著者

鎌田 雅年

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.50-60, 1997

---

<p>In Plato's Apology, Socrates claims that he knows nothing good on the one hand and indicates almost absolute confidence concerning the righteousness of his philosophical activities on the other. I think the latter appears in this claim of knowledge of his. "I know it is evil and disgraceful to do injustice and to disobey my superior, god or man."(29b) What is the relationship between this claim of knowledge and his consciousness of knowing nothing good and how does this claim of knowledge make him confident? G. Vlastos thinks Socrates had a special kind of knowledge and so a certain extent of virtue and therefore thought his life was happy. Vlastos regarded Socrates' knowledge in the weaker sense as elenctically justifiable beliefs and considered Socrates' conviction dependant on such knowledge. According to Vlastos, such knowledge always has 'a security-gap,' i. e. the possibility of being false. However, we do not want to decrease this 'gap' at the expense of our daily utilities and try to live with this fallible knowledge. The trial described in the Apology is not a daily event but a situation unavoidable for Socrates' life and death. For this reason, I can not think that the basis for deciding whether our way of life is just or not is on the same level as a simple decision in daily life. Therefore, even if the knowledge in 29b is fallible knowledge in Vlastos' sense, I think it can not explain Socrates' moral conviction about the righteousness of his philosophical activities. In the Apology, one aspect of the knowledge Socrates ascribes to himself is the so-called 'consciousness of ignorance.' Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness to his knowledge. On his first interpretation of the oracle of Delphi, the god of Delphi allows only Socrates' consciousness of ignorance as a kind of knowledge. The knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b includes moral judgements. Therefore, Socrates' basis for this knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in relation to his claim of consciousness of ignorance. One way to resolve this problem is to take it into account that Socrates apologizes during his trial. In a trial, it is necessary not only to clearly tell his audience what he knows, but also to clarify the basis of his knowledge. But does he need to show the basis of the knowledge-claims in 29b and 37b? What he said there is, if we take his words at their face value, self-evident to his audience, but recognizing what is implied, we(and also his audience)can not accept Socrates' words easily. Namely, he says he chooses the death penalty rather than the banishment from his country. This is what anyone in his audience would expect, but could not be persuaded easily. For without any other condition, anyone of us would wish to avoid the death penalty. But Socrates had an inviolable condition. So in the Apology 29b, he does not simply claim the truth of his beliefs but also emphasizes that there is a firm basis for the knowledge-claim and that he had a resolute will to behave according to his beliefs. I think the very basis which he was ready to bring forward as his witness is at the core of his moral conviction. Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness for the knowledge-claim in 29b and 37b. However, as previously said, the oracle of Delphi does not issue substantive statements or commands. In short, he 'interprets' the oracle as a command of the god and on this interpretation relates his consciousness of his ignorance to the knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b. I think this interpretation makes his conviction firmer. For the basis of his knowledge is what Socrates can not doubt the truth of, i. e. the oracle of Delphi brought to Socrates from an external source. In addition, he accepted this oracle as seriously as his own consciousness after prolonged philosophical activity</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

