文献一覧: 13486497 (ISSN) - Ceek.jp Altmetrics

In this article, we discuss the correlation between structural change in the world economy and Russian strategy. The transition to market economy in former socialist countries was the process joining the neo-liberalistic world economy. The liberalization of cross-border capital flow accelerated the expansion of capital markets and outsourcing. It stimulated the economic growth in China and other East Asian countries. Russia also enjoyed its benefits increasing oil price. It has caused a power shift from Europe and United States to Asia.But the failure of “circulation of growth”—the financial capitalism driven by USA and EU, the export-led quantitative growth in China, and the growth in Russia depended on natural resources—was revealed after the global economic crisis in 2009.According to the Constellation theory, the Ukraine crisis reflects an unstable hegemonic core of the world economy. In the EU financial institutions were relieved, but the burden is imposed on citizens by the reduced budget. It caused social deficits and anti-EU movements. At the same time, because of developing division of labor between East Asian countries, the East Asia economy is stepping into the way of self-sustained growth.The competition for hegemony of the world economy is intensified by mega-regions. A Eurasian Union alone could not be a very serious challenge to the hegemonic core. However, Russia’s Pivot to the East will strengthen its economic relations with East Asian countries, and might contribute to development of “counterpoints” with the capitalism model different from the neo-liberal one.The world energy market is undergoing a structural change through liberalization, development of renewables, and change of demands from Europe to Asia. Russia, depending on resources, must adapt to changes in the energy market and modernize its economic structure. The eastwards shift of Russia may be a wise choice. Its strategy is an adaptation to the structural change in the world economy, even if it costs enormous money to develop Far East regions in Russia. Closer relations between Russia and Asian countries will secure the energy supply in Asia and support their development. The power shift from the West to the East will be accelerated. From the long-term viewpoints, Russian joining the division of labor in Asia could be a chance of modernizing Russian industry.At the same time, for Russia, being afraid of excessive dependence on China, the cooperation with Japan is more important than ever.

2022-09-30 07:40:00
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1 0 0 0 OA ロシアにおける主観的厚生と政治的姿勢 ―社会調査による観察―

著者: 雲和広
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2016, no.45, pp.32-46, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)
参考文献数: 8

This paper examined trends in subjective well-being and political situations in Russia, paying special attention to the period of economic stagnation since the introduction of economic sanction after Crimean incidence.It may be unclear whether or not the approval rate of current political bodies in Russia is stable in the long run. Deterioration in macroeconomic situations, however, did not play a critical role in the worsening of political circumstances. Additionally, the decline in economic activity related to sluggish oil prices and economic sanctions seemed to have bottomed out, therefore it is unlikely that the economic or political situations would deteriorate sharply in the short term. In this sense, the years of 2014–2016 may have shown the stability of the political system in Russia.

2022-09-30 07:40:00
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1 0 0 0 OA プーチン大統領の再登板と「反体制派」の時代 ―政治体制の正統性をめぐる攻防―

著者: 油本真理
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2016, no.45, pp.47-61, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)
参考文献数: 29

