著者
永井 滋郎
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.15, pp.52-62, 1967-03-23

It is the object of the present article to analyze and understand the characteristics of peace consciousness of Polybius who lived in the Hellenistic age of chronic wars and wrote a world history in the true sense. We can see in his book, especially in IV. 31. 3-8 and IV. 74. 3, what kind of attitude he took toward the problem of peace. There he wrote as follows: "That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. ......Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful." Thus, Polybius insisted that liberty and justice were indispensable conditions for peace. We can also recognize the same idea of connecting peace with liberty and justice in many other Greek politicians and historians such as Thucydides. The Greek thought of peace, however, was metamorphosed gradually by historical conditions in the development of the ancient world. Thucydides advocated the war for justice and took a rather aggressive attitude against other city-states such as Sparta, putting stress on Athenian hegemony, although he admitted that peace was naturally desirable. His conception of peace could never depart far from the narrow idea of ομονοια within a πολι&b.sigmav;. The Greek idea of peace was widened by Isocrates to Panhellenistic homonoia, but he had a strong antagonism against Barbaroi. In the historical development of peace theory, the Hellenistic age played a very important role, giving birth to the cosmopolitan pacifism. This kind of pacifism, however, could not become a historical force to attain world peace, because it had a tendency to escape from reality. Though Polybius was influenced by Stoicism he was able to reach a sort of realistic pacifism and wanted to cooperate with Rome, cherishing the idea of a united and organic world consisting of the cultural Hellas and the political Rome, where the common freedom of Hellas should be fundamentally respected. Moreover, he evaluated highly the value of unions of city-states such as the Achaean league. He had not merely a Stoic, philosophic and abstract idea of cosmopolitanism, but a positive, ego-involving and realistic attitude of international cooperation. Thus, the freedom of Hellas as a condition of peace was connected by him with a kind of internationalism and with a Hellenistic idea of one organic world founded on the principle of equality among races and nations. In this sense, we may recognize that Polybius was indeed a pioneer of realistic pacifism, that is of internationalism, though of course in an ancient pattern, which has its limitations for us. It was regrettable after all that the ancient world could not develop this kind of pacifism, but had to seek for a key to solve its problems in Pax Romana and eventually in Pax Dei.
著者
松原 俊文
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, pp.78-93, 2003-03-20

Diodorus' accounts of the Sicilian Slave Wars have been a source ofcontroversies This paper deals with two particular problems among them the blaming of C Gracchus' equestrian jury in the aetiology of the First War, a notorious anachronism that has vexed scholarship since Mommsen, and the accusation against 'Italian' landowners as having encouraged the highway robbery by their slaves, but whose presence in any large number on Sicilian soil at this period is not much attested by other evidence Some scholars maintain that these passages go back to Posidonius, whose contribution, to whatever extent, as a source to the Diodoran narrative of the First War is beyond doubt I shall below present some likeliest routes for the transmission of the information that has caused these problems 1) Roman Sources The ubiquitous criticisms of Roman magistrates in the narrative smack of narrow partisan hostility within the ruling oligarchy, and it has been suggested that our difficulties result from Posidonius' use of a Roman source coloured by conservative pique against the knights Among Posidonius' Panaetian connexions the most important was P Rutilius Rufus, whose semi-autobiographical history in Greek was certainly one of Posidonius' sources, and whose sorry experience at the repetundae trial in 92 might well suggest a Rutilian origin of the troublesome passages Yet evidence reveals Rutilius' attentiveness to the niceties of law, and his work, like other Republican memoirs, was written primarily for his own political apologia Thus I doubt that this Roman Stoic dared jeopardise the whole credibility of his apologia by a trifling distortion of the history of the extortion court Furthermore, if we allow for an interpreter, Posidonius' potential Roman sources need not be restricted to works written in Greek The annals of Fannius, if the historian is to be identified with C Fannius M f, yet another disciple of Panaetius and the anti-Gracchan consul in 122, are a strong possibility Another candidate would be Sempronius Asellio, who, like Rutilius and Posidonius, belonged to the same Polybian school of history and whose kinsman Diodorus alone in ancient traditions praises for his governorship of Sicily immediately after the Second War 2) Posidonius' Narrative Pattern Many scholars have perceived a structural and thematic parallelism between the accounts of the two wars One school of thought further stretches this deductive tendency of Posidonius the Philosopher-Historian into a strictly