著者
市川 健二郎
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1971, no.1, pp.79-100, 1971-10-28 (Released:2010-03-16)

Because she was not a Western colonial country, but an Asian Kingdom and a member of the Axis Power, wartime Thailand was free from Japanese military administration and a able to keep aloof from warfare after the friendly entry of the Japanese army, Thai political leaders assumed a pattern of “compromise” rather than “hostility” in response to the Japanese impact. Although intellectually, most Thai leaders did not agree with the Japanese idea of “The Great East Asia Go-prosperity Sphere, ” they accelerated an allied relationship with Japan to avoid a possibly critical situation of Japanese militarism sweeping all over the country. For her own national benefit in facing increasing Japanese power in Southeast Asia, Thailand put pressure on the anti-Japanese boycott movement of the Chinese within a country, sat on her fence of neutrality and tried to remain out side the Japanese military occupation until the opening day of the war. Even after December 8, 1941, when she recognized the friendly entry of the Japanese army, Thailand tried hard to stand behind the bay line by contributing economic ally to the Japanese military operation in Burma, Malaya and Singapore.In wartime, Pibul Songkram, Prime Minister of the Government, promoted Rathaniyom (Patriotic Movement) and Thai Yai (Great Thai Nation Movement through which he wanted to keep national stability based on of traditional Thai sentiment rather than the idea of individual freedom from the Constitutional Revolution in 1932. In terms of motivation, therefore, these movements were quite different from the Japanese idea of the “Co-prosperity Sphere.” Meanwhile, the dynamics of the anti-Japanese “Free Thai” movement were accelerated by Thai elites and university students then in the United States and the United Kingdom. There they carried out the actual plan to develop their resistance against Japan. On the other hand, Thai leaders, except several domestic “Free Thai” leaders, outwardly continued their friendly relations with the Japanese while secretly linking up with the “Free Thai” members in order to find a new place for themselves after the war. With the benefits of this duality, they reserved their own clear cut opinion and left rooms for changing attitudes to their advantage.Chinese leaders in economic circles also had similar patterns of response. Although they started the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement in 1937, which was motivated from loyalty to their native land, they joined neither the all Chinese united front in Southeast Asia nor the overseas Chinese good-will tour party to Chungking and Yennan in 1938. However, from 1938 the Chinese in Thailand began cooperating with the national policy of the Thai government and, after war erupted, made contributions by procuring for the Japanese army. In reply to a requisition for labour for army railway construction between Burma and Thailand in 1943, the Chinese again tried to keep their security in the country by means of economic cooperation in offering munitions war, rather than by sending labour power for dreadful construction. In the meantime, however, they donated funds secretly to members of the “Free Thai” movement. Chang Lan-ch'en, former President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, was a leader of pro-Japanse group during the war, but was able to return to the some position again in 1948 and held thee post until 1961 when he died. Pibul was also reinstalled in his former position in 1948 and was Prime Minister until 1957. These two political and economic leaders began to leave room for changing attitudes by the end of the war, to enhance their reinstatement in the post-war period.
著者
柿崎 一郎
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.39, pp.52-85, 2010 (Released:2016-12-14)
参考文献数
29

