著者
木原 淳
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, pp.156-164,194, 2006-10-30 (Released:2010-02-15)
参考文献数
15

Following Rousseau's theory of people's sovereignty and his concept of law, Immanuel Kant described his ideal state as “Gemeinwesen”. He consciously and intentionally denied world republic in his book “Zum ewigen Frieden”. According to Rousseau, the virtue can become fruitful only within the context of “l'amour de la patrie” (patriotism). Rousseau's patriotism and republic theory is to be expected in a small city state, not in a large state. As such, anti-world republic dogma by Kant reflects the significance of patriotism in small state posited by Rousseau. Unlike Rousseau, however, Kant interpreted “patriotism” as directed at “Land”, and “Volk” as being a group with single ethnic identity, not as an universal “Volk”. Such distinctive characteristic of Kant's state theory has generally been assumed to have derived from his pre-modern character and historic circumstances. In this paper, I suppose that the source of difference in the concepts held by the two distinct philosophers can be found in the difference of the size of states they presupposed. Rousseau considered his “republic” as a small sized city state, so the object of his patriotism could be pure and abstract fatherland, ignoring the traditional framework of property system (societas civilis). To the contrary, Kant struggled to form his state theory as a middle-sized territorial state, which aimed to destroy traditional and privileged property system and to separate territorial sovereignty from economical private land property rights. Therefore Kant's concepts of “Land” and “Volk” played an important role to build a theory of modern and republican territorial states. This indicates that it was logically natural for Kant to deny the concepts of the world republic.
著者
森村 進
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1997, pp.281-298, 1998-10-30 (Released:2009-02-12)
参考文献数
8
著者
愛敬 浩二
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, pp.76-87,203, 2005-09-30 (Released:2008-11-17)
参考文献数
33

Libertarianism is not so popular among the constitutional lawyers in Japan. There are some reasons for that situation, but one of the most important reasons is that Japanese Constitution is, both in content and in its historical background, not suitable for the ideology of libertarianism. So under the constitution like that, libertarianism could hardly prevail, and there is no need for constitutional lawyers to take it seriously. But this story is too simple. If libertarianism is not the vindication of “laissez-faire” capitalism, but the diehard claim for liberty of private life of individuals, then constitutional lawyers should not make light of the critical stance of libertarians to the paternalistic regulation of the government. Especially in Japan, constitutional theory of “double standard dependent on the aim of regulation” allows the government very wide range of paternalistic regulation on economic freedom. Japanese constitutional lawyers could learn much from the libertarian criticism of that theory. But the problem of libertarian criticism is that they don't pay due attention to democracy. So taking libertarianism more seriously, we, Japanese constitutional lawyers, should come to think much about democracy, and I think it's good for us.
著者
中村 隆文
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, pp.229-242,258, 2007

Locke's theory as a contractarian has a great influence on the debates about social justice between &ldquo;liberalism&rdquo; and &ldquo;libertarianism&rdquo; yet. Even have many differences of opinions in those, they almost depend on the &ldquo;natural law&rdquo; and &ldquo;natural right&rdquo; elaborated by Locke when he tried to defend the &ldquo;liberty&rdquo; against an authority of the king. This reason is that they believe Locke's natural jurisprudence and ideas of &ldquo;liberty&rdquo; and &ldquo;right&rdquo; are set in the Declaration of Independence. It's nothing to be surprised at this, so now I intend not to doubt this fact, and that, not to convict their debates as pointless.<br> I suggest that &ldquo;liberty&rdquo;, &ldquo;right&rdquo; and &ldquo;justice&rdquo; can be also defended philosophically by a school of thought in the eighteenth century other than Locke's, no matter how we estimate his influence on the then America. Directly and frankly professing, I regard the Scottish Enlightenment as functioning that role in the century, and its significance has still lived under the debate about the idea of social justice.<br> I place a special emphasis on the point that Scottish thinkers, especially David Hume and Adam Smith, had defended the America outside the theory of contractarianism involved with liberalism and Libertarianism. It shows that &ldquo;justice&rdquo; intrinsically exists in a relationship, in other words &ldquo;convention&rdquo; and it can not be discovered in the contractual lawmaking way but in the judiciary way reflecting sense of justice, or moral sense, because law of justice will be expanding over the domain of human rationality of economical worldview.
著者
道垣内 弘人
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, pp.128-133,263, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

What are the characteristics of legal thinking is a fundamental but difficult problem to answer in legal sciences, including philosophy of law, even if we focus on the way of the interpretation of statutory laws. However, at least, we might say that to keep the consistency of law is one of the most important requirements in the interpretation. What to evade is not only the apparent contradiction in the interpretation but the hidden conflict of different principles, for example, liberalism, libertarianism, paternalism and so on, when we cannot justify the coexistence of principles by the difference of situations. In this context, philosophy of law works as a supplier of tools for analyzing the hidden principles behind legislation, cases and statutory interpretation by academics. The education of philosophy of law as a tools-supplier might have three stages. 1) To teach the principles themselves (e. g. justice theories). 2) To teach the way of analysis. 3) To discuss the relative merits of principles. However, too much emphasis of the importance of philosophy of law sometimes drive the students to settle the cases on the principle which they believe in, without paying attention to the possibility of making other contradiction in the whole system of law. Legal thinking is a restrictive one in the sense that they should respect the firmly established rules.
著者
内藤 淳
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, pp.135-143,195, 2006-10-30 (Released:2010-02-15)
参考文献数
5

Normative judgments and their criteria are generally excluded as subjects of science on account of the dualism of facts and values. Meta-ethical naturalism, which attempts to present criteria for values in terms of facts, is therefore regarded as a fallacy. However, as normative judgments are produced through the workings of the mind of each individual, we may find some clues for examining the foundations or criteria of our normative judgments by analyzing the process of the working of our minds by scientific methods and thereby discovering its basic rules. This means that ethical problems can be approached and solved in the field of human science. Indeed, we can find some useful scientific knowledge related to meta-ethical problems. For example, it has been demonstrated in some studies of cognitive psychology that judgments on moral values are decided by intuition, which is an emotional reaction, rather than by rational thinking. And according to recent research in evolutionary psychology, emotions function in order to gain benefits for each person in their reciprocal relationships with others. These scientific studies suggest that the ultimate foundation of normative judgments is in human intuition as an emotional reaction and the ultimate criterion of “good/bad” or “right/wrong” is whether it is beneficial to the individual in his/her reciprocal relationships with others. While there remains much scope for further verification, these studies suggest that it is possible to examine meta-ethical problems by scientific methods and support meta-ethical naturalism, which presents the foundations and criteria for normative values through factual statements.