伊藤 照夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.49-57, 1985

---

Here we do not pretend to solve all problems of the Stoic doctrine of Zeus the father-god or even to cover the whole ground which they embrace. Our interest is confined to the meaning and reference of προτερη γενεη and its combination with Zeus-θαυμα-ονειαρ. While agriculture and navigation are complements each of the other in Aratus, above all within his general (and traditional) idea of human life, Zeus in the proem turns his eyes away from navigators and exclusively upon ploughmen. This deflection of σημα is suggestive of subsequent development, that is to introduce Nyx and her σημα for navigators. Nyx, both αρχαιη and ουρανιη, is, the double image of Zeus, much more active than Zeus himself and personifies the "night-motif". Night as the stage of the starry sky and its personification alone enable men to distinguish all σηματα. τι&b.sigmav; ανδρων (373), too, does so, and that by originating a new method for men, the constellation, which should correct the method of Zeus (cf. 11 αστρα διακρινα&b.sigmav;→375 παντων οιοθι κεκριμενωνv). Nyx and τι&b.sigmav; αν., whose name and epithet build up a remote antiquity and a mythical fiction around them, can convert θαυμα-Zeus into ονειαρ-Zeus for men, through intervening in their life. But this connection is also fictive and intends to show the origin of the relation between stars and men. Then we can identify πρ. γεν., whose name describes the same mythical situation as that of Nyx and τι&b.sigmav; αν. does, with them. In Phaenomena θαυμα mirrors and means all aspects of the reaction of men against Zeus or the celestial world. Despite the dissolution of θαυμα by πρ. γεν. it remains still in the sky: nameless stars, which do not associate themselves with any constellation, and some constellations of which the shape and name stir up θαυμα again in the mind of men (e.g. Engonasin). Then that paradox rises (cf. 374 f. απαντ'……ηλιθα). But πρ. γεν., who will favour men constantly and devotedly, has nothing to do with it. Aratus shows us the origin of the paradox implicitly and skillfully. The contrast between ειδεα and ειδωλον is in this case more remarkable and intentional, because the former, only one example (381), indicates the shape of the constellation which τι&b.sigmav; αν. first designed, and the latter, nine examples, does for some of the constellations which were transmitted from τι&b.sigmav; αν. to mankind. The ειδλον means therefore constellations like Engonasin and nameless stars which men could not appreciate just as τι&b.sigmav; αν. intended and then which men see with θαυμα. From ειδεα to ειδωλον: in this process that paradox rises and gains ironical significance. It is through the same process as this that Nyx and her σημα finally lead also navigators to the ironical paradox. Men have themselves to blame for the failure. Gods favour men and lead them to ovsiccp. But θαυμα sometimes leads them astray. We may name such a belief "theodicy" as some interpreters do, and it goes without saying that Aratus intends there an ironical effect. In Phaenomena Aratus' purpose, the sole aim, is to describe the celestial sphere, in other words, to explain all σημαγα as intelligibly as possible. He could not, however, suppress his intent to install here one particular point (and the originality of this work), namely, when and how men have a concern with stars. For that purpose the mythical digressions were created by him. In parallel with the association between πρ. γεν. and mankind, then Zeus, the kindly father-god of the Stoics, rises again to the surface now as θαυμα, now as ονειαρ. Zeus is not always ovsiccp for men and that in consequence of mankind being paradoxical. It may safely be said that Aratus' Phaenomena is more ironical than allegorical.

著者

平山 晃司

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, pp.86-97, 2001-03-05 (Released:2017-05-23)

