著者

下斗米 伸夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.14-25, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The aim of this essay is to investigate the political evolution of Putinism following the March 2004 presidential election and its aftermath. By 2003 Putin has evolved as unique political figure eliminating the remnants of Boris Yeltsin, by arresting a politicized oligarch, Boris Khodorkovskii and ousting Premier Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. His second tenure, however, turned out to be backlashed. The Beslan tragedy, orange revolution in Ukraine and others gave negative image of the second term Putin Presidency. By 2005, however, things seem to be normalized partly because of high energy prices. Property of oil and energy related company was redistributed among ‘Siloviki’ generals and the state. In Russia property was not totally independent from the power. In this political landscape, future of Putinism is discussed by the middle of 2005, whether he is going to change the game of presidential election, or he will appoint his successor.

著者

安岡 治子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.26-36, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

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After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russians, in search of an identity to unify their still vast country, are reevaluating a movement of the 1920s, Eurasianism. Why is Eurasianism attracting Russian attention again today? The main reason may be that Eurasianism, in designing an idealistic State system, took into account the unique spiritual, cultural and psychological factors of Russian history. This paper aims to make clear the spiritual foundations of Eurasianist thought.Eurasianism views the Orthodox Church as a spiritual foundation able to unite the whole Eurasian world. However, could the Orthodox Church really provide a common spiritual foundation for the vast cultural range of the various Ural-Altaic ethnics? To this question Eurasianists answer: “The ideal of Orthodoxy is a symphonic, organic and sobor-like unity of various religions.” The expression sobor-like unity derives from the Russian theological term sobornost, which signifies the central concept of the Orthodox Church, whereby the individual shares corporate life and unity, while retaining personal freedom.With this concept of sobornost they insist that the aim of Orthodoxy is not to erase the individuality of each pagan religion and Russianize it, but to create a symphonic world made up of various sounds. In support for this position, they say that there exists some similarity between the spirituality of Orthodoxy and some Eurasian pagan religions, including Buddhism.This similarity could be summed up in terms of the contiguity of the pantheism of religions such as Buddhism and the panentheistic tendency of Orthodoxy. Panentheism is the belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the entire universe. The Orthodox Church, which does not draw a sharp boundary between Nature and Grace, (a characteristic marvelously described in the words of Elder Zosima in the The Brothers Karamazov, ) is indeed panentheistic.When Eurasianists explain the peculiarity of their own culture and of the State system plan based on it, they use the key-concept symphonic personality (lichnost) . Lichnost is often translated as personality or individual, but this notion, which is obviously influenced by Orthodox ideas, is quite different from the usual Western meaning of individual. In Orthodoxy lichnost (the real personal Self) can be achieved only when it is opened to the whole, so it does not oppose the whole, rather it is enriched by it.The society of symphonic personalities is an idealistic organic united whole of plurality. However, Eurasianists also insist that it is a society where various levels of symphonic personalities are hierarchically united. This suggests that the smallest unit of lichnost, which is individual, might have the least autonomic value of itself. Berdyaev severely criticized the idea of symphonic personality, considering it a metaphysical foundation for human slavery.When we read the Eurasian project of a new State governing system named“iheocracy, ”we have to agree with Berdyaev's criticism of the“utopian etatism.”This is because“iheocracy”reminds us of theocracy on the one hand, and of the Soviet totalitarian system on the other.The idea of the symphonic personality comes from the idealism of sobornost and the tradition of philosophy of Unitotality. Eurasianists, in order to overcome the defects of both individualism and totalitarianism, eagerly searched for the symphonic unitotal community, but we have to say that the too hasty attempt to realize it“here and now”on earth, without due consideration of the moral cultivation of each individual, generates a serious danger of Utopianism.

著者

上垣 彰

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.4-15, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

23

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The economic recovery of Russia after the financial crisis in August 1998 has been driven by a large amount of “net export”. The “net export” was produced by low exchange rate of ruble and high price of oil. Using rough estimates of the future trend of the exchange rate and oil price, we can conclude that the Russian economic boom will not suffer a serious setback in the near future. In the longer term, however, Russia will face political and economic difficulties if Russians cannot restructure the oil-gas monoculture, which has been existed at the core of the economic recovery until now.

