著者

桜井 万里子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.1-11, 2010

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How prevalent were the Orphic mysteries in classical Athens? Important evidence for this question was discovered during the second half of the 20th century. In 1978 were published a set of bone tablets with graffiti-like letters of the fifth century BC. from Olbia. The Derveni Papyrus (DP) was found in 1962 from one of the tombs dated around the end of the fourth century near Derveni about twelve kilometers north of Thessaloniki, the editio princeps of which was published in 2006, almost fifty years after its discovery, as T. Kouremenos, G. M. Parassoglou and K. Tsantsanoglou, The Derveni Papyrus, Firenze, 2006. The editors date the papyrus between 340 and 320 BC, whereas the text itself on the papyrus is more difficult to date, but the content of the text is mostly supposed to suggest it is a Preplatonic commentary on the Orpheus theogony. A gold tablet from Hipponion in south Italy published in 1974 turned out to be from 400 BC., the oldest among the same kinds of tablets, and the words mystai and bakchoi in the text have convinced scholars of the Orphic religious significance of this and other gold tablets of the same type. Looking at the sites of the evidence on the map, we cannot suppress the impression that they are in marginal areas in the Greek world, or not in major poleis like Athens or Sparta. Were the Orphic Mysteries not popular in Athens? One paragraph on the deisidaimon in Theophrastos' Kharakteres, 16 persuaded me to assume private practice of the Mysteries by the orpheotelestai in Athens, but Plato's comment in the Republic 364d-e puzzled me as he wrote that agyrtai and manteis(orpheotelestai-like people) persuaded not only private individuals but some poleis. What did Plato mean by the word poleis ? Were there any poleis where the Orphic Mysteries were public ? Athens certainly could not be counted among such poleis. Col. XX of the Derveni Papyrus may help us attain a good understanding of how the Orphic Mysteries were performed in classical Athens. In this column two groups of initiates are contrasted: those who were initiated, participating in the public Mysteries, and those who were initiated in the Mysteries under the guidance of a private professional priest. The editors of the editio princeps of DP believe that both groups were meant to be initiates in the Orphic Mysteries, but I cannot agree with the editors' comment. I would like to propose my own opinion that the former are not initiates in the Orphic Mysteries but initiates in public mysteries like the Eleusinian Mysteries, while the latter are Orphic initiates. Col. XX may shed some light on the way in which the Orphic Mysteries were performed in Athens.

著者

高橋 宏幸

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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no.44, pp.96-108, 1996