---

There has long been a controversy among scholars about how pharmakoi, or ancient Greek human scapegoats, were treated at the end of the ritual, namely, whether they were killed or not The disagreement among modern scholars has been caused by that among ancient writers some state that the pharmakoi were put to death, while others indicate their being driven out of the community But it makes little difference whether they were slam or expelled Greater significance is to be attached to the fact that some of those scholiasts and lexicographers who refer to the pharmakos ritual assert that stoning was performed in it Of the two sources for the pharmakos ritual at Abdera the scholiast on Ovid(Ibts 467)states that in that city the scapegoat was killed with stones every year, whereas the commentator on a Callimachus line (fr 90 Pfeiffer) asserts that he was stoned until he was driven over the borders There is a similar discrepancy between the two sources for the purificatory ritual at Massalia while Servius states that the ritual was performed as often as the citizens were suffering from pestilence and that it culminated in mere casting out of the scapegoat, according to 'Lactantius Placidus' the ritual was held annually and at the end of it the scapegoat was led out of the city beyond its boundaries and then was stoned to death What caused these discrepancies? As for the latter case, one could surmise that for some reason Servius and 'Lactantius' both misconstrued the following circumstances in Massalia in very ancient times, whenever they suffered from pestilence, they would kill a scapegoat with stones so as to save their own lives, this practice was gradually established as an annually performed ritual for averting pestilence, and subsequently the final treatment of the scapegoat changed into banishment from the city, possibly accompanied by a ceremonial stoning Such may be the case also with Abdera and the scholiast on Ibis may have made a mistake similar to that of 'Lactantius' The following two sources provide some support for this view (1) According to Helladius, the pharmakos ritual held at Athens has its origin in the unlawful death of Androgeos and the ensuing pestilential disease this suggests that the Athenians purified their city with scapegoats to survive the plague What was the ultimate fate of the original pharmakoi ? An account of Plutarch (Mor 297b-c) and an episode in Philostratus (VA 4 10)enable one to conjecture that they were stoned to death And we are informed by Harpocration that the Athenians would expel two pharmakoi during the festival of Thargelia Thus the same process of change as is supposed for Massalia (and perhaps for Abdera) can be detected here (2) According to Ister, as cited by Harpocration, a man named Pharmakos stole the sacred bowls of Apollo and was stoned to death, and at the Thargelia (of an unknown Ionian city) certain things were performed in imitation of this event Very probably the principal thing performed during the rite was a ceremonial stoning (or pelting with harmless objects such as, for example, squill bulbs) accompanying the expulsion of the pharmakos Here too the above-mentioned process can be well perceived From the materials shown above it may be inferred that in very ancient times in some Greek cities, on the occasion of crises such as plague or famine or drought, to purify the city they would stone to death either the perpetrator of a sacrilegious act which was regarded as the cause of the disaster, or scapegoat(s), if it was of unknown origin Such a practice was gradually established as an annual event with the purpose of averting calamity, and subsequently the expulsion of scapegoat (s) from the community became the essential element of the ritual and stoning changed into a symbolical, ceremonial act performed in casting out the scapegoat (s)

著者

中村 友代

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, pp.60-72, 2013

---

The "Alexander Sarcophagus" is one of the most celebrated works in the Hellenistic period. One of the six reliefs that decorated the sarcophagus shows a battle scene with Alexander the Great even though most scholars believe that the sarcophagus was not made for him but for Abdalonymos, the last king of Sidon in the 4^<th> century BCE. This paper aims at an iconographic interpretation of the battle scene featuring Alexander the Great through comparison with battle scenes made in the same period. What was the most important agenda for Abdalonymos, and what message did he intend to convey with the battle scene? Hence I would like to suggest a different point of views from previous studies. Most scholars identify the figure on the far left as Alexander wearing a lion-skin headgear. Based on his depiction, many scholars suggested that the relief shows a historical battle scene and tried to establish a connection between the relief and literature sources. Nowadays, the scene is often identified as the battle of Issus(333 BCE). There are, however, scholars who suggest a different interpretation, namely that the relief shows a symbolic or unidentifiable generic battle scene. It should be worthwhile to compare this battle scene with other contemporary battle scenes - for example, on the "Amazon Sarcophagus" in Vienna - in order to throw some light on the theme. As far as we know, similar works represented generic figures with idealized features. There are many similar motifs between these works and the Alexander sarcophagus that could be categorized as conventional topoi. A noteworthy difference between the battle scene on the Alexander sarcophagus and comparable reliefs' lies in the rendering of Alexander. Comparing the sarcophagus with the "Alexander Mosaic", which also depicted battle scene with Alexander, we find many similar motifs. Both works are considered to be influenced by the same original, a painting made in the 4^<th> century BCE. But it should be noted that there are distinguished differences between both works. Firstly, the expression on the sarcophagus is far less triumphant than on the mosaic. Secondly, Alexander is portrayed on the sarcophagus wearing lion-skin headgear, it's clearly an expression of his divinity. We know that Alexander wore lion-skin headgear which is an attribute of Hercules' because he saw himself as a descendant and rival of Hercules. Besides, there is no reference proving that Alexander fought with the lion-skin headgear on battlefields. According to ancient literature sources, Abdalonymos was appointed king of Sidon by Alexander. For Abdalonymos, it was most important to commemorate both the authority and the divinity of Alexander, the origin of his own royal authority. Very probably, the rendering of the victory over Persia was to him a matter of secondary concern.

