著者

安部 悦生

出版者

明治大学経営学研究所

雑誌

経営論集 (ISSN:0387298X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.2-3, pp.127-143, 2022-03-23

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_44-3_59, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

1

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.55-65, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, no.4, pp.95-101, 1988-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.1, pp.27-44,ii, 1984-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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From the viewpoint of accounting history, it is one of the great issues when and how systematic depreciation began. At the present time, an influential understanding on this matter might be that of A.C. Littleton, a renowned accounting historian. He maintained that systematic depreciation did not originate until the mid-nineteenth century when railway came up. By contrast, there is a different view that during the Industrial Revolution systematic depreciation already started. In this controversy, it is noteworthy that depreciation must be systematic and regular, not haphazard is assumed. Accordingly, depreciation by the inventory method is excluded from the discussion because it is not planned depreciation.The author tries to give some evidence to this problem by dint of looking into the accounts of the Cyfarthfa Ironworks which was the largest ironworks in Britain during the early nineteenth century. As a result of analysing these accounts, the following facts were found.In the Cyfarthfa ironworks, broadly speaking, the straight line method was adopted as a means of writing off “Premises”, from 1819 on. Although the way to write off “Premises” was rather complicated, it is obvious that they used the system so as to recover their invested fixed capital just when the lease contract regarding raw materials would expire. For that purpose, they set the length of 45 years to write off “Premises” in 1819. The process to discover this mechanism was kind of mysterious. In the long run, this fact-finding gives weight to the view that systematic depreciation started before the railway age by offering a fresh exemplification.

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3, pp.25-47,i, 1981-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Admittedly, there are two sharply contrasted views on the late Victorian entrepreneurial performance at the present time. One traditional opinion, for instance, maintained by D.L. Burn (1939) is that the British entrepreneurs performed badly from the 1870's and if they had done better, the decline of the British steel industry compared with the German and American steel industry could have been avoided.Another opinion, recently asserted by D.N. McCloskey (1973) is that the relative decline was inevitable and from whatever perspective they are viewed, the British steel makers did well and their behavior was rational. According to him, the relative decline, i. e., slowing down of British steel production growth, was merely caused by maturity of the British economy.By taking a biggest iron and steel company in Britain over that period, that is, the Bolckow Vaughan & Co., this study tries to give an important example to this controversy.Bolckow Vaughan's were formed as a partnership in 1839 at Middlesbrough in the North-East of England and in 1865 they were transformed into a limited company. Throughout the late Victorian and Edwardian age they were a largest pig-iron producer. As a steelmaking company, they had four steel-making processes: acid converter, basic converter, acid open-hearth furnace, and basic open-hearth furnace. Although they were willing to adopt acid converter and basic converter processes in the 1870's and early 1880's respectively, they did not show a prompt response to basic open-hearth furnace process in the late 1880's and for the next 20 years. The basic open-hearth furnace process, from the technical point of view, became the most important steel-making process from that time on.Consequently, they lagged in adoption of basic open-hearth for the reason that they were not innovative in research and development of technology by contemporary standards. Primary sources such as Directors Minutes, Annual Reports and so on of the company bear out the above conclusion. In spite of the fact that this is only one case, considering the influential position of Bolckow Vaughan's, this study throws doubt on the view of, so to speak, “rational school” regarding the British entrepreneurial performance during the late Victorian and Edwardian Age.

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, no.3, pp.22-44,ii, 1978-06-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The Crawshays, a famous iron-maker family in South Wales, became inactive in the management of their iron-works in the middle of the 19th century. On the contrary, Crawshay (William II) rapidly increased his investment in securities such as Consols and domestic and foreign railway bonds, becoming in 1867 the greatest government stock holder in Great Britain. Why happened such a transition from industrial investment to investment in securities since 1850's?The general condition of Crawshay's business was very sound in 1850's. Some unfavourable factors, however, were forecast in the future of their business: first, the decline of production of iron ore in South Wales, a drastic change of the products from wrought iron to steel and the development of labour movement. In addition to these external factors, there was an unfavourable circumstance in Crawshay family itself: the lack of successor's talent for management. The reasons above mentioned seem to have been the key factors for the change from an ironmaster to a rentier.Crawshay thus suffered a great loss in iron-making in 1870's and eventually closed the iron-works. On the other hand, Crawshay's securities which amounted to over one million pounds brought the family tens of thousands pounds return a year. This article compares also Crawshay with the Dowlais Iron Company, and explains the difference in investment activity between the two rivals.

著者

横井 勝彦 奈倉 文二 小野塚 知二 西牟田 祐二 田縞 信雄 松永 友有 倉松 中 永岑 三千輝 千田 武志 鈴木 俊夫 安部 悦生 西川 純子 斎藤 叫 秋富 創 高橋 裕史

出版者

明治大学

雑誌

基盤研究(A)

巻号頁・発行日

2008

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本研究は、イギリス、ドイツ、オーストリア=ハンガリー帝国、アメリカ、日本の兵器産業と軍産関係ならびに武器移転の歴史に注目して、両大戦間期における軍縮破綻の構造を多角的・総合的な視点より解明することを目的としている。特に、武器移転の「送り手」と「受け手」の世界的な全体構造に焦点を当て、帝国史・国際関係史・経済史の総合化(共著刊行)による軍縮問題研究の再構築を試みた。