著者
江里口 拓
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.1, pp.23-40, 2008-07-31 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
65

The purposes of this paper are, first, to present a critique of B. Semmel's social imperialist inter-pretation of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's theories, and second, to establish the compatibility of the Webbs' ideas on “national efficiency” with the “internationalism” of the world economy. Pivotal to their program of national efficiency were the idea of “national minimum” and strategies developed at the London School of Economics (LSE).As they argued in Industrial Democracy (1897), the Webbs believed that national minimum policy should be based on free trade, and from that standpoint they criticised the protectionism of W. Ashley. However, the Webbs did not recognise the necessity for an “international minimum” as proposed by A. C. Pigou in The Economics of Welfare (1920) because effective use of the national minimum policy would by itself ensure efficiency in the British economy. This idea was affirmed with the founding of LSE (1895), which was established with the objective of promoting the application of scientific knowledge and skills (especially in areas of commerce and public administration) to the British economy. The Webbs hoped that their policies of national efficiency, which they saw as compatible with free trade, would be adopted by every civilised nation.Behind the Webbs' approach to the social imperialists were the realities of British party politics at the turn of the century, just before the blossoming of the “new liberalism.” That was the context in which they sought to realise their policies of national efficiency. It is therefore important to carefully distinguish their political behaviour from their economic thought.After the Second World War, G. Myrdal (1960) criticised the welfare state on grounds of its nationalist bias. However, the Webbs' idea of national efficiency based on free trade continues to offer an important clue to the resolution of that aporia in the logic of modern welfare states.
著者
岡田 章
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.137-154, 2007-06-30 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
79

This paper considers the history of game theory since von Neumann and Morgenstern published their monumental work The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. It points out changes in research themes and discusses what game theory has achieved up to the present. The aim of von Neumann and Morgenstern was “to find the mathematically complete principles which define rational behavior for the participants in a social economy, and to derive from them the general characteristics of that behavior.” Extending the theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Nash classified all games as either non-cooperative games or cooperative games and defined the notion of an equilibrium point for a non-cooperative game. Nash also suggested a research program, now called the Nash program, to analyze a coop erative game by constructing a non-cooperative game model for negotiations. The main field of game theory was cooperative games in the 1950s and the 1960s. Thereafter, research trends in game theory in the 1970s and the 1980s shifted from cooperative games to non-cooperative games, led by the seminal works of Harsanyi on incomplete information games and Selten on perfect equilibrium in extensive games. This socalled non-cooperative revolution greatly promoted applications of non-cooperative game theory to economics. At the same time, researchers became increasingly dissatisfied with the strong assumption of rationality in traditional game theory, and consequently research interest turned toward two new fields in the 1990s. One is evolutionary game theory, developing out of evolutionary biology, and the other is behavioral game theory, which collaborates with psychology. Evolutionary game theory investigates dynamic processes of evolution and learning in economic behavior, and it reformulates game equilibrium as a stable stationary state of those dynamic processes. Behavioral game theory studies the structures of motivation, cognition, and reasoning in human decision-making using the methodology of experiments. This paper shows how present-day research in game theory is developing in divergent fields that consider both traditional theory based on unbounded rationality and behavioral theory exploring human bounded rationality. Game theory continues to be one of the most active research fields in economics.
著者
西條 辰義
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.51-66, 2006-12-20 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
26

Over the past decade, a number of economists at the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, including myself, have been conducting experiments to test theories regarding the provision of public goods. One of our more interesting findings to date is evidence among Japanese of a trait that can be described as “spite” in the way it impacts the provision of public goods. This paper describes the purposes, method, and some results of those experiments.We have been forced to ponder economic methodology in every phase of this project. We considered the methods of neo-classical economists such as Walras and Pareto, for example, who tended primarily to analyze data without concern for the motives behind strategic choices, and we examined the approach of those experimentalists who put forth questions only after finishing their tests. To develop our own methodology, therefore, it seemed reasonable and legitimate to pose questions midway through our experiments in order to elicit the factors behind strategic choices.That reasoning led to questions concerning the validity of behavioral assumptions made by neo-classical economists, moving us well away from Milton Friedman, who pays little attention to whether those assumptions are valid or not. In this way, experimentalists in this area, including ourselves, have begun to study behavior in terms of whether it is altruistic, spiteful, or fair in the provision of public goods.In our experiments, we found that the first priority for several subjects was not the total payoff amount they could expect to receive but the ranking among them. Comparing American subjects with Japanese, we found that the American subjects tended to behave as game theory would predict, while some Japanese subjects adopted 'spiteful' strategies initially and demonstrated cooperative behavior later.Today, we believe that understanding human behavior is the central issue in social science. Adam Smith, David Hume, and other eighteenth-century thinkers were interested in the sentiment and emotion behind economic decisions, but for a long time neoclassical economists of the last century effectively avoided the factor of motivation behind human behavior. By describing the experimental method, I hope that this paper will help to open a new and challenging path to understand human economic behavior and may contribute to the development of a new economics for this century.
著者
南森 茂太
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.1, pp.62-78, 2008-07-31 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
41

