著者

河村 哲二

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.37, pp.23-43, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-26)

参考文献数

70

著者

上西 哲雄

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, pp.21-38, 2014-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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Mark Twain is said to have written Pudd’nhead Wilson (1892) in a pessimistic mood when his financial situation was rapidly deteriorating. This article essays to examine the novel and its background in search of the cause of his pessimism.The book is composed of two similar stories, “Pudd’nhead Wilson” and “Those Extraordinary Twins,” with the same characters in the same place during the same time period, both of which, however, deal differently with elections. In the latter, Siamese twins run for municipal positions from different parties, only one of them to be elected as an alderman of the city. Meanwhile, in the former story, elections are described in a less complicated way: the twins, physically separated, stand as candidates from the same party, both of them to be defeated. It is noticeable that “Pudd’nhead Wilson” specifies the years of its story: it begins in 1830, a few foreshadowing incidents happen in 1845, and in 1853 appear the main episodes including the municipal elections. This article examines the mid-19th century situation of Missouri State, especially the author’s home town Hannibal, in order to trace his pessimism back to his early life.Eighteen fifty-three was when the Kansas-Nebraska Act was proposed and fiercely disputed, and the next year the act was approved. The act allowed the two territories to become federal states of slavery but also prepared for the transcontinental railroad expected to be constructed in both or either of the two states which adjoin Missouri State. Railroad construction was a driving force of economic growth on the frontier, which brought forth urban areas including Hannibal, and a booming economy including land speculations all over the state. The story uses the specific year to make readers imagine that behind the sleepy town in fiction, real societies were undergoing economic advancement, leading to the urbanization of Missouri State.In “Pudd’nhead Wilson,” the grandees of the old community are plunged into tragedy by an urban character, Tom Driscoll, who is reared by a land speculator and, while studying in the East, learns city fashion and gambling, and, after frequenting the big city of St. Louis for gambling, ends up killing his foster father for money. The tragedy represents urbanization in mid-19th century Missouri society.The author’s father, John Marshall Clemens, who immigrated from the south and ended up planted in Hannibal, had repeated financial collapses due to land speculations, which the very young Twain witnessed. Apart from his financial troubles, John Marshall was a prominent citizen engaging in urban reform activities in the town. It is possible, however, to suppose from reading the novel that experiences in his very young days lead the author to think his own financial trouble originated in his father’s inclination toward speculation, for which, in the story, he seems to blame the age of economic boom and urbanization.

著者

寺地 功次

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.30, pp.57-77, 1996-03-25 (Released:2010-11-26)

参考文献数

120

著者

奥出 直人

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.19, pp.81-103, 1985-03-25 (Released:2010-10-28)

参考文献数

83

著者

平体 由美

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, pp.49-68, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-30)

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The Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health was founded in 1916 on the recommendation of the Welch-Rose report submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board (IHB) to modernize public health education. This research-oriented graduate school not only generated notable scientists but also became a model for other universities; however, it did not directly contribute to the improvement of rural health. Wickliffe Rose, one of the contributors to the report, had had a vision to train personnel as public health officers for rural areas who would supervise and educate people to improve rural health. Rose did not promote his idea in the Welch-Rose report due to the IHB’s bias against him, but his vision was passed on to John A. Ferrell, an IHB director who strongly believed that every county must have a health board with a skilled public health officer. In the early 1920s, Ferrell launched a campaign in rural counties and secured budgets from the IHB to support local health boards and to induce public health students to apply for internships. Counties and towns were experiencing a growing need for public health personnel, but many of them could not employ a health officer because of budget shortfalls. Graduates from best schools were not attracted to such underpaid and unstable jobs with slim future prospects. Meanwhile, public health nurses and school nurses filled the role of local health workers and educated families on personal hygiene, nutrition, and childcare, paving the way for more organized community health institutions. The presence of nurses in the southern and western mountain areas encouraged women to enter medicine but marginalized public health work. To Ferrell, rural counties still needed a health officer to administer broad health-work with the local government, the courts, physicians, and civic organizations—a role nurses would be unable to fill. The Social Security Act of 1935 provided federal subsidies for rural public health work; however, a discrepancy between the counties’ requirement of field-based health workers and the scientific training of specialists promoted by the IHB continued to shape the rural public health structure until the 1950s.