著者

仙石 学

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.16-25, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

34

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse factors influencing the policy making in Central Eastern European countries and is to claim that the legacies of the socialist regime have been influencing the current policy of these countries by taking examples of the environmental policy of the Czech Republic and Poland. Main discussions can be summarized as follows:1) There exists a difference between Polish environmental policy and Czech's environmental policy. While Poland has formulated systematic environmental protection system with advanced mechanisms since the socialist era, Czech's environmental policies, mainly relying on classical command and control tools, have been introduced after the collapse of the socialist regime.2) This difference cannot be explained by focusing on the political institutions because there exists little difference in political institutions between the two countries. It also cannot be explained by focusing on the party system of these countries, as the environmental issue has not worked as a cleavage for party competition in these countries during the transition period.3) The need to adapt the national law to the acquis communautaire (or the effect of what is called “Europeanization”) has some influence on the environmental policy of the two countries. However, this does not mean that the environmental policies of these countries have “converged.”4) It is likely that the institutional and policy legacies of the socialist regimes have influenced the current environmental policies, as the difference of the two countries had already existed during the socialist period. However this point needs further theoretical refinement.

著者

永綱 憲悟

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.26-35, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper argues that Russian democracy has become a charade, like Potemkin villages, caused by Putin's personality and his method of leadership.We can discern four types of viewpoints about the Russian political system under Putin. The first is the “affirmation/optimism” type, as represented by Anatol Lieven's view. He asserts that Putin is a “convinced reformer, dedicated to modernizing Russia” Scleifer and Treisman make a similar argument, advocating that Russia has become a typical middle-income capitalist democracy and noting that the common flaws of such a democracy are not incompatible with future economic and political progress. Russian analyst Vyacheslav Kostikov takes the same view and points out that Putin promotes “a pragmatic democracy”, which differs from the western style of democracy.The second is the “affirmation/pessimism” type, as represented by Russian political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov. He has a pessimistic outlook for the future, while, to some extent, supporting the current Putin system. The third is the “negation/pessimism” type. American scholar Richard Pipes has a very negative opinion about the present, as well as the future, of the Russian political situation. He asserts that “Russia's democratic institutions have been muzzled” and “its cooperation with the international community far from assured.” Russian sociologist Olga Kyshtanovskaya, known for her elite studies, takes a similar pessimistic position.The fourth type, to which this paper adheres, is “negation/optimism”. Most Rus-sian liberal intellectuals maintain this point of view. Vladimir Ryzhkov, a member of the Lower House, believes that the Putin government is going to take “a modernization model of authoritarianism”: However, he adds that this model cannot overcome such problems as poverty and corruption in Russia. Therefore, in his view, opinions demanding big changes will increase around the time of the government elections, from 2007 to 2008. Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova takes a similar position and expects a growth of grass-roots democracy in Russia.We can verify concretely the deficiencies in Russian democracy by looking at the process of the national election campaign in 2003 and 2004. The OSCE election monitor group concluded that the election process for Parliament, as well as the President, did not reach the international standards of a democracy.Russian political journalist Elena Treguvova confirms that Putin's political outlook and behavior are not suited to politicians in a democratic country. She asserts, first, that Putin has no charisma as a public politician. Second, Putin is an expert who “mimics” the manner of the person to whom he is talking. Third, Putin often takes a strong attitude when someone points out problems in his work. Fourth, Putin used to be extremely faithful to an order from a superior official. Fifth, Putin is bluntly strengthening control over the media.Under such a president, we cannot expect Russian democracy to make progress. Putin's limits are not, however, the Russian nation's limits. It is, therefore, groundless to assume that Russia will never become a democratic country in the future.

