著者

庄司 潤一郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.54-69,L8, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

93

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At the beginning of 1945 American forces landed in the Philippines and Manila fell. As the war situation grew still more desperate, Konoe Fumimaro attended the court on February 14 for the first time in over three years and presented a long memorial to the Throne. In this memorial Konoe adomitted that defeat was inevitable but reasoned that defeat itself did not necessarily mean the end of the national polity, as the real threat was a communist revolution which could occur as a result of defeat. Therefore Konoe concluded that Japan should seek to terminate the war as immediately as possible.Until now studies about this memorial have focused mainly on his fear against the danger of a communist revolution. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to reexamine his aim in this memorial.Not only Konoe but also the Jushin, Hiranuma, Kido, and Wakatsuki, had strongly expressed the same view. It is natural that the ruling class has such feeling, and Konoe, who was a prince, has been frightened by the fear of a communist revolution from his youth.Konoe also stressed that the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War and their expansion into the Pacific War were skillfully plotted by one group within the army which have long time aimed at a communist revolution. But Konoe was strongly influenced by Ueda Shunkichi, Yosida Shigeru, and other some adherents of Kodoha, who had helped draft this memorial to begin to hold this conspiracy. Moreover this idea has been developed and intensified by his strong anger toward the army, which regarded his detachment as negativism and watched him with deep suspicion, the Sorge Incident, and his political motive to attempt a Kodoha revival.More noteworthy is Konoe's grasp of the international scene. On the one hand he pointed out that the Soviet Union was pushing revolution not only in Europe but also in East Asia. On the other hand he observed that America and Britain had not yet decided over forcing Japan to abolish the national polity. Through obtaining much accurate information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other channels, he was somewhat optimistic about American opinion. Amongst his contacts, Ogata Shoji, chief of the second section of the Investigation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, played a most important role by talking and submitting the memorandum to Konoe about the international situation.In particular Konoe was very sensitive to the trend about Japan in America and knew well that there were some influential persons like Joseph Grew and Hugh Byas, who understood the position of Konoe and Japan. He concluded that Japan must terminate the war immediately by negotiating with America in order to avoid a communist revolution and to preseve the national polity.Four months later Konoe agreed to go to the Soviet Union as special envoy by the Emperor's entreaty. Though he personally distrusted the Soviet Union, he had one secret plan to negotiate directly with America using this chance. But his plan was not realized, as the Soviet Union did not accept the Konoe mission.

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.122, pp.202-205, 1999-09-24 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

武田 悠

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.162, pp.162_130-142, 2010-12-10 (Released:2012-10-20)

参考文献数

70

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The 1970s was an era of crisis and internationalization for Japan-U.S. relations. Both governments started to settle their bilateral conflicts for their policy cooperation which was required in the changing international environment at that time. To clarify the character of this change, this paper examines the bilateral negotiation of Tokai reprocessing plant held in 1977.In the late 1970s, the U.S. government attempted to rebuild international nuclear nonproliferation system by limiting peaceful nuclear power development such as spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. Carter administration took the office in 1977 and called its allies to stop reprocessing. However, Carter's new policy was highly problematic since reprocessing was a key technology in energy policies of other developed countries such as Japan. As Tokai reprocessing plant was planned to begin operation in 1977 and an approval from Washington was required for its operation, they need a settlement.At the first bilateral talk in April, Washington opposed firmly to the operation. On the other hand, international opposition grew rapidly against the new U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Western European countries were especially sensitive to it since it could ban further export of nuclear-related technology to developing countries.Washington started to consider a compromise since Tokyo was the only close ally showing its approval to a framework of new nonproliferation policy. At the second meeting, the United States offered a proposal to alter Tokai plant more resistant to nuclear proliferation by technical modification. Although Japanese government opposed to the modification, they agreed to do a research about possible technical alternatives at Tokai Mura, Japan. As a result of this joint research and other investigations, however, Washington gave up all the technical solutions. Finally, at the third meeting at the end of August, Carter decided to permit the operation without any modification in return of Tokyo's agreement to reconsider reprocessing and suspend large scale Plutonium use for the moment.The above examination shows two aspects of the Japan-U.S. relations in the1970s. One is that Tokyo had an option to refine the U.S. foreign policy and participate in international politics by supporting Washington. In contrast to European countries that stopped the U.S. nonproliferation policy by refusing to cooperate, Japan did the same thing by aligning with the United States.The other is decreased importance of the bilateral relationship itself for the U.S. government, while Japan's substantive contribution to the U.S. foreign policy became a must to the United States. In sum, although both countries agreed to coordinate their policy objectives in the 1970s, this success became a basis of further bilateral conflicts on the way of implementing those goals.

