著者
東野 篤子
出版者
日本EU学会
雑誌
日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.24, pp.96-124,313, 2004-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

This article explores how the EU reached it decision to finalise accession negotiations with 10 candidate countries at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. At the time of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, there was an apparent lack of consensus on the three crucial questions concerning enlargement—‘timing’ of the conclusion of accession negotiations and the date of the accessions, with ‘how many’ candidate countries, and how to ‘finance’ enlargement. It was extremely hard to find solutions that might satisfy both the current member states and candidate countries. This article analyses when, how and why these questions were solved, and how these painful accession negotiations were able to be finalised at Copenhagen.As for the question of the ‘timing’, most of the EU member states had initially been extremely reluctant to set any specific ‘Target Date’ to conclude the negotiations, while the candidate countries had constantly been demanding the EU to present such a date. The only ‘commitment’ that the EU made at Helsinki was to indicate that it would be ‘in a position to welcome new Member States from the end of 2002’. However, it turned out that the EU had to step up its commitment by a proposal after the Commission and the French Presidency to create the ‘Road Map’, a detailed scenario to finalise the negotiations, which was endorsed in the Nice European Council in December 2000. Although creating the ‘Road Map’ and setting a ‘Target Date’ were not precisely identical, it turned out that implementing the ‘Road Map’ directed the EU almost inevitably to refer to 2002 as the EU's goal to finalise the accession negotiations with the most prepared countries. Also, the pressure from the European Parliament to set the date of the accession as 2004 had a great influence on the conclusion of the negotiations by the end of 2002.The question of ‘size’ was settled in two stages: when the EU decided to conclude the accession negotiations with the most prepared candidates by the end of 2002, the question of the size was almost automatically settled. Then, having to admit the considerable progress of the accession negotiations under the Road Map, the Laeken European Council in December 2001 named 10 countries which were likely to finalise the negotiations by the end of 2002.The finalisation of the negotiations on the chapters with budgetary implications—‘Agriculture’, ‘Regional Policy and Co-ordination of Structural Instruments’ and ‘Finance and Budgetary Provisions’—was by far the most difficult. Although the EU claimed that their common positions were agreed at the Brussels European Summit in October 2002, the candidate countries were far from being satisfied by the deal. The negotiations were therefore on the brink of collapse. However, two factors contributed the finalisation of accession negotiations with the 10 candidate countries at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002: the Danish Presidency played a role as an honest broker to find a compromise between current member states and the candidate countries, and EU member states were ‘entrapped’ to keep their ‘commitment’ at the Laeken European Council to finalise the negotiations by the end of 2002.
著者
東野 篤子
出版者
慶應義塾大学法学研究会
雑誌
法学研究 (ISSN:03890538)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.82, no.5, pp.47-77, 2009-05

はじめに一 理論的枠組み(1)セキュリタイゼーション・アプローチの概要(2)他の理論的アプローチとの比較(3)セキュリティタイゼーション・アプローチの評価二 EU拡大と安全保障ディスコース(1)EU東方拡大の実証研究におけるセキュリタイゼーション・アプローチの有用性(2)EU東方拡大プロセスの諸段階と安全保障ディスコースおわりに
著者
東野 篤子
出版者
慶應義塾大学法学研究会
雑誌
法学研究 (ISSN:03890538)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.82, no.5, pp.47-77, 2009-05

はじめに一 理論的枠組み(1)セキュリタイゼーション・アプローチの概要(2)他の理論的アプローチとの比較(3)セキュリティタイゼーション・アプローチの評価二 EU拡大と安全保障ディスコース(1)EU東方拡大の実証研究におけるセキュリタイゼーション・アプローチの有用性(2)EU東方拡大プロセスの諸段階と安全保障ディスコースおわりに
著者
東野 篤子
出版者
日本EU学会
雑誌
日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2000, no.20, pp.210-234,343, 2000-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