著者

小澤 治子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.36-46, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States has been increasingly inclined towards unilateral actions in international relations, while Russia, which has declined to the status of a middle class power, has become far more discreet in its foreign policy strategies. This was seen especially during the Boris Yeltsin period, when a mixture of cooperation and conflict in US-Russian relations could be seen. After Vladimir Putin took office in May 2000, Russia has begun to attempt the reorganization of its present international relations strategy into a multipolar system while also assuming the role of a world-class power. In the beginning days of President Putin's administration, conflict, rather than cooperation, defined the relations between the two countries. However, after the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, Russia has started to attach greater importance towards cooperation in the international war against terrorism. Russia opted to cooperate with Washington D.C: s plans for Central Asian Countries and the Republic of Georgia, which ultimately resulted in a US military presence in these countries.In March 2003, with the beginning of US attacks against Iraqi without a resolution from the UN Security Council, Russia with France and Germany criticized the US decision as a unilateral military action made with total disregard to international law. However, did the development of the Iraqi war actually damage US-Russian relations? Close analysis of events and policy decisions suggest that, despite severe criticism of the United States' actions, Russia has not changed its basic stance with dealing with America. Cooperation with the US continues to have a vital importance for Russia's national interests as well as its concerns about international terrorism.Will cooperative relations between the US and Russia last in the foreseeable future? Two major challenges exist for both countries. First, the US military presence will continue in post-Soviet regions, especially in Central Asian Countries and the Republic of Georgia regardless of any developments or breakthrough in international terrorism. The political forces in Russia have already assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the US because of this situation. Putin has been repeatedly criticized for allowing an agreement that is of greater advantage to the United States than Russia. Second, with the expansion of NATO in 1999, and again in 2004, with seven Eastern European countries and the three Baltic states joining NATO without considering Russian opinion, revives historic Russian fears about the security of its Western border. If NATO expands into CIS countries, the relationship between Russia and these former satellite states will be thrown in a period of significant crisis. In the event of this taking place, Russia would be forced shift not only its present attitude toward the US but also its entire foreign policy strategy. The result would be a return to growing conflict between the United States and Russia.

著者

林 忠行

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.47-58, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This article aims to analyze the responses of the Visegrad Four countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to the Iraq War which started on March 20, 2003. Central and East European countries, including these four countries, were considered to be“pro-American, ”particularly as demonstrated by their leaders' signatures to“the Letter of Eight”or“the Declaration of the Vilnius Ten, ”issued at the end of January, and at the beginning of February 2003, respectively.U.S. unilateralism was particularly notable during the period between November 2002, when the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1441, and May 2003, when the US declared an end to major combat in Iraq, and the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483. Specifically during this period responses of the Visegrad Four countries to the crisis in Iraq differed significantly from one another. Poland, for example, sent its special forces unit (GROM) to Iraq at the beginning of the War. The Czech and Slovak Republics deployed their NBC weapon response units in Kuwait, however they did not engage militarily in Iraq. Hungary allowed the U.S. to use an airbase located in its territory as a training ground where Iraqi opposition members were trained by U.S. forces as police officers and interpreters, but it did not send any military units to the Middle East during this period.The military measures taken by the four countries varied in accordance with the different agendas of their respective key parties in parliament. Generally speaking, the main pro-American factions were the Trans-Atlanticists within the center-right parties, who oriented themselves toward mainstream European Christian democrats or liberal democrats. Realism among center-left social democratic parties, especially the parties in power, was another factor which encouraged conciliatory attitudes toward U.S. policy and the crisis in Iraq. At same time, however, a considerable group of social democrats opposed U.S. unilateral military actions in Iraq because of their high regard for maintaining multilateralism in respect to agreements established by international institutions, such as the UN, NATO or the EU. Therefore, center-left parties faced a dilemma in evaluating whether or not to support military action in the Middle East.Extreme leftists, nationalists and Catholic traditionalists were almost universally opposed to dispatching troops to the Middle East. However, most of these were only“protest parties”which did not have the actual ability to influence decision-making in parliament. One of the key factors which inhibited Central and East European participation in the U.S. military's intervention in Iraq was in fact heavy criticism leveled by populist opposition parties. These parties were sensitive to public criticism of U.S. unilateral military activity in Iraq and thus blocked local involvement therein.Thus, the differing responses of each country to the Iraq War can be viewed as a reflection of local political dynamics between the Pro- and Anti-American forces within each country's internal politics.