formulated 'narrative pattern', claiming that the philosopher, for want of information, retrojected the conditions in Sicily around the time of the Second War, or those in Southern Italy at the time of the Spartacus War, to the island of the 130s, and that in this process he 'reduplicated' an equestrian/Italian involvement in the First War Yet in my view the whole idea of a narrative pattern stands on far too many unattested premises, and hence to attribute our particular problems to this nebulous paradigm risks circularity In fact the similarities between the two Diodoran accounts are no more striking than the obvious differences This fact suggests that the author had fairly detailed knowledge of each war, thus rendering it unlikely that he, simply out of horror vacui, made up part of the account of one war on the analogy of another 3) Local Sources These details include 'folkloric' anecdotes, which all concern Sicehot Greeks, and without doubt go back to the same community But how did they find their way into the current text? Posidonius' famous trip to the West may have included an investigative sojourn in Sicily, but Diodorus himself was a Sicilian, born in a town only a few tens of miles away from the epicentres of both wars within thirty years after the Second War Thus he would have been as well placed as Posidonius to draw on locals for first-hand information The fact that in Bk 11 Diodorus added his own digression on the sanctuary of the Palici, with a cross-reference to the Second War, shows that he had at least some local knowledge of this war Thus the censure against the equestrian jury and the 'Italian' landowners may also have been transmitted through the same intermediary, echoing provincial indignation among Diodorus' contemporaries, if not of the historian himself whose critical views of the Romans and the Italians are known from other examples, over the activities of the equestrian businessmen and Rome's laissez-faire policy The past Quellenkritik has variously attempted to explain these problems, but the desperate dearth of external control precludes any definitive conclusion Yet internal evidence points to two distinctive groups of ultimate informants, Roman and Sicilian The passages in question could derive from either of them If the former is the case, I suggest Posidonius transmitting a non-Rutilian, alternative source If the latter, however, it could have been any provincial Siceliot, Diodorus included, who had garbled part of the picture of the First War
著者
高橋 久一郎
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, pp.45-55, 1989-03-15

Many scholars emphasize the importance of prohairesis in Aristotle's Ethics as a key concept in explaining human action However, its precise nature remains obscure In this paper I will attempt to explicate Aristotle's answer to a fundamental question concerning prohairesis-viz "How should we individuate prohaireton?", and then locate it in the practical syllogism This task is of importance, since we cannot understand Aristotle's views on action as energeia without understanding his conception of action as chosen for its own sake As a preliminary, in section I I defend and develop constituent-innterpretation of ta pros to telos A clue to the solution of this dispute is the fact that the bodily movement performed pros to telos must be an action in itself It must be telos in a sense, otherwise the relation of telos and ta pros to telos would be external Aristotle may be a consequentialist in a broad sense, but not a utilitarian (As a corollary of this point I suggest that we cannot use description of bodily movement as a tool of action mdividuation ) In section II I propose my interpretation of prohairesis by examining Cooper's excellent explanation of deliberation My contentions are as follows 1)We cannot accept his assertion that to kath' hekaston means not the individual, but the atomon eidos We do not deliberate on individuals, as Aristotle says, but use recognition of individuals as premisses of deliberation 2) We should admit that the deliberation ends at prohairesis to perform an act of some suitably specific type Prohairesis is not mere desire, but a unity of desire and belief, which is caused, via deliberation, by having a wish and some appropriate beliefs as to circumstances, but it is not an action We identify (future) action as such not by rinding a uniquely applicable description, but by specifying its type Future action cannot be referred to. 3) We must think that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action It seems to me that Cooper's and Mele's argument are not convincing 4) Prohaireton is the major premiss of the practical syllogism Aristotle's examples of the major premisses, however, are not always prohaireton Some of them do not fully specify the types of action to be performed 5) Therefore we must distinguish between the practical syllogism, conceived as including deliberative process, and the so-called "practical" syllogism, which has only two premisses As for human action, the latter is the last step leading to action, and in animal movement it is the only step In section III I criticize and modify Nussbaum's anankastic model of so-called practical syllogism 1) As Nussbaum says, misfire of action is explained either by not wanting G or by not believing it necessary to do A But the hypothetical necessity of A-ing is not