This article revisits the beginning of Putin’s third term, which was characterized by the rise of opposition. Here the opposition means “non-systemic opposition,” who placed itself decisive opposition to the regime. One of the most prominent opposition activist was Alexei Navalny. Following the 2011 Duma election, the opposition gained power with the activation of post-election protest movements “For Fair Elections.” Since the protest movements soon declined, many researchers focused more on the regime’s coercive measures towards the opposition. However, it is no less important to ask why the opposition gained power and remained active for a while. This article explores the reason behind the rise of opposition, and reveals how the regime reacted to the opposition’s activities. In answering these questions, this article focuses on the regime’s effort to defend its legitimacy from the opposition’s attacks.The article first explores why the opposition gained power. The answer can be found in the opposition’s active commitment to the politicization of regime legitimacy. Such topics include electoral integrity, distribution of power, corruption and others. The early example of the opposition’s commitment to the legitimacy issue was their initiatives in anti-corruption campaigns. Corruption issue became a trigger for the opposition’s further attack on the regime legitimacy. In addition, it should not be ignored that the opposition’s attack on the regime legitimacy well suited to a populist discourse. The opposition emphasized how the regime contradicts the interests of ordinary people, for example, by committing electoral fraud, contradicting the “rule of law,” or committing illegal enrichment. The regime had difficulty in refuting the opposition’s criticism.Second, the article traces how the regime reacted to the opposition’s attacks. At first, the regime tried to discredit the opposition by mobilizing anti-western rhetoric and strengthening the patriotic mobilization. But the regime’s attempts had limited impact in discrediting the opposition. Then the regime tried to narrow the room for opposition activities by forestalling the opposition’s agenda. The regime actively participated in the anti-corruption campaigns, such as banning the high-ranking officials from possessing bank account abroad, and limiting the maximum amount of money for purchase of cars by officials. The regime’s active commitment to anti-corruption initiative narrowed the room for opposition activities.The analysis on the “era of opposition” reveals the importance of discourse-level struggle over the regime legitimacy. Despite its significant disadvantage against the incumbent elites, the opposition could attack the regime by mobilizing the legitimacy issue. In order to avoid the opposition’s attacks, the regime could adopt limited measures: after a series of attempts, the regime took over the opposition’s agenda and itself began to commit to the legitimacy issue. The experience of Putin’s third term provides us with a useful perspective in predicting the future of Russian politics: once the opposition succeeds in mobilizing the legitimacy issue, it will not be easy for the regime to tackle the opposition’s attacks.

2022-09-30 07:40:00
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1 0 0 0 OA 世界経済の変動とソ連・ロシア経済

著者: 溝端佐登史
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2015, no.44, pp.29-43, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)
参考文献数: 38

The present study demonstrates theoretical significance of system changes in the Soviet/Russian economy under the globalization, and reexamines its research changes. Through the historical evolution and the research development, rich experiences in the Soviet/Russia give us basis for an investigation of the economic system, particularly market and the state. Russia radically liberalized in transition and its liberalization process synchronized neo-liberal changes of the world after 1970s, which made the contemporary capitalism “normalized” one with the unequal society. In practice, Russia drastically changed its economic system after the transformation in 1992, and a newly built market looked to function completely, based on the liberal economic institutions. The Russian market, however, has shown its specificities strikingly different from the standard model of the developed market. The concepts such as “the emerging market” and “the state capitalism” also testify that Russia has different market structure and different market actors. The Soviet/Russian economy has fluctuated on “the imported growth model” by petroleum and cheap money as well as an economic cycle, which were caused by a long-term Soviet/Russian structure. Economics of transition in Russia gives clues to analyze the fundamental determinants in the Soviet/Russian economic crisis. The following determinants work in close operation. First of all, in spite of liberal policy measures, the economic growth cannot establish normal markets and cannot improve market quality. Market quality can be defined as a measure of efficiency in allocation and fairness in pricing based on market infrastructure. The Russian market building caused misuse of institutions and rules and it lost the law enforcement. The informal institutions substituted for the formal institutions, and even though they diminished risks and transaction costs under a malfunction of market infrastructure, market quality has got worsened. The state’s strong control over the economic actors also accelerated deterioration of market quality. Secondly, under the strong ideology of neoliberalism, the state excessively retreated from the economy in transition. The state lost the fundamental capability and reliable policy making, and state quality also deteriorated. While the rentier state expanded tax revenues and state assets with a favorable oil price, Russia could not build the efficient tax state. Tax haven and offshore have broken the normal financial flow. The state institutions destabilized and the state changed into the authoritarian regime. Both market and state quality have become risk factors. The evolution of markets and state are based on geopolitics, international environments, and endogenous socio-economic conditions. The institutional evolution certifies the above market and state barriers. On the one hand, institutions liberalized based on the global standards. On the other hand, the institutions that emerged from the transition did not converge into the “normal”, and follow a path the Soviet/Russia have shaped. The cultural inertia and legacies as a relationship become a determinant of institutional arrangement, and institutions change in ‘path-dependent’ ways. The view on the institutional change certifies continuous evolution of institutions in the Soviet/Russia and difficulties for improving quality of market and state under the politicized regime.

