著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

千葉大学

雑誌

千葉大学人文研究 : 人文学部紀要 (ISSN:03862097)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.1-18, 2004-03-31

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.37, pp.118-128, 1987-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

千葉大学文学部

雑誌

千葉大学人文研究 = The journal of humanities (ISSN:03862097)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.114-175, 2018-03-31

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

千葉大学文学部

雑誌

千葉大学人文研究 = The journal of humanities (ISSN:03862097)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.57-113, 2018-03-31

著者

高橋 久一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, no.1, pp.7-33, 1976-07-20 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

東北哲学会

雑誌

東北哲学会年報 (ISSN:09139354)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.49-56, 2001-04-30 (Released:2018-02-28)

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

東北哲学会

雑誌

東北哲学会年報 (ISSN:09139354)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.73-75, 1999-05-20 (Released:2018-02-28)

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

千葉大学文学部

雑誌

千葉大学人文研究 = The journal of humanities (ISSN:03862097)

巻号頁・発行日

no.49, pp.117-175, 2020-03-31

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

千葉大学文学部

雑誌

千葉大学人文研究 = The journal of humanities (ISSN:03862097)

巻号頁・発行日

no.49, pp.71-115, 2020

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

千葉大学文学部

雑誌

千葉大学人文研究 = The Journal of humanities (ISSN:03862097)

巻号頁・発行日

no.44, pp.1-7, 2015

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

千葉大学文学部

雑誌

千葉大学人文研究 = The Journal of humanities (ISSN:03862097)

巻号頁・発行日

no.44, pp.1-7, 2015

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.45-55, 1989-03-15

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Many scholars emphasize the importance of prohairesis in Aristotle's Ethics as a key concept in explaining human action However, its precise nature remains obscure In this paper I will attempt to explicate Aristotle's answer to a fundamental question concerning prohairesis-viz "How should we individuate prohaireton?", and then locate it in the practical syllogism This task is of importance, since we cannot understand Aristotle's views on action as energeia without understanding his conception of action as chosen for its own sake As a preliminary, in section I I defend and develop constituent-innterpretation of ta pros to telos A clue to the solution of this dispute is the fact that the bodily movement performed pros to telos must be an action in itself It must be telos in a sense, otherwise the relation of telos and ta pros to telos would be external Aristotle may be a consequentialist in a broad sense, but not a utilitarian (As a corollary of this point I suggest that we cannot use description of bodily movement as a tool of action mdividuation ) In section II I propose my interpretation of prohairesis by examining Cooper's excellent explanation of deliberation My contentions are as follows 1)We cannot accept his assertion that to kath' hekaston means not the individual, but the atomon eidos We do not deliberate on individuals, as Aristotle says, but use recognition of individuals as premisses of deliberation 2) We should admit that the deliberation ends at prohairesis to perform an act of some suitably specific type Prohairesis is not mere desire, but a unity of desire and belief, which is caused, via deliberation, by having a wish and some appropriate beliefs as to circumstances, but it is not an action We identify (future) action as such not by rinding a uniquely applicable description, but by specifying its type Future action cannot be referred to. 3) We must think that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action It seems to me that Cooper's and Mele's argument are not convincing 4) Prohaireton is the major premiss of the practical syllogism Aristotle's examples of the major premisses, however, are not always prohaireton Some of them do not fully specify the types of action to be performed 5) Therefore we must distinguish between the practical syllogism, conceived as including deliberative process, and the so-called "practical" syllogism, which has only two premisses As for human action, the latter is the last step leading to action, and in animal movement it is the only step In section III I criticize and modify Nussbaum's anankastic model of so-called practical syllogism 1) As Nussbaum says, misfire of action is explained either by not wanting G or by not believing it necessary to do A But the hypothetical necessity of A-ing is not relevant to the necessity for action, since if an agent does not want G, he will never do A, even if he believes it necessary for G We should take a parallel with the theoretical syllogism more seriously If one does not believe in premisses because of their falsity, one will not assert (phanai) the conclusion, even if one recognizes it as validly reasoned An action is performed only when both premisses are actualized, as akrates illustrates it negatively Aristotle's contention in asserting the necessity of action lies in the rejection of the third element, e g will, to explain action 2) As to a chosen act, the anankastic model should be modified As argued above, prohairesis is a unity of desire and belief Nonetheless, it is not an action, but a desire I suggest the following modification pN [{wanting G & believing (A for G)} and (believing now & here to A)→acting A] Akrates has both premisses, but he does not use his major premiss he does not stay in prohairesis (Elsewhere I argued for this unorthodox interpretation of akrasia) My arguments in this paper are rather sketchy and need elaboration Nevertheless, I should say that the present paper has taken a step in the right direction toward understanding action as enevgeia

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

学術雑誌目次速報データベース由来

雑誌

哲學雜誌 (ISSN:03873366)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, no.775, pp.144-162, 1988