著者

宮地 啓介

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, pp.30-39, 1990-03-29

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The idea of the state supplying soldiers with rations was rather new for the Greeks in the second half of the fifth century B C Previously, it had been common for hoplites to supply rations as well as weapons for themselves and for their expeditions to conclude in a short time It wasn't until Athens began, around 470 B C, calling out citizens for naval expeditions that provisioning came into common practice, particularly when Athens was fighting Persia and trying to dominate the sea Since the seminal work of K Tanzer, the provisioning of soldiers has been studied mostly as an aspect of the history of military systems, and especially as a theory of supply This paper argues that the principle of state provisioning of soldiers, first established in Athens, became a basic factor in the predominance of sea power Pericles (Thuc I 141-44) and the author of Athenaion Politeia (Ps Xenophon) both explained the value of naval domination and the strategic predominance of Athens as a sea power by pointing out the inferiority of land expeditions depending on the traditional supply system Though they emphasized the mobility of a navy, naval supply was more restricted than that of the army Thus, as naval operations elicited new battle conditions unsuited to traditional supply systems, Athens established a principle whereby the state secured the living of soldiers on the basis of payment of money for rations The predominance of sea power insisted upon a solution of the provisioning problem Thus, it is easy to understand the importance of funds in long war and the strategy of abandoning the Attic fields The new principle was not only a prerequisite for the effective activity of the navy, but also contributed to the development of democracy in Athens by building a state where demos could play a more active role

著者

長谷川 岳男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.12-24, 2010-03-24

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Fustel de Coulange considered that ancient Greeks had never had any private spheres in their poleis and the polls was a fusion of state and society. In the entry 'polis' in the 3^<rd> edition of OCD 0. Murray basically followed his ideas and gave Sparta as a typical example. Thus the general understanding seems to have been that polis could not be translated as 'state'. M. Hansen, however, argued against taking Sparta as a typical case and insisted that there was a differentiation between public and private spheres in Athens and many other poleis and consequently concluded that we may view a polis as similar to a modern state. However S. Hodkinson, as part of his studies aimed at rescuing Sparta from a 'fossilized society' themepark and normalizing her position as a polis, objected to the idea that Sparta was a polis where the state and society were inseparably fused together. He argued that Xenophon showed no clear cases of Spartan authorities taking active control over every aspect of Spartan citizens' life in his Lakedaimonion Politeia which is the most credible source concerning the Classical Spartan society. Moreover, building on Humble's thesis that the characteristic feature of Spartan citizens was not σωψροσυνη but αιδωζ, it seems that Spartan citizens were only careful how they behaved in public spaces and in private they could do as they pleased. Therefore it can be recognized that there was a distinction between the public and private sphere in Sparta. Indeed, not only Xenophon, but also Thucydides painted the picture of the Spartan society as a system of voluntary corporations among citizens rather than one of severe controls over them. Hodkinson then insisted that there was no social control on the part of the Spartan authorities, but only social pressure from the citizens themselves within their society. I agree with his conclusion regarding the importance of social pressure in Sparta, but I do not think that there was no social control over the citizens, because the existence of social pressure reveals the existence of Gramsci's theory of the 'hegemony'. I think it is a flaw in Hodkinson's argumentations that he did not point clearly to the substance of the authorities in Sparta so that the reality of social control became obscured. In order to complement his contention, I would introduce the thesis on which Berent insisted in a series of articles, namely, that a polls is not a state but a stateless society. A polis did not have the public coercive power so that Greeks had to devise ways to keep order in their polis and prevent an outbreak of a stasis. If we are right to perceive a polis as a stateless society, it followed that it was of paramount importance for Greeks to reach consensus on public matters. As a result, politics became entangled with ethical considerations and education which internalized ethics became important. In consideration of this context, the images of Spartan society seem fit for achieving consensus among its citizens, the fact that made it an object of high esteem among other Greeks. We should realize from this conclusion that a polis was not a monolithic entity and that it was susceptible to being torn apart because of the lack of public coercive power, and that Sparta (and Athens) were exceptional in preserving their stability.