著者

岩本 和久

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.59-68, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Zoshchenko, like many other Russian writers during the 1920s, was interested in psychoanalysis. Zoshchenko criticized Freud in his novel, Before Sunrise, when the Soviet government blamed psychoanalysis in Stalinist Russia. Some scholars suspected that his criticism was merely an excuse for pursuing his interest in psychoanalysis and that the novel was condemned specifically because of references to Freud. After the era of “perestroika”, many biographical materials have been documented and published. As a result, now we can discuss Zoshchenko's interest in psychoanalysis more accurately.In Before Sunrise Zoshchenko analyses his dreams in an attempt to recognize his earliest experiences, which he has forgotten. He intends to find stimuli, which cause his melancholy, in his past. This idea is based on the physiological psychology theories of Pavlov, but Zoshchenko's search of trauma in his life and his symbolic interpretation of dreams are more reminiscent of Freudian theory.Zoshchenko's interest in psychoanalysis and physiology is consistent with the literature at that time. His interest shows his belief in reason; which was emphasized in the Stalin era. Such an emphasis on science can be seen in newer literary genres: Science Fiction and Socialist Realism. Psychoanalysis, however, influences the style of Before Sunrise as well as its philosophy: symbolism of psychoanalysis penetrates not only the interpretation of dreams, but also the description of real life.Various biographical materials show that Before Sunrise was condemned not because of references to Freud, but because of its support of individualism and deviations from the canon of the Socialist Realism, both of which were consistent with psychoanalysis.

著者

久保 慶一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.69-79, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

9

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In Montenegro, there has been a deep divide between those who seek the independence of Montenegro and those who oppose it and seek the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation or the union with Serbia. It is well known that there is a correlation between the ethnic identity and the attitude towards this issue, particularly among ethnic minorities such as Albanians, Muslims (Bosnjaks) and Serbs. While one tends to assume that the ethnic identity is an independent variable that affects the behaviour towards the issue of statehood, I would argue that this assumption does not hold for Serbs. To do so, I firstly examine the correlation between the ethnic identity and the behaviour towards the issue of statehood. Secondly, by examining the census data of 1991 and 2003 in Montenegro, I point out that there seems to have been a significant scale of re-definition of the ethnic identity. In particular, a significant number of those who now regard themselves as “Serb” did not indeed do so only 12 years ago. This suggests that the assumption discussed above is wrong and the causal relations run in the opposite direction: they re-defined themselves as “Serb” because they support the maintenance of the union with Serbia. Thirdly, I briefly examine some factors that might possibly have affected the decisions made by those who regarded themselves as “Montenegrins” in 1991 to support or oppose the independence of Montenegro.

著者

土田 久美子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.80-90, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