著者

松原 俊文

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.150-154, 2011-03-23 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

田中 邦夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.169-173, 1972

著者

内田 次信

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.14-28, 1981

---

Was Pindar "honest" or not in his praises of victors? To answer this question we should deal with each ode separately, for his odes were written for different men, on different occasions. I discuss three cases in this paper(the text used is that of Bowra). First, Isthmian 2. I interpret its proem in line with Farnell and Bowra. The poet is asking Thrasybulos in indirect words for the payment promised, seemingly, by the late Xenocrates in exchange for this ode or the odes including this. Now, the poet's veiled requestruns through the ode. In vv. 23-27, "ανεγνον" and "ασπαζοντο" point, as a preliminary suggestion, to vv. 43-45, where Thrasybulos is required not to reject "these hymns". In vv. 35-42, the long praise of the late father hints, "You, the son, should be equaly hospitable". The poet tries to bring home this hint by quoting his own Pyth.6 (vv. 50 ff.) , an ode which was written to praise the son's filial devotion to the father. Thrasybulos is asked to perform as a dutiful son this Isthm. 2 which celebrates his father's memory. Now, in conclusion in this ode, Pindar's praises of his Standesgenossen are never wholly false on any occasion. In this case, however, we cannot but feel that the words to Thrasybulos(v. 12, 48) are somewhat "cajoling", and that the praise of the father is intended in part as a"tool". Secondly, Ol. 13 and fr. 107. It is argued by Norwood and Meautis that the poet dislikes Xenophon, the receiver of these odes. One of Norwood's points is that Xenophon receives not a word of praise in Ol. 13 except the mere naming of his victories. But, the words of v. 1 or vv. 30-1 serve fully as praise. Moreover, the long praise of Corinth or the Corinthian virtues in vv. 4-23b is not irrelevant, but intensifies as a foil the value of the rare achievement of Xenophon praised in vv. 30-1. In the section after the myths no mention of Xenophon is made(Hamilton, Epinikion 108 n. 5). It is not a mark of Pindar's coldness to Xenophon. Fr. 107 for the hieroduloi is also called to witness by the two scholars. The poet is playful in this fragment through and through. Vv. 1-9 recall to us the Greek "prejudice" about women's lewdness shown mythologically in Teiresias' story. Pindar is jokingly indignant of the license given to the hieroduloi. Vv. 13-15 are also playful. Pindar was doubtlessly embarassed at first by the order of a song for the hieroduloi, but he performed this difficult task with professional sincerity and tact. This is the point of v. 16. To sum up, we probably cannot say Pindar "loved" Xenophon, to be sure, but the argument that Pindar disliked him is out of the question. The fragment shows the smiling attitude of the poet to Xenophon. Finally, Pythian 10. This is one of the most fervent odes of the poet. The twentyyear-old poet, who feels great gratitude(cf. vv. 64-68)to Thorax for receiving an order for a Pythian victory for the first time in his poetic career, and who is filled with hopes of his own future glory, idealizes the aristocratic Thessaly as an aristocrat himself, and compares admiringly its happiness which has now been brought about by Hippocleas' victory with the blessedness of the Hyperboreans. His praise of the Thessalian aristocrats is whole-hearted.

