著者

後藤 伸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.22-46,iii, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

In the international maritime history, the International Mercantile Marine (IMM) Co., established as an American concern in 1902, had an unique beginning as follows : firstly, J.P. Morgan & Co., a famous investment banking, played an important role in forming the IMM; secondly, Morgan & Co. combined several important liner companies engaged in a single operating route, the North Atlantic; and lastly, the IMM was composed of shipping firms whose nationalities were different, but mainly American and British. So far, many books and articles have treated of the IMM, usually, from a viewpoint of regarding the IMM as Morgan's Trust in the shipping industry. They analyse the financial aspects of the IMM, with pointing out failure as Trust because of poor financial performance. They are, however, little explanation of 'Americanization' policy that the IMM disposed of its foreign subsidaries and became an American shipping enterprise after the First World War. In order to inquire into the reason for and meaning of adopting Americanization policy, it should be required to analyse the IMM's strategy and structure rather than financial results up to the period of pre-War, and that is my task of the article. In conclusion, it is the reason for adopting Americanization policy that the IMM failed to formulate definite corporate strategy because of differences in managerial environment between constituent companies in the U.S.A. and U.K., and to create administrative control as a whole because of different approaches to organizational design between the top management in the U.S.A. and U.K. While, thus, Americanization policy taken by the IMM after the war was seen as a result of managerial failure of an earlier transnational enterprise in the maritime history, its policy was valid in the sense that it aimed to reconstruct effective organization for control and operation of fleets through unification of strategy by disposing of foreign flags under nominal control.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.1, pp.47, 1982-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

田村 祐一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.1-22,i, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

Mutually organized enterprise have had a long and snccessful history in American life insurance business. In theory, mutuals, without capital item in its balance-sheet, are owned by and operated for the benefit of the policyowners, and their boards of directors or “trustees” are elected by them, typically exemplified by the original Charter and By-Laws of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, the first mutual in the United States. But in practice, officers and directors of mutuals, although claiming democracy of their companies, have completely ignored the sovereignty of policyowners, who have consequently been silent majority for nearly one and a half century.The third president of the Mutual Life usurped the control through proxy contests and established his autocracy, so-called “Winston regime”. He and his vice-president held so many proxies, compared to “Children of Israel, ” that no one succeded in defeating his rule. Management control were dramatically disclosed by the Armstrong Committee of the New York Legislature in 1905, saying “Notwithstanding their theoretical rights, policyholders have had little or no voice in the management. Entrenched behind proxies, easily collected by subservient agents and running for long periods, unless expressly revoked, the officers of these companies have occupied unassailable positions and have been able to exercise despotic power”. With all the drastic revision of the New York Insurance laws, nothing happened in the elections of mutuals except temporary excitement, and management control continued at no stands for more than thirty years later the Temporary National Economic Committee disclosed the fact. “Life Insurance executives and directors constitute a small group that is self-appointing and self-perpetuating”. Another thirty years-plus have passed since TNEC, and the situation remains the same. All the while mutual managements have been criticized and refuted in the courts, legislatures of the stastes and journals, it has been desparately impossible to find out an effective means to bring indifferent policyowners to annual elections.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.23-46,ii, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

---

The purpose of this paper is to compare the relation between the Mitsui Bank and Tokyo Electric Light Co. with the relation between the Mitsui Bank and Toho Electric Power Co..In the 1920's and the 1930's the Mitsui Bank had been positively financing both of the two electric power companies. Nevertheless, the Mitsui Bank intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. alone. On the other hand Toho Electric Power Co. was its own master.This contrast was due to the difference in point of administrative ability of managers of the two electric power companies. Owing to loose-spending management by Shohachi Wakao, the president from 1926 to 1930, Tokyo Electric Light Co. was in financial difficulties. Therefore Tokyo Electric Light Co. could not pay back debts from the Mitsui Bank sufficiently during the latter half of 1920's. Shigeaki Ikeda, the head of the managing directors of the Mitsui Bank interfered in human affairs concerning directors of Tokyo Electric Light Co.. Firstly he dispatched Seinosuke Go and Ichizo Kobayashi in 1927. Secondly he changed the president from Wakao to Go in 1930. Under capable management by Go and Kobayashi Tokyo Electric Light Co. recovered itself in the 1930's. The Mitsui Bank had never intervened in Tokyo Electric Light Co. directly after 1930.The intervening in Tokyo Electric Light Co. by the Mitsui Bank was a temporary phenomenon in order to preserve credits. The Mitsui Bank had never intervened in Toho Electric Power Co. which could pay back debts sufficiently under excellent management by the president Yasuzaemon Matsunaga. Therefore the commonly accepted theory is not adequate, which asserts that electric power capital was put under the control of Zaibatsu.