著者

井口 武夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_169-175, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

著者

山崎 眞

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_145-154_160, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

57

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Recently, it has been closed-up again that Japan relies on the import mostly of the energy source, food, and the raw material because the sudden rise of the oil price and the price hike of food and various raw materials, etc. occurred in early 2008. A serious discussion about the food security is happening, too. Japan imports most 99 percent of oil, 87 percent of wheat, 95 percent of the soybean, and 100 percent of other iron ore and rare metals, etc. and 98 percent of those materials are transported through Sea Lane. Japan has developed economically for 60 years after the war because such a raw material etc. were able to be imported without trouble by can the free use of the sea, and to export the product.A two great sea power of U. S. -Soviet was rivaled, and the stability of the ocean was kept because two great military power of U. S. -Soviet faced it at the cold war era. The balance of such a sea power collapses when the cold war is concluded, and the element of instability in the ocean has increased. Therefore, the confrontation by the race and the religion, etc. came to light, and the pirate and the outrage, etc. for the capital work of these group and organization came to be generated. Moreover, maritime terrorism came frequently to occur chiefly when becoming after 2000 years. Safety and the stability of the ocean are deteriorating than the cold war era because of such a situation, and it has come not to be able to disregard the influence given to the economy of the world. For instance, the Strait of Malacca passes by 50 percent of the amount of the oil transportation in the world and 30 percent of the amount of the world trade, and if here would be blockaded by the terrorism such as mines, it is said that the economy of the world will become a situation that nears panic.And furthermore, recent Chinese naval modernization and reinforcement and North Korean nuclear armament under opaque situation will bring insecurity in this region. 90 percent of the trade of the world depends on marine transport now. Moreover, 75 percent of the world's population and 80 percent of the capital are in the coastal frontier. Safety in the ocean therefore can be called a base for the world economy as well as the human race living. Especially, this is extremely important for Japan that is the maritime country.The ocean policy of Japan was something like a inconsistent stripe passes existed in the situation in which the national interest in the ocean was being lost for this by the government office organizations of lack of coordination so far. The former political administration of Prime Minister Abe enforced “The Basic Law of the Sea” to demonstrate a strong statesmanship considering such a situation and to straighten the situation as the country in July, 2007. The Cabinet Council was continuously decided to “Oceanic basic plan” based on this law in April 2008.On the other hand, the United States that valued safety and the stability of the ocean made “New Maritime Strategy” public after an interval of about 20 years in October 2007. This is a new idea of acquiring safety and the stability of the ocean in the world by cooperate about the ally and the friendly country strong. It is the one that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's being sending the fleet to the multinational fleet in the Indian Ocean coincident with such an idea. Now, there is no country that can defend safety in the ocean in the world by one country. Peace in the sea can be acquired only by concentrating the imperative power such as naval forces and coast guards in the world.It is necessary that Japan cooperate positively in such the world strategy.

著者

芝崎 厚士

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.129, pp.44-60,L9, 2002-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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This article aims at introducing a brief overview of the theoretical perspective of International Cultural Relations (ICR, Kokusai Bunka Ron). ICR employs two meanings of “culture”, one is culture sensu stricto (CSS), the other is culture sensu lato (CSL). In order to understand ICR as one of the new fields of study in International Relations, one would have to elucidate how CSS and CSL are applied into international relations respectively and how these two analyses could be integrated as ICR.The study of ICR based on CSS has two traditions. Both regard ‘culture’ as elements from which the actor or some relations (composed of these actors) are constructed. Students of ICR use CSS in order to examine how ‘culture’ is used inside the reality of international relations.One tradition generated by the study of diplomatic history in the United States from 1970s, was conducted by Akira Iriye and his successors. They insisted on the need to interpret international relations as intercultural relations, rejecting the realist, power oriented approaches which dominated the field. They also tried to change diplomatic history into ‘international history’, which seeks to overcome the somewhat narrow-minded nationalistic view of diplomatic history.The other tradition was initiated in the study of International Relations in Japan from 1970s, launched by Kenichiro Hirano and his disciples. They borrowed their approach from anthropology, especially acculturation theory, which captures culture's dynamic changes and reconstructing processes. Basically they perceive international relations as cultural relations, which implies that international relations need not only to be interstate relations, and international relations are only one part of many cultural relations. They seek to establish ‘mobile International Relations’, which opposes traditional ‘immobile International Relations’.CSL studies consists of two parts. One is ‘international relations (ir) as culture’; the other is ‘International Relations (IR) as culture’. Students of ICR use CSL when they want to understand how ir or IR would look like from outside of the IR discipline, from the historical point of view. Unfortunately, the research stock is not so abundant in the study of ICR based on CSL. However, some recent studies indicate that CSL will be one of the most important future fields of study.Thus, ICR students have to deal with two notions of cultures. Sometimes they apply CSS, which focuses on how international relations could be explained by culture as elements of actors or groups of actors. Sometimes they adopt CSL, which explicates how and why international relations are generated in the history of mankind and International Relations invented in the history of ideas. ICR must deal with these two tasks, which could be accomplished both by the work of a single individual or though collaboration.

