著者
立石 洋子
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.40, pp.50-64, 2011

The paper discusses the controversies on the history of non-Russian peoples in the USSR among the Soviet Marxist historians in the 1920s to early 1930s.<br> The development of early Marxist historical science in the USSR was closely related with the policies of the party. The party leaders distinguished the nationalism of the oppressing nations from that of the oppressed nations, and considered &ldquo;great power chauvinism,&rdquo; or Russian nationalism, the main danger. Accordingly, the study of all the peoples in the USSR and the improvement of their cultural level became an important task for scholars, including historians.<br> At the first convention of the All-Union Society of Marxist Historians in December 1928 to January 1929, the study of the history of the peoples in the USSR was declared as the main task of Soviet historians. For the first time, the historians faced the problem of how to interpret the history of non-Russian peoples from the Marxist perspective.<br> One main arguing theme was the evaluation of the Russian rule over the non-Russian peoples. Another main problem was the tendency of &ldquo;the great power chauvinism&rdquo; of the Russian Marxist historians; this issue was raised by Ukrainian Marxist historians, including M. Iavorskii. They criticized some Russian Marxist historians for underestimating the Ukrainian elements in the history of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine and for not acknowledging the independent features of the cultural, social, and economic history of Ukraine. However, M. Pokrovskii, the most authoritative Russian Marxist historian, did not accept the criticism, and thus, the historians never reached a consensus. In contrast, the problems that became serious themes in the Stalin period, such as the evaluation of the Khan who led the rebellion of non-Russian peoples against Russia, or the evaluation of the &ldquo;Holy war&rdquo; by the Muslim population against Russian rule, were given less attention by the historians.<br> At the end of 1929, when &ldquo;the cultural revolution&rdquo; began, not only did the non-Marxist intellectuals receive criticism, but the debate among the Marxist historians became strained. In Ukraine, the criticism against Ukrainian nationalism caused mass political oppression, and the most famous non-Marxist historian, M. Khlshevskii, and Marxist historian, M. Iavorskii, were both arrested. The class factor was put forward in the historical interpretation and this change was reflected also in the study of non-Russian history. The leaders of rebellions against Russia in nineteenth-century Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus and of the rebellion against Poland in seventeenth-century Ukraine came to be evaluated as repressors of the masses, and their dissatisfaction against the ruling classes was considered to be a driving force of these rebellions.<br> In the Stalin period, historians tried to reevaluate the tradition and the leaders of each people and again faced the problem of the harmonization of the class elements and the national character of each people. This problem remained unsolved from the 1920s. Thus, in the discussion of the early Soviet period, we can see the roots of the fierce discussion among the historians and politicians of the Stalin period.<br>
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.37, pp.i-xiii, 2008
著者
工藤 仁子
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.37, pp.42-57, 2008

This paper attempts to analyze politico-military relations in Russia, providing a perspective on the Putin-Medvedev duumvirate. Political leaders from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin had needed support from the military for governing the state. The military had expanded its influence on politics, based on this politico-military cooperation. The political leadership had placed its foremost priority on military policy, which had coincided with the military's interests. However, the political leadership is currently seeking to put more emphasis on economic development than military policy, for stabilizing Russia's domestic and external environment. This policy shift may provoke dissatisfaction from the military, which regards the national security as Russia's top concern. Therefore, the political leadership will strengthen its control over the military, for the purpose of keeping political superiority on military. Nevertheless, strengthening control over the military contains a dilemma in which strong objection from the military would lead to secession of the military from the political leadership, losing military support for politics. When the duumvirate collapses, a problem on which leader the military chooses will emerge. Therefore, unless the dilemma is settled, the politics will have to give way to, or pay the price for pacifying the military in case of confrontation with the military.
著者
村田 真一
出版者
The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
no.38, pp.47-59, 2009

Russian society has been drastically changing for the past ten years, especially because of the terrible financial crisis that has struck the worlds' economy in 2009. Due to this process of change, it is very difficult to provide a graphic illustration of today's Russian literature and proffer a treatise on its future. It is nonetheless important and necessary to give a detailed analysis of the current state of Russian literature in order to investigate the direction in which the profound changes occurring in Russia and in Russian art are headed.<br> This paper is aimed at analyzing the novels of the most important Russian writers from the 1990s to the present day and examining how they are perceived by the public of readers in Russia. Many of these novels have yet to be translated into Japanese and are not widely known.<br> In the post-Communist era, a select number of Russian writers began to publish a myriad of works under the banner of "here and now". These works were written using many expressions taken from everyday slang without any direct reference to classical literature. Rather, the writers aimed at representing what they saw "in front of their eyes" and depicted themselves in the micro-cosmos of their own literature.<br> Readers can access all of these works on the Internet. Literature has greatly changed from what we knew it to be a decade ago. Even the Internet has become a great library that anyone can approarch. For example, until the 1990s, writers would argue what the revolution meant for Russia, and politics were often discussed in their works. Nowadays, issues like these are not considered as important in contemporary literature.<br> It is possible to consider "post-realism" as the most appropriate definition of Russian literature from the 1990s hitherto. This concept has been proposed by N. Lejderman and M. Lipovitsky, who worked to combine realism and post-modernism.<br> In terms of analyzing the style of contemporary Russian writers, we can regard V. Erofeev and O. Slavnikova as the representatives of the 1990s and the 2000s. The text of "Overshoes" and "Encyclopedia of Russian Soul" by V. Erofeev, "2017" and "Love in the seventh Coach" by O. Slavnikova show that the same writers can compose in different styles. "Magic-realism", observed in their novels, is also a characteristic of Russian literature which derives from the 1990s.<br> In addition to popular B. Akunin, L. Petrushevskaya, L. Ulitskaya and aforementioned authors, the most important Russian writers today must be D. Rubina, A. Gelasimov, V. P'etsukh, Z. Prilepin, and also M. Shishkin, E. Limonov as the writers of "diaspora".<br> Traditionally, Russian literature has always tried to blaspheme authority, drawing largely on poetry and metaphors to slander establishment. Does today's Russian literature dare to do this? Does censorship still exist in Russia? These are the questions for us to answer.<br>
著者
長谷川 雄之
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.43, pp.69-88, 2014

