著者
武島 良成
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2016, no.45, pp.69-85, 2016 (Released:2018-06-01)
参考文献数
68

This article aims to follow footsteps of the Japanese advisory body that was placed in Burma’s Ba Maw government during the Pacific War, and to deepen the understanding of the degree of the accomplishment of autonomy and self-reliance of the government. Japan withdrew many of the military directorial personnel from Burma after its ‘independence’ (August, 1943), and instead, decided to send an advisory group. Booklets created by the Historical Facts Section of the Demobilization Department and some publications of the hometown of OGAWA Gotaro (the supreme advisor) state that the advisory group contributed great deal to the reconstruction of Burma. If this is the fact, it means that the resistance and countercharge of Ba Maw government to realize Burma’s autonomy and self-reliance did not succeed in this sphere. However, as I studied unpublicized diaries and official documents, it was revealed that Ogawa arrived in Burma in December 1943, and returned to Japan temporarily during March through July of 1944. Ogawa went back to Japan to summon advisory members. Those senior advisors summoned at that time arrived on a plane in Burma around August. Meanwhile, general advisors took boats and trains and all the members finally arrived by November. However, by that time, Burmese frontline was about to collapse, and the advisory group did not have enough time to operate much. In addition, Ba Maw’s government, at that time, was requiring science technicians, and there was not much of work the advisory group could have done. Consequently, it never intervened and interfered with the Ba Maw government in full scale. Incidentally, Lieutenant General KAWABE Masakazu came to think that there was not much to expect from the advisory group by 1944. If the Japanese Burma Area Army actually decided to go back to the policy of interfering with the government of Burma by the civil officers belonging to the Army, the weakened interventions and interferences of Japan would have been only about the advisory group or a temporary status. However, there were differences of opinions between KAWABE and other staff officers. Besides, there were some other materials that implied the interference had been slackened all the way. Then, it would be well possible that the military never went back to its original policy of interfering with Burma’s politics. I intend to excavate historical materials further to reveal the fact.
著者
久志本 裕子
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2016, no.45, pp.25-43, 2016 (Released:2018-06-01)
参考文献数
39

Malaysia has observed remarkable social change since the 1970s as a result of Islamic revival (dakwah movement). Some previous studies have described the social change as “Islamization” by attributing the change through the policies under the Mahathir’s government that integrated Islamic elements into various aspects of official administration, such as the establishment of Islamic banking systems and enhancement of Islamic judicial system. With these policies, Malaysia’s progress in terms of Islam was hailed as a result of “Islamization policy.” However, the meaning of “Islamization” has not been explicitly discussed. Because of the lack of discussion, previous studies give impression that as if there is a single direction toward something “more Islamic,” even though it is obvious that Muslim have various interpretations about what is “Islamic.” Thus this study aims to reconsider the concept of “Islamization” by investigating how the interpretation of Islamic terms has changed under the banner of “Islamization.” As a case study, this paper focuses on the content of textbooks for the subject of “Islamic education” in Malaysian secondary schools. The subject was introduced and refined during the time of intensive implementation of “Islamization policy.” The analysis employs the idea of “functionalization” suggested by an anthropologist, Gregory Starrett [1998] to explain how the meaning of religious concepts may change when they are transferred from a traditional religious context into a social and political context. The analysis of textbooks in comparison with some classical texts that are used in traditional Islamic learning shows that the explanation of religious elements are reinterpreted in a way that may “function” positively for the national integration and social and economic development of Malaysia. This implies that the official discourses produced under the “Islamization” policy have changed the interpretation of the religious concepts. The various directions of such transformation should be understood in order to evaluate the “function” of Islam in Malaysia.

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著者
仲田 浩三
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1972, no.2, pp.100-121, 1972