Takahira Kanda, with his lifelong interest in economic problems, was a pioneering scholar, teacher, and translator of Western economics in Japan. His Keizai shogaku [Elementary Economics] (1867), for which he translated Western-language sources, is particularly well-known. But it is an earlier work, Noshoben [An Exact Explanation of an Agrarian Nation and a Merchant Nation], published in 1861 that is the focus of this paper. In this book, Kanda's economic thinking appears radical by the standards of the time. It has drawn the attention of economic historians for what they see as a liberal side, and its arguments have often been compared with Western economics. What scholars have tended to overlook, however, is the side of Noshoben that clearly reflects the economic thought prevailing in Japan at the time.Contrary to the current image of Noshoben, this paper attempts to demonstrate that Kanda's thought was largely based on the economic thought of the Edo era. In that book, he argued that taxes on farmers were the cause of the budget deficit and the poverty of farmers, and that those conditions invited aggression by foreign countries, which meant, he said, the necessity of reforming the existing tax system. He proposed tax reform by treating revenue from farm products as commercial profits, and he argued that promoting foreign trade would be effective to increase commercial profits. Those ideas were not new. We can find them in the work of Toshiaki Honda, for example, who wrote most of his treatises in the late 18th century. Nonetheless, Noshoben had considerable originality. For instance, while many Edo era economists regarded merchants as wily and untrustworthy, encouraging the shogunate or feudal rulers to maintain strict control over trade with foreign countries, Kanda recognized the important role merchants could play in external trade, and, consequently, in strengthening the domestic economy. His idea of imposing a tax on the profits of merchants was radical at that time.
著者
Timm Graßmann
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.60, no.1, pp.58-78, 2018 (Released:2019-09-03)
被引用文献数
1 2

Abstract: With the continuing publication of the complete works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, MEGA), a bulk of new material concerning Marxʼs studies of economic crises has been made available-with further releases expected to follow. These publications have revealed Marxʼs enormous efforts to examine in detail every economic cri-sis through which he lived. The most prominent examples are the three Books of Crisis (Kris-enhefte), which he compiled in 1857-58 amidst the first truly global economic crisis. This paper sets out to, first, provide an overview of new MEGA-texts regarding Marxʼs studies of contemporaneous 19th century revulsions. In the main part, a closer look will be taken at the origin of Marxʼs crisis studies in the 1840s. A comparison between his notes on James Millʼs Elements of Political Economy, written in the Paris Notebooks (1844), and his excerpts from John Stuart Millʼs Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, taken in his Manchester Notebooks (1845), reveals Marxʼs changing stance on classical political econo-myʼs ʻgeneral glut controversy,ʼ i.e., the debate over the (im)possibility of overproduction cri-ses in commodity-producing societies. In between his stays in Paris and Manchester, Marx took extensive notes on the works of Simonde de Sismondi in his Brussels Notebooks (1845), which played a major role in his break from anthropological-essentialist thinking. JEL classification numbers: B 00, B 51, E 32
著者
山根 卓二
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.2, pp.21-37, 2009-02-05 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
54

