著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.2-20, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

17

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In this study I will try to survey how Ukrainian oligarchs acted in the course of 2014 upheaval. Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions, whose rule collapsed as a result of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014, had been a party of interests, not of ideology. For the first couple of years (2010–2011) it was rather a coalition of several factions, with their interests more or less respected. The balance of power and interests of early years came to be disrupted by greedy expansion of the Yanukovich Family. It began to grow rapidly assumedly around the end of 2011 or the beginning of 2012. The President’s son Oleksandr Yanukovich coordinated building of the Family empire, with help from intimate oligarchs like Serhiy Kurchenko and Yuliy Ivanyushchenko. Even some Ministers of national government contributed to money making schemes for the Family. Its spheres expanded sometimes even to the detriment of oligarchs who had been loyal to the regime. By the time mass demonstrations began at the end of 2013, the regime was no longer monolithic, losing full loyalty from Rinat Akhmetov and Dmitro Firtash, the 2 giant oligarchs of the Yanukovich era. Petro Poroshenko supported the Maidan movement most actively among famous oligarchs. Akhmetov, who used to be the biggest sponsor of the Yanukovich Regime, is also believed to have financed Maidan. Key persons of the Yanukovich Family and Andriy Klyuyev, on the other hand, insisted on ruthless suppression of Maidan. Vitaly Klichko, one of the most popular potential candidates of upcoming presidential elections, announced withdrawal from the race in March 2014. This even more ensured victory of Petro Poroshenko in elections on 25 May. Some experts believe that Firtash arranged Poroshenko=Klichko alliance, fearing that his rival Yuliya Tymoshenko might become president and get revenge on him. In Ukraine’s elections, most candidates traditionally appeal to anti-oligarch propaganda. Paradoxically it was Poroshenko, one of the most famous oligarchs in Ukraine, who won the 2014 presidential elections. There are no clear evidence that the oligarchs, who have business interests on the Crimean Peninsula, either supported actively Russia’s incorporation of Crimea or, oppositely, resisted it. It is well known, however, that Sergei Aksenov, who became Premier of Crimean AR and led its incorporation into Russian Federation, had been fostered by Firtash as a politician. Some experts hence believe that Firtash at least tacitly approved incorporation of Crimea. But in reality Firtash’s business on the Peninsula, for example titanium business, is threatened by changes of jurisdiction. In April–May 2014 some suspected that Rinat Akhmetov, a longtime lord of the region, stood behind pro-Russian separatist movements in Donbass. It is true that Akhmetov contacted separatists and attempted to use them. But he only needed a bargaining chip in relations with Kiev. It is very doubtful wheather Akhmetov really committed to separatism of Donbass. If Donbass will be independent from Ukraine or incorporated into Russian Federation, his ferrous metallurgy will inevitably collapse. At present Akhmetov is in distress because of warfare in Donbass and other unpleasant realities.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

比較経済体制学会

雑誌

比較経済研究 (ISSN:18805647)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.2_21-2_32, 2015 (Released:2015-07-07)

参考文献数

28

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ウクライナ・ロシア危機を解明するための新たな分析視角として,両国の基幹産業である鉄鋼業を取り上げ,図表を駆使し比較検討する.世界の鉄鋼業界では,中国発の生産過剰・価格軟化が生じている.近代化が遅れ,コスト面での優位も失いつつあるロシア・ウクライナ鉄鋼業の立ち位置は,困難となっている.とりわけ,技術力が世界最低水準の上に,集積地ドンバスで内戦が起きたウクライナ鉄鋼業の行く末は,悲観せざるをえない.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.19-40, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

48

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In this study, I tried to survey economic effects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on Russia and other Eurasian Countries as its transit nations. Economic effects can be categorized into ‘investment effects,’ ‘transport effects’ and ‘areal effects.’I found that ‘investment effects’ of BRI on the railway sector of Eurasian countries were rather limited. Few fulfilled projects include China Eximbank’s loan to finance construction of Kamchik railway tunnel in Uzbekistan, China Eximbank’s loan to finance electrification of Belarus’s railway and, though the details were unknown, China’s commitment to invest in establishing the special economic zone ‘Khorgos-Eastern Gate.’ Other investment projects on the list of prospective joint works by Eurasian Economic Union members and China, such as the Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail project, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project and the project to connect rail networks of Armenia and Iran, had not been materialized so far.As for ‘transport effects,’ thus far the most remarkable success story is the rapid growth of China Railway Express connecting China and Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus by container trains, which is believed to bring about over 100 million US dollars of transit revenue annually to each of them. Companies from European regions of Russia and Belarus also begin to explore the Chinese market by virtue of China Railway Express, which may play some positive role in expanding non-resource, non-energy exports, a priority for Putin administration. One must, however, put it into consideration that according to balance of payment statistics railway service export revenue of the three countries is stagnating. In addition, China-Europe container transport is still dominated by maritime modal, not railway. Beijing plans to reduce subsidies by local governments to container trains, which also makes the future of China Railway Express uncertain.Lastly, we can regard the development of ‘Khorgos-Eastern Gate’ in Kazakhstan and the birth of industrial park ‘Great Stone’ in Belarus, both with investments from China, as typical cases of ‘areal effects,’ while the ambitious Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail project in Russia came to a deadlock because it needs larger investments and more complicated arrangements.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.35, pp.137-163, 2015-05-25 (Released:2017-05-25)