Since the theory regarding this kingdom was put forward by Mayers in 1875, A. D., according to which Ho-ling is the transcription of Kalinga in South India and showing that the people coming from that region had settled in Java, many scholars have accepted it. In 1964 Damais, who had been trying to prove the new theory by Coed&eacute;s (proposed in 1948) wrote an article, in which he said that the name of Ho-ling in Chinese is to be transcribed <i>Walai_??_</i> in Old Javanese found in southen Central Java, and that this state existed as a kingdom from 640 A. D. to 818 A. D. In 1962 Iwamoto wrote an article, in which the name was transcribed as <i>Sailendra</i>.<br>This writer has drawn following conclusions regarding this problem, 1) that Ho-ling existed from before 640 A. D. to the second half of the ninth century (860-875 A. D.), according to the Hsin T'ang-shu, 2) that Ho-ling was established as a country in before 640 A. D. because it had sent the envoys to China in 647 A. D., 648 A. D., and 666 A. D. which were earlier than the years noted in the book by (_??_ie-dzia_??_) on the country of Srivijaya, 3) that during (Da_??_) period the main harbor was (<i>Kua_??_-tsi_??_u</i>) for plying between China and India or Southeast Asia by ship and then the route was along East of Malay Peninsula and Java, according to some historical sources in Chinese, 4) that Ho-ling is given the names of (<i>Zia</i><sup>2</sup>-<i>b'u&acirc;</i><sup>1</sup>) and (<i>Zia</i><sup>1</sup>-<i>b'u&acirc;</i><sup>1</sup>) in the Hsin T'ang-shu and the country of is named (<i>Piu</i><sup>2</sup>-<i>ka-liu_??_</i><sup>1</sup>), too, in the Ling-wai-tai-ta and <i>Piu-ka-liu_??_</i> is written the name of a harbor by way of (<i>Ja_??_gala</i>) at East Java in the (Tao-i-tsa-chik), so <i>Piu-ka-liu_??_</i> is not a name of country but that of the harbor of Pakalongan in 1817 A. D. at the northern Central Java, 5) that the following word formation and sound changes are conceivable:<br>luwa_??_>lo_??_&rarr;pakalo_??_an<br>luwa_??_>lwa_??_&rarr;kaluwa_??_>kalwa_??_&rarr;pakalwa_??_an>pakalo_??_an}>pakalo_??_an<br>and (<i>xa</i><sup>1</sup>-<i>lia_??_</i><sup>1</sup>) can be interpreted as abbreviation of <i>pakalwa_??_an</i> and identified with <i>kalwa_??_/kalo_??_</i> in Old Javanese, 6) that S&aring;j&aring;met&aring; and Tuk Mas inscriptions (undated) are found in northern Central Java; the former is found at the village near Batang which is located at the east of Pekalongan in the present, and these inscriptions are written in one of the variety of Brahmi script which is, however, different from usual script in appearing of new types of letters in cerebral <i>NA/N-</i>and liquid <i>RA/R</i> as shown on the inscriptions of Kedukan Bukit, Talang Tuw&aring; in Sumatra and Hampran, Din&aring;y&aring; in Java, and 7) that on the inscriptions of Kota Kapur at Bangka and Sa&ntilde;jaya in Java, archaic forms for liquid <i>RA/R-</i> and medial <i>U (suku in Javanese</i>) had been used reguarly, and if it is correct to identify S&aring;j&aring;mert&aring; inscription at the time befor 639 A. D. (of. Nakada, 1973), the family of <i>Selendra</i> inscribed on it had ruled the northern Kedu; also that the amily of Sa&ntilde;jaya settled at the southern Kedu or Prambanan, either from another part of Java or from another land, in 732 A. D. at the latest.
著者
合地 幸子
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.44, pp.101-119, 2015 (Released:2017-06-01)
参考文献数
49

This study aims to discuss the possibility of pramurukti as one form of support for elderly people through the process of training pramurukti, who are occupational caregivers, in urban Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The pramurukti are the people who care mainly for elderly people. By Indonesian standards, no designation has been formed for the occupational group that provides elderly care. In this paper, I consider the positioning of pramurukti in Yogyakarta and the possibility for future Indonesia. In 1980, a private Yogyakarta hospital started pramurukti training. The elderly people who suffered from illness sought care service by pramurukti at the time when care needs increased. However, the pramurukti have not been able to support the needs of the elderly and their families. As a factor, there is an inconsistency between the elderly and pramurukti related to the operation of duties and contents of the work. Households which had elderly people in acute phases of illness or at end- of- life used services only when it was necessary, and pramurukti worked according to their desire. In contrast, households that had elderly in long-term care regarded pramurukti who learned the knowledge of nursing care as the people who helped with the IADL (instrumental activities of daily living) of elderly people. The pramurukti plays a role to bridge the gap for elderly people who are managed under medical care and nursing in the medical domain by providing knowledge to families in traditional elderly care through care work. I argue that pramurukti have a possibility to become collaborators with the family in the realm of household as one of the forms of support for the aging society. However, the pramurukti have a marginal presence in medicine and welfare. The occupational caregivers called pramurukti might be firmly established through a training system. However, the social recognition is still insufficient. For future Indonesia, “those who accompany the elderly,” such as pramurukti, have a major role to consider the realm of household for which there is lack of policy. It would be important to note individual conditions to affect the labor form of the caregiver. It is necessary to pay attention to the role of the caregiver in social changes of Indonesia.
著者
斎藤 紋子
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.41, pp.5-29, 2012 (Released:2016-12-14)
参考文献数
36