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This paper reexamines an inconsistency considering the fatal spear in the Cephalus-Procris episode in Met. 7 : one of the companions of Cephalus says that the spear flies back spontaneously after hitting the target, whereas it remains stuck in Procris at the ending of the story told by Cephalus. It will be suggested that the inconsistency hints at a transformation of the story as narrated by Cephalus. I have observed three recurrent story patterns in the episode : someone (thing)comes back after being lost(or gone) (P1) ; a rumor is believed before eventually turning out to be false(P2) ; happiness follows a disaster (P3). P1 fails only at the ending, where Procris dies, never to return. This failure of P1 corresponds to the inconsistency about the spear, since its power to fly back after launched exactly matches P1, whereas it did not return when piercing Procris. Why not an ending that would imply a return of Procris, in accord with P1? We note that there is no metamorphosis of a main character in the episode, that the spear is almost identical to Procris with regard to fate (7531, 846) , beauty(679, 730) , and name(Procris<procuris ; cf. Fasti 2.477), and that mirabere(682)is one of the words suggestive of metamorphosis(cf. mirandum 758). Seeing these points, it would not be quite hard to imagine that, the moment Procris dies, her soul enters the spear to give it the miracle power, so that, every time Cephalus launches the spear, it would come back into his hands, as she did in her life. This would have happened, if only Procris had not emitted her soul in the mouth of Cephalus(861) , but into the spear. With this ending by metamorphosis, the inconsistency about the spear would not have occurred, since it obtained its power after she died, but, instead, an eternal, spiritual union of the couple would have been achieved, quite a suitable finish for the story of mutual love (800). Considering P2 and P3, we should note that Cephalus echoes the phrases in the Orithyia story in Bk. 6(esp., 681f.). When Cephalus comments that he was said(dicebar 698)to be happy, he seems to presume that such a rumor is prevalent(cf. also 694), coming from the story told in Bk. 6. He rejects it as untrue with his tragic story, which fits in P2, but, it would be different with the ending by metamorphosis, which implies a kind of bliss for Cephalus as Procris' spear never goes without returning as if to ease his bad conscience, granting pardon for his wrongdoing. This version would match P3, and support the rumor of Cephalus' happy marriage with Procris. Then, we may assume that Cephalus did not speak of the metamorphosis because he intended to deny the rumor about his marriage, and I think this is where the inconsistency arises. What, then, was his motivation? On his arrival at Aegina he was spectabilis hews, which is a reminiscence of what he looked like(496f.), and Procris, when dying, was looking at him as long as possible(dumque aliquid spectare potest, me spectat 860). Then, after she exhales her soul(if exhaled into the spear, there would have been the metamorphosis), that is, at the end of his story, Cephalus appears as lacrimans hews (863). It looks as if, instead of narrating the metamorphosis of Procris, Cephalus himself has transformed from a good-looking hero into a hero in tears. Why, then, in tears? Presumably because it is a mark of great heroes, to Cephalus' eyes. In fact, Cephalus is presenting himself as a great hero like Odysseus or Aeneas, not only in his marital or tragic love as pointed out by Labate and Segal, but also in his story-telling, which takes place at the palace of a king(or queen), whose assistance the hero needs to return home, as in Od. Bks. 8-12 and Aen. Bks. 2-3. It is such an enchanting tale of his own sufferings that causes all listeners to cry. A tragic story like this, which enables Cephalus to play a role of great hero, would have been ruined if he had told of the metamorphosis of Procris, which would have made her a heroine, with him serving as a foil. This is, it seems, where his motivation lies : to make himself a hero, not her. Returning to the inconsistency about the spear, we should note that "nullo referente" (684)can be translated as "as nobody(else)tells it" (also note the frequent use of referre in the story), and that "in ore"(861)can mean "spoken" as in 1.708. Here it seems to be implied that the metamorphosis of Procris goes unspoken as nobody tells that story, while Cephalus stands out as a great tragic hero as a tearful tale of his own is put in his mouth.

著者

牛田 徳子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.31, pp.19-31, 1983

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The most important locus classicus of the 'Third Man Argument' (TMA) in Corpus Aristotelicum is found in the Sophistici Elenchi(178b36-179a10). There the TMA, the last example of sophistical refutations depending on the form of expression, is said to presuppose the admission that the common predicate, like 'man', expresses, because of its form, just what is a 'this' (hoper tode ti), that is, the substantial essence of a being (e.g. Callias) , in spite of the very fact that it expresses a quality, a quantity or some one of the other non-substantial attributes. Depending on Alexander's report of the lost work De Ideis and on his comment on Metaphysics 991a2 ff. that the Platonic Form is a 'universal' essentially predicable of individuals, many scholars explain Aristotle's TMA as follows : that which produces the 'third man' is the individualisation of the universal predicate common to the essences of Form and of particulars. This interpretation has nothing to do with the TMA above in the Soph. El. which will then assert that 'the universal predicate common to the essences of Form and of particulars' does produce the 'third man' without the 'individualisation' of that predicate, for any universal expressing an attribute, once admitted that it expresses an essence, will produce something like a third essence. The TMA in the Soph. El. depending on the similar form of expression of things that are not categorially the same, can be elucidated by a passage from the Topics (103b27-39) which distinguishes two kinds of 'what-is-it' expressions, the intercategorial and the categorial. By the former, one can give the species-genus definition to whatever the given being is, e.g. man, white, a foot length, the latter two of which are not substances, while that definition does not express any categorial 'what-is-it' (the substantial essence), but a quality or a quantity or some one of the other attributes. The truth is then as follows. That which the Form and the particulars have in common is not the eidos qua substantial form, but the eidos qua species (Met. 1059a13) whose one logos is predicated both of the Form and of the particulars as synonymous entities, so that it is limited to setting forth differentiae -a sort of 'quality' {Met. 1020a34)- to the question "what is the species 'man'?", differentiae specific and generic ('biped', 'sensitive' and so on) which are valid to all individual members belonging to the species 'man', but not valid to a substance like Callias himself, endowed with the essence identical with himself. That which causes the TMA is, therefore, to assimilate the inter-categorial 'what-is-it' expression which is in fact an attributive expression, to the categorial 'what-is-it' expression which is, according to Aristotle, the only substantial expression. Aristotle's criticism of the theory of Forms, therefore, does not consist in the following: in spite of the fact that every universal expresses an attribute, the theory of Forms which makes it express the individual, should recognize not only the second being, but the third being both having the same essence as the sublunary beings, but in the following: because of the fact that every universal expresses an attribute, the theory of Forms making it express the essence should recognize not only the second, but the third being both having the same attribute as the sublunary beings. By the first formula of criticism one could be inclined to think that Aristotle purports to emphasize the idealistic character in the theory of Forms, while in the second to see Aristotle's tactics to make the Forms 'universalized attributes'-accidental phenomena-separated from the sublunary substances, which inverts the very relation of Paradeigmata of that world and eidola of this world.