27

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the Russian translation of Murasaki Shikibu's The Tale of Genji, focusing on mono no aware. Mono no aware has been regarded as the key concept of this literary classic, ever since it was first proposed by Motoori Norinaga.N.I. Konrad's Russian translation of the third chapter (Utsusemi) was done in 1924, prior to the English translation by Arthur Waley. However, thereafter Konrad translated only the first, second, and fourth chapters. The complete Russian translation was carried out by T.L. Sokolova-Deliusina, and was published in 1991-1993. It is this complete translation that forms the principal basis for our study.According to Norinaga, aware is originally an exclamation, and as a noun and an adjective verb, it expresses deep, heartfelt emotion, including not only sorrow but also joy and amusement. Moreover, mono no aware is the emotion of aware that is aroused when one intuits “the heart of mono - things”: Ohnishi Yoshinori defined aware as the aesthetic category that was formed under the influence of thoughts about the evanescence of life. Ivan Morris noted, “Aware is one of the many untranslatable words that are used to define Japanese aesthetics”: Mono no aware is known in English as “the pathos of things” (translated by Ivan Morris), or as “pity of things” (translated by Royall Tyler) .With regard to Russian translations of the story, Konrad, in his paper titled Murasaki Shikibu's novel, translated mono no aware as “chary veshchei” (lure of things) . He further explained that it was the Japanese aesthetic principle of the need to comprehend the “ocharovanie” (charm) that is inherent in various things. In the preface of the complete Russian translation of Genji, Sokolova-Deliusina translated the concept as “pechal'noe ocharovanie veshchei” (sorrowful charm of things), and wrote that it connected the attractive beauty of the material world with thoughts about its transience and fragility.It is commonly understood by both the Russian and English translators that mono no aware comprises elements of sadness, sorrow, and thoughts on evanescence. However, it could be said that Russian translators regard this concept as involving the element of “charm”.This was supplemented by Sokolova-Deliusina in her explanation that by sensing aware, the essence of things can be comprehended. Therefore, mono no aware is aspiration of the soul to attain the eternal sources of things, and its desire to capture their elusive meaning.For certain sections of the story, Sokolova-Deliusina translated aware or mono no aware as “sorrowful charm”, and “to comprehend the heart of things, their secret meanings”, all based on her above explanation of this concept. It is also worth taking into account that for the very same sections, none of the English translators of The Tale of Genji interpreted aware or mono no aware in the same manner as that of Sokolova-Deliusina.A book review of Sokolova-Deliusina's Russian translation of The Tale of Genji describes it as “unique in aesthetic value”. As we have examined, due to her profound understanding of mono no aware, such an evaluation is well deserved.

著者

中林 啓修

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.91-105, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper aims to examine the standpoints of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in the field of Justice and Home Affaires; especially the field of police cooperation in the context of European Enlargement today.This paper, mainly, focuses on the European Union's assistance policies of Justice and Home Affaires for Candidate countries.These EU assistance policies are divided into two broad categories. One category is policy as the part of pre-accession assistance called PHARE. And the other category is called specific assistance policies including GROTIUS, STOP, OCTOPUS, OISIN, ODYSSEUS, and FALCONE.The purpose of the former policy is to make candidate countries join the EU successfully with the twinning approach (training programs for assistance) . On the other hand, the purpose of the latter policies are implementing the ability of law enforcement of assisted countries in each specific field such as combating human trafficking, Criminal Justice and so on.Before 5th EU enlargement, CEECs as candidate countries, received assistance policies of both categories from the EU and EU member countries.However, on the way to achieving full membership in the EU, CEECs standpoints were changing gradually from their candidate positions.After finishing 5th EU enlargement successfully, EUROPOL (European Police office: Main institution for police cooperation at the European level) has launched “EUROPOL Enlargement Project” for coordinating the accession process of CEECs on behalf of EUROPOL successfully.In this context, the standpoint of CEECs is a likely candidate country assisted by EU and former member states of EU. But at the same time, CEECs start to assist new candidate countries of the EU (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey) with their political and administrative experience and successful accession process to the EU through By-and Multi- lateral cooperation with these candidate countries.For instance, in 2002, the Hungarian Government offered to assist the Croatian government reform the government institutions of Croatia for joining the EU. It is specifically mentioned that this offer is earlier than the European Commission's proposal for applying the experience of new member states.These two aspects show that CEECs have been partially assisted countries, at least in the field of EUROPOL cooperation, but at the same time, have tried to make the best use of their experience of accession as the assistance tool for new candidate countries.In other words from the context of European integration (Deepening and Enlargement of the EU), CEECs have kept a nearly assisted position in the deepening phase while trying to achieve an assisting position in the phase of enlargement.The result of the examination is that CEECs are now on their way to changing their standpoint from assisted countries to mediation countries between the EU and new candidate countries in the field of police cooperation.

