著者

長瀬 真理

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.69-80, 1987

被引用文献数

1

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The questions of the authenticity and chronology of Plato's texts are long-standing arguments This paper deals with the analysis of some prose style 'concerned with word order. One of the particular features of the Greek language is its freedom with word order The choice of word order is supposed to reflect personal habit or style which can be defined by studying the frequencies of certain patterns of combination of words. The conclusions are based on data obtained in a pilot computer project organized by Dr. L Brandwood from the University of Manchester in which I participated from October 1, 1980 to March 31, 1982 The purpose of the project is to investigate some specific stylistic features of texts from different periods of Plato's career, with the aim of producing certain quantitative measures of sentence structure and establishing new methods or principles of stylistic comparison The study was carried out usmg a system of classifying elements of sentence according to their syntactic function. The categories and code numbers are twelve : noun (0), verb(1), direct object (2), indirect object (3), predicate (4), attributes of these items (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), adverb (62) and prepositional phrase (63) The combinations of word order in each category are checked according to two patterns, 'coordinate' and 'split' The coordinate is the case where more than two words of the same class are used in parallel position m a sentence The split means the gap between a word and other related words in the same class The Greek texts of Plato were already available to us on magnetic tape Among Plato's writing we chose three texts, Laches, Theaetetus, and Philebus which are generally agreed to come from three different periods of his life We were also able to obtain a tape of Xenophon from which Memorabilia was chosen In order to check the consistency of our measures withm individual works, each text was sub-divided into four sections As the project is still underway, it is too early to make many claims for our methods. But I can say that in this instance, at least, checking word order has proved an effective measure of stylistic difference. It is fully recognised that the style of Philebus stands out clearly from that of the other three dialogues The figures for coordinate and split in Philebus are extremely high compared with the other three, especially in the case of the split in the prepositional phrases. We could say, 'the greater the frequency of splits, the more complicated the sentence' Philebus is commonly grouped chronologically with Leges, Timaeus, Pohticus and Sophistes as belonging to the later period of Plato's writing These dialogues are famous for being difficult to read It is an open question how far our syntactic code system would cover the complicated implication of sentence structures But whatever the interpretation, it is important to have some quantifiable and objective methods with which to work.

著者

山下 正男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.87-93, 1957

著者

村上 正治

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, pp.31-44, 2003

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In the Philebus, Socrates (Soc) attempts to attribute a true-false distinction to pleasure and pain On the contrary, Protarchus (Prt) insists that pleasure can never be false My aim in this paper is to make cleai what supposition underlies Prt' insistence, and how Soc undermines it I would like to show Soc' view about pleasure and pain Soc introduces an analogy between belief and pleasure, and distinguishes the mental process (believing that, being pleased that)from its content (which can be described in the that-clause) Most interpreters suppose that Soc tries to prove the falsity of being pleased depending on the falsity of its content, just as one believes p falsely when p is false However, they fail to see that Prt denies such attribution of falsity to pleasure Prt thinks that the actuality of being pleased is always true for the person in pleasure, even if the content with which one is pleased is false All Soc must prove is that one can be pleased falsely in spite of the actuality of being pleased The Book-Simile explains how belief and pleasure are differently formed in our mind When we perceive and judge something unknown, we form a belief about it We believe p in judging something If p is false, the falsity is equally, not derivatively, attributed to believing p, since we fail to judge something correctly On the other hand, we do not make a direct judgment about something, concerning whether it is pleasure or pain Once we judge something and believe p about it, we are pleased or suffer with a mental image based on judgment or belief How are pleasure and pain related with our judgment or belief? First, Soc takes the physiological form of pleasure and pain when we are thirsty (in the state of deficiency), we suffer, then, when we are drinking (getting satisfied), we are pleased This form of pleasure and pain reveals their basic features 1 Pleasure and pain function as the indications of satisfaction and deficiency in our body 11 The occurrence of pleasure and pain contributes to the restoration of our body's nature Next, anticipatory pleasure explains more clearly the occurrence of pleasure and pain When we are now suffering from deficiency in our body, and also in anticipation of what we think is satisfaction, we are already pleased with the anticipation although we are not yet satisfied The occurrence of pleasure depends on what we think is satisfaction So, if our cognition about satisfaction is false, that is, what we think is satisfaction does not really satisfy our deficiency, then, our pleasure which arose from our false cognition is false in spite of our being pleased, because pleasure and pain are supposed to contribute to the restoration of our body's nature Soc thinks that pleasure and pain are not directly given, but arise from our cognitive state about satisfaction, deficiency, and also our nature Therefore, the occurrence of pleasure and pain can be modified through revising our cognitive state about them