著者

高橋 博子

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.1-19, 2008-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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After the detonation of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many people were exposed to the blast, heat and initial radiation. In addition to these people, many more people were exposed to the residual radiation which came from black rain, water and food, radioactive dust and so on. In 1947, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission was established by the Presidential Order of Harry Truman for research on people exposed to the Atomic Bomb. This article focuses on how the U. S. Government handled the facts about residual radiation and how ABCC scientists discussed it in the 1940s and 50s.On September 5, 1945, Wilfred Burchett, a correspondent for the Daily Express, based on data gathered in Hiroshima reported as follows: “People are still dying, mysteriously and horribly―people who were uninjured in the cataclysm―from an unknown something which I can only describe as the atomic plague.” Concerned about this report, Brigadier General F. Thomas Farrell, chief of the War Department’s atomic bomb mission (Manhattan Project), issued a statement denying that the damage was from radiation. He said, “the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were detonated at such a high altitude that no radiation remained, and that even if some people died later, it was because of injuries sustained at the time of the explosion.” According to The New York Times on September 13, 1945, he said, “The weapon’s chief effect was blast" and that "his group of scientists" found no evidence of continuing radioactivity in the blasted area on Sep. 9 when they began their investigation.After this statement, the Manhattan Engineer district continued an investigation of residual radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Mentioning the data which were collected in late September and early October 1945, they concluded, “No harmful amount of persistent radioactivity was present after the explosion.”However, in 1950, scientists of ABCC noticed the effects of residual radiation and started the “Residual Radiation Survey” by collecting information on the people who had radiation signs and symptoms after entering the city after the bombing. However, according to Lowell Woodbury, physician in the statistic department of the ABCC, “Due to pressure of other work and a shortage of investigators, this project was not actually initiated.”Woodbury pointed out the possibility that “The black rain left a deposit sufficiently radioactive to cause radiation signs and symptoms in extremely sensitive individuals, and that deposit was largely washed away in the September rains and typhoon,” and the necessity of more detailed investigations. But this investigation was not conducted. On the other hand, the conclusion of the Manhattan District Report, “No harmful effect of residual radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” even though it was conducted after the typhoon and rains, is still the standard which is applied today.The US government has continuously denied the influence of residual radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However this official view was not based on detailed scientific research.

著者

藤田 怜史

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.127-146, 2012-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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This article examines the descriptions of the atomic bombings against Japan in the U. S. history textbooks. In particular, it focuses on historical contexts of the bombings, and clarifies how an understanding of or a debate on the bombings is framed. In order to do that, this study analyzes thirty-nine textbooks that are/were used in American secondary schools.According to the historical research, this article assumes that the historical contexts of the atomic bombings are World War II, the Cold War, and the nuclear age. Most of the history textbooks deal with World War II and the early Cold War in different chapters. On World War II, domestic matters and foreign issues are dealt with in separate sections. On foreign issues, the history textbooks incline to mainly describe military developments on the European front and the Far Eastern front. No history textbook deals with the nuclear age in a single chapter, and some recent textbooks describe it in a section or a head. Based on these facts, this article argues that the U. S. history textbooks in general do not consider the Nuclear Age as an important historical context.Then, where is the description of the atomic bombings placed? Most of the textbooks locate the description in a chapter about World War II and a section about the ending of the war or about the Pacific front, not the Cold War. This is the case with not only the military aspects of the bombings, but also the political aspects. Based on these facts, this article suggests that the history textbooks regard the bombings as a military tactic, and unquestionably connect the bombings with the ending of the war. Some recent textbooks point out the political aspects of the bombings, but they do not provide an adequate context.On the connection between the atomic bombings and the nuclear age, about a half of the textbooks that this article uses say that the bombings ushered the nuclear age. However, as stated above, the nuclear age is not considered as a historical context, and it is only two textbooks that explain the significance of the bombings in the nuclear age. Moreover, almost no textbook clearly connects the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the image of the annihilation of the human beings in the nuclear age.As a result of the above analysis this article concludes that the U. S. history textbooks have a tendency to locate the atomic bombings in the context of World War II, especially in a military context. Historian Andrew Rotter points out that there is simplicity in the debate over the atomic bombings in the United States. This study suggests that the bombings in the textbooks reflect and affect this simplicity.