著者

六鹿 茂夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.48-62, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Income inequality has greatly increased in the Republic of Moldova since its independence in 1991. This is partly because only a small number of its people became rich through the illegal and unfair redistribution of the national wealth in the process of regime transformation, and partly because the majority of the people were reduced to poverty by the bankruptcy of the national economy. As a result, serious poverty has spread widely in small towns and rural areas, especially among unskilled workers, farmers, agricultural employees, pensioners, those with no primary education and the illiterate, households with many children, children and old people. Poverty has caused a sharp decline in fertility and the migration abroad of 600 thousand to one million workers. While their remittances to their families have prevented a worsening of the economic and social situation in Moldova, this labour emigration has given rise to a brain drain and to human trafficking. This in turn contributed to the great victory of the Communist party in the 2001 elections. Whether these issues of social and economic inequality and mass labour migration will be eased by the EU's ‘European Neighbourhood Policy, ’ which is based on a carrot and stick approach, remains to be seen.

著者

石田 信一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.63-75, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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In this article, the author investigates the Croatian problem in Istria during the interwar period, focusing on the minority policy by the Italian government and the situation of the Croatian minority there.The Slavic inhabitants in Istria, the Croats in particular, were not given a right as minority at all during the interwar period. They were exposed to the Italianization by the forced transformation of the Slavic place names and family names and by the prohibition of the Slavic language in school education and publication activity under the fascist rule.While the Slavic cultural and political societies were forced to dissolve, the secret societies as the TIGR were organized. They developed resistance movement against the fascists, and they also contributed much to the preservation of the Slavic national identity through their activities.About 100, 000 of the Slavic inhabitants in Istria emigrated during the interwar period because of the long-term economic difficulty and social discrimination including purge from public service or the land requisition. Most of them immigrated to Yugoslavia and advocated the annexation of Istria with Yugoslavia, but were not able to obtain satisfactory results.The Croatian problem in Istria could be settled only within a broader framework of international relationship, as this problem had its origin in World War I. However, the significance of persistent resistance by the Istrian people should not be underestimated, especially for the improvement of their status during and after World War II.

著者

乾 一宇

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.76-90, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Similar to many other countries after the Cold War, Russia has adopted a concept of “National Security” that has a broader meaning than the concept of “national defense”, and combines diplomacy and economy with national defense in order to ensure the national security.Organizations for decision making on national security policy in Russia have been legally and systematically established, as shown by the following.In March 1992 the Security Law was enacted, and in June 1992 the Security Council was established; at the same time provisions were passed for the creation of the Security Council.The Security Council is a consultative body that helps the President in decision making in the realm of the national security.Important matters that are discussed and decided in the Security Council are made public as presidential edicts.The Security Council consists of two kinds of members: permanent members who have authority to make decisions and members who only participate in the deliberatinos. The chairman, a post held by the President, heads up the council. The Secretary of the Security Council is one of the permanent members; he makes preparations for council meetings and puts matters on the agenda. The remaining permanent members are the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of Federal Security Bureau.Under the Putin Administration, many agenda items have been discussed, such as new concepts of national security, military doctrine, foreign policies, informational national security doctrine, and so on, and been successively promulgated as presidential edicts.The Security Council has one Secretariat and eight Directorates under the Council Secretariat, which reports to the Secretary of the Security Council. The Council Secretariat and its Directorate are well-formed organizations and have many members with considerable policy planning capabilities.In order to cope with the broad concepts and missions of “national security”, there are now 11 interadministration committees among government agencies that discuss and coordinate agendas in various fields.The existence of interadministration committee on military security is relaxing the military's monopoly in this regard. However, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff Office remain as powerful as they were in the Soviet period. For example, the military takes the initiative in drafting military doctrine.