著者

一色 裕

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.41-51, 1999

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<p>Although there is some controversy about the authenticity of Hippias Major, the majority now take it to be Plato's own work. But the assessment of 'philosophy' involved in it has just begun with the commentary of P. Woodruff. But most scholars including Woodruff who think the fine to be open to definition regard the aporia of search as representing the failure of Socratic argument depicted by Plato. But in my view, this is a grave fault of interpreters. As a result, the definitions of the fine by the beneficial and the beneficial pleasure, which are the key points of the dialogue, have not yet been given proper and successful interpretation. My task in this paper is to give a new interpretation of this dialogue, focusing on the concept of the beneficial. Hippias, Socrates' interlocutor in this dialogue, displays the fine practices desirable in youth through a fictional discourse based on Homer. Conversely, he teaches fine things without himself knowing the fine. The problem of the beauty of virtue lies hidden in the initial situation of the dialogue. Examining Hippias' ideas of the fine, Socrates shows the fine to be an incomplete predicate during the refutation of Hippias. To refute Hippias' first proposal (fine girl) and his third one (happy life), Socrates refers to the existence of gods. But Hippias' second proposal (gold) is refuted by the notion of appropriateness he himself applied. The appropriateness is at first introduced as a visual one, but is immediately transformed to a moral one, i. e. the appropriateness to ends. The visual appropriateness per se has not yet been examined. In Socrates' self-refutation, his proposal for the definitions of the fine is concerned with human motivation, whose archetype was presented in Grg. 474de. Motivations which are introduced into the argument through visual appropriateness have two series. 1. utility : the useful-the beneficial. 2. pleasure : pleasure through sight and hearing-beneficial pleasure. In each series, the last definition makes explicit the relation of the fine and the good through the notion of beneficial, which leads to aporia. But among fine things, there are some which cannot be perceived as fine. These are the beauty of law and practice Plato esteems highly. The visual appropriateness is concerned with perception, not with being. Then, the appropriateness to ends, that is, utility comes in. But usefulness for doing bad things cannot receive approbation. If good things are substituted for bad things, can the definition of the fine be formed successfully? But, if the good is made consequent of the productive agent (doing or making) and the fine is made antecedent of it, this results in the non-identity of the fine with the good. The beneficial does not explain the fine. The fine cannot be composed of objective good things. With this result, Socrates turns to the examination of the second series of motivations : pleasure. Does pleasure through sight and hearing, i. e. pleasure (s+h), explain the fine? The problems with which Plato is faced in this definition are the following. 1. Is the beauty of law and practice explicable by pleasure (s+h)? 2. Does pleasure (s+h) explain the fine? But the definiens, pleasure (s+h), which takes the form of a conjunction, cannot denote a single thing. (The same is true with disjunction.)Problem 1 can be answered only after problem 2 is settled definitely. But because the definition of the fine by pleasure (s+h) failed, problem 1 remains open. Why is the term 'fine' applied to pleasure (s+h)? The ground for predicating 'fine' about pleasure (s+h) is asked here. Is there any explanation convertible with and inherent in the fine? To this question Socrates answers that pleasure (s+h) is the most harmless and the best. When one asks with reflection the ground of predicating 'fine', the other name of the term</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

