著者

西村 賀子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.9-18, 1985

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The Bacchae is Euripides' tragic masterpiece based on the long tradition of Dionysiac plays. As is well known, the poet never fails to add his own original elements even when he treats a traditional subject. In the Bacchae such an innovation can be recognized in what is often called the Cadmus-Teiresias-scene in the first episode. It is almost certain that Euripides was the first to add the two old men. He combined the new element to enhance the tragedy; he made it indispensable to the development of the main plot by making effective use of parallel sequences and words. The purpose of this paper is to analyse Euripides' dramatic technique by examining these parallel relationships. First as to the parallel sequences, it is quite usual in drama for some motifs in the first scene to be repeated in later ones, but in the fourth episode of the Bacchae we find a whole concentration of recurrences. This episode shares the same motifs and emotional tone as the first one. Two characters, Cadmus and Teiresias in the first scene, and Pentheus and the Stranger in the fourth one, walk to Mt. Cithaeron in Bacchic dress. Both pairs have the same kind of attitudes and their dialogues have something in common. In addition, the magic of the god has great influence upon both pairs; the old men are filled with a mysterious strength and exaltation. On the other hand Pentheus feels supernatural power in his body. The emotional tone pervading both scenes is the indissoluble blending of the tragic and the comic. In all of these ways, from the viewpoint of motifs and emotional tone the fourth episode is parallel to the first one. But at the same time the relation is completely reversed when we consider who is laughing at whom. In the first scene it is Pentheus who sneers at the god, the old proselytes, and Dionysus' birth myth. He is afraid of becoming the laughingstock of Thebes; nevertheless, in the fourth episode he in turn is mocked by Dionysus. Thus both scenes are placed in symmetrical opposition. Secondly we should discuss the parallel use of words, in particular in the god's birth myth which Teiresias explains. The core of the myth lies in the story that Zeus concealed Dionysus within his thigh. The verb "conceal" appears many times in the Bacchae and constitutes an important motif. Hiding always occurs just before the miracles showing the absolute force of Dionysus. The motif of concealment is closely related with the final epiphany of the god, which brings a miserable destruction to his oponent. Therefore concealment and epiphany compose a paired motif. On the other hand this paired motif is parallel to another, the god's double birth and the antagonist's double death. It is clear from the context that Dionysus was born twice, but it may be necessary to explain in what sense Pentheus experiences double death. When he reappears on stage at v. 918, he is wearing Bacchic dress instead of the armour he called for in the preceding scene. He is suffering from Dionysiac delusions and has lost normal consciousness. In this sense his first death is mental, whereas the second one is physical, executed by his own mother. Seen against the background of these parallel motifs, Teiresias' words describing the birth of the god have a deeper meaning. They express not only Dionysus' birth but also give a hint of the coming destruction of Pentheus and his family in the last scene. V. 290 predicts the king's falling to his death from a high tree and the exile of Cadmus and Agave from their homeland. And v. 292 suggests that Pentheus will be torn to pieces.

著者

逸身 喜一郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, pp.1-13, 2008

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Did the poets we describe as 'didactic' regard their work as part of a generic tradition? Starting from this question I examine how each poet defines himself in relation to his predecessors. A central problem is that there is no word equivalent to 'didactic poetry' in the ancient world, except epos (all hexameter poetry). Grattius, Cynegetica 94-97 (o felix…) reminds us of Virgil, Georgica, 2. 490-2 (felix, qui…) or of Lucretius, 5. 8-12 (deus ille fuit, …, qui…). Has the tradition of didactic poetry a stock of common themes, motifs, or rhetorical expressions? Rather, Grattius, destined to be a second-rate poet, may have naively imitated a Virgilian/Lucretian expression. Contrary to Virgil or Lucretius, however, his appraisal of the felix is exaggerated. But the exaggeration is not deliberate. If it had been so, it would have been a parody, like Archestratos fr. 36. 1-5 vis-a-vis Hesiod, Erga, 383-4. Certainly, some poets were capable of comprehending the general idea of 'didactic poetry'. Ovid writes a mock-didactic in elegiac: Ars amatoria. Virgil seems to have grasped the essentials of didactic poetry when he made a Carthagian rhapsode sing an epos (Aeneid, 1. 740-6). Following Servius (Praef. ad Georg.) we tend to suppose a tradition of didactic poetry starting with Hesiod and culminating in Virgil's Georgica. The ancients, however, had no division between epic (in a narrower sense) and didactic poetry. Aristotle blames the tendency to classify poems according to metre (Ars poetica, 1. 1447b17), but he is an exception. Hesiod is not regarded by the didactic poets as their ancestor, or the originator of their genre. Rather, they are proud of being successors of Homer; e.g. Nicander (in the sphragis of Theriaca) or Lucretius (3. 1036-38). According to the latter, Homer is even a poet of rerum naturam expandere dictis (1. 126). Manilius' catalogue (2. 1-49) collecting Greek didactic poets starts with Homer. We should not over-estimate Hesiod's influence on Virgil, through a cliche in citation (Georgica 2. 176). Virgil is rather independent of Hesiod, especially in Book 2 (as well as 3 and 4). So is Aratus. The epigram of Callimachus (27 Pf.) does not say anything to suggest that Hesiod created a different generic entity from Homer. I imagine there are two characteristics in 'didactic poetry': (1) catalogue (2) denial of myth. There are some interactions between epic and didactic, of course, for example the Catalogue of Ships in the Iliad or the Orpheus myth in the Georgica. But Manilius's manifesto is interesting. At the end of his catalogue of heroic/historic epics (3. 1-30), he denies vulgarity. Myth is vulgar and should be denied (cf.ps.-Virgil, Aetna 74-5). Note the same tone in Virgil, Georgica, 3. 3-11. I imagine also there are two 'key-words' of 'didactic poetry': (1) artes (2) rerum causae. Observation of stars, weather, thunder, earthquakes leads to rerum causae. Interestingly, Ovid starts the Metamorphoses with the origin of the world and ends with Pythagorean theory (15. 66-72, similar to Virgil, Aeneid, 1. 740-6, above), although the central parts are catalogue of myths: this is an innovation of Ovid, self-conscious about the nature of epos. It is perhaps impossible to answer the question: 'What is didactic poetry?' There is no core of didactic poetry, comparable to the Iliad in the case of epic. Nor was there any agreement of opinion among the poets. Some simply imitate superior poets and other like to deny vulgarity. Virgil and Ovid are rare cases.

