著者
市川 健二郎
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1971, no.1, pp.79-100, 1971-10-28 (Released:2010-03-16)

Because she was not a Western colonial country, but an Asian Kingdom and a member of the Axis Power, wartime Thailand was free from Japanese military administration and a able to keep aloof from warfare after the friendly entry of the Japanese army, Thai political leaders assumed a pattern of “compromise” rather than “hostility” in response to the Japanese impact. Although intellectually, most Thai leaders did not agree with the Japanese idea of “The Great East Asia Go-prosperity Sphere, ” they accelerated an allied relationship with Japan to avoid a possibly critical situation of Japanese militarism sweeping all over the country. For her own national benefit in facing increasing Japanese power in Southeast Asia, Thailand put pressure on the anti-Japanese boycott movement of the Chinese within a country, sat on her fence of neutrality and tried to remain out side the Japanese military occupation until the opening day of the war. Even after December 8, 1941, when she recognized the friendly entry of the Japanese army, Thailand tried hard to stand behind the bay line by contributing economic ally to the Japanese military operation in Burma, Malaya and Singapore.In wartime, Pibul Songkram, Prime Minister of the Government, promoted Rathaniyom (Patriotic Movement) and Thai Yai (Great Thai Nation Movement through which he wanted to keep national stability based on of traditional Thai sentiment rather than the idea of individual freedom from the Constitutional Revolution in 1932. In terms of motivation, therefore, these movements were quite different from the Japanese idea of the “Co-prosperity Sphere.” Meanwhile, the dynamics of the anti-Japanese “Free Thai” movement were accelerated by Thai elites and university students then in the United States and the United Kingdom. There they carried out the actual plan to develop their resistance against Japan. On the other hand, Thai leaders, except several domestic “Free Thai” leaders, outwardly continued their friendly relations with the Japanese while secretly linking up with the “Free Thai” members in order to find a new place for themselves after the war. With the benefits of this duality, they reserved their own clear cut opinion and left rooms for changing attitudes to their advantage.Chinese leaders in economic circles also had similar patterns of response. Although they started the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement in 1937, which was motivated from loyalty to their native land, they joined neither the all Chinese united front in Southeast Asia nor the overseas Chinese good-will tour party to Chungking and Yennan in 1938. However, from 1938 the Chinese in Thailand began cooperating with the national policy of the Thai government and, after war erupted, made contributions by procuring for the Japanese army. In reply to a requisition for labour for army railway construction between Burma and Thailand in 1943, the Chinese again tried to keep their security in the country by means of economic cooperation in offering munitions war, rather than by sending labour power for dreadful construction. In the meantime, however, they donated funds secretly to members of the “Free Thai” movement. Chang Lan-ch'en, former President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, was a leader of pro-Japanse group during the war, but was able to return to the some position again in 1948 and held thee post until 1961 when he died. Pibul was also reinstalled in his former position in 1948 and was Prime Minister until 1957. These two political and economic leaders began to leave room for changing attitudes by the end of the war, to enhance their reinstatement in the post-war period.