著者

井上 文則

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.84-94, 2004

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In 1903 E Ritterling put forward a new theory the emperor Gallienus created four independent cavalry corps, all under the control of one commander Aureolus This theory was developed by A Alfoldi who used coins as a historical source to argue that these four independent cavalry corps were converted into the central cavalry corps stationed at Milan Alfoldi's argument was generally accepted However, H G Simon recently rebutted it and denied the existence of such corps on the grounds that the main Greek sources concerning Gallienus' reform of cavalry are unreliable In this paper, I examine Gallienus' supposed reform of cavalry to clarify the military system of the Roman Empire in the mid-third century First, I attempt to reconstruct the career of Aureolus who is key to understanding cavalry reform According to the Greek sources, Aureolus was commander of the central cavalry corps at the time of his rebellion against Gallienus But there are many inconsistencies in the Greek sources and further the Latin historian Aurelius Victor said that Aureolus was commanding the army in Raetia when he revolted In Simon's view, the Latin source is more reliable and he reinterprets the Greek sources to reconcile them with the Latin source Since his interpretation seems unconvincing, I here propose another solution to this problem I argue that Aureolus was the commander of the central cavalry corps at the time of Gallienus' war against Postumus in 265, not in 268 and that after concluding the war Aureolus remained in Raetia to defend the invasion of Postumus into Italy I observe that there is no evidence for the existence of the central cavalry corps except the title of Aureolus Rather it is recognized that independent cavalry corps, such as the Dalmatian cavalry corps, played a prominent part in many battles Moreover there were some independent cavalry corps not included into the central cavalry corps, though it is commonly said that they are all created to form it Form these observations, I suggest that Gallienus originally intended to create the independent cavalry corps and the central cavalry corps was temporarily formed from the independent cavalry corps which happened to be under the direct command of the emperor To understand the real significance of the independent cavalry corps, it is necessary to consider to the phenomenon that prior to the cavalry reform, Roman legion, which mainly consisted of infantry, divided into the vexillatio for independent use By creating a new cavalry unit corresponding with vexillatio, Gallienus probably intended to form mobile field forces, containing both cavalry and infantry I can find it not only under the direct command of the emperor but also deployed by other military commanders elsewhere It seems probable that such military condition in the mid-third century shaped Diocletian's later policy to divide the Roman Empire into four parts

著者

井上 忠

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.41-54, 1975-03-29 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In the Categories (1^a20-^b9, 2^a12-^b6, etc.), Aristotle makes a contrast between (1) καθ' υποκειμενου λεγεται (is said of a subject) and (2) εν υποκειμενω εστι (is in a subject). But why does he use λεγεται (is said) in (1), and εστι (is) in (2)? Aristotle is making an inquiry into the field of ordinary language, or rather actual language: while in (1) both τουνομα (the name) and ο λογο&b.sigmav; (the definition) are explicitly presented as the predicate (κατηγορειται) , in (2) neither the name nor the definition is presented as the predicate except some incidental coincidence of word formation (2^a27-34). We may adequately call (1) Predication and (2) Inherence. Later, (1) will develop to be the substantial predicate and (2)to be the accidental predicate; and Inherence ought to be present as predicate in some form in actual language. Making Inherence predicative results from παρωνυμα (the derivation from the name). That is, in (1), the name and the definition of substance are identically related, as being homonymous (ομωνυμα 1^a1-6) or synonymous (συνωνυμα 1^a6-12). On the other hand, the inherential predicate presents itself in actual language as nothing but η κατα τουνομα προσηγορια (addressing on the basis of the name). This name, however, is not set up through abstraction or induction of those addressings, but, from the view point of the actual use of language, must be preceded by the name. This name, being different from that in the case of substance, appearsonly as the classifying language in actual language, its definition showing "what it is" does not turn up in actual language. If one dares to look for that, one is to go beyond the level of actual language.