著者

山口 明子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.98-115, 1965-03-27 (Released:2017-05-23)

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The assertive sentence is by definition a form of proposition the content of which is presented as an assertion made by the speaker This assertiveness can also be expressed by way of vocabulary, using a certain group of verbs called verba adfirmandi (e g arbitror, puto, censeo, iudico, intellego, scio, etc) Now arises a question what is the relation between the assertiveness derived from the very form of the assertive sentence and the nature of assertion of the above verbs common to all the members of the group ? This is the first question Then comes the second what are the features characteristic to each member of the group apart from their common class-meanings, and, what is the correlation they may have with the form-meaning of assertive sentences Through the observation of verba adfirmandi used in Cicero's Letters (ca 500 in number), it is concluded 1) that the verba adfirmandi can be divided into two sub-groups one is that of verba ludicandi denoting judgement by the speaker of the things unknown and uncertain, and the other that of verba recognoscendi which denote recognition of the things as true or certain 2) that the assertive sentence describes things as they are, with no regards to the gap existing between expression and things expressed When the speaker feels it necessary to assert the content of his utterance more expressly, either as his judgement or as his recognition, he usually resorts to verba adfirmandi, and the result thus attained is that he stands also as the subject of the verb so as to express his responsibility for his assertion more distinctively 3) that both of these sub-groups may also be used for stylistic purposes i e verbs belonging to the former sub-group may denote contents of the sentences as something uncertain or at least as a judgement made by the subject of the verb only (i e not by the speaker), regardless whether it is true or not, whereas the verbs belonging to the latter sub-group express it as a fact 4) that the difference in distribution between these sub-groups can be explained, in the present writer's opinion, by the difference in stylistic nature of the sub-groups For example, the use of the 2nd person of verba iudicandi (putas etc), when used in assertive sentences, produces an impression more or less impolite, and, therefore, it is recommended to avoid it in politer expressions On the other hand, that of verba recognoscendi can be used in similar sentences quite freely, without such restrictions 5) that when a certain group of activities, such as absolutely mental activities or activities considered not honourable to their agents, are to be expressed, the expression always takes a form of oratio obliqua led by the verb of verba iudicandi (vereris-videris vereri etc) in contrast to the activities laudable to the speaker, which are expressed by means of verba cognoscendi (tibi curae est-scio tibi curae esse etc) Though the differences between these subdivisions of verba adfirmandi are essentially of logical nature, it is possible to say that the author of the Epistulae fully makes use of such differences in his own manner and for his own purposes, communicating subtle evaluations of a given activity or of its agent on the part of the speaker, and thus accomplishing a style of a true master of prose