著者
松永 典子
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1998, no.27, pp.73-96, 1998-06-01 (Released:2010-02-25)
参考文献数
42

It has been pointed out that there are some crucial differences about the nature of the Japanese language education in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. It, however, is difficult for us to recognize the differences because “assimilation policy” and “kominka policy” have been interpreted imprecisely.The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the case in Malaya with that in the other territories of Southeast Asia on the Japanese language education under the Japanese occupation (1941-45) and direct our attention to the case in Malaya within the framework of the history of Japanese language education.In the early period Military Administration of the Japanese occupation, the Gunseikambu (Military Administration) attached a great deal of importanceto primary education as a means of popularizing the Japanese language. In the middle period Military Administration, however, it shifted the emphasis to the Japanese teaching coordinated with the spiritual training of Rensei Kyoiku. In the late period Military Administration, it emphasized more on strengthening Japanese language education and primary education.But at the final stage of the late period, the Gunseikambu shifted to relaxing its language policy, because the policy that instructors employed only Japanese as a teaching language was implemented too soon, so that it failed.For the reasons stated above, the Gunseikambu played a minimal role in the education policy, particularly during the initial and middle periods of the Japanese occupation. We can confirm that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya during the late period was more directly influenced by the Japanese language education policy of the Japanese government than that in the other Japanese territories of Southeast Asia.This policy in Malaya, however, was entirely based on the kokugo (national language) ideology, and the same teaching methodology used to teach in Japan and the Japanese colonies was employed in Malaya. Therefore, we can say that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya was ideologically a copy of the internal Japanese language education policy itself in some school, and it was most influenced by the kokugo ideology in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. But it eventually failed in Malaya because Japanese was not a Malayan common language nor the kokugo Malayans. In this sense, the nature of the Japanese language education in Malaya was different from that in the Japanese colonies.
著者
柿崎 一郎
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.39, pp.52-85, 2010 (Released:2016-12-14)
参考文献数
29

The aim of this article is to describe the characteristics of Japanese military transport on Thai railways during World War II, by analyzing the train schedules now held in the National Archives of Thailand. These schedules contain such data as the number and type of carriages on each train together with their origin and destination for almost every day from the beginning of the War until September 1945. Although the author initially compiled the data from these schedules hoping to grasp the overall volume of Japanese military transport, it soon became evident that the data did not cover all types of activity, because there were not enough train movements from Malaya to Thailand in the schedules. This forced the author to complement the schedules with an analysis of bills for Japanese military transport issued by the Thai railway department. The author divides the war time period into four stages for analysis: 1) front-line-expansion (December 1941-June 1942), 2) construction of the Thai-Burma line (July 1942-October 1943), 3) the opening of the Thai-Burma line (November 1943-December 1944) and 4) network division (January-September 1945). During stage 1), the main transport flows were found on two routes: from Bangkok to Malaya via the Southern line and to Phitsanulok or Sawankhalok via the Northern line, corresponding to the Malaya Operation and the Burma Operation, respectively. Other flows originated from Cambodia to the same destinations via the Eastern line and Bangkok. During stage 2), flows from Bangkok to Malaya and from Cambodia to Bangkok still existed, although their volumes were reduced. On the other hand, new flows emerged from either Bangkok or Malaya to the starting point of the Thai-Burma line to supply its construction. Stage 3) experienced an increase in transport due to the opening of Thai-Burma line and the Imphal Operation. Flows to Malaya and the Thai-Burma line still accounted for the majority of the transport, but flows to the Isthmus of Kra and the North also increased to supplement the Thai-Burma line. Finally, during stage 4), transport volume further expanded, while the total distance of transport dramatically dropped, as many lines were halted at several points due to Allied bombing, to the extent that all long-distance transport was suspended, except on the Eastern line. The characteristic features of wartime Japanese military transport through Thai railways are threefold: 1) long-distance railway transport as a substitute for maritime transport, 2) supplementary transport to the Burmese front-lines, and 3) the existence of commodity transport unrelated to troop movements. This transport concentrated on supplementing the Burmese front-line rather than transport to Malaya, except during the Malay Operation period. As Japanese forces arrived at Saigon or Singapore for deployment to Burma, military transport on Thai railways became the main form of long-distance “international” movement. Before the War, Thai railways were of little importance as international lines compared to maritime transport. This “international” railway activity, while limited only to military transport, eventually emerged for the first time in Southeast Asia through the creation of “international” rail links with Cambodia and Burma, and a shortage of maritime vessels during wartime. Furthermore, there was a considerable amount of commodity transport apart from troop movements, a fact which has not been sufficiently dealt with in the “official” histories of the War.