著者

後藤 富士男

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.91-104, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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It is well known that North Korea has been suffering from acute economic crises since the 1990's. Although the country's food shortage was revealed in 1995, North Korea had already been confronted with economic difficulties by then. The difficulties appear to have been chiefly caused by three changes in external trade patterns of North Korea. Firstly, at the beginning of the 1990's, North Korea's imports from Russia largely decreased in comparison with that from the Soviet Union in the 1980's, which had been the most important source of obtaining materials for North Korea. Imports from Russia continued to decrease in the 1990's. Secondly, from 1994 to 1996, the physical volume of cereals annually imported by North Korea from foreign countries was remarkably small, compared with that imported until 1993. Thirdly, in the latter half of the 1990's, North Korea's imports of energy from China, which has been the largest obtainable energy source for North Korea from abroad since the beginning of the 1990's, fell significantly. These changes in turn appear to have seriously damaged the North Korean economy.North Korea has been expected to carry out economic reforms in order to improve its economic condition. Since July 2002, this country has introduced new economic polices. Although they have market-oriented features, we are not able to regard them as economic reforms. They are only improvement measures taken in the planned economic system. North Korean leaders, including Kim Jong Il, appear not to be able to execute fundamental economic reforms, even if they understand that the reforms are indispensable for improving their economy. This is most likely because having witnessed the experiences of China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1980's, they fear that the execution of economic reforms might enhance the risk of causing a democratic movement in politics and the destruction of the present regime.Hereafter, it appears North Korea will take one of the following three tacks. First, it might preserve the present“planned-economy divided from the South”, with the accompanying question of how long it can be sustained. The second possibility is that the North Korean economy might gradually transfer to the “market economy divided from the South” as the result of executing economic reforms, though that might be the “market economy unified with the South” in the long run. Finally, it might be possible that this “unified market economy” is suddenly realized as the result of a military attack by the United States or an inside coup d'état.

著者

徳永 昌弘

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.105-118, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper examines Russian enterprise reforms in the context of urban transition.The first part gives an overview of the industrial location structure unique to Russia in comparatively isolated regions, traditionally called “mono-profiling towns” (monoprofil'nye goroda) or “town-building enterprises” (gradoobrazuiushchie predpriiatiia), and depicts the case of Baikal'sk Cellulose and Paper Plant (BCPP) as a typical town-building enterprise. The author documents how the uniqueness of this type of enterprise causes the delay of the restructuring process for both private enterprises and public institutions. Nevertheless, It concludes by suggesting that the relation-ship between enterprise and its community, which were constructed in a symbiotic way, has changed. This is also the case for the “elite cites”, often called closed cities, including academic towns, and secret cities in Russian history. In the last decade, they had lost their stature and many privileges due to financial pressure resulting from changes in economic and social circumstances. It was inevitable for the state in the post-So-viet era to reduce and/or eliminate guaranteed social services.The second part focuses on the impact of urban infrastructure on enterprise reforms. Due to a lack of investments in Russia, existing fixed capital faces obsoles-cence. Municipalization of enterprise-owned urban infrastructure poses further threat to the situation. Therefore, many Russian enterprises keep some social assets (catering services, housing, medical services, sports and recreational facilities, kindergarten etc.) at hand. Although this may serve to mitigate impacts of economic reforms in some respects, “urban infrastructure hoarding”, the other side of“labor hoarding” characteristic of Russian enterprises, may lead to more serious social problems such as dilapidated housing (which had existed since the mid 90s in Russia and ruined blocks in the U.S. metropolis after the oil-shock) . No investment in urban infrastructure, its “mercy killing”, can be realized as part of enterprise restructuring. In light of all these, it is no doubt enterprises need to do the final decision-making.

著者

松本 かおり

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.131-144, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper aims to compare students in Vladivostok and Moscow, Russia and examine the differences between desirability of occupation and occupational prestige by analyzing answers to questionnaires.At present, it is very difficult for Russian youths to find employment. After the demise of the Soviet Union, it became difficult for them to acquire even basic skills and gain experience through on-the-job training, the traditional way of acquiring know-how for Soviet workers. Even if they do find jobs, these are often unrelated to their majors and/or specialties in the higher education institutions. It should also be noted that premature death rate of youths has escalated in recent years. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that the social life condition of Russian youths is significantly better than others. It is in this context that this research on occupational evaluations is conducted.The result of our comparative research demonstrates some differences in occupational evaluations between Vladivostok and Moscow. In terms of desirability of occupation, Vladivostok youths consider job attractiveness, income, school education, knowledge and skills, while Moscow youths are interested in job attractiveness, creativity, and pride. Meanwhile, occupational prestige is characterized in terms of higher income, stable social life, school education, knowledge, skills and social network in Vladivostok, and higher income, stable social life, and influence on society in Moscow. It concludes by suggesting that Vladivostok is a kind of “education-conscious society” where students value diligence, while Moscow is a kind of “authority-oriented society”, where knack and intelligence are more important than Vladivostok.The research also reveals that students in both cities values job attractiveness most, not easy jobs and long leisure time. As mentioned above, however, there is little chance in reality to find jobs that satisfy them. It is obvious that there is a structural gap in the Russian labor market resulting from inefficient vocational education in the higher education institutions and the so-called “educational inflation”, a situation where even higher degrees will not guarantee these jobs. Taking all things into consideration, we have to analyze the Russian labor market further with respect to various changes taking place in this country.