著者

伊藤 貞夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.195-197, 1992

著者

今泉 智之

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.37-47, 1996

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<p>How are the following three propositions related to each other in the Phaedo? A Something is beautiful. B Something has(echei)beauty(immanent form or character). C Something participates in (metechei) beauty (transcendental Form). Some scholars(e. g. Vlastos, Fujisawa)identify A with B and consider C is the cause(reason) (aitia)of both A and B, but in my view this interpretation is open to further discussion. Plato does not identify A with B, but rather thinks B may also be the cause of A. This paper further considers this point. If anything else is beautiful besides beauty itself, it is so only because (dioti) it participates in that beauty(100c4-6). This sentence suggests that C is merely the cause(dioti)of A, and in the following passages of the Phaedo it is never said that B is caused by C. Simmias overtops Socrates because (hoti) Socrates has smallness in relation to Simmias' largeness(102c2-5). "Simmias overtops Socrates" is similar to "Socrates is smaller than Simmias" and "smallness" is immanent form. If so, the import of this sentence is that B is also entitled to be the cause(hoti)of C. In this respect, the next sentence is important. Nothing else makes a thing beautiful except beauty itself, whether by its presence or communion or whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be(100d4-6). The meaning of the word "presence(parousia)" is close to "echein" and "communion(koinonia)" to "'metechein". Of course the immanent form (beauty)does not appear clearly in this sentence, but the ambigious expression "whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be" alludes to it. If this understanding is correct, the role of this sentence is to suggest that A can be caused by either B or C. At 103c10f. Socrates introduces some other items, namely, "fire", "snow", "three" etc. The status of these is controversial, but I take them as immanent forms, because at the advance of their opposites, say, "cold", "hot", "even", they get out of the way or perish. Since immanent forms, "largeness", "smallness", are prescribed similarly at 102d5-103a2, "fire", "snow", "three" must be immanent forms(cf. Keyt). At 104d1-7 these items are defined thus : There would be those that compel whatever they occupy to have not only their own form but the form of some opposite as well(d1-3). Anything occupied by the form of three must be not only three but also odd(d5-7). This definition suggests that when something is occupied by "three" (immanent form), it is compelled to have not only "three" but "odd", so that it must be not merely three but odd. That is to say, in these two sentences too, it is suggested that possession of an immanent form causes predication. This becomes more obvious at 105b5-c6. In this passage, "fire", "fever", "one" are immanent forms. And it is clear that their immanence in something is the cause of predication. If the above consideration is correct, we can conclude that in the Phaedo A(predication) is caused either by B (possession of immanent forms) or by C (participation in transcendental Forms), but C is never the cause of B. Why, then, is B introduced in the argument? Is it necessary to Plato's argument? To answer these questions we must consider two points. One is that this argument is subordinate to proof of the immortality of the soul. In the argument soul is parallel to immanent forms. A body lives by the immanence of soul with it(105c9-11). As "three", which brings "odd" to something, can not admit "even" (104e8-10), so soul, which brings life to body , can not admit death, and therefore is immortal(105d3-e9). To prove this, Plato has to introduce B, namely, immanent</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

根本 英世

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, pp.28-37, 1991

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The author has inquired into the implications and functions of απατη and δολοζ in Hom, by examining their usage in their context Among the four examples of απατη in Il we first scrutinize the one in B (114) Agamemnon says to the Greeks that Zeus, who had once promised him the sack of Troy, has now devised κακη απατη in bidding him retreat to Argos in disgrace (the same lines are repeated in I) In these scenes as well as in the one in 0 where Zeus warns Hera against απατη, the deed is not of human agency, but divine This is true as well in the case in Δ 168 where the word apparently refers to the truce-breaking of Pandarus, which is in fact instigated by Athena It should also be remembered that Zeus' απατη in B and I is depicted as ατη from Agamemnon's point of view In Od, on the other hand, the word appears only once in ν, and here it is applied to a human being, Odysseus, who is praised by Athena for this quality Through investigation it is proved that the same holds true of the derivatives of απατη (απαταω, εξαπαταω, απατηλιοζ, απατηλοζ), in Il they refer to divine deeds or to human deeds resulting from divine intervention, whereas in Od they depict or relate to human actions which in most cases are characteristic of the persons concerned and often have much to do with the development of the story Remarkable is the difference in the frequency of the use of δολοζ between Il and Od, i e 11 times in the former versus 32 times in the latter In Il, except for two scenes where gods' actions are mentioned (Hera's in O and Apollo's in Φ), the word is found only in small episodes and digressions which are of little or no importance in the plot In this respect Od is rather different from Il Firstly, in Od the word is used mostly to describe the tactics of human beings , the only exceptions are in the "Ares-Aphrodite song", the "Kirke-story", a small episode in δ and Odysseus' lamentation in e Secondly, δολοζ as a human strategy is generally significant in the narrative, e g in the case of Penelope it stands for the "Scheme of Weaving", in that of Aigisthus-Klytaimnestra for the "Murder of Agamemnon" and in that of Telemachus for "Vengeance upon the suitors" These repetitions of the word δολοζ, pointing up "contrasts" and "parallels" between different characters, including of course Odysseus himself, must have contributed much to the audience's appreciation of the orally recited poem Thirdly, the word is employed effectively to delineate the characters of the persons concerned The derivatives of δολοζ, as well as ψευδοζ and its derivatives, are morefrequently and significantly applied in Od than in Il Striking is the equivalency of "δολω" and "αμφαδον" in the advice given by Athena and Teiresias (α 296 a= λ 120 a) Here can be seen quite another norm of moral values than that in Il (cf H 243) As observed also from Athena's applause of Odysseus in ν where the goddess places the hero on a par with herself by using the "dual-number" (296 f), the words απατη and δολοζ in Od are not tinged with a negative import but generally with a rather positive one Nevertheless δολοζ may be regarded as having a negative implication when its agents, like Aigisthus and Clytaimnestra, are devoid of the virtues of patience and self-possession It is indeed with these virtues that Odysseus and Penelope resort to δολοζ, especially the former who, by being πολυτλαζ and πολυμητιζ, succeeded not only in reestablishing his status in Ithaka but also in establishing himself as a "hero" entirely different from Achilleus in Il