早瀬 篤

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, pp.50-62, 2012

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The main purpose of this article is to show that, in rejecting Theaetetus' first answer to the question 'What is knowledge ?'(Tht. 146c-147c), Socrates is appealing to what I call the principle of the priority of the definition of the whole over the definitions of parts, namely: (PDWP) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know the definition of any part (or any kind) of F, rather than, as many scholars have supposed, to the principle (PD) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for any x, that x is an F (where 'x' stands for anything that may possibly turn out to be F). Some scholars have noticed that (PDWP) is at issue in the relevant context in the Theaetetus, but they regard (PDWP) as an equivalent or a version of (PD), to which they think Socrates is committed. By contrast, I argue that these two principles are independent of each other, and that (PD) is not relevant here (in fact, I have argued elsewhere that Socrates is not committed to (PD) at all, as it stands). A significant difference between the two principles is that (PD) prevents us, but (PDWP) does not prevent us, from using examples of F as reliable data for the definition of F. Socrates' argument at 147a7-c2 is the source of the problem. Many scholars have supposed that Socrates employs (PD) as a basis for rejecting the examples of knowledge enumerated by Theaetetus as reliable data for the definition of knowledge. I argue, however, that on closer examination the text shows Socrates actually encouraging Theaetetus to make use of the examples before proposing the definition (cf. Tht. 147d-148d), which is a clear sign that he was not appealing to (PD). I then propose an interpretation of Socrates' argument at 147a7-c2 along different lines. I suggest that the cases Socrates is talking about there are not cases in which one enumerates many examples, but cases in which one gives a single example. The point of his argument is, then, that giving a single example of F is useless for understanding F as a whole. I suggest that Socrates argues this because of his commitment to (PDWP). I finally and briefly discuss another context in which Socrates mentions (PDWP), i. e. Meno 79c-79e. On the basis of the passages discussed in the article as a whole, I suggest that Socrates treats (PDWP) as one of his key methodological principles.

著者

松浦 明宏

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.36-47, 2017

著者

久保 徹

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.63-75, 1999

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『パノレメニデス』第II部の意義をめぐっては,とりわけ第I部のイデア論批判との関連でこれまでさまざまに論じられてきた.近年では,C.C.Meinwald らの論考が口火となって再びさかんに論じられている.しかし多くの解釈が試みられてきたにもかかわらず,いまだに研究者らの見解は大きく分かれており,基本的な合意さえ得られていない.だがこの第II部をどのように理解するかは,第I部のイデア論批判の解釈にも関わり,その意味は大きい.本稿は,あらためて第II部の意義をとらえ直し,そこから第I部のイデア論批判の議論に対するプラトン自身の応答を読み解こうとする一つの試みであり,このようなアプローチから『パルメニデス』におけるイデアの分有について考察することを意図する.

出版者

日本西洋古典学会 ; 1953-

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

no.64, pp.165-167, 2016

著者

式部 久

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.112-113, 1975

著者

戸祭 哲子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, pp.37-49, 2012

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This article considers Plato's description of the rhapsode in his dialogue Ion as a critique of the New Music which flourished in late fifth- and fourth-century Athens. At this time, mousike, which may be understood as a body of skills and activities presided over by the Muses, including poetry, instrumental music, dancing, and drama, began to change and diversify. The development of new practices of mousike was stimulated by the growth of public festivals, such as musical contests held at the Panathenaea and theatrical performances held at the Great Dionysia. The new style of mousike attracted the attention of intellectuals, most notably Plato, who subjected it to severe scrutiny. I view the rhapsode in Plato's Ion as a social critique of the innovations in mousike. The New Musicians and Plato's rhapsode share two important features. Firstly, both are professional performers on the public stage. Secondly, both emphasise superficial aspects of public performance, for example mimesis and emotional expressions, purely for entertainment. These aspects were criticised by Plato, who understood that mousike was important in nurturing people's minds and perpetuating Athenian cultural identity. He was afraid, therefore, that the New Music might be socially disruptive. This essay draws attention to a neglected aspect of the New Music as a social phenomenon, and brings social and cultural studies to bear in the examination of a literary text.