著者

藤沢 令夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.1-19, 1973-03-20

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Although Aristotle's view in the Protr. on the nature of philosophy may, generally speaking, be called anti-Isocratic and Platonic in character, this paper, by analysing esp. Frr. 5, 12 and 13, traces Aristotle's real intention in his conception of philosophy as the following: (I) There are two distinct provinces of knowledge (επισγημη=ψρονησιζ) , each of which is different from the other in its function and character, viz., (1) Knowledge that deals with 'nature and the rest of reality' (Fr. 5), i. e. ,'philosophy' (Fr. 13), which is 'theoretical' and 'good' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (2) Knowledge that deals with 'the just and the expedient' or 'the virtue of the soul' (Fr. 5), i. e. 'politics' or 'legislation' (Fr. 13), which is practical and 'useful for our human life' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (II) The relation between (1) and (2) is such that knowledge-(2) requires knowledge- (1) as the basis for its work (cf. προσδεονται ιλοσοψιαζ, Fr. 13) ; the task of knowledge- (2) should be performed 'in accordance with' (κατα) knowledge-(1) ; or the norms by reference to which the task of knowledge- (2) is to be performed should be 'taken from' (απο) nature and truth itself which are the proper objects of knowledge- (1) . The contrast, then, between Aristotle's position in the Protr. and those of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle himself in his later treatises may be described as follows: (A) The difference from Isocrates will be obvious to every interpreter since he confines the task of philosophy to the realm of (2) which he thinks can be grasped only as 'doxa' (not as 'knowledge'). (B) While Aristotle in his later years (Eth. Nic. Bks. Z, K, etc.) comes to make a sharp separation of the province of (2) (which alone is called ψρονησιζ and concerned with that which is contingent) from that of (1) (which is called επιστημη and concerned with that which is necessary), he in the Proty. is still making (2) related to (1) (by κατα, απο etc.) and using the term ψρονησιζ to cover both. This must be called a radical difference in the sense that Jaeger once argued. (C) The relationship between the two kinds of knowledge, (meta) physical (1) and ethical (2), may seem to reflect a Platonic character; but in fact it involves an entirely un-Platonic distinction, the distinction, that is, between the good (αγαθον)belonging to theoretical knowledge and the useful (ωψελιμον, χρησιμον) belonging to practical knowledge. And, whereas for Plato Being and Value, knowledge and action, coalesce in the contemplation of the Forms, so that knowledge- (1) is at the same time knowledge- (2), Aristotle in the Protr. is virtually thinking of knowledge- (1) as the proper function of human intellect, of which knowledge- (2) is only secondary and derivative and can in consequence be dispensed with in certain conditions. This difference of thought, which again must surely be considered a radical one, is strikingly shown by comparing two philosophers' descriptions of the state of pure bliss in an ideal life: the life of the gods in 'the place beyond the heavens' (Phaedrus 247 AB) and the life of the inhabitants of 'the Isles of the Blest' (Protr. Fr. 12). In the former passage the Forms of ethical virtue such as 'Justice' and 'Temperance' are mentioned as ones which nourish and prosper the souls of the gods, but in the latter it is said that all the ethical virtues are not present since they are no longer needed and there remains nothing but theoretical knowledge- (1). In submitting these points the present writer departs significantly from the views of I. During, E. de Strycker, S. Mansion, and J. D. Monan as well as W. Jaeger.