著者

佐野 好則

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.1-11, 2011

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Nestor's story in Iliad 11 seems to be without close correspondences with the main plot of the epic, unlike other paradeigmata in the Iliad such as the story of Meleager and the story of Niobe. Still, critics have detected some elements which are similar to the situations surrounding the Greeks in the Iliad, such as the loss of leading warriors and the besieged city of Tryoessa. A notable feature of the story is the similarity of Nestor's valour in the cattle raid and in the battle against the Epeians. Another notable feature is the repeated references to Nestor's relationship to his father Neleus. Both of these features strengthen the contrast between Nestor who displayed his valour though his father forbade him to enter the battle, and Achilleus who does not display his valour though his father Peleus ordered him to do so. These elements contribute to the function of this story as a paradeigma for Achilleus. Patroclus is moved by the story, and when he sees Achilleus in book 16 and reports Nestor's words, he does not overtly ask Achilleus to return to battle. Instead, Patroclus emphatically asks Achilleus to let him return to battle, though this was only Nestor's second option. Those elements in Nestor's story in book 11 which strengthen its function as a paradeigma for Achilleus are so designed that they also work on Patroclus. In Nestor's story, the point where Nestor stopped his pursuit of the enemies and withdrew is clearly marked. It is notable that the moment when Patroclus should have stopped his pursuit of the Trojans is emphasized. This contrast between Nestor and Patroclus is discernible for the audience (or readers) of the Iliad who know the outcome of the influence of Nestor's story on Patroclus through the course of the epic. Nestor's story, which seems to be merely a lengthy and garrulous boast, is skillfully connected to the main plot of the Iliad on different levels: It is scattered with elements which strengthen its function as a paradeigma both for Achilleus and Patroclus. It also points to Patroclus' death through a notable contrast between this story and the course of events in the main plot of the epic.

著者

松永 雄二

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.73-87, 1962-03-31 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Plato's formula of the One and the Many, as ιδεα and the sensibles respectively, is comprised in the recognition of Beauty itself and many beautiful things, without regard to their being man, horse, clothes etc Strictly speaking, these beautiful things are not beautiful man and horse, etc, but simply 'the many beautifuls'-whereas in Aristotle such a concept is inadmissible in his system a horse as a substance must be recognized as the substratum of the 'beautiful' In Phaedo 102 B3 ff, however, Simmias is said to be grasped independently and absolutely as a participant in the ιδεα(e g in the ιδεα "the Tall" or "the Small") and always remains as he is (i e having identity), no matter what ιδεα he takes In this trend of thought, does Plato recognize Simmias as a kind of substance=substratum, as Aristotle hold ? If so, does not Plato explain only alteration (αλλοιωσιζ) in his "causal" theory of ideas ? And does he recognize the independent reality of the so-called particulars (i e of physical things) apart from the ιδεα ? αλλοιωσιζ, however, even in Aristotle, is not αλλοιωσιζ simply because it is the alteration of qualities In order to be αλλοιωσιζ, the qualities to be changed must be the proper qualities, winch belong to the Substance itself (Arist De gen et corr, A 4, 319b 10 ff) But in the case of Plato the change can never be explained satisfactorily in terms of the changeable things, but only in the fact of their participation in the ιδεα so also the above-mentioned change in Simmias is not the change of his properties, which are primarily attached to Simmias himself The case is, strictly speaking, not then that Simmias became beautiful, but that something beautiful happened in Simmias Therefore Simmias here is only a locus in which Beauty appears-never a substance which has the quality "beautiful" in itself What, however, is Simmias as a locus ? Indeed he may not possess such a quality as beauty, yet we tend to attribute the term "man" and other definitions to Simmias as his inherent qualities But Plato never recognized Simmias as a Substance qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, Even in Aristotle, Simmias qua Simmias is not the same as Simmias qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but only something combined with various attributes which belong to the respective categories In Plato, still more, Simmias is never identical with the "man as immanent ιδεα" -Thus, ultimately, both philosophers recognize that Simmias is different from ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but the understanding of the content of this so-called Simmias qua Simmias is utterly different in the two cases whereas in Aristotle qua Simmias is thought to have all the distinct qualities which characterize the concrete man Simmias, in Plato, the so-called Simmias qua Simmias is understood as having no distinct attributes, when he loses the connection with the ιδεα of man It is this "Simmias" of which Plato speaks when he describes him as the participant in the "Tall" and "the Small" For in the case of Plato two propositions (1) "This fire is hot" and (2) "This fire is beautiful" are differentiated from each other, and may be put as follows the former (1) shows that the ειδοζ "Fire" is combined with the ειδοζ "Hot" eternally and essentially So it is changeable into a universal proposition But in the latter (2), because fire is not always beautiful, it is not a combination between the ειδοζ "Fire" and ειδοζ "Beauty" So in this case we can only assert "this thing is beautiful" In Plato's thought we can never grasp this event in the form "This fire is beautiful" So it follows that the relation between substance and attributes in the system of Aristotle is, from Plato's standpoint, the reverse of the relationship of the One and the Many Aristotle refers the many(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