relevant to the necessity for action, since if an agent does not want G, he will never do A, even if he believes it necessary for G We should take a parallel with the theoretical syllogism more seriously If one does not believe in premisses because of their falsity, one will not assert (phanai) the conclusion, even if one recognizes it as validly reasoned An action is performed only when both premisses are actualized, as akrates illustrates it negatively Aristotle's contention in asserting the necessity of action lies in the rejection of the third element, e g will, to explain action 2) As to a chosen act, the anankastic model should be modified As argued above, prohairesis is a unity of desire and belief Nonetheless, it is not an action, but a desire I suggest the following modification pN [{wanting G & believing (A for G)} and (believing now & here to A)→acting A] Akrates has both premisses, but he does not use his major premiss he does not stay in prohairesis (Elsewhere I argued for this unorthodox interpretation of akrasia) My arguments in this paper are rather sketchy and need elaboration Nevertheless, I should say that the present paper has taken a step in the right direction toward understanding action as enevgeia
著者
平山 晃司
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, pp.86-97, 2001-03-05

There has long been a controversy among scholars about how pharmakoi, or ancient Greek human scapegoats, were treated at the end of the ritual, namely, whether they were killed or not The disagreement among modern scholars has been caused by that among ancient writers some state that the pharmakoi were put to death, while others indicate their being driven out of the community But it makes little difference whether they were slam or expelled Greater significance is to be attached to the fact that some of those scholiasts and lexicographers who refer to the pharmakos ritual assert that stoning was performed in it Of the two sources for the pharmakos ritual at Abdera the scholiast on Ovid(Ibts 467)states that in that city the scapegoat was killed with stones every year, whereas the commentator on a Callimachus line (fr 90 Pfeiffer) asserts that he was stoned until he was driven over the borders There is a similar discrepancy between the two sources for the purificatory ritual at Massalia while Servius states that the ritual was performed as often as the citizens were suffering from pestilence and that it culminated in mere casting out of the scapegoat, according to 'Lactantius Placidus' the ritual was held annually and at the end of it the scapegoat was led out of the city beyond its boundaries and then was stoned to death What caused these discrepancies? As for the latter case, one could surmise that for some reason Servius and 'Lactantius' both misconstrued the following circumstances in Massalia in very ancient times, whenever they suffered from pestilence, they would kill a scapegoat with stones so as to save their own lives, this practice was gradually established as an annually performed ritual for averting pestilence, and subsequently the final treatment of the scapegoat changed into banishment from the city, possibly accompanied by a ceremonial stoning Such may be the case also with Abdera and the scholiast on Ibis may have made a mistake similar to that of 'Lactantius' The following two sources provide some support for this view (1) According to Helladius, the pharmakos ritual held at Athens has its origin in the unlawful death of Androgeos and the ensuing pestilential disease this suggests that the Athenians purified their city with scapegoats to survive the plague What was the ultimate fate of the original pharmakoi ? An account of Plutarch (Mor 297b-c) and an episode in Philostratus (VA 4 10)enable one to conjecture that they were stoned to death And we are informed by Harpocration that the Athenians would expel two pharmakoi during the festival of Thargelia Thus the same process of change as is supposed for Massalia (and perhaps for Abdera) can be detected here (2) According to Ister, as cited by Harpocration, a man named Pharmakos stole the sacred bowls of Apollo and was stoned to death, and at the Thargelia (of an unknown Ionian city) certain things were performed in imitation of this event Very probably the principal thing performed during the rite was a ceremonial stoning (or pelting with harmless objects such as, for example, squill bulbs) accompanying the expulsion of the pharmakos Here too the above-mentioned process can be well perceived From the materials shown above it may be inferred that in very ancient times in some Greek cities, on the occasion of crises such as plague or famine or drought, to purify the city they would stone to death either the perpetrator of a sacrilegious act which was regarded as the cause of the disaster, or scapegoat(s), if it was of unknown origin Such a practice was gradually established as an annual event with the purpose of averting calamity, and subsequently the expulsion of scapegoat (s) from the community became the essential element of the ritual and stoning changed into a symbolical, ceremonial act performed in casting out the scapegoat (s)
著者
山本 建郎
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, pp.20-30, 2003-03-20