著者

長瀬 真理

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.69-80, 1987-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

---

The questions of the authenticity and chronology of Plato's texts are long-standing arguments This paper deals with the analysis of some prose style 'concerned with word order. One of the particular features of the Greek language is its freedom with word order The choice of word order is supposed to reflect personal habit or style which can be defined by studying the frequencies of certain patterns of combination of words. The conclusions are based on data obtained in a pilot computer project organized by Dr. L Brandwood from the University of Manchester in which I participated from October 1, 1980 to March 31, 1982 The purpose of the project is to investigate some specific stylistic features of texts from different periods of Plato's career, with the aim of producing certain quantitative measures of sentence structure and establishing new methods or principles of stylistic comparison The study was carried out usmg a system of classifying elements of sentence according to their syntactic function. The categories and code numbers are twelve : noun (0), verb(1), direct object (2), indirect object (3), predicate (4), attributes of these items (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), adverb (62) and prepositional phrase (63) The combinations of word order in each category are checked according to two patterns, 'coordinate' and 'split' The coordinate is the case where more than two words of the same class are used in parallel position m a sentence The split means the gap between a word and other related words in the same class The Greek texts of Plato were already available to us on magnetic tape Among Plato's writing we chose three texts, Laches, Theaetetus, and Philebus which are generally agreed to come from three different periods of his life We were also able to obtain a tape of Xenophon from which Memorabilia was chosen In order to check the consistency of our measures withm individual works, each text was sub-divided into four sections As the project is still underway, it is too early to make many claims for our methods. But I can say that in this instance, at least, checking word order has proved an effective measure of stylistic difference. It is fully recognised that the style of Philebus stands out clearly from that of the other three dialogues The figures for coordinate and split in Philebus are extremely high compared with the other three, especially in the case of the split in the prepositional phrases. We could say, 'the greater the frequency of splits, the more complicated the sentence' Philebus is commonly grouped chronologically with Leges, Timaeus, Pohticus and Sophistes as belonging to the later period of Plato's writing These dialogues are famous for being difficult to read It is an open question how far our syntactic code system would cover the complicated implication of sentence structures But whatever the interpretation, it is important to have some quantifiable and objective methods with which to work.

著者

中務 哲郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.26-37, 1986

---

ヘロドトス『歴史』のテーマは何か,という大問題にこのような小論で答えようとするのは,いわば「鶏刀を以て牛を割く」類の暴挙との誹りを受けるかもしれないが,以下に筆者の考えの大要を述べてみたい.

著者

森 進一

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.1-12, 1980

---

『法律』のなかで,「最も難解な節の一つ」とされている,859c6-864a8の箇所をとりあげて考察してみたい.初めに,その箇所をとりあげた意図について,簡単に述べてみる.

著者

金子 善彦

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.88-100, 2007

---

In Motu Animalium (MA, hereafter), Aristotle repeatedly says, "The soul moves the body", "Desire moves the animal", etc.. Commentators, who interpret Aristotle's philosophy of mind in a non-dualistic way, would find these claims perplexing, since they appear to imply that the soul is a non-material substance, separable from body, and imparts motion to body. Martha Nussbaum, one of the most influential proponents of the functionalistic interpretation of Aristotle, argues that the capacities of the soul are called "the movers of the animal" because of their role in the explanation of goal-directed motions, not of their causal agency, and so his claims there do not imply the Cartesian or Platonic conception of the soul as an incorporeal agent. However, although this sort of view is dominant in the recent literature, I don't think that it is a plausible reading. A number of passages in MA suggest that Aristotle takes the animal soul, or part of it, to be a causal agent in the quite literal sense, by which an animal can be moved to act. That wouldn't be so embarrassing if you saw that it is his theory of causation and other connected doctrines that lie behind the account of animal movements in MA. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a crucial aspect of Aristotle's philosophy of mind and action developed in MA. The first part of my discussion treats the MA's account of the initiation of animal (and human) movements. Aristotle explicitly says that the capacities of the soul, such as perception, imagination, thought and desire, have by themselves the power to alter a bodily organ (on his view, the heart). It is important to notice that he thinks such an alteration occurs because an animal's soul receives a certain form from the external world and thereby acquires the power to change its physiological state. The idea is that the form itself, both internal and external, has the causal efficacy by virtue of which the alteration in an animal at the material level can be brought about. I show that this idea is the key to understanding Aristotle's view, and that he makes use of it here on the basis of both the theory of formal and efficient causation he has established in Physics and his other writings, and the view which might be called "isomorphism" developed in De Anima. Next, I turn to another passage from MA. It is supposed to strongly support the functionalistic interpretation because Aristotle seems to introduce the connate pneuma to provide a material basis for mental causation. However, a careful reading will show that he insists there is a distinct type of alteration that the soul itself, rather than its material correlate, would undergo, which he calls "energeia" elsewhere. Here too he holds that a physiological change like that of pneuma takes place just as the result of this formal level causation. I conclude by suggesting in brief that such a picture of Aristotle's philosophy may throw some light on the problem of mental causation.