各著者

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, pp.99-152, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

著者

永井 龍男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.59-69, 1993-03-23 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In De Anima II 12 and III 1, Aristotle argues that the common sensibles (movement, rest, figure, magnitude and number)are perceived by each special sense only per accidens and they are perceived per se by a common sense. To understand Aristotle's theory of the common sense consistently, however, we must answer the following three questions. The first is whether the common sense is an independent faculty of the special senses or not. This needs consideration , because at the beginning of De Anima III 1 Aristotle denies that there is any sence faculty or any sense organ other than those of five special senses. The common sense is a part of the perceptual faculties of the primary (central) sense organ. Likewise, in the case of the special senses, their perceptions are achieved ultimately in the primary sense organ. Then, the faculty of perception which belongs to the primary sense organ is also contained in the special senses. Accordingly, for the common sense, we don't need any sense organ other than those needed for the special senses. In a way, the special senses as a whole contain the common sense. The second question is as follows : Aristotle thinks all the senses are the faculties receiving sensible forms, but what are the forms of the common sensibles? In De Anima 424a17-b3 and 426a27-b7, Aristotle insists that the sense is some sort of ratio(logos), and the former passage suggests that sensible forms are some type of ratios as well, This suggestion is confirmed by the arguments in De Sensu. Then, it is possible to take the forms of the common sensibles as some type of ratios. The interpretation above enables us to construe the form of magnitude as the external ratio of an extension of some object to the extensions of other objects, and the form of figure as the internal ratio between some parts of the extension of an object. The third question is how we can defend the commonness of the common sensibles to the special senses against G. Berkeley's arguments which deny the commonness of magnitude and of figure to sight and touch. If we regard the forms of the common sensibles not as extentions as such but as some type of ratios, we can defend the commonness. Having identified magnitude with extention, Berkeley puts two points. (1) The visible objects(colour, light)and the tangible objects (solidity, resistance)are entirely different, therefore, there are fundamental differences between the visible magnitude and the tangible magnitude and between the visible figure and the tangible figure. (2) The tangible extension(i. e. magnitude) is invariably the same, but the visible extension(i. e. magnitude)varies as you approach or recede. If we deny the identity of magnitude with extension and consider(with Aristotle)that the magnitude is a sort of ratio, then these two points are clarified. For, first, although the visible extension and the tangible extension is radically different, the ratio of some extension to other extensions can be common to sight and touch. And, secondly, it is true that the visible extension of the same object changes according to its distance, but it is possible that in different perspectives the changing extension refers to the same ratio. Thus, we can defend the commonness of the common sensibles against Berkeley's arguments.

著者

小池 和子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, pp.136-139, 2013-03-28 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

長谷川 岳男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.79-89, 1994-03-28 (Released:2017-05-23)

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The nature of assemblies convened at the synodoi and the synkletoi in the second century B. C. is one of the most inextricable questions in the study of political organizations in the Achaian Confederacy. This is because Polybios' descriptions on the Achaian Confederacy are replete with contradictions. This paper investigated the question above by re-examining the evidence concerning Achaian assemblies. It is generally accepted that the synodos and the synkletos are not terms indicating the bodies of the assemblies. "Synodos" merely means a regular meeting, held four times a year, while "synkletos" means a specially summoned extraordinary meeting. Many scholars have thought that a primary assembly had been originally convened and resolved all subjects in the synodoi, but after regulations were introduced in the late third century B. C. which forbade summoning the primary assembly except for special subjects, e. g. alliance, war or written communications from the Roman Senate, the synkletos was created to deal with important subjects and the synodos began to deal only with routine subjects. This assumption is mainly based on Polybios' description of the synkletos held in Sikyon in 169 B. C. His writings indicate that this synkletos was assembled to discuss military aid to Egypt after an appeal that it was illegal to discuss this subject in the synodos was made. The synkletos was opened not only to the boule but also to all citizens over thirty. Based on this information, the synkletos was generally regarded as a primary assembly which dealt with special subjects. If, however, a primary assembly was convened in the synkletos, two problems arise. First, the membership of this meeting excluded citizens in their twenties and those serving in the Achaian army. This contradicts several passages which imply that the Achaian army occasionaly acted as the equivalent of an assembly. Therefore, it was not an ekklesia that was summoned in the synkletos. Second, military aid was not a subject which required summoning the primary assembly(cf. XXVII. 2. 11-12). Furthermore, several kinds of assemblies could be specially summoned. In concluson, "synkletos" referred not only to a specially summoned primary assembly but also to all kinds of assemblies which were specially summoned (i. e. in the Greek original sense). Therefore, another explanation is required for Polybios' description that the synkletos was specially held in Sikyon. For this purpose, the synodos in the second century B. C. should be examined. Many studies have centered on the synodos and attempted to prove that a specific assembly, either a boule or an ekklesia, was convened in every synodos. Unless, however, one abandons this preconceived idea that earlier scholars have had, the contradictions between the two types of synodoi, a boule and an ekklesia that were mentioned in Polybios' descriptions, are inextricable. By careful examination of the descriptions, it is evident that an ekklesia convened in the synodos dealt with subjects prescribed by the regulations mentioned above to be resolved by an ekklesia, while boulai convened in synodoi dealt with subjects which were not prescribed by the regulations. Besides, Polybios' narrative on the synodoi implies that the magistrates were summoned before a synodos to discuss the subject. In conclusion, one can say that the federal magistrates chose the body of the assembly according to the subject to be dealt with by each synodos as well as by each synkletos. This assumption explains why the synodos held in 168 B. C. could not deal with military aid for Egypt. Since the magistrates summoned an ekklesia in this synodos disregarding that this subject could not be discussed in an ekklesia, a synkletos was specially convened in Sikyon to discuss the matter. One concludes upon these re-examinations that the Achaian assemblies,(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