This study considers the formation of the concept of ‘Bamar Muslims’ by examining the description in history books written by them and the political and social background of the 1930s. ‘Bamar Muslims’ are self−styled individuals having Islamic faith; they are conscious indigenous citizens and respect Myanmar customs. It is maintained that approximately 89% of the entire population of Myanmar is Buddhist, with 98% of the Burmese ethnic group following Buddhism. It is quite common that the term “Bamar” includes a religious implication, namely Buddhism, although it is occasionally used to refer to the Burmese “ethnic group” only. The concept of “Bamar” ethnicity, which includes both ethnic grouping and religious belief, is widespread throughout Myanmar society. In British Burma, there was an influx of Indian immigrants in the mid−19th century because of the new administrative system and economic development during the British colonial rule. Muslims currently living in Myanmar, including ‘Bamar Muslims’, are mostly descendants of Indian immigrants who migrated prior to, or during, the British colonial period. Most of these immigrants gained citizenship through naturalization and appeared to be integrated into the nation state. The claim of Bamar Muslims appeared during the British colonial period. Bamar Muslims wrote some books on their history in the 1930s, emphasizing that they are not Indians but ethnically Burmese. These history books describe their adoption of Burmese culture and customs, and good relationships between Bamar Muslims and the dynasties of Burma. In contrast, on the Census, they were categorized as ‘Zerbadi,’ whose father is Indian Muslim and mother is Burmese Buddhist. The Zerbadi community was recognised as the Indian Muslim community, and the Census reports show that Burmese people regarded Bamar Muslims as Indians or foreigners, not as Burmese. Moreover, in the 1930s, there was widespread discontent against Indians in Burmese society, so the Indians found the environment there uneasiness because of the social frustration directed at them. The voice of Bamar Muslims that they were indigenous Muslims and respected Myanmar’s culture first came to light during the 1920s and 1930s; this was a result of an interplay of various factors. The point of emphasis first appeared in history books written by Bamar Muslims themselves, in which they asserted their own identity. In addition, it is speculated that one of the reasons for the formation of the concept of ‘Bamar Muslims’ was the feeling of anxiety harboured by those who found themselves the targets of frustration and dissatisfaction, along with the feeling of disconnect between their self−consciousness and the way in which the surrounding society grouped and categorised them.
著者
北川 香子
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.43, pp.87-116, 2014

<p>In January 1885, anti-French rebellions broke out at various points in the Kingdom of Cambodia. France concentrated four thousand troops on Cambodia and barely suppressed the rebels with the help of the Cambodian King by the end of 1886. In general understanding, those rebellions were the reaction of Cambodian elites to the treaty which the Governor of Cochinchina, Charles Thomson, forced to King Norodom on 17 June 1884. Although much attention has been given to the roles played by supreme elites, such as the Governor of Cochinchina, King Norodom, Second King Sisowath and Prince Si Votha during those years, little is known about the situation in each region under the rebellions. In this paper, I inquire closely into the activities of the rebels who uprose along the Mekong River between Kampong Cham and Kracheh. After the rebellion subsided, this region began to develop significantly under the French colonial rule which guaranteed the safety of the traffic on the Mekong River from Cochinchina to Laos. </p><p>The rebellion in Kampong Cham─Kracheh region occurred in inland <i>srok srae</i> (the land of paddy field), and the main participants were Khmers. <i>Prei</i> (forest) or <i>phnom</i> (mountain) behind <i>srok srae</i> were not the foothold of the rebels, but served as supply and escape routes for them. Ethnic minorities and religious or magical authorities were not included in the main body of the rebels. Most chiefs of the rebels were officials who held traditional titles as governors and <i>balats</i> (deputy governor). They led hundreds of people, held their own grounds in the plain of <i>srok srae</i>, and shared information about the maneuvers of French troops by exchanging letters with each other. They had been respectively appointed by different authorities, and some of them were appointed by Si Votha who had maintained another independent kingdom to the north of Kampong Thum, which contacted with the territory of Siam. A dozen "Burmese warriors" were distributed under chiefs who had strong ties with Si Votha, and Siamese of Siem Bouk played an important role in supplying guns and ammunition for the rebels. These facts suggest that the rebels maintained close connection with Northeast Thailand area. The targets of the rebels were those who related to the French colonial rule, Chinese merchants, and Malay and Chams along the Mekong River. </p><p>The French did not have enough military power to defeat independent chiefs to control the entire <i>srok srae</i>, but could find skilled pro-French local officials and nominated them as governors in the process of suppressing the rebellion. During the decade after the outbreak of rebellion, the chiefs of the rebels disappeared one by one, and the governors newly appointed by the name of the King were received by the local population. Then the French succeeded in stabilizing their rule to promote "a colonization without collision" on the territory along the Mekong River to the edge of <i>prei</i> and <i>phnom</i>.</p>