著者

田中 利光

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.1-11, 1992

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Plato said that names are instruments with which we differentiate things according to their nature and teach one another something(388B10-C1). The text is written in the figure Hysteron Proteron. It appears to be commonly unnoticed. By the correctness of names, Plato means two states which concern names. One is the correctness in the sense of using names as instruments correctly(cf. 387C1). The other is the correctness in the sense that names in themselves are fine as instruments(cf. 388D6-7). Plato's view on the correctness of names in the first sense is as follows : Determination is not according to a man's fancy, but according to their nature by names which their nature prescribes(cf. 387B11-C4, D4-8). In this connection 'names' does not mean the sound only, but the combination of sound and meaning. If we pay attention to sound only, we cannot understand why truth-falsehood of names and Protagoras' theory became the topic in the Cratylus. When Hermogenes first argues that the correctness of names is not natural but conventional and arbitrary, names which he has in mind are combinations of sound and meaning. When he later mentions that names for the same things differ with languages(385D9-E3)in order to support his view, names that he mentions imply their sounds only. In this point, he is confused. Plato denies Hermogenes' view, but it is a matter of course that Plato recognizes the fact Hermogenes mentions. Plato describes the fact in the style of a myth(390A4-7). The importance of Plato's view on the correctness of names cannot be understood well if we pay attention to their sounds only. It is best understood, in connection with what is said at Thucydides 3, 82, 4. Plato's view on the correctness of names in the second sense is as follows : It is to have a likeness to "that which is a name(Collective Singular)" (389D7). Also, names given by custom have it to some degree. To what degree? It is the dialectician that judges it case by case(388D6-390C12). If fine names are to be given as custom, it requires the dialectician as its supervisor (390D4-5). The nomothete is not the philosopher(Cf. Guthrie, ib. p. 6. n. 3.), but custom personified. Plato repeats a part of the above-mentioned view after an introductory phrase "Cratylus is right in saying that...."(390d9). Thus, Cratylus' view appears to be approved. However, in the rest of the Cratylus, Cratylus' theory of names is refuted completely. How should this point be interpreted? I understand that Socrates pretends that Cratylus is right in the view assumed to be his(an example of Socratic irony) ; otherwise, it should be understood that the circumstantial participle λεγων is used not modally, but conditionally(cf. Crat. 387C1, Phikb. 34A10, Laws 727A2, 862A1). The rest of the Cratylus considers what the correctness of names is like and shows that it is not as Cratylus thinks. Then, what is it like? I think we can see concretely what the correctness in the second sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 433A8-B1, 533D4-5 and what the correctness in the first sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 476D5-6.