藤澤

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.179-180, 1986-03-18 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

久保 正彰

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.100-103, 1962

著者

三嶋 輝夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.1-12, 2004-03-05 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In the following, I would like first to clarify what Cleitophon actually demands from Socrates in the eponymous dialogue Second, I sketch how Socrates is depicted in it Third, I examine the legitimacy of Cleitophon's demands and, finally, take up the vexed problem of authorship 1 What does Cleitophon demand from Socrates? Cleitophon expresses his demands in various forms Though Cleitophon does not articulate the nature of their relationship, we could take him to demand two things, namely (i) to go beyond a mere exhortation and grasp the matter fully (cf 408d3-4), that is, to define what justice is by giving its peculiar ergon (cf 409b6-c1), and (ii) to give a concrete advice concerning the next step which corresponds to the nature of Cleitophon's soul (cf 410d1-5) 2 What features does Socrates have in the Cleitophon ? Socrates here should be differentiated into two figures the Socrates in the frame dialogue, who directly speaks to Cleitophon (Sc1), and the Socrates indirectly portrayed by Cleitophon (Sc2) Most of the thoughts put into the mouth of Sc2, except for Polemarchus' thesis, can be regarded as basically Platonic, whereas Sc1 shows both Platonic and non-Platonic traits This strongly suggests that the main target of the author is the Socrates of Plato, giving some hint as to the authorship 3 Is the demand made by Cleitophon legitimate? On this, there seem to be three options A Cleitophon's demand (CD) is legitimate because he rightly sees the dangerous consequence of being merely protreptic and leaving the young at a loss without giving any positive guidance B1 CD is illegitimate because he understands neither Socrates' role as a "midwife" nor the meaning of philosophizing in a Socratic sense B2 CD is illegitimate because Socrates actually gave a definite practical principle, namely the absolute denial of doing injustice (adikein) B1 appears to be convincing, but in view of the similar demand made by Glaukon in the Republic II, it is highly likely that Plato himself felt some uneasiness about the aporetic ending of the first book, which undoubtedly stands in close connection with the Cleitophon B2 deserves serious consideration Still, it seems to me that B2 cannot satisfy CD either, so long as Socrates offers no clear definition of injustice itself From all this, I am inclined to agree with A 4 Is the Cleitophon Plato's work ? Apart from other grounds for doubt, the problem of wrongly ascribing the "Harming enemies and helping friends" principle to Socrates still remains the fatal stumbling block to claims of authenticity The only possible way to avoid this would be to regard the Cleitophon as a draft conceived before the Republic I, which seems to me very improbable It is more plausible to assume, as some scholars have already done, that somebody other than Plato wrote the Cleitophon after reading the Republic I, and that Plato, having found Cleitophon's demand to be justified, then wrote the rest of the Republic

著者

池田 黎太郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.22-27, 1969

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この小論はOresteiaをθρασο&b.sigmav;に基づくδικηの否定という観点から論じようと試みる.周知のようにδικηはこの作品の中心になる重要な思想であり,それを主に「正義・裁き・報復」の意味に分ける.δικηはこの劇の中で,「正義の名によって敵を裁く行為が実は報復にほかならない」というパターンを構成し,報復は報復を呼んで悲劇的な悪循環を生ずる.これがアトレウス家に伝わる呪いの実態であり,オレステースの母殺しはその呪いの頂点に立つ.女神アテーナーはオレステースの罪を裁き,「自らの手」による報復行為を否定すると共に,劇の背後にある市民の抗争をも警告している.この報復のδικηをθρασο&b.sigmav;, τολμαとして把えようとする私の試みは,アトレウス家の呪いと,当時のポリスの問題の特質を示し,この伝承を劇化した作者の意図を明らかにすることができると思う.