著者

水野 有庸

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, pp.86-108, 1966-03-28

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The contents of this book have long been regarded as a 'theory of propositions', to be naturally placed between the Cat. and the Anal. Pr. -a traditional view originated by the ancient Greek commentators and Boethius, and still presupposed more or less uncritically by most modern scholars. On the other hand, a conventionalism has given currency to 'De Interpretatione' as the title, leaving unsolved the question what 'ερμηνεια' really means; for upon the validity of the definition of 'interpretatio' by Boethius (I.p. 215), though in reality a merely tautological definition, no doubt has been thrown, while the valuable though short and minute suggestion on that point by Waitz (Organon I. pp. 323 sq.) has in fact been neglected. According to the present author our work does not treat of propositions (προτασει&b.sigmav;), of abstract entities, like the Analytics, for the ονομα and ρημα are essentially different from the two οροι that are homogeneous and can easily be represented by alphabetical signs, and we can find nothing of a copula here. Again, instead of a proposition, it is a λογο&b.sigmav;, though of a particular kind, which forms the main subject of our work, and this λογο&b.sigmav; retains such concreteness that it cannot be separated from our ordinary thinking and verbal processes. This way of looking at the λογο&b.sigmav; is precisely shown when it is laid down as an αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (one must think of the phrase 'γνωμην vel δοξαν αποφαινεοθαι'), when it is defined to be a φωνη σηματικη καγα συνθηκην and when 'ο λογο&b.sigmav; λεγων οτι…' is made to correspond strictly to η δαξα η δοξαζονσα οπι…', etc. Besides, 'καγαφασι&b.sigmav;', 'αποφασι&b.sigmav;' and 'αντιφασι&b.sigmav;' ought to be construed with a stress on '-φασι&b.sigmav;'. The peculiar relation of the λογο&b.sigmav; in our work to the πραγμα, or the peculiar extent to which this λογο&b.sigmav; is true, reveals much in this respect, much which is characteristic of the way of thinking and its verbal expression which does not rise above the level of laymen. The relevant points are as follows: (i) The attack against the Megarics in Ch. 9 results substantially in indicating that the power of knowledge corresponding to the αποφανσι&b.sigmav; (though the special αποφανσι&b.sigmav; related to future contingents) can be no επιοτημη since the latter is always true and has only the necessaries for its objects. (ii) Every καγαφασι&b.sigmav; or every αποφαοι&b.sigmav; is is necessarily either true or false and can be neither above nor below that; it is therefore a λογο&b.sigmav; of δοξα or υποληψι&b.sigmav; indeed, but just by being precisely half-true (so to speak), it makes known the πραγμα with the perfection highest possible on this limited and lower epistemological level and with such distinctness as 'either so or not'. (iii) Ch. 11 also, where such an av ripaols plays no role, keeps the same thing in view. The discrimination between the καγα συμβεβηκο&b.sigmav; and the καθ αυτο does not explicitly lead to a higher-order consideration, e.g. that on the nature of the δοξα and iεπιοτημη, but is performed within the lower range of inquiry, i.e. in the form of an inquiry whether or not a given φασι&b.sigmav; can be regarded as having unity. The recondite question is adapted for beginners of philosophy and something of Aristotle's protreptic intention might be concealed here. Such being the character of the whole contents, the title to be given might be expected to run: 'on Elucidation of realities in laymen's language'; and that is the meaning of 'ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ. But some attestation from other sources is required which may confirm that the term ερμηνεια was in use in at least analogically the same cases. When it is realities (various as they are in kind case by case) which are elucidated, and the elucidation is neither more nor less complete than it can be under such and such unavoidable conditions, and its means are nothing but verbal expression-then that elucidation is signified by the term ερμηνεα or the like (Pl. Resp. 524 b, Tht. 209a; Arist. Po. 1450b13-14, SE 166b11). Further, at Arist. Top. 139b12, the ερμηνεια is closely connected with the oaprlveia indispensable for general intelligibility, and it is especially at Pindar o1. 2.86 that it is a thing for laymen. That its σαφηνεια is pregnant with a secret intention of elevating other people's minds is seen at Diog. Apoll. fr. 1 and Diog. Laert. 9.7. Thus we may conclude that the extant title rather characterizes the philosophical level and purpose, than simply summarizes the contents, of the work, and that, apart from the history of the manuscripts and pertinent records, it is not impossible that Aristotle should himself have attached the title.