著者

臼井 勝美

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.116, pp.181-183, 1997-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

平田 忠輔

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.80, pp.142-160, 1985-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

60

著者

戸部 良一

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.71, pp.124-140,L11, 1982-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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The aim of this paper is to examine SHIRATORI Toshio's views and thoughts on Japan's foreign relations, as one of the typical advocates of Kodo Diplomacy in the 1930's. The main reason why his diplomatic thought should be the subject of careful study lies in the fact that he was regarded as a “philosopher” of Japanese diplomacy by the younger bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and he influenced their thoughts and behaviors.With the impact of the Manchurian Incident, SHIRATORI began to declare that Japan should return to Asia. He attacked the evils of Western Civilization and denounced the Washington Treaty System as an international order in the Far East which symbolized the interests of the Occidental (especially Anglo-Saxon) powers, though he had not challenged it in the 1920's. Then he sought an ideological basis to guide Japanese diplomacy, and tried to construct a conceptual framework of a New World Order based upon Japanese morals and interests.At first he looked upon Soviet Russia as the arch enemy whose influences had to be driven out of the Far East. But, as Japan had been bogged down in a war of attrition with China since 1937, he refrained from saying that Russia was the enemy of Japan and the other peoples of Asia. He stressed the global confrontation between the “have” countries, which championed the Popular Front, and the “have not” countries, whose ideological basis was totalitarianism. His search for a new moral world order was joined with Nazi Germany's world view. He began to advocate the tripartite alliance among Germany, Italy and Japan, and then a quadruple one between these three powers and Russia. Britain, which he had regarded earlier as a partner of Japan in driving out Russia from the Far East, became his (and Japan's, in his view) arch enemy. At last he emphasized the wickedness of Jewish financial capitalism which ruled the Anglo-Saxon powers, and in the spring of 1941 he predicted that a war between Japan and the United States would be inevitable, though he was suffering from mental ill health at that time.Did his attempt and effort to seek an ideological or moral basis for Japanese diplomacy achieve satisfactory results? This question is answered in the conclusion of this paper.

著者

松岡 完

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.130, pp.160-174,L15, 2002-05-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

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The Vietnam War had hardly ended when intensive efforts to “correct” the war narratives were commenced within the United States. The challenge to the once seemingly established fact that the United States had suffered a humiliating defeat came to its peak in the middle of the 1980s. Revisionists such as the former and incumbent Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan aimed to cure the Americans of the Vietnam syndrome, and to help them regain their self-confidence and a sense of national integrity.The withdrawal of American troops, the revisionists insisted, should never be portrayed as a surrender, instead merely as an American unilateral decision to leave Vietnam. The defeated, if any, were the South Vietnamese, not the Americans. The United States was actually a winner there, for it helped the anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam survive for two decades so that other nations in Southeast Asia could develop their economic and political strength. Moreover, American soldiers were always victorious in any encounter with the Communist guerrilla or regular forces.The revisionists believed that the United States could have won at an earlier stage if only it had used its military power in an overwhelming way. The United States was on the verge of triumph by the end of 1972, almost forcing the leaders in Hanoi to accept American terms in peace talks through its massive bombing attacks in central North Vietnam. Then, suddenly, the revisionists argue, the U. S. Congress, intimidated by an unjustified fear of United States inability to win the war, threw in the towel.Political leaders in Washington came under the attack of the revisionists. The United States lost this war for several reasons, namely because the government was unable to offer the American people a definite war objective, placed exceedingly unnecessary restrictions upon the military, failed to demonstrate sufficient will to win, and was unsuccessful in fully mobilizing the public behind the war effort.American mass media, including television, was another target. The correspondents were criticized for being too young and too inexperienced to grasp the reality of battleground and sometimes too naive to shelter themselves from the influence of the Communists' propaganda. Hence, their reporting across the Pacific contributed to serious increases in anti-war sentiment back home, which in turn caused extreme damage to the American war strategy.The majority of the American people were, however, far from being persuaded by such revisionist arguments. They knew that they had never fulfilled their objective of building a strong and viable anti-Communist regime in Vietnam, that they had been responsible for the South Vietnamese deficiencies, that winning in a shooting war had been irrelevant to the political future of the country, that the results of truce negotiations could hardly have been American triumph, and that blaming politicians and reporters merely was a means to protect the military from further criticism. That is why, to the regret of the revisionists, the memory of defeat in Vietnam still haunts the American people.