By exploring a theory of human sciences that is the basis of Karl William Kapp's concept of institutional economics, this paper aims to clarify the originality of his social cost theory. The difference between the so-called external dis-economy theory, which is part of mainstream economics, and Kapp's social cost theory is a disagreement about rationality. The former assumes that entrepreneurial behavior to maximize profit is simply rational. Therefore, the cause of social loss, such as environmental disruption is not attributed to the entrepreneurial behavior per se, but is attributed to externalities called “exceptional cases.”On the other hand, in Kapp's social cost theory, irrational human actors are assumed. Kapp, who lived through Nazi oppression, and who was inspired by the methodology of psychologist Erich Fromm, sought to explain human irrationality by people's self-deceptive behaviors. In the background of conscious corporate desire for money and profit are the wholly unconscious human needs for stability, continuity, power, and social approval. And the fulfillment of these needs might be pursued even at the price of one's existence or well-being. For Kapp, social cost is a socio-pathological phenomenon generated collectively by enterprisers who, in their conscious minds, firmly believe themselves to be “sane.” While mainstream economics might define rationality solely from the perspective of monetary desire, Kapp takes unconscious needs into consideration as well as conscious needs, and seeks to define rationality within a comprehensive structure of human need, including biological and cultural needs. This is what is called substantive rationality. In order to develop this standard, Kapp's theory had to integrate economics with other social sciences, and even with the natural sciences.

2 0 0 0 OA 契約理論

著者
伊藤 秀史
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.52-62, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
41
被引用文献数
2

The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of contract theory, a highly successful and active research area in microeconomics, with particular emphasis on its history and influence on modern economics.According to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), currently a standard textbook in this field, the theory of incentives, information, and economic institutions is generally refer-red to in short as contract theory. Contract theory is thus a theory of imperfect markets, mainly because of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection.Contract theory is also a theory of economic institutions and as such applies far beyond markets. The basic model of moral hazard and that of adverse selection both use agency (or principal-agent) relationships as the main analytical framework, in response to various attempts to lay open the black-box nature of the firm in the standard neoclassical model. Furthermore, theories of boundaries of the firm, originating out of Coase's classical work, are today analyzed in the framework of incomplete contracts that leads to the third basic model of contract theory, along with those of moral hazard and adverse selection. Although these basic models are games with specific extensive forms, they are formulated as optimization problems subject to incentive compatibility and participation conditions, and are solved without explicit reference to equilibrium concepts. Contract theory is thus related to both price theory and game theory, but it has developed its own analytical frameworks and tools to solve problems under conditions of asymmetric information or incomplete contracts.Contract theory is also a theory of incentive design. Incentive design is not important under perfect competition but is crucial when there is asymmetric information or contractual incompleteness. Myerson claims that today, “economists can define their field more broadly, as being about the analysis of incentives in all social institutions.” (Myerson 1999) I argue that it is contract theory that enables us to define today's field more broadly.
著者
Keith Tribe
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.155-160, 2007-06-30 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
6

The modern market economy which we seek to build should have a decidedly social constitution. Its social character is based primarily on the fact that it is able to offer a greater and more varied quantity of goods at prices determined by the demands of the consumer, the resulting low prices raising the real value of wages and thereby permitting a greater and more extensive satisfaction of human needs.
著者
中井 大介
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.46-62, 2006-06-30 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
37

While Henry Sidgwick may be best known as a moral philosopher and the author of The Methods of Ethics (1874), he made notable contributions spanning economics and other fields as well, one of them being The Principles of Political Economy (1883). Even now The Methods and its treatment of utilitarianism is recognized as an authoritative model for ethical theory, but his conclusion that there is a “dualism of practical reason” has generated a great deal of controversy. The relationship between these two works has not yet been fully analyzed in the scholarly and critical literature. In this paper I demonstrate that the structure of the argument in The Principles is closely related to The Methods.Sidgwick distinguishes economics as a Science (what is) from economics as an Art (what ought to be) based on two moral principles, egoism and utilitarianism, both explicated in The Methods. Sidgwick's Science/Art distinction is instantiated by his distinction between “economic man” and “ordinary man.” Economic man is an abstraction signifying economic behavior based on self-interest. In Sidgwick's argument, Science can employ the idea of economic man to objectively analyze a society where self-interested economic behavior is the norm. Ordinary man, on the other hand, is the ideal of economic behavior motivated by moral rules based on both self-interest and utilitarianism. Art defines those governmental activities desired in a society consisting of “ordinary men.”Self-interested economic activity does not necessarily achieve the preferred results. When it leads to monopoly, for example, it works to reduce social production. The dilemma of Sidgwick's “dualism of practical reason” is the generation of conflict between the outcome of economic man's behavior and the desired results of behavior by ordinary man. As I attempt to show here, in The Principles Sidgwick constructed a role for government that would resolve that problem. Furthermore, using the distinction between Science and Art, and introducing egoism and utilitarianism, Sidgwick tried to resuscitate the ideas of the classical school of political economy.
著者
熊谷 次郎
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.2, pp.1-21, 2020 (Released:2020-02-26)