著者

斎藤 憲

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, no.2, pp.47-75, 1982-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

西川 登

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.64-76, 1981-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

ブラックフォード マンセル G

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.77-81, 1981-07-30 (Released:2010-05-07)

著者

四宮 俊之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3, pp.1-24,i, 1981-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

Japan Paper Association was established in 1880, as a trade association by the Japanese papar-manufacturing companies, for the purpose of controlling price. However, in a short time, it found the price cartel difficult to maintain in the period, and transformed the purpose to promote friendship among members.But with the tariff reforms in 1899, 1906, and 1910, the Japanese paper-manufacturing industry fell into a difficult situation owing to the tax reduction of imported paper. So the association strived to reinforce its organization and operations by degrees. As a result, it laid a foundation that was able to manage cartels for the limitation of output after World War I.The object of this article is to trace the development of Japan Paper Association and analyze its organization and, operations before World War I.

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3, pp.25-47,i, 1981-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

Admittedly, there are two sharply contrasted views on the late Victorian entrepreneurial performance at the present time. One traditional opinion, for instance, maintained by D.L. Burn (1939) is that the British entrepreneurs performed badly from the 1870's and if they had done better, the decline of the British steel industry compared with the German and American steel industry could have been avoided.Another opinion, recently asserted by D.N. McCloskey (1973) is that the relative decline was inevitable and from whatever perspective they are viewed, the British steel makers did well and their behavior was rational. According to him, the relative decline, i. e., slowing down of British steel production growth, was merely caused by maturity of the British economy.By taking a biggest iron and steel company in Britain over that period, that is, the Bolckow Vaughan & Co., this study tries to give an important example to this controversy.Bolckow Vaughan's were formed as a partnership in 1839 at Middlesbrough in the North-East of England and in 1865 they were transformed into a limited company. Throughout the late Victorian and Edwardian age they were a largest pig-iron producer. As a steelmaking company, they had four steel-making processes: acid converter, basic converter, acid open-hearth furnace, and basic open-hearth furnace. Although they were willing to adopt acid converter and basic converter processes in the 1870's and early 1880's respectively, they did not show a prompt response to basic open-hearth furnace process in the late 1880's and for the next 20 years. The basic open-hearth furnace process, from the technical point of view, became the most important steel-making process from that time on.Consequently, they lagged in adoption of basic open-hearth for the reason that they were not innovative in research and development of technology by contemporary standards. Primary sources such as Directors Minutes, Annual Reports and so on of the company bear out the above conclusion. In spite of the fact that this is only one case, considering the influential position of Bolckow Vaughan's, this study throws doubt on the view of, so to speak, “rational school” regarding the British entrepreneurial performance during the late Victorian and Edwardian Age.

著者

武内 達子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3, pp.48-76,iii, 1981-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

A principal problem in the management of an industrial enterprise is the judgement in the combination between possible technologies and goods. In iron industry, the amount of pig iron produced in Britain in the industrial revolution was almost doubled in decade, and more than half of the goods were castings for various uses.In the present paper, the goods of Newton Chambers, iron works specialized to foundry, were analysed based upon Day Books between 1793-1833 at an interval of ten years. The goods were classified into seven groups: (1) goods sold to merchants, mainly domestic uses, (2) tools and machine components, (3) rails and wheels for mines, (4) pig iron, (5) ballasts, (6) water pipes, and (7) gas pipes and components of gas works plants. The company did not produce guns and components of steam engines. The constitution of goods and its variation over the period revealed the trace of the activity of entrepreneur.The goods which characterize Newton Chambers were cast-iron pipes. Their high quality and low price stimulated new social needs. The great demands for iron pipes had started from 1807 in London for water works and for gas light companies after 1814. The percentage of pipes in the annual sale in 1813 was 20%, in 1823 30%, and 1833 49%. Newton Chambers could survive in serious depressions after Napoleonic War by the great demands for iron pipes.It is concluded that the success of Newton Chambers is the judgement of adoption and improvement of the production technology for mass production of standardized castings, which combined successfully with the newly developed public works for the improvement of city environments.

著者

チャンドラー Jr. A・D

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.4, pp.1-25, 1982-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

2

著者

川辺 信雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.4, pp.26-49,i, 1982-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

---

Recently Japanese sogo shosha has begun attracting the interest of scholars. Sogo Shosha is a very unique economic organization which has developed fully only in Japan. It handles wide variety of product lines, operate all over the world, and performs various kinds of functions.So far a lot of studies of sogo shosha has been done, and they have stressed the importance of its overseas operations. In spite of the importance of its world-wide operations based upon branch activities, there is no systematic study of activities of foreign branches. There appear several questions, related with activities of overseas branches of sogo shosha. Why and how does headquarters open a particular branch? What is the relationship between the opening of overseas branches and the other strategies of sogo shosha including diversification of product lines and integration of functions. How are they controlled? What kinds of managerial problems does they have, and how are these problems solved? These questions have remained unanswered.This study aims to answer these questions on sogo shosha's overseas operations, as well as its development as a whole. For this objective this study traced the development and activities of the San Francisco and Seattle Branches of Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha in the period between 1918 when the Seattle branch opened and the outbreak of World War II, which ended the operations of both branches, using the company's original records, which were confiscated by the United States government just after Pearl Harbor.