著者

呉 茂一

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.14-24, 1954-06-20 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

杉原 丈夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, pp.109-117, 1966

---

アリストテレスの様相三段論法を記号論理学的に研究することはベッカー〔1〕に始まり,ロス〔8〕,ボヘンスキー〔2〕,ルカシエヴィツ〔5〕,マッコール〔6〕,リシャー〔7〕,杉原〔9〕などによって次第に精緻な考察が加えられるようになった.このうち最初の3人はアリストテレスをできるだけ忠実に記号化し,彼の難点はそのまま難点として指摘する態度をとっている.杉原もほぼこの立揚にある.これに反してルカシエヴィツは彼独自の様相論理学に基づいてアリストテレスをはげしく攻撃している.しかるにマッコールとリシャーはアリストテレスに対して弁明的である.本稿は,一方においてルカシエヴィツの行き過ぎに反批判を与え,他方マッコールとリシャーの弁明の不備を検討し,アリストテレス解釈の中正な立揚を述べたいと思う.

著者

古澤 香乃

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, pp.1-13, 2012

---

Achilles, returning to the battlefield, begins with a duel against Aeneas in book 20. Subsequently he fights his first duel with Hector in the same book. These two scenes are similar in structure and in elements which may be said to form doublets. They have four components in common: 1. an intervention by Apollo; 2. a dialogue and a duel proper; 3. divine rescue of an opponent; 4. Achilles' slaying of a series of minor warriors. The aim of this paper is to show how the two duels function as doublets in book 20, and in the whole battle of Achilles ranging from book 20 to book 22. First, despite their similarities, these two duels are different in detail, length, and elaboration. 1. Apollo's instruction to Aeneas/Hector and their reactions to him are in contradiction with each other. 2. The dialogues and the duels are contrasted in the space devoted to them and in their content. Achilles urges Aeneas to withdraw and has a long verbal exchange with him; however, in the case of Hector, Achilles demands that he come closer and they finish their conversation promptly. 3. Aeneas/Hector is rescued by Poseidon/Apollo. But Achilles complains about Hector's disappearance much more. 4. Achilles ferociously kills more than twice the number of minor warriors after the duel with Hector compared to the duel with Aeneas. The poet must have intended to depict the increase in Achilles' rage and the fierceness of his battle by contrasting the two duels. It still remains to address the subject of fate itself with relevance to the above contrast. The different fates of three antagonists in these duels are related from the viewpoint of the gods; Aeneas' survival after the Trojan War, Hector's death and the fall of Troy, and Achilles' death after Hector's, and therefore all three characters' fates are mutually contrasted. It is obvious that the doublets are composed so as to reflect the opposite fates of Aeneas and Hector, which together prepare for the climax in book 22. The two duels function not just as a preparation, but as important structural elements of the whole battle of Achilles. The duel of Achilles and Aeneas includes the episode of Aeneas' past duel with Achilles and his rescue at Zeus' hands. Then the actual duel is interrupted during the dialogue between the gods, who grant him his salvation and he is rescued again by a god, Poseidon. It turns out that Aeneas is depicted as the one who survives the past, the present, and the future (that is, the fall of Troy). On the other hand, Hector is saved by Apollo as Aeneas has been saved by a god. Nevertheless everyone must expect Hector to be killed in the near future since his death has been predicted. Indeed, his salvation is rejected in the dialogue between the gods in book 22, and accordingly Apollo leaves him to his death. The poet, incorporating the past and future aspects into the doublets, constructs the multilayered narrative structure in the whole battle of Achilles where the scenes are closely linked to each other through these divine motifs. Accordingly, the poet at once prepares for the climax in book 22 by the doublets in book 20 and depicts the climax as contrasting to the fate of Aeneas mentioned in the duel in book 20. Furthermore the fact that such duels are set out in the earlier battle scene of Achilles hints at the fact that he is approaching his own death because he is doomed to die shortly after Hector's death. Therefore the two duels seen as doublets ultimately permit us to foresee the outcome of "the wrath of Achilles".