著者
北澤 直宏
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.44, pp.64-82, 2015 (Released:2017-06-01)
参考文献数
76

This paper aims at assessing the religious policy in the Republic of Vietnam from 1955 to 1963, with a focus on separation of church and state in Cao Dai religion. Ngo Dinh Diem, the president in this era, is notorious as a dictator. However, it is obvious that empirical research has been too scarce to consider his policy. To overcome these problems and to understand the South Vietnamese history more objectively, this study clarifies the intent and outcome of Diem’s religious policy by using provincial government’s and religious documents. After WWII, Cao Dai formed an autonomous area with a private army which the government could not interfere with. The purpose of Ngo Dinh Diem’s reform was to correct this situation. Even if the government could intervene in religious personnel affairs, the purpose of government was not to manipulate the religions. In other words, the result of the reformation was introduction of westernized concept by force, and there was neither protection nor suppression of the religions. Although all religions had to obey the Republic’s order like anti-communism, religious activity itself did not attract government’s attention at all.
著者
伊藤 友美
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.38, pp.64-105, 2009 (Released:2016-12-14)
参考文献数
133
被引用文献数
1

In recent centuries, the religious authority figures of Theravāda Buddhism were only bhikkhu, fully ordained monks. However, during the Buddha’s time, women were allowed to be ordained as bhikkhunıī, fully ordained nuns at the status equivalent to bhikkhu. The female ordination lineage was disrupted some centuries later, and since then Theravāda Buddhist women have had to do their ascetic practice with the status of lay devotee, rather than the ordained status of bhikkhunıī. In Thailand the head-shaven female devotees who don the white robes are called māe chıī, and they are not given as much honor, support, or opportunity to play religious roles as male bhikkhu enjoy. The recent bhikkhunıī movement in Thailand was initiated by the novice ordination of the famous bhikkhunıī advocate scholar Chatsumarn Kabilsingh in Sri Lanka in February 2001, when she took the monastic name Dhammanandā. Her novice ordination attracted the attention of Thai media and foreign scholars as the new beginning of a female monastic order in Thailand. Most previous studies on Thai bhikkhunıī restoration have focused on the public debates about the rationales given for her ordination and negative critiques of them; it was for the most part taken for granted that Dhammanandā was singlehandedly leading and representing the bhikkhunıī restoration movement in Thailand. The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of the Thai bhikkhunī restoration movement after Dhammanandā’s sāmaṇerī (novice) ordination in February 2001, particularly focusing on Thai sāmaṇerī (later bhikkhunıī) who were previously māe chī. Dhammanandā did play a significant role in transmitting her vast knowledge of the history of bhikkhunıī lineage and vinaya (monastic disciplines) to Thai māe chıī who were interested in bhikkhunıī ordination; however, only a few of them could receive her assistance for their ordination. The number of Thai sāmaṇerī increased after an old Thai monk in Yasōthōn province ordained his māe chıī disciple as a sāmaṇerī in November 2003, and subsequently more māe chıī came to him for their ordinations. Particularly, the members of the Outstanding Women in Buddhism Awards Committee assumed a key role in connecting māe chıī candidates to the Yasōthōn preceptor monk. Nevertheless, the development of Thai women’s sāmaṇerī and bhikkhunıī ordination was not a continuous process. On the one hand, several unfortunate sāmaṇerī and bhikkhunıī met sufficiently serious obstacles that they disrobed to be māe chıī again; on the other hand, a group of better supported māe chıī and sāmaṇerī chose Sri Lanka as their place of ordination and contributed to the growth of the number of Thai sāmaṇerī and bhikkhunıī. In conclusion, the paper indicates that the bhikkhunıī movement is not solely represented by urban intellectuals such as Dhammanandā, but is even more significantly supported by conscious local māe chıī determined to overcome their unfair situation by taking up the yellow monastic robes as sāmaṇerī and bhikkhunıī.