The aim of this article is to describe the characteristics of Japanese military transport on Thai railways during World War II, by analyzing the train schedules now held in the National Archives of Thailand. These schedules contain such data as the number and type of carriages on each train together with their origin and destination for almost every day from the beginning of the War until September 1945. Although the author initially compiled the data from these schedules hoping to grasp the overall volume of Japanese military transport, it soon became evident that the data did not cover all types of activity, because there were not enough train movements from Malaya to Thailand in the schedules. This forced the author to complement the schedules with an analysis of bills for Japanese military transport issued by the Thai railway department. The author divides the war time period into four stages for analysis: 1) front-line-expansion (December 1941-June 1942), 2) construction of the Thai-Burma line (July 1942-October 1943), 3) the opening of the Thai-Burma line (November 1943-December 1944) and 4) network division (January-September 1945). During stage 1), the main transport flows were found on two routes: from Bangkok to Malaya via the Southern line and to Phitsanulok or Sawankhalok via the Northern line, corresponding to the Malaya Operation and the Burma Operation, respectively. Other flows originated from Cambodia to the same destinations via the Eastern line and Bangkok. During stage 2), flows from Bangkok to Malaya and from Cambodia to Bangkok still existed, although their volumes were reduced. On the other hand, new flows emerged from either Bangkok or Malaya to the starting point of the Thai-Burma line to supply its construction. Stage 3) experienced an increase in transport due to the opening of Thai-Burma line and the Imphal Operation. Flows to Malaya and the Thai-Burma line still accounted for the majority of the transport, but flows to the Isthmus of Kra and the North also increased to supplement the Thai-Burma line. Finally, during stage 4), transport volume further expanded, while the total distance of transport dramatically dropped, as many lines were halted at several points due to Allied bombing, to the extent that all long-distance transport was suspended, except on the Eastern line. The characteristic features of wartime Japanese military transport through Thai railways are threefold: 1) long-distance railway transport as a substitute for maritime transport, 2) supplementary transport to the Burmese front-lines, and 3) the existence of commodity transport unrelated to troop movements. This transport concentrated on supplementing the Burmese front-line rather than transport to Malaya, except during the Malay Operation period. As Japanese forces arrived at Saigon or Singapore for deployment to Burma, military transport on Thai railways became the main form of long-distance “international” movement. Before the War, Thai railways were of little importance as international lines compared to maritime transport. This “international” railway activity, while limited only to military transport, eventually emerged for the first time in Southeast Asia through the creation of “international” rail links with Cambodia and Burma, and a shortage of maritime vessels during wartime. Furthermore, there was a considerable amount of commodity transport apart from troop movements, a fact which has not been sufficiently dealt with in the “official” histories of the War.
著者
北澤 直宏
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.44, pp.64-82, 2015 (Released:2017-06-01)
参考文献数
76

This paper aims at assessing the religious policy in the Republic of Vietnam from 1955 to 1963, with a focus on separation of church and state in Cao Dai religion. Ngo Dinh Diem, the president in this era, is notorious as a dictator. However, it is obvious that empirical research has been too scarce to consider his policy. To overcome these problems and to understand the South Vietnamese history more objectively, this study clarifies the intent and outcome of Diem’s religious policy by using provincial government’s and religious documents. After WWII, Cao Dai formed an autonomous area with a private army which the government could not interfere with. The purpose of Ngo Dinh Diem’s reform was to correct this situation. Even if the government could intervene in religious personnel affairs, the purpose of government was not to manipulate the religions. In other words, the result of the reformation was introduction of westernized concept by force, and there was neither protection nor suppression of the religions. Although all religions had to obey the Republic’s order like anti-communism, religious activity itself did not attract government’s attention at all.
著者
松永 典子
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1998, no.27, pp.73-96, 1998-06-01 (Released:2010-02-25)
参考文献数
42

It has been pointed out that there are some crucial differences about the nature of the Japanese language education in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. It, however, is difficult for us to recognize the differences because “assimilation policy” and “kominka policy” have been interpreted imprecisely.The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the case in Malaya with that in the other territories of Southeast Asia on the Japanese language education under the Japanese occupation (1941-45) and direct our attention to the case in Malaya within the framework of the history of Japanese language education.In the early period Military Administration of the Japanese occupation, the Gunseikambu (Military Administration) attached a great deal of importanceto primary education as a means of popularizing the Japanese language. In the middle period Military Administration, however, it shifted the emphasis to the Japanese teaching coordinated with the spiritual training of Rensei Kyoiku. In the late period Military Administration, it emphasized more on strengthening Japanese language education and primary education.But at the final stage of the late period, the Gunseikambu shifted to relaxing its language policy, because the policy that instructors employed only Japanese as a teaching language was implemented too soon, so that it failed.For the reasons stated above, the Gunseikambu played a minimal role in the education policy, particularly during the initial and middle periods of the Japanese occupation. We can confirm that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya during the late period was more directly influenced by the Japanese language education policy of the Japanese government than that in the other Japanese territories of Southeast Asia.This policy in Malaya, however, was entirely based on the kokugo (national language) ideology, and the same teaching methodology used to teach in Japan and the Japanese colonies was employed in Malaya. Therefore, we can say that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya was ideologically a copy of the internal Japanese language education policy itself in some school, and it was most influenced by the kokugo ideology in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. But it eventually failed in Malaya because Japanese was not a Malayan common language nor the kokugo Malayans. In this sense, the nature of the Japanese language education in Malaya was different from that in the Japanese colonies.
著者
左右田 直規
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.34, pp.3-39, 2005-05-30 (Released:2010-02-25)
参考文献数
42

