- 著者
-
武島 良成
- 出版者
- 東南アジア学会
- 雑誌
- 東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2016, no.45, pp.69-85, 2016 (Released:2018-06-01)
- 参考文献数
- 68
This article aims to follow footsteps of the Japanese advisory body that was placed in Burma’s Ba Maw government during the Pacific War, and to deepen the understanding of the degree of the accomplishment of autonomy and self-reliance of the government. Japan withdrew many of the military directorial personnel from Burma after its ‘independence’ (August, 1943), and instead, decided to send an advisory group. Booklets created by the Historical Facts Section of the Demobilization Department and some publications of the hometown of OGAWA Gotaro (the supreme advisor) state that the advisory group contributed great deal to the reconstruction of Burma. If this is the fact, it means that the resistance and countercharge of Ba Maw government to realize Burma’s autonomy and self-reliance did not succeed in this sphere. However, as I studied unpublicized diaries and official documents, it was revealed that Ogawa arrived in Burma in December 1943, and returned to Japan temporarily during March through July of 1944. Ogawa went back to Japan to summon advisory members. Those senior advisors summoned at that time arrived on a plane in Burma around August. Meanwhile, general advisors took boats and trains and all the members finally arrived by November. However, by that time, Burmese frontline was about to collapse, and the advisory group did not have enough time to operate much. In addition, Ba Maw’s government, at that time, was requiring science technicians, and there was not much of work the advisory group could have done. Consequently, it never intervened and interfered with the Ba Maw government in full scale. Incidentally, Lieutenant General KAWABE Masakazu came to think that there was not much to expect from the advisory group by 1944. If the Japanese Burma Area Army actually decided to go back to the policy of interfering with the government of Burma by the civil officers belonging to the Army, the weakened interventions and interferences of Japan would have been only about the advisory group or a temporary status. However, there were differences of opinions between KAWABE and other staff officers. Besides, there were some other materials that implied the interference had been slackened all the way. Then, it would be well possible that the military never went back to its original policy of interfering with Burma’s politics. I intend to excavate historical materials further to reveal the fact.