著者
左右田 直規
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.34, pp.3-39, 2005-05-30 (Released:2010-02-25)
参考文献数
42

This paper intends to examine the interplay between the official construction of “Malayness” in colonial educational policy and the formation of Malay ethno-national identity in British Malaya. For this purpose, it uses as its case study the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC), a Malay teacher training college that was established in Tanjung Malim, Perak, in 1922.The SITC played an important role in the reproduction of ethnic, class, and gender relations in British Malaya. As in the case of the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK), the SITC was a residential school, modeled on public schools in England, in which the college authorities aimed to have total control over the students' studies, their extra-curricular activities (sports, cultural and recreational activities, military training and scouting), and their lives in the student dormitories called “houses.” Unlike the aristocratic MCKK, however, the SITC was designed to train Malay rural male teachers so that they would be able to educate Malay village boys to be “intelligent peasants.”SITC-graduated teachers were expected to become local agents of the British colonial authorities for the inculcation of desirable values among rural Malay children. The formal curriculum for the SITC was Malay-centered and ruralbiased, with an emphasis on the Malay language and the history and the geography of the “Malay world, ” as well as on practical education such as gardening, basketry, carpentry, etc. Furthermore, it was also male-biased when compared with the curriculum for the Malay Women's Training College (MWTC), which stressed domestic science for Malay girls.Though the SITC was a product of British colonial education policy, it left enough room for its teachers and students to utilize their shared experiences and to reorganize their acquired knowledge in order to construct Malay ethnonational identity. The SITC had some well-known Malay teachers and a European Principal all of whom were active in propagating Malay nationalist sentiments.SITC students could obtain knowledge on Malaya, the “Malay world” and other parts of the world not only during regular classes, but also from daily communication with their teachers and college mates, as well as from various kinds of reading materials such as books, magazines, and newspapers. Some of the students secretly participated in political activities. As a result of this local appropriation of colonial education, the SITC produced a number of Malayeducated nationalist intellectuals. This was not what British colonizers originally intended or wanted to be the product of the educational system that they had imposed.
著者
岩本 裕
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1981, no.10, pp.17-38, 1981-06-30 (Released:2010-03-16)
参考文献数
15

On the full account of the author's opinion on this problem, please see the Proceedings of the International Symposium on Chandi Borobudur, Tokyo 1981, in which the author deals with the following points in details:1) The ancestors of the Sailendra royal line were in a leadership position among the Old Malay speaking population in some colony of Srivijaya in Java.2) Though originally Sivaites, under the widespread Buddhist influence from Srivijaya, their native land, they converted to Buddhism.3) Under the economic development of Srivijaya, they came to dominate over the area west of Central Java. This country in the west of Java was called Ho-ling in the Chinese sources. (As there were no kingdom in Java except Sailendra and Mataram in those days, we have no choice but to identify Holing with Sailendra, because the Buddhism had floulished in either country).4) In the mid-eighth century, they advanced eastward to Central Java and pressured the Mataram kingdom.5) As a symbol of the dynasty's devotion to Buddhism, they built candi Borobudur to the southwest of the capital, and the date of beginning of its construction was ca. 780 A. D.6) There arose discord for the suzerainty over Java among the members of the Sailendra royal line during the construction work of candi Borobudur, probably in the second quarter of the 9th century.7) Samaragravira was defeated in this war, and he escaped then to Srivijaya, becoming the king of that country.8) By the latter half of the 9th century, the suzerainty over Java had passed completely into the hands of the Mataram kings.