2022-09-30 07:39:00
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1 0 0 0 OA 若手ロシア人研究者による1916年の日露協約の研究 ―現代のための教訓―

著者: ミハイロバユリア
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2015, no.44, pp.44-55, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)
参考文献数: 16

This article examines three books by young Russian scholars on the topic of 1916 Russian-Japanese Alliance aiming to find out what implications their research may have for the present state of relations between Japan and Russia. The books under consideration are: E. Baryshev, The Period of Japanese-Russian Alliance of 1914–1917, The Truth about the ‘Extraordinary Friendship’ (2007); Yu. Pestushko, Japanese-Russian Relations during the First World War (2008) and D. Pavlov, The Forgotten Alliance, Japan and Russia in the Period of 1914–1918 (2014). One common feature of their research is the wide use of Russian and Japanese original sources, which sets their research apart from ideological inclinations usually characteristic to historical studies in the Soviet period. Though the three authors concentrate on analysis of the same political process, they are different in accents the authors make and in what they add to the central topic of their books. For Baryshev, the rapprochement was supported by what he calls the “civilizational similarity” of the two countries, which were both latecomers in modernization and thus felt themselves antagonistic to the Anglo-Saxon world. His research may, indeed, be qualified not only as a history of diplomacy, but also of the social and political thought. Pestushko conducted a thorough study of political and economic processes emphasizing the difficulties of negotiations between Japan and Russia and highlighting the importance of the territorial issue, i.e. the transfer of the southern branch of the East Chinese Railway from Russia to Japan. Though the issue was not resolved to Japan’s entire satisfaction, this did not prevent the signing of the treaty because other considerations prevailed. Pavlov describes in details the process of weapons supply by Japan to Russia calling it the core of Russian-Japanese rapprochement. This article argues against such an assessment, because, though Russian money helped modernize the Japanese military industry, the establishing of zones of influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was the priority for each negotiating party. Pestushko and Baryshev reject the previously dominant assessment of the 1916 Alliance as the anti-German one suggesting its anti-American nature. However, it may be more right to say that while for Russia it was anti-German, Japan saw the United States as the main threat to its interests in China. The article also examines how the rapprochement influenced mutual Russian-Japanese images. It reviews the case of the writer Vas. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko who in 1916 had to make corrections to his book written in 1908 concerning the assessment of Russian-Japanese relations. The article brings to attention letters written by young Japanese to their Russian friends, which were published in Kokumin Shinbun in 1916. On the whole, though the period of rapprochement was not long and ended with the 1917 revolution in Russia and Japanese intrusion into Siberia, the attention paid to it by Russian scholars is indicative of the trend towards seeing the relations between the two countries in a positive perspective. The three books demonstrate that in spite of many frictions and frequent differences in vision Japan and Russia are able to overcome them.

2022-09-30 07:39:00
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1 0 0 0 OA Yu.オレーシャ『羨望』の草稿における主人公と語り手の問題

著者: 古宮路子
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2015, no.44, pp.56-69, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)
参考文献数: 8