著者

藤井 崇

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.84-95, 2011-03-23

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The aim of the present paper is to investigate into the imperial cult performed on Roman Cyprus, placing a special emphasis on the so-called Cypriot oath to emperor Tiberius preserved in a Greek inscription from the Aphrodite sanctuary of Paphos Vetus (T. B. Mitford, A Cypriot Oath of Allegiance to Tiberius, JRS 50(1960), 75-79). In the oath, the Cypriots swore to the goddess Roma, Tiberius and his family at the accession of the emperor to the throne in 14. After providing an overview of studies on the imperial cult and of the Cypriot oath, the present paper tackles the oath and its text from the following three viewpoints: the theoi horkioi, i.e., the guarantor deities of the oath; the oath and the imperial cult; and the context of the oath. The Cypriot oath to Tiberius, though fragmentary in part, provides us with some fascinating insights into the religious status of the emperor on the island, the rituals of the imperial cult, and the religious and political communication between the centre and the province. The elaborately structured list of the theoi horkioi not only connects the local deities with the communal and Roman deities of greater importance, but also places Augustus and his descendants into the local context of Cyprus by means of representing the first emperor as an offspring of Aphrodite, patroness of the city of Paphos and of the island as a whole. The living emperor Tiberius also received the cultic veneration of the Cypriots, though his religious status was modified 'downwards' by means of depriving him of the epithet theos and including the goddess Roma in the objects of the final clause, which would pertain to the sacrifice to the emperor. The practice of the oath was perhaps focused on the city of Paphos, which retained the Aphrodite sanctuary and (probably) that of Hestia; however, this does not mean that the Paphians drafted and performed the oath exclusively for their own purposes and that the other cities were excluded from it. The Cypriot oath is probably a 'provincial-civic' oath in which all communities on the island participated. The oath would have involved communication between the Cypriots and the imperial power (imperial agents and the emperor himself), e.g., through the supervision of the oath by proconsules and the dispatch of a delegation to the emperor. The oath, therefore, offered the occasion for a communicative network between the Cypriots in the provincial capital and other communities, imperial agents, and the emperor himself at the religious and political levels.

著者

和田 廣

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.67-74, 1976-03-31

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Im allgemeinen hat man bisher fur bewiesen gehalten, dass das griechische Feuer in der zweiten Halfte des 7. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. von einem syrischen Ingenieur namens Kallinikos erfunden worden sei. Diese These, die von der Mehrheit der Byzantinisten kraftig unterstutzt worden ist, basiert auf einer kurzen Nachricht von Theophanes Homologetus in seiner Chronik aus dem Jahre 678. In einem der glaubwurdigen Berichte von Malalas aus Antiochia, namlich im 16. Kapitel "Vbev den Kaiser Anastasius I.", ist von einer Feuerwaffe die Rede, die "το λεγομενον θειον απυρν" heisst und die starke Zerstorungskraft besitzt, sowohl zu Lande als auch zu Wasser. In "Kestoi", jener popularen Enzyklopadie der Kunste und Wissenschaften, finden wir ferner eine Mitteilung(cap. 44), wonach es Feuer gabe, das sich automatisch entzundet. Als ihr Teilautor gilt Sex. Iulius Africanus aus dem 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Zwei Nachrichten, Malalas und Kestoi, sind bisher meines Wissens kaum im Zusammenhang mit dem Ursprung des griechischen Feuers erwahnt worden. Studieren wir sie genauer, kommen wir zum folgenden Ergebnis: Das griechische Feuer ist nicht, wie bisher behauptet worden ist, in der zweiten Halfte des 7. Jahrhunderts plotzlich erfunden worden. Die sog. Erfindungsgeschichte von Kallinikos stellt nur eine Stufe in der historischen Entwicklung der Feuerwaffen dar. Das Feuer fur die Seeschlacht, πυρ θαλασσιν, wie wir es bei Theophanes vorfinden, ist keine alleinstehende Erscheinung selbst in der Geschichte der byzantinischen Waffenkunde. Wie wir in diesem Aufsatz gezeigt haben, sind seine direkten Vorlaufer "το λεγομενον θειον απυρον" von Malalas und "το πυρ αυτοματον" von Kestoi. Und die vollendete Form von jenem πυρ θαλασσιον von Theophanes sehen wir in der Vorschrift von dem "Liber ignium" von Marcus Graecus. Es lasst sich zugleich feststellen, dass die Bezeichnung "Griechisches Feuer" viel zu vage ist und kaum in der Lage sein kann, um die verschiedene Arten der foyzantinischen Feuerwaffen dementsprechend zu benennen.