著者

瀬口 昌久

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.25-35, 1994

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An Eleatic stranger presents the definition that being is nothing but power or function(dynamis)in the Sophist(247d-e). However, this definition is not accepted by the friends of the Forms because they are afraid of the paradox that Reality must be acted upon in so far as it is known(248a4-248e5). They believe that cannot happen to the changeless. I shall attempt to clarify the purpose of this paradox and whether the definition of being as power is maintained. D. Keyt analysed the paradox and found that it is based on five premises (Plato's Paradox that the Immutable is Unknowable, PQ, 19, 1969, 1-14). (1) Real being is completely changeless. (2) Being is known. (3)To know is to act on something. (4)If knowing is acting on something, then that which is known is acted upon. (5)To be acted upon is to be changed. Premises(2)-(5)entail the denial of(1) , which contradicts the belief of the friends of the Forms. Does Plato avoid the contradiction? If so, how? As Keyt points out, no one has claimed that Plato rejects either(2) or(4). I shall consider premises(1) , (3) and(5). Many commentators(e. g. J. Moravcsik, G. E. L. Owen, I. M. Crombie, R. S. Bluck, W. G. Runciman)think that Plato rejects(1). However, they are claiming that the Forms are subject to change only in the sense that dated propositions are true of them, not that the Forms undergo a change of their own nature when they are known. If the Form of Justice is known by an individual, a temporal proposition is added to the Form, and then the Form is changed in an accidental way. However, this view has no textual evidence. On the contrary, it contradicts the statement in the Timaeus that the Forms are timeless (37e1-38a8). W. D. Ross suggests that(3) is the only explicit hypothesis of the five and holds the view that in knowledge the object acts on the mind not vice versa. Ross ignores the fact that the paradox is meant to damage the claim that the power of acting or being acted upon belongs to becoming but not to being (Keyt, p. 4). Other commentators(F. M. Corn ford, H. Cherniss, G. Vlastos)suppose that Plato himself will abandon(5). They think that the spiritual motion distinguished from the physical does not alter its objects. Keyt and A. C. Ray criticize this interpretation on the ground that the distinction between physical and spiritual motion is not drawn in the Sophist. If it had been drawn, the friends of the Forms would not have adhered to(5). I support the denial of(5). The problem is why the friends of Forms stick to(5). I connect the definition of being as power with the perception theory in the Theaetetus(155e-157d). "More refined and subtle people" in the Theaetetus maintain the principle that everything arises from the motion of two kinds of power, the one being active and the other passive. I suggest the definition of being in the Sophist derives from this Heraclitean principle of being. Plato deliberately omits the crucial word "kinesis" in the Heraclitean principle from the definition of being in the Sophist. It is by virtue of this omission that the definition of being can be applied to real being as well as material things. Moreover, when the notion of the active and passive power is distinguished from that of changes or motions, the definition will ensure Plato's view of the communion of Forms. The paradox shows the absurdity which arises when we connect the active and passive power of Forms with motion or change. Plato's aim in the paradox is to establish the view that the power of Forms need not cause changes in its objects. I conclude that the definition of being as power is maintained and not given up after the paradox and is the key to understanding the meaning of real being.

著者

藤繩 謙三

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.14-25, 1961-03-29 (Released:2017-05-23)

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The peculiar use of the chariots in the Iliad is usually explained as being due to Homer's ignorance of their use among the Mycenaeans who must have "fought like the Hittites" (D. Gray). Of course, there are some passages in the Iliad which suggest that the Mycenaeans attempted such chariot fighting (e. g. Nestor's advice to his charioteers, -A 297 ff.), and the Linear B tablets attest the existence of some hundreds of chariots in Knossos and Pylos. In spite of these facts, considering the geographical conditions of Greece, we cannot imagine that such tactics were so effective as to be widely used. So I think the assumption doubtful that Homer had forgotten Mycenaean chariot tactics, and having reexamined the text of the Iliad, I point out some evidence against the assumption. (1) Even among the chief heroes we find some who have no chariot for their own use, to say nothing of chariot troops (e. g. Odysseus, Aias of Salamis, Teukros and Aias of Lokris). As this difference among the heroes must be due to the geographical conditions, it certainly existed in the Mycenaean Age. Moreover, since Odysseus and Aias of Salamis are on equal terms with the other heroes, the possession of chariots must have been of little importance. (2) Among the Achaeans, fifteen persons have epithets relating to horses (or chariots), ten of them being of the former generation (e. g. Pelops, Atreus, Peleus and Nestor), and only five in the prime of life (e. g. Diomedes and Patroklos). This curious ratio shows that, though in earlier times horses (or chariots) had been highly esteemed, their value became lower towards the end of the Mycenaean Age. This change suggests that they were not effective in actual battles. (3) While we find many formulae which depict the scenes of jumping down, falling or making a person fall, from a chariot, there is no set formulae in the Iliad which depict an attack from a chariot. But a few passages show that Homer himself (or his immediate predecessors) aimed to depict attacks from chariots, combining spear-throwing formulae with a falling-from-a-chariot formula (Ε 275-97, Θ116-23). Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not Homer but the stock of the traditional formulae, that is responsible for the treating of the chariots as mere vehicles. We cannot assume that Homer or his immediate predecessors should have left out, if there had been any, fighting-from-chariots formulae, since they sometimes wanted to depict such scenes. Moreover, some parallel cases confirm the possibility that formulae which are inconsistent with each other do co-exist. So it does not seem possible that the fighting-from-chariots formulae arose from the many treatments in chariot fighting in the Mycenaean Epics. One is inclined to conclude that with regard to the use of chariots there was no great difference between the Mycenaean World and the Homeric.