参考文献数

26

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Ukraine after gaining independence in 1991 suffered the longest economic recession among the former Soviet Republics. Its long-waited economic boom in 2000’s was interrupted by the global economic crisis of 2008, followed by an only small recovery and ensuing stagnation. Its poor performance could be explained by, along with other causes, outdated and inefficient industries, notably ferrous metallurgy. This led to a worsening of its balance of payments in 2010’s, forcing the ruling Party of Regions headed by Viktor Yanukovich to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) in November 2013. Most Ukrainian citizens, however, said ‘no’ not only to this decision but also to the corrupt Yanukovich administration itself, which ended up with a collapse of the regime in February 2014.Ukraine has two traditional trade partners, Russia and the EU, with the amounts of trade turnover with them roughly equal. Ukraine tends to export low value-added commodities to markets outside Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), e.g. to the EU, on the one hand and relatively high value-added items, such as machinery and processed foodstuffs, to Russia and other CIS countries on the other hand. Ukraine, having chosen a pro-EU orientation, risks losing markets of Russia, whose government threatens to impose custom duties on imports from Ukraine.Ukraine’s new administration led by Petro Poroshenko finally signed the Association Agreement with the EU in June 2014. The new administration strives to overcome today’s turmoil by virtue of eurointegration. The immediate effects, however, of creation of a free trade area with the EU, widely proclaimed as a core of the Agreement, on Ukrainian economy should not be overestimated because margins of import duties reduction are rather modest. Structural reforms and adjustments to the EU standards, another aspect of the Agreement with the EU, will be more crucial to Ukraine’s future.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.135-155, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

36

被引用文献数

2

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The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was established in 2015 and so far consists of five nations (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). One cannot deny that the EAEU has several defects such as too much dominance of Russia among the member states, an imbalanced network of intra-EAEU trade, relatively low importance of intra-EAEU trade for the member states, tendency to postpone market integration of crucial sectors like oil & gas and differences of import tariffs as a result of Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO.We should, however, evaluate true merits of the EAEU for Russia in the context of its actual political and economic developments, not of the classic economic integration theory. It is noteworthy that the concept of the EAEU was proposed by Vladimir Putin on the eve of 2012 Presidential elections of Russia. Meanwhile Putin, who put ‘modernization’ of Russia on the top of the agenda, pursued innovation and new industrialization of Russian economy. Putin argued that so as to achieve these goals Russia should improve investment climate and enhance investment merits and that the creation of the EAEU was one of the efforts in that direction.Russian automotive industry is an important touchstone in this regard. Manufacturers of passenger cars in Russia used to concentrate on Russian domestic market, paying almost no attention to foreign markets because of high production costs within Russia. The creation of the Customs Union, a predecessor of the EAEU, however, lead to a unification of import tariff on passenger cars among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, resulting in a rapid expansion of Russia’s new cars exports to the two partner countries, which used to be occupied by used cars. Thus, the EAEU plays a positive role in developing Russian automotive industry, a pivotal sector for new industrialization of Russian economy.It is true that the markets of Belarus and Kazakhstan are not sizable enough for Russian manufactures to secure profitability. Still the EAEU could be instrumental in converting some industrial sectors of Russia more export-oriented and in this sense could contribute to modernization of Russia to a certain extent.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.134-137, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

京都大学地域研究統合情報センター

雑誌

地域研究 (ISSN:24337358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.62-76, 2015-11-30

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第I部: ウクライナをみる視角

著者

服部 倫卓

巻号頁・発行日

2017-12-25

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北海道大学. 博士(学術)

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

日経BP社

雑誌

日経エレクトロニクス (ISSN:03851680)

巻号頁・発行日

no.956, pp.137-140, 2007-07-16

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ロシアの家電市場が急成長を続けている(図1)。2006年の市場規模は前年比で約15%拡大し,150億米ドル相当に達した。旧ソビエト連邦が解体される直前の1990年と比較すると,15倍に成長した計算になる。 この市場規模に関する数字は,家電業界を束ねる「ロシア家電・コンピュータ製品販売・製造企業協会(RATEK)」が推計し,2007年4月に発表したもの。

著者

六鹿 茂夫 廣瀬 陽子 黛 秋津 佐藤 真千子 小窪 千早 梅本 哲也 吉川 元 上垣 彰 大西 富士夫 西山 克典 小久保 康之 吉村 貴之 中島 崇文 末澤 恵美 服部 倫卓 木村 真

出版者

静岡県立大学

雑誌

基盤研究(A)

巻号頁・発行日

2008

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黒海地域の国際関係を歴史、経済、域内国際関係、域外国際関係の4次元から分析し、国際会議をボアジチ大学(イスタンブール)と静岡県立大学にて開催して学際的総合化に努めた。その結果、1.黒海としての地域性、2.地政学的重要性、3.黒海地域の特殊性と地域特有のイシュー(エネルギー、民主化、凍結された紛争)、4.黒海地域の構造とその変動、5.黒海地域と広域ヨーロッパおよび世界政治との相互連関性が明らかにされた。