This paper intends to examine the interplay between the official construction of “Malayness” in colonial educational policy and the formation of Malay ethno-national identity in British Malaya. For this purpose, it uses as its case study the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC), a Malay teacher training college that was established in Tanjung Malim, Perak, in 1922.The SITC played an important role in the reproduction of ethnic, class, and gender relations in British Malaya. As in the case of the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK), the SITC was a residential school, modeled on public schools in England, in which the college authorities aimed to have total control over the students' studies, their extra-curricular activities (sports, cultural and recreational activities, military training and scouting), and their lives in the student dormitories called “houses.” Unlike the aristocratic MCKK, however, the SITC was designed to train Malay rural male teachers so that they would be able to educate Malay village boys to be “intelligent peasants.”SITC-graduated teachers were expected to become local agents of the British colonial authorities for the inculcation of desirable values among rural Malay children. The formal curriculum for the SITC was Malay-centered and ruralbiased, with an emphasis on the Malay language and the history and the geography of the “Malay world, ” as well as on practical education such as gardening, basketry, carpentry, etc. Furthermore, it was also male-biased when compared with the curriculum for the Malay Women's Training College (MWTC), which stressed domestic science for Malay girls.Though the SITC was a product of British colonial education policy, it left enough room for its teachers and students to utilize their shared experiences and to reorganize their acquired knowledge in order to construct Malay ethnonational identity. The SITC had some well-known Malay teachers and a European Principal all of whom were active in propagating Malay nationalist sentiments.SITC students could obtain knowledge on Malaya, the “Malay world” and other parts of the world not only during regular classes, but also from daily communication with their teachers and college mates, as well as from various kinds of reading materials such as books, magazines, and newspapers. Some of the students secretly participated in political activities. As a result of this local appropriation of colonial education, the SITC produced a number of Malayeducated nationalist intellectuals. This was not what British colonizers originally intended or wanted to be the product of the educational system that they had imposed.
著者
岩本 裕
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1981, no.10, pp.17-38, 1981-06-30 (Released:2010-03-16)
参考文献数
15

On the full account of the author's opinion on this problem, please see the Proceedings of the International Symposium on Chandi Borobudur, Tokyo 1981, in which the author deals with the following points in details:1) The ancestors of the Sailendra royal line were in a leadership position among the Old Malay speaking population in some colony of Srivijaya in Java.2) Though originally Sivaites, under the widespread Buddhist influence from Srivijaya, their native land, they converted to Buddhism.3) Under the economic development of Srivijaya, they came to dominate over the area west of Central Java. This country in the west of Java was called Ho-ling in the Chinese sources. (As there were no kingdom in Java except Sailendra and Mataram in those days, we have no choice but to identify Holing with Sailendra, because the Buddhism had floulished in either country).4) In the mid-eighth century, they advanced eastward to Central Java and pressured the Mataram kingdom.5) As a symbol of the dynasty's devotion to Buddhism, they built candi Borobudur to the southwest of the capital, and the date of beginning of its construction was ca. 780 A. D.6) There arose discord for the suzerainty over Java among the members of the Sailendra royal line during the construction work of candi Borobudur, probably in the second quarter of the 9th century.7) Samaragravira was defeated in this war, and he escaped then to Srivijaya, becoming the king of that country.8) By the latter half of the 9th century, the suzerainty over Java had passed completely into the hands of the Mataram kings.
著者
北川 香 岡本 真
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.44, pp.120-141, 2015 (Released:2017-06-01)
参考文献数
18

