- 著者
-
若田部 昌澄
- 出版者
- The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
- 雑誌
- 経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.51, no.2, pp.18-32, 2009 (Released:2019-08-08)
- 参考文献数
- 49
This paper proposes a way to understand the evolution of macroeconomic thinking.
The macroeconomic thinking, not necessarily synonymous with macroeconomics,
has been dealing with the questions of money and business cycles. Money and business
cycles, in turn, have been closely connected with the international monetary arrangements
such as the Gold Standard, the Bimetallic Standard, the Bretton Woods
system, and the Flexible Exchange Rate. I shall argue that the evolution of macroeconomic
thinking is best understood as the responses of economists to, and their interaction
with, the changing monetary and exchange rate regimes. The theoretical
foundation of the paper is rather simple: the so-called trilemma, or “irreconcilable or
impossible trinity.” A policymaker cannot simultaneously choose a fixed exchange
rate, free mobility of capital, and domestic price stability via independent monetary
policy. Facing this constraint, the policymaker can, at most, choose two from among
these three goals. Therefore, further questions emerge: which goal or goals should be
given priority from among these three, and what is the exact tool or mechanism that
can ensure the achievement of preset policy goals. The answer to the first question
determines the nature of international monetary arrangements, which, in turn, are
shaped by political and economic factors. With respect to the second issue, institutions,
or what we might call the institutional or social governance technology, play a
crucial role. Throughout history, concerns over “unrestrained inflation” have been
widespread, since there have always been strong incentives for a government to raise
seigniorage by over-issuing money. The choice of international monetary arrangements
depends on the availability, credibility, and effectiveness of a specific social
governance technology that acts as a constraint upon policymakers, which, in turn,
depend on the specific political and economic structure.
JEL classification numbers: B 20, B 22, E 42.