著者
北川 香 岡本 真
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015, no.44, pp.120-141, 2015 (Released:2017-06-01)
参考文献数
18

This paper treats the letters which Cambodian court exchanged with the Edo-Shogunate in the early 17th century. Copies of six letters in Khmer and twelve letters in Chinese from Cambodia, and fourteen letters in Chinese from Japan, including the replies to the former, are contained in the compilations of diplomatic documents named“Gaikoku-Kankei-Shokan 外国関係書簡,” “Gaiban-Shokan 外蕃書翰” and “Gaiban-Tsusho 外蕃通書,” which were edited by Kondo Juzo 近藤重蔵 by the beginning of the 19th century, and in “Tsuko-Ichiran 通航一覧” which were edited by order of the Shogunate around 1853. Among the thirty-two letters, five in Khmer and twenty-three in Chinese are of the early 17th century, and the others are of the early 18th century. Unfortunately, the locations of their originals are unidentified. The Chinese letters are thought to have been hand-copied with considerable accuracy, but as for Khmer, the characters are corrupted remarkably and hard to make out. The only exception is a letter of 1742, written in beautiful Aksor Mul (round characters of Khmer) which Kondo Juzo sedulously hand-copied by himself from the original which a family of To-Tsuji 唐通事 (interpreter of Chinese language) had reserved in Nagasaki. In the Khmer letters, Cambodia is called Krong Kamvuchéa Thipadei and Japan is called Ñipon Kakacho (possibly Koku-Shu 国主). Expressions as Preah Reach Sar Pi Ñipon (royal letter from Japan) suggest that Cambodian court recognized Japanese Shogunate as something similar to the kingship of Cambodia. They assume an attitude of Metrei (friendship) between kings on even ground, in contrast to the Chinese letters which adopt humble expressions. The authors of the Khmer letters might be experts called Smien (clerk), because some marks of handsome script of Aksor Mul are recognized among deformed characters of the reproductions. As for the Chinese letters, probably some Chinese merchants were the authors and significant differences are recognized in the skill of rhetoric. Their contents are gratitude for presents, order of commodities, request of the limitation of the number of commercial ships, complaints about Japanese who committed robbery around Cambodia, and so on. The notable thing is that Cambodian court regarded the Chinese and Japanese merchants who carried the letters as their subjects, and required Japan to let them return to Cambodia as soon as the mission would be finished.
著者
津村 文彦
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.40, pp.54-78, 2011 (Released:2016-12-14)
参考文献数
28
被引用文献数
1 1

This article focuses on spirit belief in northeastern Thailand from an anthropological viewpoint. The studies on phi belief were conducted through three aspects: classification, structural functionalism, and historical sociology. However, these aspects consider the concept of phi as being stable and the historical changes are difficult to identify or they depict the contrast between Buddhism and phi belief cursorily. I attempt to investigate the multi-layered knowledge concerning phi within village life by introducing various views of the villagers and analyze the diverse meanings of phi belief, especially focusing on the boundary dividing benevolent and evil spirits. People in northeastern Thailand believe in various spirits called phi, which are usually categorized into benevolent and bad spirits. Benevolent spirits include ancestral spirits, natural spirits, such as water and forest spirits, and village guardian spirits, while evil spirits include ghosts of unusual deaths and spirits with special names ─ phi pop, phi phrai, etc. Benevolent spirits are believed to protect villagers if they are treated appropriately. Although ancestral spirits sometimes bring diseases to their descendants, they are appeased and asked what they want. On the other hand, evil spirits also bring diseases to the villagers, and sometimes, villagers are possessed by them. At such times, the evil spirits are caught, expelled, or killed by religious specialists. The villagers react differently toward benevolent and evil spirits, but the concepts of benevolent and evil spirits cannot be isolated from each other easily. In my research, one guardian spirit was regarded as evil. It was said to bring misfortune to the village and therefore expelled by religious specialists. Another guardian spirit was ignored by villagers recently, and they placed a Buddha statue into the shrine instead of the symbol of the guardian spirit. Some of the benevolent spirits could be looked upon as evil. In this situation, religious specialists called mo tham deal with the evil spirits. Mo tham are expert exorcists of evil spirits. Their magical power is derived from Buddhist dharma. Mo tham consider phi as evil even if they are benevolent spirits, including village guardian spirits. However, other religious specialists called cham deal with the village guardian spirit. Cham are a medium between the villagers and guardian spirits, helping villagers seek the spirits’ help. Cham consider the guardian spirit to be benevolent. By comparing the opinions of the two religious specialists regarding village guardian spirits, I attempt to extract the two incompatible logics behind phi belief: the mo tham’s Buddhist logic, which always considers phi as evil or foes of Buddha and the village community’s ethic, which has been shared since the establishment of the village and emphasizes mutual aid among villagers. The former is concerned with the history of nation building since the twentieth century, and the latter is related to the moral economy of the barren frontier land of northeastern Thailand. The concepts of the benevolent and evil spirits appear to waver between these two logics.
