著者
武島 良成
出版者
京都教育大学
雑誌
京都教育大学紀要
巻号頁・発行日
no.119, pp.1-16,63〜70, 2011-09
著者
武島 良成
出版者
京都教育大学
雑誌
京都教育大学紀要 (ISSN:03877833)
巻号頁・発行日
no.119, pp.1-16,63〜70, 2011-09
著者
武島 良成
出版者
京都教育大学
雑誌
京都教育大学紀要 (ISSN:21873011)
巻号頁・発行日
no.129, pp.15-29, 2016-09

本稿は,沖縄県読谷村を1つの「戦争遺跡」と捉え,1945年4月1日の同村北西部の軍と住民の様子を掘り下げるものである。その際,アメリカ軍の様子を掴むために,「米海兵隊太平洋戦争記録」の各種レポートを活用する。これらのレポートには,連隊・大隊のものが含まれており,かなり細かなレベルで隊の動きを追うことができる。また,『読谷村史』の編纂過程でつくられた調査ファイルも使う。それらを,既知の諸情報と突き合わせ,この日の読谷村北西部の様相を深めていく。
著者
武島 良成
出版者
京都教育大学
雑誌
京都教育大学紀要 (ISSN:03877833)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.119, pp.49-70, 2011-09

This paper is a consideration, evidenced through the intersection issue of the Eizan Electric Railway and the Kyoto City Tram, of the Kyoto City urban development initiative within the application of city planning laws. Backed by the Ministry of Railways and the Kyoto Prefectural government, the Eizan Electric Railway commenced work to extend itself to Sanjo Street in 1928. Opposed, however, to its intersection with it tramway, after the change of government to the Minsei Party, Kyoto City brought the Ministry of Home Affairs to its side, and had the work abandoned. Kyoto City further attempted a resolution to the city-planning No.1 route intersection issue, but the Eizan Electric Railway would not co-operate. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Railways as well were not proactive in intervening on the issue, and the route was closed five years after its completion.本稿は、叡山電鉄と京都市電の交差問題を通して、都市計画法準用下の京都における、町づくりの主導権について考察するものである。叡山電鉄は、鉄道省や京都府に後押しされて、1928年に三条への延長工事を始めた。だが、京都市は市電と交差するために抵抗し、民政党への政権交代後には、内務省を味方にして工事を断念させた。さらに京都市は、都市計画第1号線との交差問題を解決しようとしたが、叡山電鉄は応じなかった。内務省と鉄道省も、解決に向けて積極的に介入したわけではなく、この道路は完成後も5年以上にわたり封鎖されたままになった。
著者
武島 良成
出版者
史学研究会 (京都大学文学部内)
雑誌
史林 (ISSN:03869369)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.79, no.2, pp.227-257, 1996-03

本論は、日本占領下のビルマにつくられた東亜青年連盟(アシャルーゲー) の検討を通じ、東南アジア占領の意義付けに提言をなそうとするものである。今回はその組織を中心に論ずるが、まず、アシャルーゲーが一元化された命令系統を持ち、制度化の進んだ、五〜六万人の人気ある大組織となったことを、その成長過程と共に分析する。さらに同組織が、戦後はパサパラの最有力組織の一つとなり、その対英闘争を支えたことを指摘する。アウンサンらビルマ側民族運動のリーダーが認めるように、戦前のタキン党らの大衆組織化が、彼らを苛立たせるほどに困難のものであったとすれば、このように統制力のある大組織が登場した意義は大きく、その意味で民族運動の高次化が起ったといえる。
著者
武島 良成
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2016, no.45, pp.69-85, 2016 (Released:2018-06-01)
参考文献数
68

This article aims to follow footsteps of the Japanese advisory body that was placed in Burma’s Ba Maw government during the Pacific War, and to deepen the understanding of the degree of the accomplishment of autonomy and self-reliance of the government. Japan withdrew many of the military directorial personnel from Burma after its ‘independence’ (August, 1943), and instead, decided to send an advisory group. Booklets created by the Historical Facts Section of the Demobilization Department and some publications of the hometown of OGAWA Gotaro (the supreme advisor) state that the advisory group contributed great deal to the reconstruction of Burma. If this is the fact, it means that the resistance and countercharge of Ba Maw government to realize Burma’s autonomy and self-reliance did not succeed in this sphere. However, as I studied unpublicized diaries and official documents, it was revealed that Ogawa arrived in Burma in December 1943, and returned to Japan temporarily during March through July of 1944. Ogawa went back to Japan to summon advisory members. Those senior advisors summoned at that time arrived on a plane in Burma around August. Meanwhile, general advisors took boats and trains and all the members finally arrived by November. However, by that time, Burmese frontline was about to collapse, and the advisory group did not have enough time to operate much. In addition, Ba Maw’s government, at that time, was requiring science technicians, and there was not much of work the advisory group could have done. Consequently, it never intervened and interfered with the Ba Maw government in full scale. Incidentally, Lieutenant General KAWABE Masakazu came to think that there was not much to expect from the advisory group by 1944. If the Japanese Burma Area Army actually decided to go back to the policy of interfering with the government of Burma by the civil officers belonging to the Army, the weakened interventions and interferences of Japan would have been only about the advisory group or a temporary status. However, there were differences of opinions between KAWABE and other staff officers. Besides, there were some other materials that implied the interference had been slackened all the way. Then, it would be well possible that the military never went back to its original policy of interfering with Burma’s politics. I intend to excavate historical materials further to reveal the fact.