著者

神崎 繁

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.41-53, 1984

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Many scholars treat the first part of the dialogue (384 c-391 b) as the exposition of Plato's own views about the correctness of names because of its similar phraseology to that of the Republic X and its critical remarks on the Protagorean background of Hermogenes' conventional theory of names. But this treatment not only drops the demarcation between Plato's position and Cratylus', but also prevents them from understanding the overall structure of the dialogue. For, as Bernard Williams recently revealed in his brief but excellent paper, it is Cratylus' natural theory of the correctness of names that Socrates attempts to elaborate with Hermogenes in the next part (391 b-427 d) and then he sets about to refute with Cratylus himself in the final part (427 d-439b). According to my interpretation, however, Plato's strategy is already mentioned to some extent in the first part of the dialogue. Because a name-giving role personified as νομοθετη&b.sigmav; is said not only to precede a name-using role as διδασκαλικο&b.sigmav; but also to be supervised in turn by the dialectician, διαλεκτικο&b.sigmav;, who uses names for discussion. And I suppose these three personified figures to represent the positions of Cratylus, Hermogenes and Socrates respectively. So the main theme in succeeding arguments of the dialogue as well as the dialogue itself seems to be under dialectical supervision. This is a noeud initial of the dialogue. I suggest, therefore, that the notorious etymological section in the second part displays various deviational forms of name-relation from such integral linguistic practice with names as the dialectic. For, though we find in the text somewhat confusing expressions with the same verb 'δηλουν' (to show) , e.g. 'someone shows something by a name.', 'a name shows something to us.', 'a name shows something.', etc., we can presume from them an underlying structure: A shows p with n to B (where A and B are persons, p is a thing, and n a name). This underlying 4-place relation is transformed into the various expressions found in the text without changing the meaning of 'show' in it. But the etymological explanation urges us to think the verb 'show' equivocal like this: A legislator as a name-giver showed^1 something with a name, from which descended name shows^2 it to us. Thus, etymological study turns out to be nothing less than research for original intentions or thoughts of the name-giver-they are usually expressed by a verb 'βουλεσθαι'-, for such intentional factors take advantage of the time- and semantic gap between giving names and deciphering their descendants. But, of course, research for such factors may be uncertain and arbitrary. To do without it, there must be a direct relation between names and things : 'a name shows^3 something'. Being interpreted by similarity, this binary relation though it is also transformed from the same 4-place relation above gets another meaning of 'show': 'a name is a copy of something'. It is this final position of Cratylus' natural theory that is to be refuted in the third part of the dialogue. If we demand the correctness of names for its own sake i.e. apart from our integral linguistic practice, we cannot but rely on either the correspondence between language and reality or tacit consent among people without reference to our understanding the reality whatever we acknowledge it to be. So we must try to understand the truth (that is not the same thing as the correctness anymore) with names and the other linguistic components in the dialectical integrality. This denouement seems to have been already anticipated in the noeud initial of the dialogue.

著者

田中 あや

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, pp.39-50, 2014

著者

新島 龍美

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.36-47, 1993

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<p>This paper examines the so-called Protreptic parts of Plato's Euthydemus (Euthyd. 278E-283B[=PL(1)]; 288D-292E[= PL(2)]), and investigates the characteristics of wisdom or knowledge to show the basic misunderstanding of the traditional interpretation. I (1) The argument as a whole derives from the concern of Socrates' and others' that young Cleinias will become as good as possible (Euthyd. 275A) , so that the matter of 'becoming good' is meant to apply to us as well. The argument of PL(1) can be summarized as follows : (i) the realization of our happiness through possession of many good things; (ii) the demand that we use these things correctly to attain some benefit ; (iii) the requirement of wisdom or knowledge to guarantee correct use ; (iv) the necessity of searching for and loving wisdom or knowledge, namely philosophy. (2) From this summary, PL(1) seems to be Plato's real argument in favor of philosophy, and to indicate the Socratic eudaimonism. However, its more complicated figure is revealed as our investigations proceed : (a) The four 'cardinal' virtues are treated in the same way as wealth and other good things, namely as 'things' (πραγματα; 282A2). Meaning that they are supposed to be able to stand in some way independently from their owners, namely ourselves. (b) Such a treatment will almost inevitably invite these questions : what does using temperance, courage, or justice mean ; what is correct use ; what is the content of the benefit resulting from their correct use, and who are 'we' that supposedly benefit by their correct use. It is in the basic understanding of wisdom itself that these kinds of questions culminate. Yet they are unanswered and remain implicit in PL(1). Traditional interpretations believe that PL(1) shows Plato's real speech recommending the activity of philosophy. However, our scrutiny has shown that the situation plausibly suggests a problematic feature of Protreptic Logos, and if PL(1) ended with a declaration of the necessity of philosophical activity, such an interpretation could be sustained. Yet, in fact, PL(2) which clearly continues PL(1) finally ends with an anopia or impasse. II (1) PL(2) asks the question: if philosophy is the acquisition of some wisdom or knowledge, which wisdom or knowledge must we rightly acquire? The argument is still led by both the question of how we benefit and consideration of the context of acquisition or possession and use(cf. 288E1-2 ; 289B4-6 ; 290D5-7). PL(2) then proceeds to the test of kingship or royal art which is apparently the most plausible candidate, if it is knowledge that can achieve and supply our happiness. Consideration of knowledge, finally arrives at the question, in what respect are people good, and in what aspect are they useful. These remain unresolved. (2) We insist that we must take this ρπορια or impasse as such, and search for its significance and origin. (a) That final ironical situation signifies that 'being good' can not possibly be evaluated by connecting good things with ourselves through the context of possession and use. (b) The origin of this impasse can be traced back to the thought that we can be good or happy by possessing many good things. These things were, in fact, unreflectingly and unquestionedly presupposed to stand as good even outside ourselves. The final indecision within the most crucial point of determining in what respect we are good is undersood to suggest that our being good or happy, can not justly be considered by the presupposition of such a grasp on 'good' things. We could say that the more we are inclined to such a possessive thought, the more suggestive and significant the perplexing situation can be for all of us. Philosophy, when considered the acquisition of knowledge to obtain some type of benefit, remains empty and senseless. We can not, therefore, accept the</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