著者
井東 猛
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1985, no.14, pp.44-66, 1985-06-01 (Released:2010-02-25)

In the study of Islamization, main interest of research has centred upon the questions as to when Islam came, from where and by whom it was brought to the region, and upon particular Islamic mystical teachings. Studies of these problems in the last one century have certainly presented us with new findings related to the Islamization of Southeast Asia in general. However, this does not mean at all that the question of the Islamization of the region has conclusively been solved. In fact, little is known about the establishing process of the Islamization or the position of Islam in various Islamic states in the region.The overall, establishing process of the Islamization may be studied from two view-points, apart from those mentioned above. One concerns the acceptance in indigenous society or state of Islam as religion and creed, and the role played by the rulers or state in its acceptance. The other is the acceptance of Islamic Law in the existing legal system, or the Islamization of the legal system of a given state.This paper aims to look at the administration of law and justice in seventeenth century Aceh as a case study of the establishing process of the Islamization from the latter point of view. As necessary background information for a better understanding of the present theme, the following may be noted.It is known that Bandar Aceh, the capital of the Sultanate of Aceh, presented the appearance of one of the major centres of Islamic studies in the Malayo-Indonesian world from the last quarter of the sixteenth century onwards. As a result of this, by the end of the century, at the latest, Islamic Law had become an established force, and consequently the prescriptions of Islamic Law had begun to exert their influence on the Acehnese, particulary on those in the capital. As for the relationship between Islam and the state, the Acehnese rulers used Islam to assert their ritual authority and supremacy. Just as Islam helped the rulers, the rulers also helped Islam by raising it to the position of a state religion, by supporting its institutions and by raising the clergy to influential positions.The present theme is divided into three. Section I takes up the legal system of the Sultanate. Section II examines various cases and punishment, both ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ in nature. Section III looks at the royal edict of 1726 which offers how the Acehnese of the eighteenth century regarded the administration of law and justice in the seventeenth century.As a result of research, it can be concluded that Islamic Law exerted considerable influence upon the administration of law and justice through the efforts and influence of the senior religious figures of the realm, who were the rulers' religious and spiritual preceptors. This was particularly true for Acehnese social and family life in the urban area of the capital. The implementation of Islamic Law can be easily observed in a number of actual cases. In fact, the ruler as head of an Islamic state, and Islam as both creed source of law were inseparably linked, the ruler playing a central part in the judicature. Nevertheless, the Islamic legal system as such occupied a secondary position in the overall legal system of the Sultanate. The will, and often whim, of the sovereign was, in effect, the prime and ultimate law of the Sultanate, and administrative practices based on such precedents, i. e. the will of ruler, came in time to be regarded as ‘adat’ in the eyes of the Acehnese of the capital, ‘adat’ as ruler-made unwritten law and not traditional customary law and practice which have been defined as adat law by Dutch legal scholars. Furthermore, the degree of the rulers as law-givers and of the enforcement of Islamic Law largely depended on their political authority and religious conviction. As for the Kadi Malik al-'Adil as the representaive of the rulers, this position may perhaps best be seen as the head of the leg
著者
和田 正彦
出版者
Japan Society for Southeast Asian Studies
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1980, no.9, pp.24-50, 1980-02-25 (Released:2010-03-16)

