empiricism, physicalism, formalism, etc., though I do not take them up this time. Concerning (A), firstly I try to explain why Frege must constitute the higher order logic through formulating his formal language (Begriffsschrift) for the accomplishment of his logicist project. Secondly I take note of his theory of judgment/ assertion and inference, and point out its two distinctive features, i.e., (1) his priority thesis of judgment, and (2) his epistemological characterization of judgment and inference. For Frege, a judgment is the recognition of the truth (als wahr anerkennen) of the thought-content and assertion is the manifestation of a judgment with assertoric force,while an inference is the justification (Berechtigung) of the correctness of the conclusion based on its true premises. Thirdly, Frege's claim of the primacy of the sentence or the context principle, and the composition principle are Frege's methodological guiding principles of his syntactic and semantic considerations as a whole. Concerning (B): his philosophy of logic, (1) Frege will neither approve the justifiability of primitive logical laws nor definability of primitive logical terms within his Begriffsschrift. (2) In fact, Frege does not introduce distinctive model theoretic ideas such as variant domains or quantification along with domain fixing. However, Frege explicitly provides lots of semantical 'explanations (Erklärung/Darlegung)' in his ‘explanatory language (Darlegungssprache)' as metalanguage distinguished from his object language (Begriffsschrift as ‘Hilfssprache'). For example, in his main work: GGA, Frege tries to give the proofs of the meaningfulness of his primitive logical symbols, truthfulness of axioms, and the truth-preserving nature of inference-rules. (3) Frege gives further metalinguistic explanations as propedeutic concerning the basic ‘logical forms' such as‘fall-under (subsumption)' and his logical categories: objects versus concepts/functions, and his semantic distinction of sense (Sinn) and Meaning (Bedeutung). In such explanations there might be a certain anticipation of Wittgensteinian idea of ‘saying' and ‘showing'. Furthermore Frege provides meta-meta-linguistic elucidations or suggestions resorting to vivid metaphors concerning his fundamental categories of proper names versus function-signs/concept-words,o r objects versus functions/concepts, the distinction of Begriffsschrft from ordinary language, and the relationship of representation, sense and Meaning, etc. Really Frege is not only the most revolutionary logician since Aristotle, but also a distinguished man of metaphor.
著者
宮野 晃一郎
出版者
北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.57-71, 2004-07-18

Le texte de ses dernières années,nommé "Qu'est-ce que les Lumiéres?," nous montre que l'attitude critique et philosophique de M. Foucault était traversée par les idées des 'l'êthos philosophique' et 'l'ontologie historique de nous-memes' depuis l'archéologie et la généalogie. Nos positions sont qu'il est à la fois la reprise mêmede ses travaux et la charnièrede la theme du savoir, celle du pouvoir et celle de l'éthique,y trouvent-elles leur charnière, et donc qu'il est également au point de départ de envisager son éthique.
著者
斉藤 健
出版者
北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.45-63, 2004-07-18

The aim of this paper is to examine Shapiro's structuralism in philosophy of mathematics and to show several difficulties in his structuralism. He adopts ante rem structuralism which is based upon his realism. After delineating his arguments I will point out some advantages of his structuralism, which become apparent when it is compared especially with a traditional type of mathematical Platonism. Then I will show, by using examples taken from mathematics, that there are some ambiguities in his uses of the basic notions, such as structure, system, exemplification and place. Finally I criticize his axiomatic theory of structure mainly because it relies upon too many undefined terms, and show that in his ontological views there is an underlying discrepancy between his ante rem structuralism and his set-theoretic approach to structures.
著者
中島 孝一
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, pp.右63-右77, 2005-07-17

In this paper I characterize the method of Wittgenstein's later philosophy as "quasinatural historical consideration" and sketch its important aspects. What is essential to his way of dealing with philosophical problems is to invent imaginary language games in order to compare them with the facts of our real language games. These imaginary language games are invented by modifying various facts of "natural history" of existing language games. They make our own particular ways of understanding our language visible and enable us to survey (übersehen) its grammar. From this perspective we will be able to interpret Wittgenstein's later writings on diverse subjects consistently and properly.
著者
Imoto Seiichi
出版者
北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, pp.29-44, 2004-07-18

John R. Searle (1998) upholds what he calls "external realism" that there is a real world that exists independently of us, a world of mountains, trees, oceans, molecules, and soon. Some research findings in cognitive science, however, are compelling us to re-examine such a framework. In this essay I insist, from a cognitive science perspective, t hat the so-called external world we perceive as it is, is not independent of us, it is dependent on us in such a manner that those entities such as mountains and oceans are the end results of our perceptual processes, and as such they are in our phenomenal or mental space. It is a world as causes for our perceptual processes that is considered to be independent of us, though we have no direct, empirical access to the world as such.