中務 哲郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.26-37, 1986-03-18 (Released:2017-05-23)

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ヘロドトス『歴史』のテーマは何か,という大問題にこのような小論で答えようとするのは,いわば「鶏刀を以て牛を割く」類の暴挙との誹りを受けるかもしれないが,以下に筆者の考えの大要を述べてみたい.

著者

木原 志乃

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.12-23, 2002

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In this paper, I would like to examine the change of the soul (psyche) in fr 36 and reconsider the significance of Heraclitus explaining the soul in the physical process In fr 36, Heraclitus says that the soul becomes the water, the water becomes the earth and vice versa There is little agreement as to what the changes of the soul should be It is a disputable question whether the reciprocal changes in fr 36 are in macrocosm (that is, the extinction or production of the soul from its relation to the sea and the earth cf fr 30 and 31) or in microcosm (that is, the physiological process of the soul from its relation to the blood and the flesh) Many commentators have interpreted it as being in macrocosm However, I do not share this interpretation First, I will examine the two typical interpretations in which the soul in macrocosm is supposed (Kirk and Kahn) According to Kirk, the soul is equated with cosmic fire and 'the death of the soul' means the death of individuals in an eschatological context However, this interpretation is unsound when Kirk must suppose the relation of two fires, between 'a fiery soul' of individuals and the 'cosmic fire' Although Herachtus indicated 'the soul out of water', Kirk discounted this point and supposed falsely the soul out of cosmic fire through respiration On the other hand, Kahn intended that the soul is equated with the air Inasmuch as Heraclitus described the soul as 'dry' or 'wet', so Kahn considered that 'fire' is not suitable as a substitute for the soul from the expressive viewpoint in the fragments Although Kahn's interpretation is a correct one in view of his insistence that the soul is not fire, he overcomplicated the relation between the 'airy soul' of individuals and (cosmic) fire or water The soul as the fire or the air, which is also macrocosmic, is not suitable for the explanation of 'the death of the soul' The important point is the relationship between life and death We must recognize that, for Helaclitus, the psyche has the fundamental meaning of 'life force' and that his 'life and death' is a unity of opposites Heraclitus did not uncritically accede to antecedent ideas of the soul The traditional problem of immortality is reconsidered by Heraclitus in fr 36 The 'death of the soul' is not the biological death of the individual Rather, his use of the soul enables him to combine these aspects of the life and death of individual I would like to emphasize this point and elucidate that the soul includes death and is incessantly renewed as life by death Heraclitus refused the traditional idea that the soul of individuals continues separate from the body after death For him, the soul is not a transcendental substance separate from the body, but constantly maintains the material aspects of the bodily force So for Heraclitus the soul is not like an airy or fiery element or a cosmic soul, but the constitutive principle of the life force That is the meaning of the physiological process This suggests that the soul in fr 36 is a principle for physiological activity as the subject of the life force Finally, I wish to conclude by referring briefly to two connected contents of the soul, as a subject of this physiological activity and of the cognitive activity in other fragments.