There were, in the Tokugawa period, offices of interpreters called To-tsuji (Lit. Interpreters of Chinese). Within this category were two divisions; To-tuji To-kata (Interpreters of Chinese) and To-tsuji Shokoku-kata or Ikokutsuji (Interpreters of other Asian Languages). To-tsuji Shokoku-sata or Ikokutsuji included Tonkin-tsuji (Interpreters of Vietnamese), ..... The latter consisted of the Tonkin-tsuji (Interpretes of Vietnamese), Shamro-tsuji (Interpreters for Siamese), Mouru-tsuji (Interpreters of a language used in the Mughals) and Ruson-tsuji (Interpreters of a language used in Luzon under Spanish). This paper traces the history of the Ikoku-tsuji from its establishment to its abolition.It must be pointed out that both divisions, namely To-tsuji Tokata and Ikoku-tsuji were theoretically equal in status, yet, in fact, the latter was regarded as lower than the former. This is clearly shown in the difference in their pay-scales. The discrepancy in their actual position resulted from the differnces in their business. The To-tsuji To-kata was much more important than the Ikoku-tsuji not only because of the fact that only one or two vesseles which came to Nagasaki were from countries other than China, but also, because the To-tsuji To-kata played at the same time the role of commercial agents having discretionary powers of foreign trade. On the other hand the Ikoku-tsuji were no more than interpreters. It should be also taken into account that the To-tsuji To-kata were either Chinese living in Nagasaki or their descendants so that they easily got on good terms with Chinese merchants coming to Nagaski for trade. On the contrary among the Ikoku-tsuji, only the Gi family held the office hereditarily.As the number of vessels requiring Ikoku-tsuji dwindled, the work of the Ikoku-tsuji was gradually transfered to the sections of To-tsuji To-kata or Oranda Tsuji (Interpreters for Dutch). They held only the nominal position through hereditary until the last days of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The position of Ikoku-tsuji was, nevertheless, necesary to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Because of its policy of seclusion, the Shogunate had to be ready to receive and handle exclusively such vessels.It is be worthy of special note that there were some Japanese who studied languages of South and Southeast Asia, wrote the books of vocabulary and conversation of these languages despite it being the age of seclusion.
著者
奥平 龍二
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.43, pp.69-86, 2014 (Released:2016-12-17)
参考文献数
42

Myanmar is a country where Theravāda Buddhism has been thriving since King Anawyahta, the founder of the Bagan unified dynasty introduced it from the Mon kingdom of Thaton in the latter part of the eleventh century. This Buddhism is generally known as the ‘monastic Buddhism’ which is principally focused on the monkhood. But it has also been permeating among the laity until the present day. We may regard the successive dynasties of Myanmar, which had introduced this Buddhism into the political sphere, as the ‘Theravāda Buddhist State’, which placed the dhamma (Law of Buddha) in the core position of the state structure. Therefore, the relationship between kingship or government (ānācakka) and religious authority (buddhacakka) has always been strained and the former has usually intervened and has been standing at predominance over the latter until today. Although the Theravāda Buddhist Polity collapsed with the fall of the Konbaung dynasty in the late nineteenth century due to the British colonial rule, it has been regenerated as a ‘sovereign independent state’ after independence under the Constitution of the Union of Myanma adopted in 1947. Even though once Myanmar inclined towards a ‘religious state’ during U Nu’s regime under the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act in 1961 because of his treatment of Buddhism as the state religion, the country was brought back to a secular state by its strict secularity under President U Ne Win’s policy of ‘the Burmese way to Socialism’ under the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1974). It had principally continued until the end of the regimes of the military administration by both the Senior Generals Saw Maung and Than Shwe in March, 2011 when the new regime of President U Thein Sein began under the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008). This paper is an attempt to examine the characteristic of a modern Myanmar secular state, through further detailed analysis of its previous studies on the provisions of religious affairs and also a new approach to the preamble of the constitution (2008), comparing it with those of previous constitutions of 1947, its 1961 (Amendment) and 1974.