著者

伊藤 雅巳

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.176-178, 1999-03-23

著者

岩井 経男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.58-70, 1985-03-29

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E. T.サノレモンの『共和政期ローマの植民市建設』は,共和政ローマが,いつ,どこに,どんな目的で植民市を建設していったかを詳細に検討し概観した,この分野ではほとんど唯一の貫重な労作である.彼はそこで,ローマ植民市建設の第一義的目的は,イタリア支配とローマ防衛の戦略のため,と主張している.そして,前133年に始まるグラックスの改革になってはしめて性格を変え,経済的社会的意図の下に建設されることになった,と言う.一般に,ローマの植民市建設は軍事的意義とといこ社会経済的側面もあわせもつと理解されるが,軍事面を一貫して強調する彼の説は極端と思われ,その結果,グラックス以前の植民の社会政栄的考察が欠落し,グラックスが突然出現することになろう.しかし,ウェーバーが『ローマ農業史』で行っている問題設定が示すように,またサルモン自身認めるように,ローマの植民政策は植民市建設deductio coloniaeと,都市建設をともなわない個人的土地分配adsignatio viritimからなっていた.伝える史料が少ないこともあり,個人的土地分配は本格的に論じられていない.そこで以下においては,ローマの固有領域の飛躍的拡大をもたらしたウェイイの併合からグラックスの改革前までの植民政策を,主として社会政策的観点から,個人的土地分配政策を含んで再構成し,検討してみることにする.方法としては,我々が今問題としている時期を便宜的に前268年(ラテン植民市アリーミヌムAriminum建設)を境に二つに分け,前期と後期を対比させて述べることにしたい.というのは,後に述べることになるが,筆者は前三世紀前半を境としてローマの植民政策が大きく転換すると考えるからである.