As is well known, in the Respublica III Plato remarks many kinds of harmoniai, among which he selects the Dorian and the Phrygian as fitting subject matter for education of the young The aim of this paper is firstly to find out the real nature of Dorian and other harmoniai The detailed structures are shown in the additional paragraph of Aristides Quintihanus (Arq)' De Musica I ch 9 as old-fashioned harmoniai, according to which we can guess that Plato's Dorian is akin to the form of disjunction of two tetrachords, the standard style of a scale of an octave On the other hand the rationalized styles of harmoniai as the species of an octave are also described in Arq (I ch 8) These structures correspond to the modes of Western Medieval and Renaissance music Historically speaking the standard schema of an octave has developed through Terpander's improvement Terpander's schema has been guessed to be conjunction of tetrachords added the tonos uppermost But this schema shows the Mixolydian octave instead of the Dorian To be Dorian the schema must be the form of disjunction As an evidence of the disjunct octave we can take up Nicomachus' description of Philolaus' scale in the Enchilidion ch 9 This passage is opposed to the description of Pythagoras' scale (Ench ch 5), which is an improvement of the old-fashioned conjunct scale Compared to Nicomachus' passages we can conclude that Terpander's schema must have been the disjunct schema devoid of the trite Terpander arranged the old-fashioned Dorian which had appeared much earlier into the rationalized schema of the disjunct octave Contrary to the Dorian the other old-fashioned harmoniai are supposed to come into existence respectively These traces could be seen in Plutarch's description (mainly on the Mixolydian) So the rationalized style of harmoniai which form the species of an octave should have come into existence somewhat later They might have been constructed artificially about BC430 when Eratocles (an inventor of the circularity of a scale) and Damon were both in their akme Plato's so called Dorianism is supposed to be a reaction against the overflowing of ethos of his age But Plato was not a theorist of harmonics, so he was unable to make an actual reformation It was Aristoxenus (Arx ) who reformed the musical situation by replacing the species with tonoi (pitch) Each tonos is also the same fragment as the species of an octave, but there is a central note, the mese, around which all of the other notes move As the mese works as a central note, many kinds of ethos in the species of an octave disappear, and the scale is reduced to the Dorian The system of tonos presupposes the Great Perfect System (GPS), two octaves system which has the mese as a central note Usually GPS wasconjectured to be arranged about at the middle of the 4^<th> century BC and succeeded by Arx , but I assert as a conclusion that it was invented by Arx constructing the system of tonos
著者
岩崎 良三
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.109-118, 1957-03-30
著者
松平 千秋
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, pp.1-12, 1968-03-30

In the Aeschylean "Persae", Xerxes is contrasted, in a most simplified way, to Darius, his father. He is a fool, or at least a very thoughtless young man, who, by his reckless attempt to subdue Greece, has endangered the safety of the kingdom, which his predecessors, with Darius at their head, had laborously built up, guided by laudable foresight. The same person, as described by Herodotus in his Histories, can, however, hardly be done away with so easily. That Xerxes was endowed with royal dignity as well as lordly generosity, is well illustrated by episodes in the Histories: he is not inferior to his predecessor in this respect. What separates him from Darius, is the lack of firm mind and resolute will, while these are the very characteristics that principally made out the greatness of Cyrus and Darius. Xerxes was, unlike Cambyses who had a born inclination to insanity, a man of perfect normality. But the two shared the same fate to be heirs to their great predecessors, Xerxes to Darius, Cambyses to Cyrus. Both of them painfully felt their obligations to cope with their predecessors or even to surpass them in merits. However, they lacked the firmness of mind, which was most essential to actualize this ideal; hence their frustration. The way Herodotus presents us Xerxes in VII 187, with description of his physical characteristics, is most impressive and dramatic too, reminding us of the scene in the τειχοσκοπια, where Agamemnon is shown to Priamus by Helen. The lordly figure of the Great King, with his immense host behind him, is really that of a tragic hero, who proudly stands on the summit of happiness, not knowing what fate awaits him at the next moment. Does then Xerxes in fact deserve the name of a tragic hero? Perhaps in the modern, sentimental sense of the word, but surely not in its true sense. The present writer believes that Herodotus was well aware of it. In that he nevertheless dared to stage Xerxes as a tragic hero, one might discover some ironical implications of the author. It is indeed a typical tragic situation that Xerses is placed in. But it seems as if the main concern of the author lies not so much in the fate of Xerxes as in his character itself. Tradition assigns Sophocles, among the tragic poets, the nearest place to our author. It is a pity, however, that no record has been preserved concerning the contact which might have existed between Herodotus and Euripides.