著者

鈴木 照雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.116-122, 1959

著者

鈴木 照雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.116-122, 1959-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

鈴木 幹也

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.20-31, 1977

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Aristotle attempted to reduce the thought structure of Empedocles' On Nature to his own unique philosophical pattern by interpreting Empedocles' four indestructible elements as being the material causes, and interpreting Love and Strife as the efficient causes. Judging from Theophrastus' Physical Opinions, Frag. 3, the basis for Aristotle's reasoning is thought to be contained in the couplet of Empedocles' Frag. 17. 7-8; αλλοτε μεν φιλοτητι συνερχομεν ει&b.sigmav; απαντα αλλοτε δ' αυ διχ' εκαστα φορευμενα νεικεο&b.sigmav; εχθει and particularly in the participle φορευμενα found in the latter half. In other words, Aristotle interpreted (φορευμενα to be a passive voice, from which he deduced his understanding of the four elements as being the material causes, and Love and Strife as the efficient causes. The present writer, however, cannot agree to such an interpretation of φορευμενα. The writer here attempts to reject one of the traditional viewpoints in the history of philosophy-the Aristotelian schematic understanding of Empedocles-by elucidating that the φορευμενα in question is not a passive voice but rather a direct reflexive intransitive middle voice, through the examination of three points, namely: (1)other groups of expression illustrating the spatial movement of the four elements; (2)similar verses in Empedocles Frag. 20. 2-5; and(3)usage of the verb φερω which has the same etymological origin as φορεω.

著者

澄田 宏

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.56-59, 1972

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Heraclitus' Fr. 101 (DK) is regarded as one of the fragments referring to the basis of his philosophical thoughts. But there is little reference to it in most of the studies of Heraclitus' philosophy. This is, I suppose, because of some difficulty in the interpretation of Fr. 101. For instance, the fragment is given different interpretations from the two different sources and it is isolated from any of his other fragments. The purpose of this essay is to approach the problem of its interpretation with the help of his other fragments, especially Fr. 22 which is something like a proverb. The author examines the meaning of each word of Fr. 22 in which there is the participle form of the same verb as used in Fr. 101. In Fr. 22, where are found at least four terms of his philosophy, i. e., 'much', 'little', 'earth' and 'gold', the verb 'search' is paraphrased in his analytical way into two other verbs, 'dig' and 'find'. Then my work is to make clear the meaning of the whole passage. Fr. 22 is a kind of proverb saying that whoever seeks for something valuable will. take much pains and get small profits. Now there rises some doubt whether he was talking by metaphor about his own philosophical method. The preferable way to get the true meaning of this metaphor is, I believe, to refer to the following fragments one after another: Frr. 29, 104, 41, 32, 90, 118; 10, 40, 35; 55, 107, 56. The conclusion is as follows: (1) Fr. 22 suggests his philosophical method of recognition and so its metaphor proves to be a formula of recognition. "The subject that searches 'digs' (se. perceives or inquires) the medium and 'finds' (sc. understands and recognizes) the object." (2) The object is called by many different names, but in fact it is 'one'. (3) On the other hand the medium is a sensible object whose structure is of many forms. The medium is significant for the investigator only when it is related to the object. (4) The subject is the soul, ψυχη. Now self-search is one way of philosophical research. To this, therefore, must be applied the formula. If not applied, it is obvious by reference to Fr. 45, that self-search does not take any means i. e., the medium. But the same fragment seems to say that to "discover" is needed for the soul to know everything. So to "find" or "discover" is to research without digging or perceiving. Self-search is research in absence of the medium. It is self-discovery. I think self-search may be proposed to be a major premise of Heraclitus' philosophical thoughts of ψυχη.