著者

森岡 真史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.162-174, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Boris Brutzkus is well-known for his pioneering and penetrating criticism against the Socialist economy. However, relatively less known is the fact that he defended the social role of government to protect the interest of the people. The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct and appreciate his vision of economic development underlying such a unique standpoint.For this purpose Brutzkus's following two important contributions will be investigated: i) his report “Economic Precondition for the Reconstruction of Agriculture” made at the All Russian Congress of Agronomists held in March 1922; ii) his paper “Agrarian Overpopulation and Agrarian Institution” published in the organ of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture in June/July 1922. Both of them include profound insight into the causes of catastrophic destruction of Russian agriculture after the October Revolution as well as several important policy proposals for its restoration.Brutzkus attributes the root cause of agrarian catastrophe to the “black redistribution” and emphasizes that it is not only the Soviet government but also all of the intellectuals and the people who must free themselves from the illusionary idea that the agrarian problem can be solved by nationwide land redistribution. Fully recognizing the limits of NEP as partial liberalization under the Communist dictatorship, he supports the basic direction of NEP for the reason that it serves the interest of Russian national economy.In his schema of national economy, the dynamic agro-industrial linkage, especially the smooth flow of labor from agriculture to urban industry constitutes one of the essential factors in the process of economic development. Coupled with slowness of industrialization, Russian land community hindered this flow of population and became the hotbed of agrarian overpopulation. Agrarian policies and agrarian institutions must be favorable for such a flow and at the same time soften the pain attendant on it. From this follows the necessity of guaranteeing peasants the right to dispose of their land freely. Owing to some fundamental differences between agriculture and industry, this right brings not the victory of agrarian capitalism but promotes the growth of peasant economies and their adaptation to the market environment.For Brutzkus, the national economy is a huge social framework giving its members economic and cultural wealth that they cannot produce alone. Flowering of individual freedom needs development of the national economy. The reason he affirms capitalism and rejects Marxian Socialism is that he firmly believes that the development of national economy in the industrialization era is possible only under capitalism and that individual freedom is inseparable from the private ownership of the means of production. However, as is shown in his argument of the relative advantage of peasant economy in agriculture, dominance of capitalism is neither exclusive nor unconditional even in the market. His vision of the desirable national economy can be characterized by it compositeness and variety created by the mixture both of capitalist institutions playing the leading part and of various kinds of non-capitalist institutions playing secondary but often essential roles.The above-described Brutzkus's vision is highly suggestive in its rare combination of economic logic and due attention to historical factors. Understanding of this vision will be of considerable help in an in-depth appraisal of his critical analysis on the Soviet economy.

著者

加藤 久子

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.175-177, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

著者

辻本 政雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.146-163, 2002 (Released:2010-10-27)

参考文献数

52

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The thesis based on the so-called Harvard SCP Theory deals with the mechanism and the implication of the development of the regulatory reform in the natural gas industry in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland by showing how the market structure of the industry has been reformed and how the performances in terms of social welfare have been improved. Moreover, the thesis shows the reform marks an epoch-making achievement in that it has given the industry new responsibility to support international society and that the regulatory policy has been elaborated from the stage of deregulation and pro-privatization to the more comprehensive stage of pro-competitive policy by adopting the vertical separation of the industry as well as by ensuring reliable supply and fare competition in the transitional economies.