著者
和田 利博
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, pp.114-124, 2005-03-08

In Democritean atomism, all atomic motion is forced by blows of other atoms On the contrary, Aristotle demanded an explanation for why, if there was no natural motion for atoms, there was any motion for them at all In response to this criticism, Epicurus introduced the downward fall of atoms by their own weight as a natural motion for them But if all atoms only fall downwards at equal speed, why is there any collision amongst them at all ? This is just why the atomic swerve was introduced as another natural motion for atoms in Epicurean cosmology Now, according to Cicero, Epicurus introduced the atomic swerve to avoid a necessary motion by atom's own weight that he himself has introduced with the intention of improving upon Democritean atomism However, the fear arising from this necessity is that if all atoms were only to fall downwards, since there would be no collision amongst them, no compound body would be formed On the other hand, Diogenes of Oenoanda represents the atomic swerve in Epicurean atomism as counterevidence to a necessary motion by collisions amongst atoms in Democntean atomism And the fear arising from this necessity is that if all atoms were only to collide with one another, since the soul too is composed of them, no voluntary action would exist If that is the case, the testimony that the necessary motion by atom's own weight hinders the voluntariness of action by governing the mind is inaccurate Therefore, the interpretation that the atomic swerve ensures the voluntariness of action by freeing the mind from such a necessity is mistaken To sum up, in Epicurean atomism, the atomic swerve plays the following two roles (A) In his cosmology, the atomic swerve prevents the atom's own weight from causing all things (including all actions) not to occur by the blows of other atoms and makes a beginning of collisions amongst atoms, (B) In his theory of action, the atomic swerve prevents the collisions amongst atoms from causing all actions to occur exclusively by the blows of other atoms and breaks a chain of collisions amongst atoms (though it does not hinder collision itself, needless to say) Incidentally, Epicurus divides all things into three categories and contrasts necessity with chance and what depends on us And since the atomic swerve was exactly introduced to avoid necessity, it must be either chance or what depends on us However, there is much evidence suggesting that the atomic swerve is uncaused motion Judging from this, it is inevitable to conclude that the atomic swerve is a kind of chance Nevertheless, I suppose that the atomic swerve need not be the alternative of chance or what depends on us but can be either of them as the case may be That is, it is just the atomic swerve occurring even without the soul that Epicurus called chance in a general sense And what depends on us eventually means the action that has the atomic swerve occurring within the soul at the beginning of motion
著者
森谷 公俊
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.40-48, 1985-03-29

The concepts of arche and hegemonia in Isocrates have the following features in the light of analysis conducted from a politico-historical perspective. In the first place, Isocrates attributed a highly moral and ethical value to the concept of hegemonia. In his Panegyricus, he claimed that Athens alone deserved the title of supreme leader of the Greeks because the city had been a benefactor of the Greeks and a protector of all those who had suffered. This claim never changed throughout his political discourses. Secondly, Isocrates located the essence of arche in sea-power which he criticized as bringing misfortune to Greece, and stressed the ethical superiority of land hegemony. He came to this conclusion in his On the Peace as a result of the downfall of Sparta after the battle of Leuctra and the defeat of Athens in the Social War. His position is in sharp contrast to that of Thucydides and Old Oligarch, who insisted on the superiority of Athens as a sea-power. In the third place, he considered the problem of constitutional reform in the light of his concept of hegemonia. He sought the model of the ideal constitution in the age of hegemonia of Athens and Sparta, and described it in contrast to the age of arche. The concepts of arche and hegemonia in Isocrates reflect the political situation of Greece in the middle of the fourth century when Sparta, Thebes and Athens fell one after the other, and differ from those of historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon.