著者

千葉 恵

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.47-56, 1994-03-28

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I offer an interpretation, mainly on the basis of Physics II 9, of Aristotle's claim in his biological writings that explanation by necessity involving only material and efficient causes is consistent with an explanation of the same phenomena by purpose. My argument is directed towards the further question of whether Aristotle also believes that while the essences of certain biological phenomena are partly determined by their role in a teleological system, there is a complete account in terms of material and efficient causation of the conditions under which they exist. Physics II 9 presupposes his argument for the final cause as the nature in the primary sense in II 8, and is similar in theme to Parts of Animals 1 1 where Aristotle criticises the physiologoi on the ground that when they claimed that biological phenomena come into being by necessity, they fail to distinguish what kind of necessity is involved. At the beginning of II 9, Aristotle considers two alternative ways of understanding the necessity involved in generation ; either hypothetical necessity(HN) or HN plus simple necessity(SN). HN depends on a goal. If the goal is to be, it is necessary that certain other things come to be. SN, by contrast, depends on the nature of simple bodies and their movements. Aristotle locates the SN which the physiologoi take as the main cause of generation as a "necessary nature" (200a8) and regards this as explanatory of the goal, only insofar as the latter is purely materially specified as the matter of the goal(ω&b.sigmav; δι υλην). The goal taken as its matter is simply necessitated by its material components in the sense that the material components yield a specified condition for the existence of the goal. Thus Aristotle expresses two modes of necessity involved in generation as follows ; "The necessity, then, is on a hypothesis, but isn't necessary as the same way the goal(ω&b.sigmav; τελο&b.sigmav;) is necessary. For in the latter case the necessity lies in the matter, but in the former case the purpose lies in the λογο&b.sigmav; (account as design)." (200a13ff) Aristotle confirms the two modes of necessity in comparison with a mathematical reasoning. He compares both (1) "things which come to be based on nature(κατα <φυσιν)"(200a16) and (2) "things which come to be for something" (al9) with the necessity involved in a specific mathematical proof : given that the straight is thus and so, necessarily the triangle has angles whose sum is two right angles. While (1) is wider than (2) in terms of their extensions, they differ from each other in that the necessity involved in (1) is determined by the nature of underlying(υποκειμενομ), but the necessity involved in (2) is determined by goal. Aristotle defines nature in "κατα φυσιν" in (1) as a certain underlying based on simple bodies which have "natural tendency for change" (ορμη 192b18 cf. 95 al, 276a26) for both "substances" which "have a nature"(192b33) as formal or final cause and "their per se components" (cf. 73a34ff)which "do not have a nature" (193 a1) specified above as moving upwards belongs to fire. In that mathematical reasoning, the premises or components of the conclusion determine the necessity of the conclusion. This is said to be "in a parallel fashion" (200a16) with the case in (1). On the other hand, it is said to be "in a reversed fashion"(a19) with case in (2) in the sense that the goal which is achieved at the end of generation determines the necessity of the antecedent which comes no doubt earlier than the end. In this way, these two modes of necessity in generation are indirectly compared with each other via an example of mathematics. I conclude that while the purpose as design at the level of Adyoc determines what kind of matter should be employed in generation "as matter of λογο&b.sigmav; (200b8) , matter at the level of generation necessarily generates the matter of a goal by its own power, according to the program which is laid as design at the level of λογο&b.sigmav;. This allows us to say eg. eyeball and optic nerve etc. are an eye by themselves for the sake of seeing(cf. 1041a26). By distinguishing the level of λογο&b.sigmav; in which the purpose lies from the level of generation in which material necessity lies, Aristotle sets up the compatibility between teleological explanation of biological phenomena and explanation by material necessity in which both HN and SN lie.

著者

國原 吉之助

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.143-146, 1956-04-05

著者

今井 知正

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.89-97, 1978-03-23

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According to my diagnosis, when we try to solve problems of Aristotle's modal syllogistic, a key to them, lies in a semantical analysis of which of the three-terminterpretations for 'proof by contrasted instances' and 'proof by instances' is applied to non-modal propositions of each of his syllogisms. I. The analysis of proof by contrasted instances in the case of the non-modal syllogisms shows that the non-modal propositions here are clearly regarded as those which can also be interpreted as necessary propositions. II. On the analysis of proof by instances in the case of the syllogisms with one necessary and one non-modal premiss, we can conclude that the non-modal propositions here are characteristically posited as true in at least one possible world accessible to the real world, on the ground that they are true in the latter as admissible propositions in the strict sense. III. Exactly speaking, there is only one example of proof by instances in the case of the syllogisms with one admissible and one non-modal premiss. Therefore let us direct our attention to his restriction on the term-interpretation in An. Pr. 34b7-18. From a logical point of view, then, this restriction is opposed to the definition of a valid syllogism as dependent only on its logical structure. From a philosophical point of view, on the other hand, it gives rise to the serious problem that the formal language level in which, proper to An. Pr., no semantical distinction is drawn between categories, is confused with another language level which contains this distinction.

著者

岡 道男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.101-105, 1958-05-10

著者

久保 田中 美知太郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.175-176, 1978-03-23

著者

岩崎 允胤

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.68-82, 1958-05-10

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アリストテレスは矛盾律と排中律を定式化した入として知られるが,彼はまた運動の論理について鋭い考察をおこなつている.本稿は,形式論理學と辮證法的論理學との關係をアリストテレスにまで遡つて,とくに矛盾律・排中律と運動の論理との關係を検討しようとするものである.