This paper treats the letters which Cambodian court exchanged with the Edo-Shogunate in the early 17th century. Copies of six letters in Khmer and twelve letters in Chinese from Cambodia, and fourteen letters in Chinese from Japan, including the replies to the former, are contained in the compilations of diplomatic documents named“Gaikoku-Kankei-Shokan 外国関係書簡,” “Gaiban-Shokan 外蕃書翰” and “Gaiban-Tsusho 外蕃通書,” which were edited by Kondo Juzo 近藤重蔵 by the beginning of the 19th century, and in “Tsuko-Ichiran 通航一覧” which were edited by order of the Shogunate around 1853. Among the thirty-two letters, five in Khmer and twenty-three in Chinese are of the early 17th century, and the others are of the early 18th century. Unfortunately, the locations of their originals are unidentified. The Chinese letters are thought to have been hand-copied with considerable accuracy, but as for Khmer, the characters are corrupted remarkably and hard to make out. The only exception is a letter of 1742, written in beautiful Aksor Mul (round characters of Khmer) which Kondo Juzo sedulously hand-copied by himself from the original which a family of To-Tsuji 唐通事 (interpreter of Chinese language) had reserved in Nagasaki. In the Khmer letters, Cambodia is called Krong Kamvuchéa Thipadei and Japan is called Ñipon Kakacho (possibly Koku-Shu 国主). Expressions as Preah Reach Sar Pi Ñipon (royal letter from Japan) suggest that Cambodian court recognized Japanese Shogunate as something similar to the kingship of Cambodia. They assume an attitude of Metrei (friendship) between kings on even ground, in contrast to the Chinese letters which adopt humble expressions. The authors of the Khmer letters might be experts called Smien (clerk), because some marks of handsome script of Aksor Mul are recognized among deformed characters of the reproductions. As for the Chinese letters, probably some Chinese merchants were the authors and significant differences are recognized in the skill of rhetoric. Their contents are gratitude for presents, order of commodities, request of the limitation of the number of commercial ships, complaints about Japanese who committed robbery around Cambodia, and so on. The notable thing is that Cambodian court regarded the Chinese and Japanese merchants who carried the letters as their subjects, and required Japan to let them return to Cambodia as soon as the mission would be finished.
著者
吉田 信
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.37, pp.3-27, 2008 (Released:2016-12-13)
参考文献数
47

This article takes a historical approach to the legal status of the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies with particular emphasis on the law making process. It is widely known that the Dutch government made a legal distinction between its colonial population as Europeans and “inlanders (natives).” The criterion of this distinction was that the concerned group could be regarded as either “civilized” or not. According to the law, the Japanese were classified as “inlanders” until the introduction of the Japanese Law. However, as the navigation treaty between the Dutch and Japanese governments concluded in 1896, the Dutch government was confronted with whether or not to change the legal status of the Japanese in the East Indies. They subsequently enacted the so-called Japanese Law to elevate the Japanese from “inlanders” to quasi-Europeans. A parliamentary discussion regarding this law reveals the notion of civilization held by the law-makers and Dutch politicians. In addition, this article describes how the Japanese recognize this law in relation to its social significance in the East Indies.
著者
斎藤 照子
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.42, pp.59-79, 2013 (Released:2016-12-15)
参考文献数
18

In the 18th−19th century Burma, a variety of metallic currencies casted freely by any individuals were circulated side by side with gold, silver, copper and lead bullion. Accordingly, people had to call assayers and weighers who gauged the quality and weight of these currencies in every commercial transaction. An attempt at standardizing currencies was made by two kings; King Bodaw-hpaya at the end of the 18th century and King Mindon in 1865. The first monetary reform was not successful, while the second one proved to be successful, despite the similarity in terms of policy content and methodology. Conventional studies on these monetary reforms have failed to inquire into the causes of the failure and success of each reform. This paper argues that the first reform could not eliminate the middlemen such as brokers and assayers who played important roles in providing as well as circulating monies. As for the second reform, ironically enough, it was given a momentum by the loss of Lower Burma in the 2nd Anglo-Burmese war in 1852. The Lower Burma, the important supplier of the staple to the Central Burma was annexed to the British India. The royal government had to procure necessary staples with the currencies acceptable to the British Burma. Only option for the government was to issue the standardized currency similar to the British Indian Rupee in terms of quality and weight. Basing on the Burmese case study, we suggest that studies on the monetary systems would surely provide several useful insights to understand the 18−19th century Southeast Asia. (1)The study on monetary systems in the 18−19th centuries reveals that the process of political integration and economic integration did not occur simultaneously. In terms of currency circulation, different areas coexisted within a politically integrated area and it was not rare such an area was connected to areas belonged to other polities. (2)Research on Southeast Asian monetary system before the colonial period will surely provide ample opportunities for the comparative studies not only within the area but also between SEA and the neighboring countries such as China, India and Japan. (3)The study of currencies leads us to the deeper understanding of segmented markets and the important roles of middlemen who connect demands and supplies, which we can observe up to now in many places in Southeast Asia.
著者
百瀬 侑子
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2002, no.31, pp.97-112, 2002-05-30 (Released:2010-03-16)