著者

松田 春香

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.39-57, 2010-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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This article focuses on the U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula during the Imperial Era, from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. The twentieth century is sometimes called the “American Century.” The U.S. sustained its commitment to Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula, especially during World War II. Exploring its first meeting with the Korean Peninsula would facilitate an understanding of the international environment surrounding the related events.When the U.S. showed an interest in the Pacific for the first time over the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, China was the most important market in the Northeast Asia. The second country they focused on was Japan, and the third was Korea. The main interest of the U.S. with respect to Korea concerned missionary activities, and thus, U.S. missionaries brought educational institutes to Korea.With the conclusion of the Spanish-American War (1898), the U.S. changed its policy toward East Asia after acquiring the Philippines. The U.S. implemented an open-door policy toward China and sought an adversarial relationship with Russia, which freed the port of Dalian in 1899. On the other hand, the U.S. enhanced its friendly relations with Japan, which tried to expand its territory in order to manifest itself as an imperialist state.Korea asked the U.S. to do ‘good offices’ that is negotiating with Japan and China, since Korea became the turf of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The U.S. considered doing good offices for a short while; however, it decided not to make a commitment to the war. Since the U.S. feared Japanese involvement in the Philippines, it entered into the Katsura-Taft Agreement (1905), in which it approved of Korea being placed under the Japanese rule in return for a pledge that Japan would not invade the Philippines. The balance of power in the Northeast Asia seemed to be preserved for a while.After the Japanese annexation of Korea (1910), Japan intervened in China ―the point of contention was specifically the puppet state of Manchukuo, an important market for the U.S, which was established by Japan in 1932. As a result, the confrontation between Japan and the U.S. became inevitable. Eventually, the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor in 1941 led to the Pacific War.From the end of the nineteenth century to the twentieth century, Korea had been in the “periphery” because China and Japan as well as the Western powers used strong-arm tactics vis-a-vis Korea. In 1910, the Western powers acknowledged the Japanese annexation of Korea, which ended in 1945. Therefore, I demonstrate in this article that with the influence of the international environment, the Korean peninsula has been a fool of fate up to the present day.

著者

森 孝一

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.22, pp.71-88, 1988-03-25 (Released:2010-11-26)

参考文献数

110

著者

安田 常雄

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.37, pp.1-21, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-10-28)

参考文献数

66

被引用文献数

1

著者

平野 孝

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.22, pp.14-32, 1988-03-25 (Released:2010-10-28)

参考文献数

57

著者

土屋 大洋

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.51-68, 2012-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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A major factor accelerating globalization is the development of various networks. Maritime and aviation networks increase the transnational movement of people and things. At the same time, telecommunication networks send messages instantaneously to the other end of the globe and enable people to share information without travelling. Historically, powerful states in international politics developed and exploited global telecommunications networks. The British Empire had extensive telegraph networks in the 19th century; in 1892 it owned 66.3% of telegraph networks in the world. The United States has had an even larger influence over the Internet since the 1990s. The U.S. presence today in Internet traffic, technologies and services is bigger than any other country. Submarine cables, whether historically in telegraph networks or in today’s internet networks, are an essential infrastructure for connecting nodes across network. The first submarine cable was laid in 1850 at the bottom of the Straits of Dover. Today there are numerous undersea cables in every sea. However, while there was a shift from the copper cables of the telegraph network to the fiber-optics of today, it is not clear why and how Britain lost its dominance to the U.S. in the area of submarine cables. This paper analyzes historical documents and data to answer these questions. It argues three points. First, between the end of the old copper cables and the new fiber-optic cables satellite’s caused technological disruption in the Cold War era. Satellites enable wider coverage over vast areas and have more capacity to send messages than copper submarine cables. The U.S.-led Intelsat made it easier to communicate overseas by satellites; Britain could not catch up with the U.S. and Soviet Union in satellite development. Second, the increase of communication demands needed a technological innovation and made both copper cables and satellites obsolete. Optical fiber was a disruptive technology and replaced old telecommunication systems. Finally, the rise of sovereignty claims over communications channels by developing countries after World War II weakened state control over new telecommunication systems. Telecommunication providers were privatized and laid private cables instead of common carrier (or consortium) cables, which were easier for governments to control. Therefore, the foundations of U.S. control over the Internet is not based on legal arrangements, but on technological advantages and the geopolitical layout of submarine cables. The vast Atlantic and Pacific Oceans could be disadvantageous for the U.S. But it led innovations of satellites and optic submarine cables and put them in place earlier than other competitors. Britain failed to take advantage of its earlier expertise and it made the U.S. a key hub in the new information age.