著者

廣川 洋一

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.40-48, 1972-03-25

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As the forerunners of philosophy, we have no small numbers of semi-philosophical cosmogonies written both in verse and prose. Almost all cosmogonies in verse such as that of Hesiod and of Epimenides are composed in hexameters. While even in the age of philosophy hexameters were still influential as one of the effective means of expression, lyric meters on the other hand are scarcely found used for semi-philosophical as well as philosophical ideas. Although it has been admitted that lyric poets had perhaps so great an influence on the shaping of philosophy, it is to be noted that no philosopher set forth his thoughts with the aid of lyric meters. Alcman's cosmogony in lyric meters, viewed in this light, arouse a great deal of interest. However, serious problems, such as the fact that the cosmogonical subjects from thenceforward had not been treated in lyric meters are by no means answered here. In this article, as the first step towards solving these problems, merely some remarks on his cosmogony will be given. Though we may regard Thetis, poros and tekmor as characteristic of his cosmogony, we do not subscribe to the opinion which holds that by emphasizing Thetis' character as a craftsman too much, it is alien from the early Greek cosmogonies. It is perhaps more suitable, when considering the nature of his cosmogony, to draw a comparison with the Hesiodic cosmogony than with the Near Eastern cosmogonies. Indeed, some close parallels are found between Alcman and Hesiod: (1) The original state of the world in their cosmogonies is a confused, undifferentiated mass. (2) Thetis, poros and tekmor can be considered to make a group and have the same function, -differentiation; differentiation, however, in the same sense as the formation of Chaos implying a vast gap comes into being. τηζ θετιδοζ γενομενηζ κ. τ. λ. (vv. 15-16) is therefore equivalent to χαοζ γενετ' (v. 116). (3) The formation of Daylight, the moon and stars out of Darkness (vv. 22-27) corresponds well to that of Aither and Daylight out of Night (v. 24). From what we have seen above, we may conclude that Alcman's cosmogony follows Hesiod with considerable accuracy even after having given careful consideration to the point that while Hesiod, as G. S. Kirk (Pres. Ph.) suggests, places emphasis on the nature of the gap itself, Alcman, on the other hand, takes a vivid interest in the act of separation at the first stage in the formation of a differentiated world.

著者

岩田 靖夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.15-28, 1979-03-29

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"What is Place?" To this question Aristotle proposes four possible answers: form (ειδο&b.sigmav;) , matter (υλη) , the empty interval (διαστημα) between the extremities of the containing body and the limit of the containing body (περα&b.sigmav; του περιεχοντο&b.sigmav;), and examines these possibilities one by one. First, both place and form contain things so that we could say they are similar in this respect. But, while form is the boundary of the contained body and not separable from it, place is the boundary of the containing body and separable from the contained one. So we must say place is not form. Second, both place and matter receive qualities or other limitations, and in this respect they somehow seem to resemble each other. But, while matter is neither separable from the thing nor contains it, place is separable from it and contains it. So, also in this case, we must say matter is not place. The third possible answer, that is, the empty interval seems to be most appropriate as the explanation of place. But Aristotle denies even this answer. His main argument is as follows. If there were an interval which existed by itself(καθ' αυτο ειναι) , it would be a hypostatized κενον, which would further demand its own place to be in, so that there would be a place of place ad infinitum. (This argument of Aristotle seems in my opinion not to be so successful. But even if it fails, it reveals, by his strong denial of the existence of κενον, his conception of κοσμο&b.sigmav; which matters to us. Thus the only remaining answer is the fourth, that is, "the first unmoved limit of the containing body(πρωτον ακινητον περα&b.sigmav; του περιεχοντο&b.sigmav;)" which is indeed to be the final definition of place by Aristotle. This definition has two important characteristics. One point : Place as Aristotle understands it, is not an independent reality but the relation of a containing body to a contained one. In other words, place is an attribute of bodies. Another point: Although place as above said is the relation between bodies, it does not necessarily mean that place is a relative phenomenon. Rather, he says, the containing body realizing the role of place must be unmoved. From this it follows that place as a relation must be based on an absolute measure. This measure is just the everlastingly revolving circumference of the universe (κοινο&b.sigmav; τοπο&b.sigmav;)and the four ringed layers of the elements fire, air, water, earth-(οικειο&b.sigmav; τοπο&b.sigmav;)whose unalterable absolute arrangement in the incessant change into one another imitates the constant movement of the heaven. This fact that the elements have a natural tendency to move towards their own(respectively different)places is the very reason why he denied so strongly the existence of the void which implies the negation of all differentiation. Conclusion: the universe which is reflected in his theory of place is a finite(πεπερασμενον) and complete (τελειον) universe which is so densely filled (πληρε&b.sigmav;) by bodies that it has no empty interstices at all. Actually there exists no infinite thing. In ontology he was essentially the most genuine successor to Parmenidean theory of being.