著者

山田 徹雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.1-28, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

This paper will make clear how and in what extent the railway policy of the Prussian government exercised its influence on private railways in Rhine-Westphalia. The Berg-Mark Railway with some local lines, founded by bankers and manufacturers in Wuppertal, expanded its network of lines to be one of the greatest railways in Germany within a half century. It was so closely linked with the State that the Minister of Commerce, August v.d. Heydt, initiating the policy of railway nationalization, had been a main member of the board of directors. In 1850 when the Berg-Mark Railway could not raise the capital to build a new line, the State made a financial support with a conditional contract that the former should hand its administration over to the latter. Though this measure robbed private shareholders of control over the running of the company, they were rather willing to accept it, because they were of opinion that skillfull managers and engineers were merely obtainable under the name of officials.This type of railway enterprise, owned by shareholders and managed by the State, might be, in a sense, a suitable form in Germany. The State intervention was made, in some extent, by military needs to facilitate the defence of the west but also in view of the economic significance of the Ruhr with coal fields and the Western industries. Both the State and the Western had the common interest that their economic activities were hampered by economic-geographic standing-points of the Rhine-Westphalia, which was in closer touch with Holland and Belgium than Berlin.

著者

後藤 伸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.29-41, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

湯沢 威 原 輝史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.88-94, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

山口 一臣

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.95-100, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

高寺 貞男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.101-106, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

岡山 礼子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.107-110, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.2, pp.1-33,i, 1981-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The historical side of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu has yet to be studied deeper. The writer has attempted to get the whole perspective of the Group, based on his 5 previous theses.The object of this study is to analyse the fund raising mechanism of the Group, in the 1921-1943 period. This is because the analysis of the flow of funds inside the Group is a short cut to grasping the structure of the Zaibatsu.In this study, the writer utilized documentary materials from the Honsha (the holding company of the Group named Sumitomo Goshikaisha) and annual reports from its member companies. Some notable results of the analysis follow;(1) Within the Sumitomo Zaibatsu the Honsha functioned as the financial control organ for the companies of the Group. Whenever the Honsha was short of funds, the necessary amounts were furnished to it by the Sumitomo Bank. There were no example of fund raising from outside the Group. Even when an enterprise directly managed by the Honsha became an independent affiliated company, the financial control by the Honsha over the company was strictly maintained.(2) In substance the fund raising of the Group depended largely on its own accumulated capital and comparatively on little on bank loans.Thus, the Sumitomo Bank had rather little business within the Group both in loans and in deposits. This is partly because the Group had not such giant enterprises as Mitsui & Co., Ltd. or Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd. of the Mitsui Zaibatsu.(3) During World War II, however, the scale of manufacturing companies of the Group expanded rapidly and they were forced to raise necessary funds outside the Group also. As a result the fund raising function of the Honsha weakened. In turn, the role of the Sumitomo Bank increased and the share of funds from outside the Group became more important.

著者

畠山 秀樹

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.2, pp.57-83,iii, 1980-08-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The object of this paper is to trace the formative process of business organization in coal mining of the Sumitomo family and analyze its business results during the period.It is a well-known fact that the Sumitomo family invested in other undertakings as well, a large amount of profits derived from operating the Besshi Copper Mine and thereby diversified its business into coal mining, banking, rolled copper industry and warehousing business in the 1890's.In such a case, the high level of strategic decision-making shown by the Sumitomo family is worthy of consideration, since it extended its business to coal mining with the intention of not only providing for itself a great deal of coal which was consumed in the Besshi Copper Mine, but also obtaining a profitable investment.In 1893, the Sumitomo family bought the Shoshi Coal Mine and, for the first time participated in coal mining. Further, the next year the Sumitomo family succeeded in purchasing the Tadakuma Coal Mine which was regarded as very promising in the Chikuho Coalfield, and then opened a place of business in Wakamatsu (coal trading center).Business results at these three places were very favorable because the years 1894 and 1895 were the boom years due to the Sino-Japanese War. In a few years after starting its business, the business organization of coal mining was arranged in order, and at this point the Sumitomo family acquired a position as one of the leading coal-mine owners in the chikuho district. But, afterwards coal mining business of the Sumitomo family couldn't show a substantial development because of its failure to get other promising coal mines from the latter half of 1890's to the first decade of the 20th century, in addition to the Tadakuma Coal Mine.As mentioned above, in this paper we made an attempt to observe the managerial characteristics of the formative process in coal mining business of the Sumitomo family.