著者

岡部 三郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.12, pp.53-67, 1960-05-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.139, pp.144-158,L15, 2004-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

63

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In the midst of the Pacific War, SHINOBU Junpei, international lawyer and diplomatic historian, provided a bold speech at the general assembly of the Japan Association of International Law. Reflecting his experiences in studying and teaching international law of war for more than thirty years, Shinobu cautioned the audience about the rapid decline of obedience to international law after the Sino-Japanese War amongst Japanese. Although making the least reservation for fear of censorship during the wartime, Shinobu undeniably had presented his keen anxiety about the decreasing effectiveness of international law of war as restrainer to the total war. Did practices and norms of the classical diplomacy including international law of war remain relevant to international order during the interwar years? If they still had relevance, how could they be applied to Japanese diplomacy in the different situation from the pre-W. W. I era? This article intends to shed lights on the ambivalent attitude of Japanese intellectuals toward international order during the interwar years who had still believed in the classical diplomacy even after W. W. I with special reference to the case of Shinobu Junpei.In the historiography of Japanese studies of international politics, Shinobu is known for his pioneering works, “International Politics” published in the mid-1920's. Investigating those works, the first chapter analyzes how Shinobu perceived the trend of the “New Diplomacy.” While skeptical about the Wilsonian idealism, Shinobu regarded the “democratization of diplomacy” as the trend of “national diplomacy” which had increasingly gained currency in Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. In this sense, like H. Nicolson's classical work on diplomacy, Shinobu's works tried to tame the “New Diplomacy.”Given those perceptions, Shinobu had published a series of essays arguing how Japanese foreign policies were and should be. The second chapter therefore tries to delineate Shinobu's diagnosis of Japanese foreign policies around the Manchurian Incident and evaluate the significance and limits of his legalist approach toward the Manchurian problems with comparison to the cases of ROYAMA Masamichi and KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu, younger political scientists emerging after W. W. I.The third chapter surveys the trend of Japanese studies on international law of war after the Manchurian Incident. Shinobu's persistence in international law of war will be discussed here with comparison to the case of TAOKA Ryoichi who had shared the realist sentiments to international politics in the 1930's. Finally, on the basis of the post-W. W. II recollections, this article depicts how Shinobu viewed the Pacific War manly focusing on his understanding of the relationship between the Renunciation of War Treaty and the Pacific War.

著者

石川 一雄 大芝 亮

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.100, pp.270-285,L20, 1992-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

3

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The objectives of this paper are to figure out what substantive issues and theoretical approaches are receiving scholars' attention in Japan and to present proposals to build a viable transnational community of students of international relations.To avoid writers' personal conceptions of these problems, the following methods were used; first, a questionnaire was addressed to the members of the Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) to bring together JAIR members' perceptions of the problems in 1988. The rate of return was about 27 percent; 329 out of about 1, 200 JAIR members answered the questionnaire. The results of the questionnaire were suggestive.Second, to avoid a gap between perception and behavior, the academic works done by JAIR members were also examined to understand what substantive issues were actively studied and which theoretical approaches were frequently used in research. Third, a research team was organized to examine the result of the questionnaire and the characteristics of international studies made by JAIR members.The result of this research was presented to the Third World Assembly of International Studies held in Williamsburg, Virginia, August 1988. This article is a Japanese version of a summary of the original paper.The first section of this paper explains the objectives and methodology. The second section briefly reviews international studies of Japan before the 1980s. The third section figures out JAIR members' primary fields of research. The fourth section investigates JAIR members' perceptions of the important substantial issues and their works in regard with these issues.The fifth and six sections are devoted to the examination of JAIR members' perceptions on theoreticl approaches, the theoretical characteristics of the works done by JAIR members, and major analytic weakness of research. The seventh section argues the principal users of scholarly research on international questions. The eighth section discusses the way in which Japanese scholars contribute to building a viable transnational community of scholars.