著者

千葉 槙太郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.50-63, 2020 (Released:2023-05-19)

著者

中畑 正志

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.101-114, 2020 (Released:2023-05-19)

著者

小池 澄夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.130-133, 1993-03-23 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

青木 巌

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.31-38, 1962

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It lias been said that Aristotle, being intent on establishing his own system, was often inaccurate or negligent in his description of the presocratic philosophers He is said to have written about them only for the purpose of either illustrating how they are wrong as compared with his own views, or showing their ideas as confirmations of his own, which are always true He is, after all, not motivated by any historical sense, and turns out to be incorrect and at times unjust in his historical treatment As against him, it is said, Theophrastus, thought not prompted by any different motive, is more impartial and correct concerning the early Greek philosophy There is a third opinion that Theophrastus is in all essentials only repeating interpretations he found in Aristotle and they have, therefore, the same deficiencies, in fine, he too is a biased witness and even less trustworthy than Aristotle In view of these three interpretations, the present writer scrutinizes the problem deliberately confining himself to a single item το απειρον of Anaximander He knows that such a limited method of treatment is inadequate, and may even be dangerous, but he is also convinced that even though he restricts hisv problem to such a small aspect, he can come to a conclusion which has some value In sum there can be no choice between Aristotle and Theophrastus in regard to the presocratic causes in general Sometimes incorrect and inattentive as he is, the former is quite reliable as a historian, and the latter surely follows his master's interpretations faithfully without being blind to the blunders and omissions on his part Any issue has to be solved through consulting both of them together with other sources, and, carefully adopting or rejecting them

著者

三浦 洋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.48-59, 2017 (Released:2020-03-31)

著者

小西 晴雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.55-65, 1968-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

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The structure of the Archaeologia is a product of three preconceived ideas of Thucydides'; namely, his conception of power, his conception of cyclic history and his conception of proof. 1. Conception of Power: the power of a state consists of four elements; stability (A), unification of city-states (B), seapower (C) and wealth (D). In the Archaeologia each element is surveyed in turn. 2. Conception of Cyclic History: Thucydides seems to have thought, at least when he was writing the Archaeologia, that these four elements of power developed successively from (A) to (D) during a certain period, and that after (D) there was a war, and then another cycle. Since he knew that there had been two large wars before the Peloponnesian War (i. e, the Trojan War and the Persian War), he divided the past into three periods marked by the two wars, and believed that each period constituted a cycle. 3. Conception of Proof: Thucydides seems to have thought that he had to prove that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest war of all. He employs a specific form of proof. First he states what he is going to prove (T); then he explains his theme (E); and then finally he states again what he has proved (T). This TET form is only applied to the parts of the Archaeologia where he wanted to prove his case. (E) can further be divided into two parts, X and Y. [table] Thucydides' a priori attitude is apparent in the Archaeologia. His subjective attitude in the structure of the First Book and in the Pentecontaetia has already been discussed by the writer in JCS XIV 1966, pp. 77-85. By tracing the changes and developments in the character of his subjectivity, one can discover the path that Thucydides' thought took for thirty years. Using the results of this study, one may possibly establish the chronological order of his writings.