著者

有馬 哲夫

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.31, pp.41-58, 1997-03-25 (Released:2010-10-28)

参考文献数

55

著者

大八木 豪

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.38, pp.199-217, 2004-03-25 (Released:2010-11-26)

参考文献数

109

著者

米山 裕

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.20, pp.99-113, 1986-03-25 (Released:2010-10-28)

参考文献数

78

著者

鈴木 淑美

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.33, pp.135-150, 1999-03-25 (Released:2010-11-26)

参考文献数

65

著者

中島 和子

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1977, no.11, pp.70-89, 1977-03-25 (Released:2010-06-11)

参考文献数

40

著者

黒崎 輝

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.77-97, 2008-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, people around the world faced the danger of nuclear holocaust. The US and the USSR, having acquired the hydrogen bombs, were developing the ballistic missiles such as ICBMs and SLBMs. Against the backdrop of the détente after Stalin’s death, the two nuclear powers were apparently stuck in nuclear stalemate. It, however, came into question if uncontrolled nuclear arms race would automatically lead to stable mutual deterrence between the two nations in view of the rapid technological evolution of their nuclear arsenals. How to manage the transition to stable mutual deterrence, thus, became a major issue of concern for such emerging fields of research as strategic and arms control studies in the US.This article focuses on the Pugwash Conferences and the role that American scientists played in the transnational non-governmental organization’s pursuit of disarmament under such circumstances; it is also an attempt to reconsider the history of the nuclear age from transnational perspectives. The Pugwash Conferences was organized in 1957, to provide a forum for scientists from the East and the West to discuss issues concerned with peace and security of the world during the Cold War. In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the major topic of discussion was disarmament. Especially the reduction of nuclear danger and the prevention of a nuclear war were considered to be urgent. By the time the first conference was convened, however, distrust between the East and the West was so deep that nuclear disarmament seemed to be infeasible both technically and politically. Scientists could not ignore the formidable reality.In the early 1960s, minimum deterrence became one of the most contentious issues between American and Soviet scientists at the Pugwash conferences in relation to general and complete disarmament (GCD). Some American scientists, considering minimum deterrence as desirable and feasible to prevent a nuclear war and to restrain nuclear arms race in the interim, proposed disarmament schemes based on the concept. On the other hand, Soviet participants supported their government’s GCD proposal, opposing to nuclear deterrence intransigently. Although it was after the USSR’s concession to the West on GCD that Soviet scientists accepted minimum deterrence, American scientists helped create broad support for minimum deterrence by introducing it to and providing its logical and political foundations at the conferences.Consequently, the Pugwash Conferences came to seek ways to live with nuclear weapons, while striving to ease distrust between the East and the West. In fact, the Pugwash Conferences supported American-Soviet collaboration to form and maintain a strategic arms control regime based on the concept of mutual assured destruction during the Cold War. Nevertheless, nuclear arms race did not stop under the security framework. This was a disappointment for many scientists who were involved in the Pugwash movement, though humankind survived the Cold War. After all, the nuclear age is far from over even today. Ironically, however, American scientists’intellectual struggle to pursue the challenging goals without yielding to despair would remain worth remembering, unless we are set free from the nuclear threats.