著者
仲手川 良雄
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, pp.1-11, 1989-03-15

Both isegoria and parrhesia have the meaning "free speech", which seems to have been indispensable to the Greeks, especially the Athenians The aim of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between isegoria and parrhesia, two ways of realizing free speech at meeting It is noteworthy that the parrhesia, which came into being about the last third of the fifth century BC, came to be used widely in a short time and invaded the large sphere of the word isegoria What does this mean historically? The essence of isegoria is manifest in the expression heralds conventionally used to urge free speech in the assembly "Who wishes to address the assembly?" On the other hand, according to Aischines, the expression was formerly as follows . "Who of those above fifty years of age wishes to address the assembly?", this practice of addressing according to age was aimed at obtaining the best counsel for the polis, though it went out of fashion in Aischines' day An attitude of πολει χρηστον (rendering service to polis), which also is proclaimed in Euripides' Suppliants' "Who desires to bring good counsel for his polis to the people?", predominated among Athenians in the moderate democracy It declined remarkably, however, with the rise in radical democracy and the spread of individualism Moreover, we must consider the growth of class antagonism between οι χρηστοι and οι πονηροι, as is proven in Pseudo-Xenophon, Ath Pol 1 2, 1 6, 1 9, 3 12-13 In this situation, the word χρηστοζ might be viewed with a strong tincture of classconsciousness The multitude must have had some doubt as to whether the practice of addressing according to age and the principle of πολει χρηστον were serviceable to them or to οι χρηστοι alone They did away with that practice and introduced the parrhesia, by which every citizen could speak out on whatever he regarded as important and right, free of the restrictions of πολει χρηστον The shift in stress from isegoria to parrhesia corresponded with the momentous change in the actuality and the sense of polis-community
著者
朴 一功
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, pp.98-111, 1999-03-23

By investigating the Greek word neidw and its cognates in the Republic and other dialogues, Popper believed that Plato is recommending rhetorical propaganda i. e. "talking over by foul means," together with violence, rather than "persuasion by fair means" as instruments of political technique (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). But more important than this criticism is Morrow's claim that even without the foul means, persuasion, as is understood by Plato, involves ominous consequences ('Plato's Conception of Persuasion,' PR62, 1953). Morrow examined relevant passages, particularly in the Laws and concluded that Plato, who could not allow any soul to engage in "the free play of individual criticism" so that it could safely reach maturity, blinded himself to the deeper meaning of Socratic concern for the soul. Yet Socrates' dialectic, in which Morrow sees the spirit of genuine persuasion, does often break down without any agreement being reached when it is carried on with such difficult interlocutors as Callicles and Thrasymachus. Plato took seriously Socrates' failure to persuade them to care for virtue. My purpose is, by examining this line of Plato's thought, to show that his conception of persuasion has the significance drawn from his reflections on Socrates' dialectic. It is not just that the failure of a reasonable conversation would be, as Irwin supposes ('Coercion and Objectivity in Plato's Dialectic,' RIP40, 1986), due to the insincerity or ill-temperedness which the interlocutor displays in refusing to continue cooperative discussion. We know that in the Gorgias Socrates argued that rhetoric alleged to be the art of persuasion was no art but a mere empirical knack, whereas in a later dialogue, the Phaedrus, Plato concedes the possibility of the kind of rhetoric that deserves a genuine craft and sets it forth as the art of leading souls. What this remarkable change actually means will become clear to us when we consider Socrates' method of cross-examination and refutation. His arguments always rest on, and his conclusion step by step logically follows from, premises to which he secures agreement from his interlocutors. But the problem lies in the way in which the agreed-upon premises are accepted, taken, and felt by each interlocutor with his own point of view. Socrates' understanding of some premises does not agree with, and is sometimes irreconcilably different from, the interlocutor's, so that it is hard for them to share the same conclusion. For no statement and no word is a logical formula or a logical symbol to be manipulated in a definite way. Such disagreement has its roots, Plato's theory of the tripartite soul reveals, in their essentially different conceptions of the good that cannot be easily reduced to each other. Now in the Apology Socrates says, "the unexamined life is not worth living" and invites everyone to join in cooperative inquiry. However, when Plato wrote the Republic he had become sceptical, not about the truth of Socrates' memorable words, but about his philosophical activity characterized as inquiry into the truth by examinig himself and others, since everyone does not want to, and cannot, therefore, should not, examine himself or herself in the same way as Socrates does. Plato's realistic view is that no two people are born alike in that there are innate differences which fit them for different occupations. Dialectic requires a natural gift for it. People's different conceptions of the good, however, derive from their dominating desires or motives rather than from their natural gifts. Hence three basic types of men, the philosophic, the ambitious, and the lovers of gain. Plato can, then, no longer believe that the conflict of their value judgements is resolved by Socratic argument, since their experience, intelligence, and ability in discussion are decidedly different. Thus in the Phaedrus he attempts to reinstate rhetoric as the art of persuasion by basing it on psychology and dialectic. Plato was not blind to the deeper meaning of Socratic concern for the soul. Following Socrates, he certainly admits that genuine persuasion requires inquiry into the truth by dialectic, but unlike Socrates, he demands that a person who employs it should select a fitting soul, not every soul, to plant and sow in it his or her words founded on knowledge. Persuasion in other cases, therefore, must involve more or less "noble lies" or compulsion. Such conception of persuasion Plato applied to his own political philosophy. But perhaps the application was an inevitable conclusion for Plato himself who experienced more than once political confusion and violence in the Cave. Whether it may lead to liberation or enslavement of human beings, we can see in it Plato's insight into the significance of his master's philosophical activity. For, as Corn ford argued ('Plato's Common Wealth,' GR4, 1935), he would have foreseen that Socrates' mission pointed to a subversion of all existing institutions, which rest on fictitious devices.