&lt;p&gt;To deal effectively with global security issues and the changing security environment, how to build and develop effective national security policies has been an important issue today. In this context, the function of the National Security Council (NSC) has been focused on, though there are some other decision making bodies, because of its ability that would solve the hard political decisions from cross-departmental perspective. According to the prior researches (Vendil-Pallin 2001, Hyodo 2004; 2009; 2012, White 2008), under the Putin regime (May 2000–) the Russian Security Council has enlarged its function and started to play the more important role of decision-making process in contrast to the Yeltsin era. This trend is going to continue into the Tandem (under the Medvedev administration from 2008–2012) and the Second Putin government (May 2012–). &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At the same time (May 2000–), to build "vertical power", President Putin has started several federal reforms, such as series of legislative amendments which changed the formation of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament, the creation of "federal districts", and the appointments of plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in a federal district. Remarkably every representative was mainly a person from the "Power Ministry" or "Saint-Petersburg" and also holds the status of Russian Security Council membership. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Previous works are not enough to examine the enlarged function of the Russian Security Council in the political reforms of the Putin era. This study looks into the role of Russian Security Council in Putin's centralization like building "vertical power" and aims to provide a viewpoint for present state analysis on the Russian politics. As with every NSC in the world, the Russian Security Council is also an advanced secret organ. Thus, this study points out the personnel policies for the members of the Security Council and representatives in every federal district by analyzing public information such as legal documents (Presidential Decree and Federal Law). &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Reflected on the legislation of the new federal law on Security on December 28 2010, President Medvedev signed a presidential decree on the revised Regulation of the Russian Security Council. The new Regulation not only tightened its control power to the other state organs, but systematized local meetings held in every federal district, in which the secretary of the Security Council, presidential represent who covers the district, and federal and regional officials participate. In the meeting, the secretary of the Russian Security Council N.P. Patrushev, who assisted Putin for many years from when they worked together at the control division of the Presidential office, plays an important role in "realizing" the state program at the regional level. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This paper concludes that the main mission of the Russian Security Council 
includes not only planning the national security policies or military affairs, but coordinating (or controlling) the relationship between federal government and regional leadership.</p>
著者
久保 慶一
出版者
The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
no.33, pp.69-79, 2004

In Montenegro, there has been a deep divide between those who seek the independence of Montenegro and those who oppose it and seek the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation or the union with Serbia. It is well known that there is a correlation between the ethnic identity and the attitude towards this issue, particularly among ethnic minorities such as Albanians, Muslims (Bosnjaks) and Serbs. While one tends to assume that the ethnic identity is an independent variable that affects the behaviour towards the issue of statehood, I would argue that this assumption does not hold for Serbs. To do so, I firstly examine the correlation between the ethnic identity and the behaviour towards the issue of statehood. Secondly, by examining the census data of 1991 and 2003 in Montenegro, I point out that there seems to have been a significant scale of re-definition of the ethnic identity. In particular, a significant number of those who now regard themselves as "Serb" did not indeed do so only 12 years ago. This suggests that the assumption discussed above is wrong and the causal relations run in the opposite direction: they re-defined themselves as "Serb" because they support the maintenance of the union with Serbia. Thirdly, I briefly examine some factors that might possibly have affected the decisions made by those who regarded themselves as "Montenegrins" in 1991 to support or oppose the independence of Montenegro.
著者
松里 公孝
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, no.36, pp.17-29, 2007
被引用文献数
1

The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no &ldquo;clashes of civilizations&rdquo; between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine.<BR>Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (<I>Diyanet</I>), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor.<BR>Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.
著者
横川 和穂
出版者
The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
no.33, pp.106-121, 2004

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the reforms of local public finance in Russia that have been carried out during the first term of the Putin administration from 2000 to 2003. The building processes for home rule and local pubic finance institutions in Russia started during the 1990s, although it was after 2000 that a comprehensive fiscal reforms focusing on municipalities ensued. Therefore, after a brief survey of the problems during the 1990s that caused reforms to be necessary, this work attempts to examine a"Program for the Development of Fiscal Federalism in the Russian Federation in the Period until 2005"that was introduced in 2001 and gave an orientation for reforms of intergovernmental fiscal relationship.<BR>The program tried to strengthen federal control over local public finances, by introducing uniform rule at federal level for the delegation of expenditure authority, revenue distribution, and intergovernmental transfers, that have to be applied to all levels of government. It also aimed at improving the efficiency of local public finances by strengthening the fiscal independence of the municipalities.<BR>As a result of the reforms, local government retained less taxable revenue source, causing them to depend more heavily on fiscal transfers from federal and regional government. This change imposed certain constraints on the expenditure patterns of local governments, and caused changes in the local public service systems; subsidies for housing and public utilities were reduced, while social assistance to residents was increased. However, the actual reform process did not necessarily embody the ideals of the program in the sense that did not strengthen the fiscal independence of the municipalities.<BR>It can be said that distinguishing feature of fiscal reforms under the Putin administration is an attempt to concentrate more fiscal resources within the federal budget while simultaneously strengthening political control over municipalities. And thus federal government tried to restructure the lax management of local public finances through reforms from above.