Kamishibai originated in Japan's early Showa era for children's amusement perfomed by street performers. Later, Kamishibai was introduced into school education. During the wartime era, Kamishibai was used as a military propaganda media by the Japanese government.After Japanese Forces occupied Indonesia, Kamishibai began to be used as a tool for pacifying the local peoples and to force them to cooperate with the Japanese military administration.This parer analyzes why Kamishibai were produced and also clarifies what kinds of Kamishibai were produced in Indonesia under the Japanese Occupation.Some of the author's results are:(1) Kamishibai on the subject of “destroying the USA and UK” were produced for the purpose of propagandizing the significance of the war.(2) Kamishibai on the subject of “saving money” and “increasing production” were produced for the purpose for the propagandizing the wartime economic policy.(3) Kamishibai on the subject of “labor” and “social services” were produced for the purpose of maximizing contributions from Indonesians.(4) Kamishibai on the subject of “tonarigumi” and “fujinkai” were produced for the purpose of organizing Indonesians.(5) Kamishibai on the subject of “heiho” and “kaiin yoseijo (seamen's training center)” were produced for the purpose of recruiting Indonesian young men.(6) There were many Kamishibai produced based on actual stories.These topics were also used in movies, plays and radio broadcasts. The Japanese propaganda bureau used a number of media for the same campaign topic to get improve their results. Kamishibai had economical, mobile and popular characteristics. For example, Kamishibai could be produced at low cost, delivered to small remote villages by bicycle, and used of indoctrinating even illiterate people.
著者
野田 彦四郎
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1971, no.1, pp.101-121, 1971-10-28 (Released:2010-03-16)

Very few articles on the study of international relations between the Chakri Dynasty in Thailand and the Ch'ing Dynasty in China during the first half of the nineteenth century have been published, although the relationship between them has had a great effect on the modern history of Thailand. This is one reason why the author wants to fill this gap in our historical studies on the subject.Three major periods in the relations between these two countries are: a) the period of increased trade and developed political relations from 1821 to 1843, b) the period of decreased trade and declined political relations from 1843 to 1861, c) the period of broken and alienated relations from 1868 to the e of the Ch'ing Dynasty.Since the first period of the Ch'ing Dynasty was a golden age, the Chine emperors regarded Chakri kings in Thailand as a and asked them to show their submission through tribute trade to the Peking Court, while their treatment of envoys from Thailand was tempered with mercy. Chinese historical documents of the period also show us trade commodities from and to Thailand, a well as Chinese relief activities for wrecked Thai ships on the coast of southern China and the role of overseas Chinese in trade between Bangkok and Canton. Since 1843 of the reign of Rama III in Thailand, the tribute trade from Thailand began to declined.
著者
鈴木 中正
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1981, no.10, pp.3-16, 1981-06-30 (Released:2010-03-16)

Because the Chinese Ch'ing Dynasty deemed Burma a troublemaker in the Southeastern border area of the province of Yunnan, it sent four successive expeditions to Burma during the years from 1766 to 1790. The Shan states on the borders had long been sending tribute to the Burmese court of Ava but the practice was disrupted due to the disorder in Burma caused by the dynastic alternation of the mid-eighteenth century. The newly established Konbaung dynasty claimed their right to collect tribute from the Shan states and while carring on a campaign in Ayuthaya, Siam (1764-67). The Ch'ing emperor thought it necessary to punish and expel the marauders at their borders. The Ch'ing at the zenith of its power mobilized all its resources to chastise Burma but the new dynasty in Burma made every effort to withstand the invaders.The last Ch'ing expeditionary army evacuated Burma at the end of 1769, after concluding a truce agreement on reciprocal restitution of the war captives and surrenders. The Ch'en-lung emperor, however, never consented to turn over the princes of the Shan states who had surrendered to the Ch'ing side, thus putting the border area in a state of severe tension. But a rebellion occured in the province of Sze-ch'uan in 1771 diverting the emperor's concern from Burma and his resentment was gradually dissipated.For the purpose of normalizing relations with the Ch'ing, Burma attempted to negotiate twice, in 1772 and in 1777. Their effort, however, was in vain because the Ch'ing emperor continued to demand from Burma, unilateral restitution of war captives. Among the Shan rulers on the borders, however, there emerged a move to normalize the relations between their two powerful neighbors in order to bring about trade relations which profitted the border states. In 1787, the prince of Keng Ma, a Shan state on the Yunnan side, sent a friendship mission to Burma disguised as a Ch'ing court mission: Burma sent a return mission to Peking in 1788. This brought the two countries' relations nearly to completion. In 1790, the prince of Bhamo on the Burmese side, sent a mission to Peking on his own initiative, unnoticed by the court of Burma. Thus the long disrupted Sino-Burmese relations came to be normalized despite the fact that the Ch'ing court declared Burma as its vassal state and Burma had no intention of accepting such a status