著者
國方 栄二
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.57, pp.65-77, 2009-03-26

The concept of the modern cosmopolitanism is connected with the ideal of cessation or prevention of wars, as represented in Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace, and it has been claimed that this concept has its origin in ancient Greek philosophy. Martha C. Nussbaum, an American scholar on ancient philosophy as well as on political philosophy, advocates in her article, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism' (Boston Review, 1994), the revaluation of ancient cosmopolitanism as an effective thought for the realization of peace and the protection of human rights across countries' borders. However, she is often criticized for anachronistically importing our enlightenment-derived interpretation into ancient Greek thoughts (cf. Lee Harris, 'The Cosmopolitan Illusion', Policy Review, 2003). Diogenes the Cynic, upon being asked to give the name of his home city, replied 'I am a citizen of the world (cosmoplolites)'. But Cynic cosmopolitanism seems to have been rather negative in that it rejected any ethical obligation. I attempt in this paper to trace cosmopolitanism to its origins, making use of materials from Cynics, early Stoics and Roman writers. My contentions are as follows: 1) Diogenes said that the only true city is that which belongs to cosmos (DL 6, 72). For him no other cities on earth could be genuine. The true city has law just like any other cities, but it is not any such system of rules as adopted in communities on earth. It was rather a system of virtues. 2) Although we know very little about what more Diogenes made of his ideal city, we can at least infer from materials of early Stoics what it was like. The assertion of Epicurean Philodemus(On the Stoics) that Diogenes and Zeno wrote works with the same title, Republic, and that they both had essentially the same opinion, suggests that they actually believed in an ideal city. As to its concrete nature, we know from the criticism of Cassius, a Sceptic, that the ideal city was for Zeno a small community of sages, and this is confirmed for Diogenes too, by relevant passages in Diogenes Laertius. It is thus likely that Diogenes' cosmopolitanism was a negative one, virtually equivalent to anarchism. 3) For Roman philosophers like Plutarch and Epictetus, both Diogenes and Zeno were philanthropists, who treated national origin and location as a matter of secondary importance. It is interesting that they also attributed 'cosmopolitanism' to Socrates. However, Socrates' 'cosmopolitanism' covered too small a part of the world, i. e. Greek world. Hence, their attributions were not exactly correct although they believed that they took Diogenes and Zeno in the right spirit. Thus, such cosmopolitanism as Nussbaum is willing to recognize in ancient world is safely traced to Roman philosophers and their interpretation of Diogenes and Zeno, even though it is difficult to trace it to these two philosophers themselves.