This paper analyses the process of the preparation for the EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Counties (CEECs) from the Madrid European Council in 1995 to the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. It sheds light on and compares roles played by main actors of the European Union, i. e. the European Commission, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. It also argue that there was a clear division of labour between the Commission and the Member Countries, before and after the publication of the Opinion for the Enlargement (‘Agenda 2000’).The agreement between France and Germany in the mid-November in 1995 created an important foundation for the EU to agree at the Madrid Summit to speed up the preparation for enlargement process. This enabled the Commission to launch the enormous task for preparing the Agenda 2000'. The role of the Commission was dominant and decisive, in processing huge data, contacting the applicants and diffusing information from time to time concerning technical evaluations by the Commission both to the applicants and Member States.In the meantime, the three main Member States were consolidating their positions toward enlargement issues, rather than committing the process actively. Partly as the result of the efforts for policy co-ordinations between Germany and France (especially in the framework of the “Weimer triangle”), the position of the French Government gradually shifted towards that of the German; it started to admit the possibilities to start the accession negotiation with the most prepared candidates (i. e. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic).The United Kingdom has always been a strong advocate for the EU enlargement Eastwards. Despite changes of government throughout this period, there seemed to be no major policy change between the Conservative and the Labour government; in favour of an early enlargement, with the most prepared CEECs, i. e. Vishgrads (and Baltic countries).Thus, when the Commission submitted the ‘Agenda 2000’ there were little difference in the positions of the three Member States. It means that there already exited a ground to admit the method proposed by the Commission (to start the accession negotiation with the 6 applicants) was created without harsh bargaining between the Member States, well before the Luxembourg Summit. Rather, the focus of the discussion was to keep the ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ of the entire negotiation process, without leaving the ‘second waves’ outsides. Here, the role played by the French government, advocating the idea of the European Conference, which is to gather all the applicants into one umbrella, is remarkable. And the British government, who determined to commit to the European Affairs stronger than its previous government, and tried to take an advantage of taking the next EU Presidency, committed actively to rap up the agreement for the Luxembourg.
著者
臼井 陽一郎 市川 顕 小山 晶子 小林 正英 小松崎 利明 武田 健 東野 篤子 福海 さやか 松尾 秀哉 吉沢 晃
出版者
新潟国際情報大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2017-04-01

(1)先行研究のレビューを進めるとともに、海外学会(英国EU学会など)に参加、さらにブリュッセルなどヨーロッパ諸国で実務者および海外研究者にアクセス、インタビューを実施するなかで、本研究課題に関わる研究状況をサーベイし、<EUの規範パワーの持続性>という研究テーマの意義およびアクチュアリティについて再確認できた。規範パワー論はEU政治研究においていまだ<終わった>研究課題ではなかった。(2)研究会を3回実施(関学大・東海大・新潟国際情報大)、理論枠組と役割分担の微調整を行った。また4名の研究協力者に参加してもらい、理論枠組と実証事例の整合性について批判的視点を加えてもらった。この一連の研究会の結果、規範パワーたろうとする加盟国首脳の政治意思と、EUの対外関係にみられる4つの制度的特徴(マルチアクターシップ・シンクロナイゼーション・リーガライゼーション・メインストリーミング)の関係性をどう理論的に突き詰めていくかについて、メンバー間に意見の不一致があることが分かり、今後の理論的討究の課題が浮き彫りとなった。それは大きくは、合理主義アプローチに依拠した因果関係として仮説化していくべきか、それとも構成主義アプローチに依拠した構造化プロセスの把握を目指していくべきなのか、という二つのアプローチの対抗関係であり、次年度の研究会で詰めていくべき課題となった。なお4年後の研究成果発表のため、メンバーそれぞれの研究課題を仮題として章立てを作り、出版社を決め、出版へ向けた交渉に入った。
著者
東野 篤子
巻号頁・発行日
2012

科学研究費助成事業(科学研究費補助金)研究成果報告書:若手研究(B)2007-2011