著者

西村 洋平

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.164-167, 2010-03-24 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

永井 滋郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.52-62, 1967-03-23 (Released:2017-05-23)

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It is the object of the present article to analyze and understand the characteristics of peace consciousness of Polybius who lived in the Hellenistic age of chronic wars and wrote a world history in the true sense. We can see in his book, especially in IV. 31. 3-8 and IV. 74. 3, what kind of attitude he took toward the problem of peace. There he wrote as follows: "That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. ......Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful." Thus, Polybius insisted that liberty and justice were indispensable conditions for peace. We can also recognize the same idea of connecting peace with liberty and justice in many other Greek politicians and historians such as Thucydides. The Greek thought of peace, however, was metamorphosed gradually by historical conditions in the development of the ancient world. Thucydides advocated the war for justice and took a rather aggressive attitude against other city-states such as Sparta, putting stress on Athenian hegemony, although he admitted that peace was naturally desirable. His conception of peace could never depart far from the narrow idea of ομονοια within a πολι&b.sigmav;. The Greek idea of peace was widened by Isocrates to Panhellenistic homonoia, but he had a strong antagonism against Barbaroi. In the historical development of peace theory, the Hellenistic age played a very important role, giving birth to the cosmopolitan pacifism. This kind of pacifism, however, could not become a historical force to attain world peace, because it had a tendency to escape from reality. Though Polybius was influenced by Stoicism he was able to reach a sort of realistic pacifism and wanted to cooperate with Rome, cherishing the idea of a united and organic world consisting of the cultural Hellas and the political Rome, where the common freedom of Hellas should be fundamentally respected. Moreover, he evaluated highly the value of unions of city-states such as the Achaean league. He had not merely a Stoic, philosophic and abstract idea of cosmopolitanism, but a positive, ego-involving and realistic attitude of international cooperation. Thus, the freedom of Hellas as a condition of peace was connected by him with a kind of internationalism and with a Hellenistic idea of one organic world founded on the principle of equality among races and nations. In this sense, we may recognize that Polybius was indeed a pioneer of realistic pacifism, that is of internationalism, though of course in an ancient pattern, which has its limitations for us. It was regrettable after all that the ancient world could not develop this kind of pacifism, but had to seek for a key to solve its problems in Pax Romana and eventually in Pax Dei.

著者

筒井 賢治

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.121-129, 1996-03-15 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Marcion, a Christian heretic in the second century A. D., is known as a docetist. This is closely related with the widely-accepted assumption that he used a special term, phantasma, with regard to the body of Jesus Christ. Admittedly, there is an exclusive connection between Marcion and the term phantasma. On the one hand, we know nobody else among his contemporaries who referred to the body of Jesus by this term. On the other hand, a number of Early Church Fathers speak of Marcion's phantasma so frequently that it is virtually impossible to deny that he has actually used the term for Jesus Christ. And Tertullian, by far the most important source of information about Marcion/Marcionites, knew two interpretations of phantasma : (a)vision, an noncorporeal entity that can be seen and heard, but cannot be touched ; (b)something comparable to the body of the angels who appeared to Abraham and Lot and associated with them just like normal human beings(cf. Gen 18-19). This juxtaposition of two essentially different interpretations indicates clearly that the term phantasma itself, at least, was not an invention by Tertullian, but a special word actually used by Marcion himself. However, if we investigate Marcion's own texts, i. e. his canon(Evangelium, Apostolicum) and Antitheses, we come to an unexpected conclusion : Nowhere can we find a clearly and directly docetic element in them, as far as reliable textual reconstruction is possible. On the contrary, there are a lot of "nondocetic" passages which show that Jesus undoubtedly had a tangible body(which contradicts the meaning(a) of phantasma ; see below). The word phantasma itself does not appear anywhere apart from Evangelium (Lk)24 : 37. In this verse, according to Tertullian, Marcion's text reads phantasma (cf. also Adamantius/Rufinus) instead of pneuma. But we should not accept this report without qualification. First, it is not a literal quotation. Tertullian may well have employed an anti-Marcionite cliche here, as he often does. Secondly, Jesus' disciples, who think he is a "phantasma", are not praised but scolded by Jesus himself in the following verses. Further, this reading destroys the contextual relation with v. 39, where pneuma is undoubtedly retained in Marcion's text. Last but not the least, this Jesus is the so-called resurrected one, not the proper subject of docetism. For these various reasons, we cannot consider this verse to be sufficient evidence for Marcion's phantasma-docetism. We must conclude, therefore, that neither docetism nor the term phantasma is clearly to be found in Marcion's own texts. To explain this contradiction, we must introduce the perspective of chronological development in Marcion : His phantasma-docetism belongs to his "pre-canonical" times. Although the "post-canonical" Marcion did not positively use the term any longer, the polemical cliche against it remained in use on the side of the orthodox church. As regards the two meanings of phantasma attested in Tertullian(see above), (a)must certainly be older than(b). (b)appears to be an alternative, ad hoc explanation given by the post-canonical Marcion or more probably Marcionites, who wanted to remove the discrepancy between their canon and the phantasma-docetism. in the meaning(a). A relationship in the reverse order, i. e. a development from(b)to(a), is hardly imaginable. As a matter of course, it does not necessarily mean that(a)was the original meaning in which Marcion used the term phantasma. This remains an open to debate. Our argument is based on the assumption of a critical change in Marcion. "Critical change" does not mean here a conversion from one definite, ready-made system of belief to another. Rather, it is creation of a new paradigm, which is usually preceded by a long, chaotic period of preparation. There is no doubt that the pre-canonical(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