著者
村田 数之亮
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, pp.1-14, 1966-03-28

The Greek vase-painting is to be at once decorative and narrative. These two fundamental elements of Greek vase-painting, decorativeness and narrativeness, are, however, separate and not easily compatible with each other. Works of vase-painters' great periods-the best black-figure and red-figure of the ripe and late Archaic Period-are therefore not produced until the difficult task, to effect a compromise between these two opposite elements, was achieved. What are then the principles that made this compromise possible, by controlling figures and composition of paintings? In black-figure painting, the head is shown in profile, the trunk in front, legs in profile, one arm and one leg extending forwards and the others backwards. But the form of figures is still rigid and is little varied. Compared with geometric style, the narrativeness is in black-figure painting strengthened and amplified, owing to introduction of running figures and more or less exaggerated motion of arms. It is, we may say, the tectonic principle that dominates here. Black-figure vase-painters are apparently very fond of antithetic (i.e. opposing two persons) composition and also often the so-called three-persons composition. The group of these figures, sometimes with some secondary persons beside themselves constitute the centre of composition. It is again the tectonic principle that rules the composition. It is interesting to note that the technique of black figure also matches with this principle excellently. Exekias marks a limit of black-figure painting. In Exekias, the figures and composition are ruled by the severe tectonic principle, which gives dignity to his art. Sometimes, however, he dares to go beyond this limit and makes some new attempts: in Exekias unlike in other painters' works, the space acquires life and sense of depth and there are more natural and free movements instead of excessive motion of arms, and the composition itself is often asymmetrical. Introduction of a new technique was inevitable, for these new trials by Exekias fully to be developed. The red-figure painter, at least after 500 B.C., was fully aware of the whole possibility of the new technique and established a new style of vase-painting on a new principle. Natural and free movement of figures has now become the main concern of painters. Normally figures move in third dimension (a figure in torsion for example), and the rendering of body suggests certain plasticity. Movement flows through the whole body. The new principle which dominates figures of the new style painting may be called rythmic principle. Compostion of the red-figure painting is normally asymmetrical. The asymmetry, however, does not mean irregularity. There is an order, which is rythm. What makes figures and composition of the red-figure more free and dynamic than those of the black-figure, this we may call rythmic principle. The emotional mood, which usually pervades scenes of the red-figure painting, is probably not alien to this rythmic principle. The principles on which the two main styles of Greek vase-painting were based are both of visual nature. In Classical periods, however, something higher than that, something spiritual, was demanded from the new viewpoint of the art. This demand, we must admit, was beyond the possibility of the vase-painting, perhaps with the only exception of the white-ground vase-painting). It was only natural that the vase-painting had to concede its supreme place in Greek painting to other branches such as the wall-painting.
著者
田中 享英
出版者
日本西洋古典学会
雑誌
西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, pp.1-11, 2002-03-05

Everyone believes and no one doubts that Socrates was a philosopher But when and how did he practise his philosophy ? We know that in conversation with Athenian people every day, he examined their opinions about moral virtues, asking a series of questions which would reveal that their opinions contained self-contradiction, and thus compelling people into the state of aporia or difficulty We know that in practising such refutation Socrates taught people their ignorance However, was this practice Socrates' own practice of philosophy ? To be a philosopher is to be a student of philosophy Did Socrates study philosophy in his refutation of other people? We must say "Yes" In Plato's Apology of Socrates, Socrates declares that the greatest good for a human being is to converse with people and discuss virtue every day (38A) and that in his conversation with people, he examined both himself and others (ibid) In the Charmides Socrates says that he refuted his interlocutors for no other purpose than to examine what he, Socrates himself, was saying (166C-D) and inquired the meaning of the answers of other people just for his own sake (ibid) According to these words, Socrates must have been examining himself and refuting himself at the same time as he refuted other people, and he must have found his own ignorance each time he taught his interlocutors their ignorance But how is such practice possible? And in what way could such practice be called philosophy ? We would understand this if we would note the fact that Socrates and his interlocutors cooperated in their inquiry, that they collaborated in making an answer to their question, and that, at the end of the inquiry, both Socrates and his interlocutors shared in responsibility for their aporia This is just what we find in the Laches, for example In this dialogue Socrates asks Laches what courage is Laches answers that it is 'some endurance of the soul' But Socrates protests about the answer and proposes to change it to 'wise endurance' And Laches accepts this as his second answer It is obvious here for us to see that the new answer is a production of the collaboration between Laches and Socrates The new element in this second answer is the adjective 'wise,' and it was Socrates who proposed adding this element (we should notice Socrates' intellectualism here) In this way Socrates participates in the inquiry and in making an answer, and, consequently, he has to share responsibility for the failure of that answer Why, then, did Socrates not practise philosophy by himself, but needed to converse with Athenian people and cooperate with them ? Our answer will be that it is because philosophy is an inquiry into reality by means of words, the usage of which cannot be decided by one person In other words, philosophy is the practice of improving the usage of words in the community in which the philosopher lives In this practice Socrates shared aporia with his fellow citizens