著者

鎌田 雅年

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.50-60, 1997-03-10 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In Plato's Apology, Socrates claims that he knows nothing good on the one hand and indicates almost absolute confidence concerning the righteousness of his philosophical activities on the other. I think the latter appears in this claim of knowledge of his. "I know it is evil and disgraceful to do injustice and to disobey my superior, god or man."(29b) What is the relationship between this claim of knowledge and his consciousness of knowing nothing good and how does this claim of knowledge make him confident? G. Vlastos thinks Socrates had a special kind of knowledge and so a certain extent of virtue and therefore thought his life was happy. Vlastos regarded Socrates' knowledge in the weaker sense as elenctically justifiable beliefs and considered Socrates' conviction dependant on such knowledge. According to Vlastos, such knowledge always has 'a security-gap,' i. e. the possibility of being false. However, we do not want to decrease this 'gap' at the expense of our daily utilities and try to live with this fallible knowledge. The trial described in the Apology is not a daily event but a situation unavoidable for Socrates' life and death. For this reason, I can not think that the basis for deciding whether our way of life is just or not is on the same level as a simple decision in daily life. Therefore, even if the knowledge in 29b is fallible knowledge in Vlastos' sense, I think it can not explain Socrates' moral conviction about the righteousness of his philosophical activities. In the Apology, one aspect of the knowledge Socrates ascribes to himself is the so-called 'consciousness of ignorance.' Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness to his knowledge. On his first interpretation of the oracle of Delphi, the god of Delphi allows only Socrates' consciousness of ignorance as a kind of knowledge. The knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b includes moral judgements. Therefore, Socrates' basis for this knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in relation to his claim of consciousness of ignorance. One way to resolve this problem is to take it into account that Socrates apologizes during his trial. In a trial, it is necessary not only to clearly tell his audience what he knows, but also to clarify the basis of his knowledge. But does he need to show the basis of the knowledge-claims in 29b and 37b? What he said there is, if we take his words at their face value, self-evident to his audience, but recognizing what is implied, we(and also his audience)can not accept Socrates' words easily. Namely, he says he chooses the death penalty rather than the banishment from his country. This is what anyone in his audience would expect, but could not be persuaded easily. For without any other condition, anyone of us would wish to avoid the death penalty. But Socrates had an inviolable condition. So in the Apology 29b, he does not simply claim the truth of his beliefs but also emphasizes that there is a firm basis for the knowledge-claim and that he had a resolute will to behave according to his beliefs. I think the very basis which he was ready to bring forward as his witness is at the core of his moral conviction. Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness for the knowledge-claim in 29b and 37b. However, as previously said, the oracle of Delphi does not issue substantive statements or commands. In short, he 'interprets' the oracle as a command of the god and on this interpretation relates his consciousness of his ignorance to the knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b. I think this interpretation makes his conviction firmer. For the basis of his knowledge is what Socrates can not doubt the truth of, i. e. the oracle of Delphi brought to Socrates from an external source. In addition, he accepted this oracle as seriously as his own consciousness after prolonged philosophical activity(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

安西 眞

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.1-11, 1998

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As editor's critical sign in the present editions of Bacchylides shows, the supplement α[ιξν, ω] at Bacchylides 2. 1 will certainly be correct. The reference, however, to Pindaric parallels, "N. 5. 2 etc."(etc. means 0. 14. 20 as the history of the supplement demonstrates), which was first made by Kenyon and has been made by Teubner-B. editors and still stands in the ap. cr. of the present edition, is, I am afraid, misleading. αιξον, ελθε (0. 14. 20), and στειχε(N. 5. 2)are of similar meaning(of human physical actions, of going and coming), in the same person(2sg.)that represents "my song", in the same mood(imperative) , and belong to the same poetical tradition(as the variations of homeric "Sing-Muse"). Moreover, all these verbs work as a principal part of the same grammatical pattern, that is, they all work as the finite verb in the same structure[finite verb in the first person or in the persons related to the first person with a connotation of human physical action(go, jump, stop etc.) +participle which stands on human verbal capacity(sing, talk etc.)] Therefore, the reference made by the editors since Kenyon to these Pindaric "parallels" seems on the surface to be reasonable enough. The stylistic backgrounds, however, of each poet are entirely different. In sing-Muse-motif or in I-sing-motif, Pindar consistently uses verbs with connotation of human physical action ; Bacchylides uses them only here. In Pindar's epinicia we find 23 sentences in the grammatical pattern which is just mentioned ; in Bacchylides', on the contrary, αιξον φερουσ' αγγελιαν is a unique instance. Behind their differences in terms of style and sentencestructure shown here I see their basic difference in the mode of epinicionmaking: Pindar heavily relied upon the chorus'(i. e. ego in his epinicia) physical competence in their performance as well as on their verbal capaclty; their physical competence, on the other hand, never entered Bacchylides' mind when he was making his epinician text. Concerning, therefore, both poets' mode of epinicion-making, the ap. cr. could be considered misleading.