著者

片山 英男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.115-117, 1986-03-18

著者

片山 英男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.114-118, 1981-03-30

著者

吉武 純夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.23-33, 1989-03-15

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It has often been said that if Ajax is manifesting his decision not to kill himself in his third speech, we have to assume that Ajax is lying But this is not true Ajax can at the same time be sincere throughout the third speech After abandoning suicide at the beginning of the third speech, Ajax comes to understand, first at 666 f and then at 677, what will be the result of his longer life, if he purges his "defilements", escapes the anger of Athena and buries his sword to hide it, he will come actually to obey the gods and honor the Atreidae, learning discipline Now these thoughts of Ajax make him realize the fact that reconciliation with fatal enemies will be inevitable if he continues to live A close examination of 666 f and 677 leads to such an interpretation of the third speech And if we are right in this interpretation, there is no question as to how and why Ajax, behind the stage, decided again to kill himself after the third speech, for the first speech has shown how dominant is the hatred for the Atreidae in the mind of Ajax Though gentle enough to abandon suicide in response to his wife's entreaty, he is so obstinate in his hatred as to refuse reconciliation with his enemies at the cost of his own life Ajax' hatred, shown in the play as an element always leading him to ruin, is continued by his wife and brother after his death And again, at the end of the play, dead Ajax' hatred is mentioned as an important dramatic motif Thus the play is unified by Ajax' hatred However, it is always presented in contrast to other mental elements the sense of honour and humanity It follows that Sophocles gave a dynamism (rather than a pathos) of the mind of Ajax to the traditional monotonous image of hateful Ajax

著者

今道 友信

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, pp.1-15, 1971-03-31

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By quoting several Greek philosophers, the author tries to distinguish the judgement from the description. According to his opinion, the description is nothing other than the task of the eye and its act is the objective exactitude. The judgement is on the contrary the personal decision concerning internal responsibility, and its act is the truth. Many thinkers utilize their objective description about the external world for their judgement. But Plato concentrates on the judgement. Because his theory goes on the level of logos, which is the correlative of the reason, and not on the dimension of pragma, which is the object of the sense. His theory of ideas is not the inductive reference from sense-data, but from this theory as principle the lot of true propositions are deduced. (Interpretation of Phaidon) The subject of thinking in Plato is neither the sense nor the reason of human beings. The human reason does love the true thinking which is the business of God. The act of the human reason is to become the horizon for the thinking of God. Periagoge tes psyches (conversio animae) to the Being-itself is the principle for the homoiosis toi theoi. Because the service for God (latreia tou theou) is the most important task for us, we must know what God thinks and we must do as we know. This is the reason why the thought and deed can be one in Platonic system. (Interpretation of Apologia and Politeia)