Contemporary British historians are almost unanimous in positing a close relation between the growth of the British economy and the colonial empire after the Glorious Revolution. The formation of the British colonial empire concurrently led to a new turn in mercantile economic thought. During the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the rationale for the concept and significance of the advantages of foreign trade shifted from the “balance of trade” theory to the “balance of labor” or “foreign-paid incomes” one. L. Magnusson, a leading contemporary scholar on mercantilism, attributes the emergence of the latter theory partly to the advent of a new science of trade,2 but he hardly mentions the relation between the theory and the remarkable development of colonial empire trade. Most mercantilists employing this theory, however, assiduously regarded British colonies and dependencies as growing and promising markets for the development of various industries as well as the increase in labor employment in Britain. This paper attempts to illustrate the importance of the theory in the context of both an emerging transatlantic colonial empire and an awareness of the economic crisis of Britain in relation to European competitors. This paper mainly deals with the arguments of Daniel Defoe, Malachy Postlethwayt, Mathew Decker, and Josiah Tucker. By examining their discourses, it shows conclusively that in the mid- and late 18th century, there was a typical mercantile imperialist (Postlethwayt) at one extreme and a so-called free trade imperialist( Tucker) on the other. However, the extreme-position holders shared the view that the colonies and dependencies were indispensable for the development of the British economy and the more extensive circulation of its trade.
著者
西岡 幹雄
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.2, pp.22-39, 2020 (Released:2020-02-26)

Economic thought in pre-modern Japan was different from Western rationalism in that it did have a religious basis in the aspect of self-interest. Therefore, the Japanese society had to address tensions between public and individual interests, as pre-modern Japan had yet to understand the essence of institutionalisation as a deepening of the market, which included regionalisation and commerce. This paper will discuss Nakai Chikuzan (中井竹山, 1730-1804), who not only entrusted the adjustment of the ‘interests of the whole nation’ (「万民ノ利」) and the public good to internal social morality through giri(「義利」) but also sought public welfare and institutional recognition for the stabilisation of local societies. His emphasis on public welfare and social stability was important for the time restriction problem in relation to the maintenance of the moral and cooperative community, as well as the formation of economic rationality as an internal mechanism to address people’s interests.
著者
高島 善哉 星野 彰男 Robert Chapeskie
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.1, pp.66-91, 2019 (Released:2019-10-01)

Introduction by Akio Hoshino Zenya Takashima (1904-90)ʼs ʻThe Wealth of Nations and the System of Productive Powers,ʼ which has been translated into English here, is Chapter 5 of Part 2, “Adam Smith and the Problem of Civil Society,” in The Fundamental Problem of Economic Sociology-Smith and List as Economic Sociologists-, Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1941 (The Works of Zenya Takashima, vol. 2, 1997, Tokyo). It was written in the midst of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and directly before Japanʼs involvement in the Second World War (1941-45), a period during which the military system severely suppressed both academic inquiry and the general population. In modern Japan (1868- ), there was a particular emphasis on the introduction of German institutions and culture, and Friedrich Listʼs political economy and its national policy of productive powers were therefore welcomed. This work of Takashimaʼs called into question the prevailing trends at the time, and managed to achieve publication in spite of the severe censorship to which such texts were subjected. Because it talked about “Smith as List” and “List as Smith,” the censors seem not to have been able to understand its central critique. Having been written under such circumstances, its prose became very complicated and difficult, but it was covertly held in high regard. It has been said that many of its readers understood its ironic implication, and that some even took it to be a cover for Marxism. Its core chapter that regards Smithʼs moral philosophy as of greatest importance (Chapter 2: ʻThree Worlds in Smithʼ) has already been translated into English (Adam Smith: Critical Responses, vol. 5, edited by Hiroshi Mizuta, Routledge, 2000). The theme of Chapter 5 is solely Smithʼs economic theory.