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.177-179, 2007-03-16 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

内川 勇海

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.12-24, 2017 (Released:2020-03-31)

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.87-94, 2010-03-24 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

津村 寛二

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.67-72, 1973

著者

森 俊洋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.52-63, 1970

---

『ソピステス』251-9で,プラトンは所謂エイドスのコイノーニアという問題を論じているが,実は一様にコイノーニアとして語っているのではなく,そこに一つの重要な区別を示しているように思える.小論の目的は,その区別がどこにポイントを置かれたものであるのか,そしてまたその区別が意味するところは何であるのかということを,明らかにしようとする一つの試みである.

著者

野津 悌

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.24-34, 2002-03-05 (Released:2017-05-23)

---

In Rhetoric 1 2 Aristotle says that artistic modes of persuasion are of three sorts, which he calls ethos, pathos, and logos, and he recommends all three modes However, among them pathos consists in arousing emotions, and in Rhetoric 1 1 he prohibits arousing emotions because it is not right to corrupt judgement This inconsistency between the first and second chapter of his treatise has been much discussed In this paper, I examine one prevailing explanation of the inconsistency, which one can find in E M Cope's Commentary, and with which other scholars, e g A Hellwig and J Sprute, agree According to this explanation Aristotle's statements in 1 1 concern only an ideal rhetoric, which can function only if an ideal system of laws exists which prohibits the litigants from speaking outside the subject, just like in the Areopagus, and he does not claim that under real circumstances of public life arousing emotions must be prohibited Therefore, it is not inconsistent that he prohibits arousing emotions on the one hand and recommends it on the other He regards it, so to speak, as a necessary evil under real circumstances, to be used for morally irreproachable ends But this explanation is not persuasive in that arousing emotions is regarded as corrupting the hearers' judgements, and yet allowable only if it is used, as a necessary evil, for morally right ends I argue that Aristotle regards arousing emotions not only as corrupting the hearers' judgements, but also as playing an important role in the hearers' recognition of the truth Then, in order to make clear the difference between the corrupting one and the other which enables hearers to recognize the truth, I reconsider what Aristotle means by saying in 1 1 that it is right to prohibit "speaking outside the subject" According to the above explanation, which supposes "speaking outside the subject" is identical with arousing emotions, Aristotle means that arousing emotions in itself must be prohibited But, in my view, that is not right "Speaking outside the subject" here is identical with, not arousing emotions m itself, but a corrupting kind of arousing emotions, namely, arousing emotions by means of speaking about things totally extraneous to the issue Aristotle means here that only arousing emotions in such a way must be prohibited According to this view, we can suppose, there is another kind of arousing emotions, which Aristotle does not prohibit, namely, arousing emotions by means of speaking about things which are related to the issue and so enable hearers to recognize the truth To conclude, I propose that the primary function of pathos which Aristotle recommends in 1 2 consists rather in making hearers recognize the truth than in corrupting their judgement Indeed it is undeniable that pathos in 1 2 can function also as a necessary evil, as the prevailing view has it, but I claim that it is rather a subsidiary function of pathos