山形 直子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.1-11, 2017 (Released:2020-03-31)

著者

橋本 隆夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.1-11, 1987

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In vv 19-21 occurs the 'ne plus ultra' theme, which indicates that the laudandus attained to the furthest point of human prosperity, and the theme is followed by the Herakles-myth (vv 22-26), where it is reported that the hero set up the pillars as ναυτιλιαζ εσχαταζ μαρτυραζ κλυταζ But m the following lines (vv 26-32) the whole myth is broken off as irrelevant to the main theme of this epmician After the transitional part, in vv 32 the poet turns to Aeacidae-myths which are more relevant to the Aeaginetan victor Anstokleides Thus vv 19-32 are subdivided into the 'ne plus ultra' motif (19-21), the Herakles-myth (22-26) and the transitional motif (26-32). This paper is an attempt to examine the relation of the 'ne plus ultra' motif to the break-off of the myth, and to understand the significance of the break-off The Herakles-myth has been naturally taken as a digressive part since ancient scholiasts Among modern scholars questions have been proposed about the function of this myth as a digression in the part or the whole poem It is here asserted that the myth which is used to explain the pillars of Herakles is a positive paradigm of the 'ne plus ultra' motif, because Harakles succeeded in going beyond the limit of the world Moreover he becomes a god and lives with Hebe in Olympos His apotheosis, although it is cut off in the narration of the myth, is supposed apparently, as suggested by the association of the word (θεοζ v 20) That the poet points to the stupidity (παρα καιρον cf P 10 4) of going to αλλοδαπαν ακραν by means of the break-off, does not mean only that Herakles travelled to the Atlantic Ocean too far from the Island Aegina It implies also the stupidity of seeking to go beyond the limit as Herakles did Thus it would be apparent what significance the transitional gnome has The poet says one should admire the good man (εσλον αινειν) Following, he claims that the desire for an alien existence (ουδ' αλλοτριων ερωτεζ) is not good for the ordinary man Instead of αλλοτριων ερωτεζ, he advises himself and the audience to seek at home (οικοθεν ματευε) αλλοτριων means the area beyond human competence, and οικοθεν means the effort within one's ability The poet's objection to the αλλοδαπν ακραν after the break-off of the Herakles-myth is an admonition against seeking the apotheosis or the divine prosperity, i e, immortality as in the case of Herakles Therefore we ought to see that the 'ne plus ultra' motif has such admonitory significance in N 3 and even in other odes In the place of Coronis (P 3) and Bellerophon (I 7) who suffered ruin because of their desire for των απεοντων (P 3 20) and απροσικτων (N. 11 48), Herakles may well have been used in N 3 as a positive paradigm In the second half of the ode, φρονειν το παρκειμενον (75) (to make much of the near at hand) is recommended to the laudandus, in opposition to αλλοτριων ερωτεζ. This implication has the same with reference to the phrase, αισχυνων επιχωρια παπταινε τα πορσω (P 3 22). To appreciate the near at one's foot (γνοντα το παρ ποδοζ P. 3 60) is also akin to the thought that man is able to get αυτοθεν the τηλαυγεζ φεγγοζ (N 3 64) Herakles in N 3 is the inverse Coronis and Bellerophon who would not have failed to attain immortality.