著者

井上 弘貴

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.63-85, 2018-05-25 (Released:2021-09-28)

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In the article, I review the political theory of Samuel T. Francis who is one of the paleoconservatives in the late twentieth century. Although he was widely regarded as an editor and controversial columnist, he elaborated a distinctive theory about political strategies for the right-wing populism. My argument is that he has tried to formulate a concept of class formation and alliance in the contemporary America, which is closely associated with “race” and whiteness.In the first section, I introduce how the American paleoconservatism was formed in the late I970s and 1980s. The conservative movement was elaborated in the sharp conflict with neoconservatism in the 1980s through the 2000s. I introduce as one example of the conflict how Reagan administration nominated William Bennett as chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities rather than M.E. Bradford, a major paleocon. I also show that Patrick J. Buchanan, a staunch paleocon regarded Trump’s followers as the Middle American Radicals of whom his “friend” Sam Francis wrote when he posted an article to understand why Trump won in November 2016.I analyze in the second section how Francis conceived the Middle American Radicals, MARs. He followed James Burnham, a former Trotskyist, and political theorist when he thought about what the contemporary state is and who rules it. According to him, the managerial class retains power in both the public sector and the private sector including mass media and universities. The federal bureaucrats have extended their ruling power over people and parts of the country when they expand public welfare programs in particular for the underclass. Francis pointed out that managerial elites have formed a class alliance with the underclass to eliminate the old bourgeois and the middle class.He called this alliance the “sandwich strategy.” He, therefore actively asked the declining Middle Americans to raise a radical consciousness to struggle against the alliance and the managerial state.I argue in the third section why Francis vehemently opposed mass immigration in America. I pick up the two examples in the 1980s and 1990s - Sanctuary Movement and Proposition 187 - about which he wrote many articles. His analysis was that immigrants could provide a stream into a new underclass that keeps bureaucrats in power and hegemony.His outrage at the issue of immigration was so stern that people might feel a little confusing to understand why he unleashed his frustration on the issue. In the last section, I try to understand a theoretical relationship between the concept of MARs and that of race in his political theory. According to Francis, MARs are not a racially diverse people at all. To put it simply, they are whites. He thought that non-white immigrants were forming a race bloc to get political power and cultural hegemony over the white people. He accordingly required these white people to form their bloc to recover the white supremacy. He called it the “reconquest” of the United States. Thus his theory combined both the class consciousness and the racial consciousness in the concept of MARs.

著者

水本 義彦

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.79-98, 2013-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established in February 1955, was a Western defense organization designed to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Following the Laotian civil war in the early 1960s, the Vietnam War provided another occasion to evaluate SEATO’s workability as a collective defense organization. As the United States deepened its commitment to the defense of South Vietnam in the mid-1960s, President Lyndon Johnson and his Secretary of State Dean Rusk actively sought to enlist SEATO’s military support for the Saigon regime. As it turned out, however, SEATO failed to demonstrate its unity of purpose, instead symbolizing Western division and “America’s international isolation” there.Precedent studies point toward French and Pakistani objections as obstacles to SEATO’s action in South Vietnam. In the 1960s, both countries began to gradually tilt toward Communist China, worsening relations with Washington over policies toward Southeast Asia. In addition to these dissents, the Johnson administration continued to perceive Harold Wilson’s British government as a primary impediment to SEATO’s action. The US administration initially expected the United Kingdom, the biggest non-regional military power in Southeast Asia, to make significant contributions, but soon realized its steadfast refusal to provide Saigon any military assistance, either bilaterally or through SEATO. For Johnson and Rusk, Britain’s active support was indispensable in convincing the American and international public of the legitimacy of the US intervention in Indochina. Lacking London’s participation, they feared that the United States would appear to be fighting a war in Asia unilaterally and without any cause. Therefore, the Johnson administration was deeply disappointed at Wilson’s refusal to provide any substantial support.In this article, we examine the Anglo-American disagreement with respect to SEATO by focusing on SEATO’s annual Council meetings and the US-UK bilateral top-level meetings from 1965 to 1968. The US administration attempted to involve Britain in the collective action against communist threats first in South Vietnam and then in Thailand. To such US attempts, however, the British government consistently objected: it rejected the US’s call for “concerted” action in South Vietnam at the 1965 Council meeting in London, rejected Rusk’s request for providing military helicopters to Thailand to combat communist insurgents in the northeastern region of the country, and finally indicated its effective exit from SEA TO by announcing military withdrawal from the East of Suez to be completed by the end of 1971.From the facts above, it can be argued that the Anglo-American discord was largely responsible for the failure of SEATO’s collective defense and its eventual disbandment in 1977.