Yury Olesha completed Envy, his first novel, after repeated trial and error in terms of the form of narrative. The novel consists of two parts, with a change in the narrator from Nikolai Kavalerov, the hero, in the first part to the author in the second. However, it is not clear why Olesha changed the form of narrative and the narrator in the second part of Envy. Upon inspection of the book’s previous drafts, it becomes apparent that Olesha tried various forms of narrative in the process of writing. This study attempts to clarify the reason of change in the form of narrative in the published version, judging from the reason of change in the form of narrative in the drafts. From multiple types of drafts, this study picked up three groups of drafts that were written in the three different stages of writing. The fragmental chapter “Useless Things” can be regarded as the first stage, in which the hero is not Kavalerov but Ivan Babichev, one of the main characters in the final draft. In “Useless Things,” Olesha introduces Zvezdarov as a narrator and gradually gives him a personality as powerful as that of Ivan Babichev. As a result, the former becomes as important as the latter. However, it seems that Olesha still wanted to present Ivan Babichev as the hero. Therefore, in the second stage, Olesha moves from Zvezdarov to Kavalerov as a neutral narrator to recount Ivan Babichev’s story. Nevertheless, Kavalerov is also gradually given a powerful personality, becoming as important as Ivan Babichev. This may account for Olesha making Kavalerov the hero in the third stage. Instead of Kavalerov, the author begins to use Kavalerov’s neighbor as the narrator. The notable feature of this stage is the relationships of pairs: Kavalerov/Ivan and Kavalerov/his neighbor. Although Olesha ultimately shifted the focus from Ivan Babichev to Kavalerov as a hero in the novel, it appears that he continued to believe the former to be more suitable for the role. Thus, in this stage, Olesha adorns Kavalerov with many features characteristic of Ivan in the previous stage. At the same time, Olesha now found Kavalerov’s personality suited to that of a narrator. Therefore, the author initially made the narrator, Kavalerov’s neighbor, a literary mirror of Kavalerov, as a hero. However, in the end, the author presents Kavalerov with characteristics separate from Ivan, abandons the use of the neighbor as a narrator, and makes Kavalerov both the hero and the narrator. This decision was adopted in the final version as well. The reason for change in the form of narrative and the narrator in the second part of Envy is revealed in the relationship between the hero and the narrator in the earlier drafts. In the second part of the published version, Ivan Babichev’s monologue is of great significance. In other words, Ivan Babichev becomes as important as the hero. As we saw above, Olesha knew that Kavalerov was not a suitable narrator for Ivan’s story. Perhaps this is why Olesha abandoned the use of Kavalerov as the narrator in the second part of the novel. In Envy, the problem of who is the narrator of the story is as important as the problem of who is the hero of the story.

2022-09-30 07:39:00
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1 0 0 0 OA ポーランド経済とEUファンド

著者: 松浦光吉
出版者: ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌: ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.2015, no.44, pp.87-98, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)
参考文献数: 23
被引用文献数: 2 4

Poland has shown strong economic growth for 20 years since 1995, and is also the only EU country that achieved positive GDP growth in 2009 during the global recession. Several studies have looked at the causes of this good economic performance, and attribute it to such as the effective utilization of EU Funds, stimulus by macroeconomic policy, devaluation of Polish currency, prudential control or regulation in the financial system and so forth. Poland is a country well favored with foreign aid both before and after its accession to the EU from international institutions including the EU. When the focus is given to EU Funds after joining the EU on May 1, 2004, it is easy to understand that such funds play an important role as key driver of economic growth in Poland. Poland enjoys a comparatively big allocation of EU Funds, indeed it was the top recipient of funds when the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) was in effect (2007–2013). The financial transfer of EU Funds is 3.7 times greater than the Polish contribution to the EU, and this amounts to 4% of Polish overall GDP (3% by Structural Fund and 1% by Common Agricultural Policy (so called CAP)) according to 2013 statistics. Furthermore the ratio of EU Funds to the governmental budget is 10-20%. The G20 members at the London Summit 2009 agreed to a financial stimulus of around 3% of GDP to mitigate the global recession. Thus the 4% of GDP from EU Funds should contribute greatly to Polish GDP growth. EU funds can be classified by 2 main categories, one is Structural Funds and the other is CAP payments mentioned above. Structural Funds are used to support the modernization of infrastructures by member states or between member states. Therefore it can be utilized as fiscal investment to promote GDP growth. Most CAP payments are allocated to farmers as direct-aid payments, which may result in an expansion of domestic demand (as household consumption). In fact, GDP ratio of the construction industry in Poland is 2% higher than in other EU member states, and the consumption propensity is also 5% higher. EU Funds are costless financial grants from the EU without any fiscal burden falling on the Polish government. Hence there is no serious concern about crowding-out in the financial market, nor about rising interest rates of government bonds. EU Funds are, therefore, a very effective tool for Polish authorities to control economic growth. As they fully understand its function and importance in their national economy, Poland had tried as much allocation of EU Funds as possible under the current MFF regime. In the recent economic forecast by the EU, Poland is expected to continue its good economic performance in the coming years mainly due to robust domestic demand. But there is fear that the Polish economy may fall into the Middle-income trap over the long-term, if they continue to depend on EU Funds for the progress of their economy.