著者

中務 哲郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, pp.215-216a, 2001

著者

松平 千秋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.109-112, 1981

著者

大貫 隆

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.97-108, 1981-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

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ヘブライおよびギリシア文学史には,死を目前にした人物の「訣別の辞」が数多く見出される.このような場合には,両者を文学様式と機能の視点から此較してヘブライ文学史の側でのその特性を解明することが聖書の様式史的研究方法にとって避け難い課題となる.しかし私の見るところでは,この研究方法が今世紀前半にドイツで提唱され,以後の聖書学の方法的基礎となったのち今日まで,「訣別の辞」の素材の辞典的な収集はなされたが,上のような視点からの立ち入った研究が行なわれたことはない.本稿は聖書の様式史的研究が残しているこの領域的な不備を,『ヨハネ福音書』13-17章のイエスの「告別説教」とプラトンの『パイドン』を各々の文学史的前提も顧慮しつつ此較することによって多少でも補おうとする試みである.

著者

脇條 靖弘

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, pp.42-52, 1995

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<p>Despite his well-known confession of ignorance Socrates does claim somehow to have knowledge in several passages of Plato's early dialogues. The aim of this paper is to focus on one of such passages, 29b of the Apology, and investigate the nature of this claim and the way it relates to his ignorance. In Apology 29b Socrates is making knowledge claim at two stages. Firstly, he claims to know(1)that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey the one who is better than him. Secondly, using this knowledge(1) as a premise and also adopting a further premise(2)that disobeying God and quitting philosophy is the very act of doing wrong and disobeying the one who is better than him, he reaches a conclusion(3)that disobeying God and quitting philosophy is bad, and concerning this conclusion he seems to be claiming to have knowledge. It is my contention that the grounds on which Socrates claims to know(1) and(3) are distinct and both of them are such as to be compatible with, and explain, his constant confession of ignorance, and further that not only in the Apology but also in early dialogues in general, when Socrates announces his knowledge in the process of drawing a conclusion(often in his elenchus) , his knowledge is classified either in type (1)or type(3). I suppose that the best way to make Socrates' claim of knowledge concerning(1) compatible with his confession of ignorance is to limit his knowledge to the area of logical properties of certain moral expressions. That is to say, when Socrates says he knows(1)that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey the one who is better than him, what he means is that he knows that if something is described as an act of doing wrong or disobeying someone who is better than oneself, it necessarily follows that it is also described as an act that is evil and disgraceful. Thus I take it that type (1) knowledge concerns entailment relationship, or meta-ethical facts, concerning certain moral expressions, and Socrates declines to do what he takes to be an act of doing wrong, partly backed up by this kind of formal knowledge. As to type(3) knowledge, it seems at first sight that Socrates' knowledge concerns conclusion(3)itself, but this interpretation meets a difficulty : although he announces his knowledge of premise(1), premise(2)is mentioned only as what he believes(28e), and it is unlikely that Socrates takes the conclusion to constitute knowledge when one of its premises is only a belief. One possible way of avoiding this difficulty is to introduce the distinction between two levels of knowledge. For example, Vlastos distinguished between the stronger kind of knowledge whose hallmark is infallible certainty and the weaker kind which, although falling short of certainty, can be and has been acquired by Socrates through his habitual activities of elenchus. Thus, whereas(2) is strictly speaking only a belief, Socrates can say he knows(2)in this weaker sense and accordingly, can claim also to have knowledge of conclusion(3), which is drawn from(1) and(2). However this interpretation is rather complicated, and the solution I would like to propose is simpler and more straightforward. In my view, Socrates' knowledge does not concern conclusion(3) itself but the logical necessity of(3)following the acceptance of(1)and (2). What Socrates claims to know at 29b is that(3)necessarily follows if (1) and(2) are accepted, or that(3)is true provided that(1)and(2)are both true. Because "if" clause or "provided that" clause is omitted here, his statement gives a false impression that he is saying he knows(3)itself. Thus, according to my interpretation both types of knowledge are rather formal in that type(1)concerns the logical-semantic necessity of certain moral expressions and type(3)concerns the logical necessity of inference. Type(1)knowledge is not so useful if it is possessed without any</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>