著者

石川 一雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.67, pp.102-124,L5, 1981-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

77

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The American study of international relations since the '60s has been in confusion and disorder. There is no agreement on the future of scientific International Relations, no semblance of a theory nor hope of its development, no agreement about the accumulation of knowledge nor paradigm takeoff, no reliability in the methods nor the data, no credibility in the public domain nor relevance for the foreign policy practitioners.This is another “twenty years crisis” of confidence in the scientific study of International Relations. The crisis is not merely the result of methodological immaturity, but reflects something fundamental about the human world: it concerns the nature of scientific investigation itself.In the first part of this article, the state of the field, in confusion and disorder, is reviewed and described, and A. Lijphart's and J. Rosenau's arguments on the scientific revolution in IR are taken for criticism as a starting point for developing an alternative viewpoint, the focus of which is the intersubjective and common meanings of human behavior.In the latter part, the author looks from an interpretive angle at the study of international relations, refocusing attention on the concrete varieties of cultural meanings in their particularities and complex texture.The main thrust of the whole argument is, somehow, on the American mainstream of thought in International Relations which is pecuriarly scientistic and ethnocentric in its own way.

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.102-118, 1962-04-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

著者

若林 千代

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.10-27,L5, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

73

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In contemporary Okinawan history studies, attention has largely focused on events in the political process of the reversion to Japan in 1972 and thus presenting the image that Okinawan postwar history can be neatly divided into two distinct eras. Recently, however, this premise has been questioned in light of the rape incident of 1995 and recent political issues, which show that pre-1972 problems remain almost three decades later. The U. S. -Japan military security regime has consistently been the main factor that fetters democracy and self-reliance in Okinawa throughout both periods.This thesis proceeds from the premise above, and the author maintain that the basic foundation of relations and issues in postwar Okinawa until the present day originates after the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The U. S. Forces inherited, occupied and developed the military air bases on Ie Island, central and south west coast of Okinawa Island (where U. S. Forces are based now) which the Japanese Army had constructed in the early 1940's. The surviving Okinawans interned in camps in the Northern area were not permitted to return to their homes and rebuild their villages.On 15 August, the U. S. military government established the Advisory Council of Okinawa to rebuild government functions, a body composed of fifteen Okinawan representatives chosen by the Okinawan leaders and the American authorities. Although the Council was an organization hand-picked by the U. S. military government from above and no more than a sup-port group for the occupation, the debates in the Council went beyond the implementation of administrative policies. According to the records, the Council sought “self-government” institutions including the separation of police powers, war reparation from the Japanese government, freedom of speech. and press, popular elections for the democratic governmental body, and the proposition of a constitution for Okinawa. These debates were primarily focused on the situation inherited from Japanese rule, in which the Okinawans became enmeshed in the modern Japanese state system not as a colony, yet as a marginalized group within an imperialist power.The demands for political change, however, did not last long. The events in the weeks after the surrender of Japan between August and October 1945 shuttered them. From late September to early October, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the military bases in Okinawa as a “primary base, ” for possible air base sites in the American overseas base system, and examined the possibility of exclusive rule. The U. S. Military Government in Okinawa changed the orientation of its “self-government” program and ignored the debates formerly discussed by the Advisory Council. Moreover, the military government suppressed freedom of speech and press, the Okinawans' demands to be allowed to return to their villages, and a general election for the governor and gubernatorial elections. The military government regarded the Okinawans as having no experience of living in a “democracy” and therefore the most appropriate form of government in Okinawa was the “prewar political institutions” with its strict controls from above. This, of course, reflected U. S. military strategy as it sought to use Okinawa as a “primary base” and develop a governing structure that would facilitate “exclusive rule” by U. S. Forces.The Okinawan political leaders in the Advisory Council reacted cautiously to the military government and attempted to avoid conflicts with its new ruler. In spite of pressure from the Okinawans for the return of their villages and agricultural land, the Council ignored the petition protests from the leaders of local districts. The Advisory Council finally recognized that the “Nimitz Proclamation”

著者

古田 元夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.99, pp.69-85,L10, 1992-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

28

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The 7th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party held in June 1991 declared that Vietnam would steadily maintain “the road to socialism” in the ongoing crisis of the socialist countries. The Congress emphasized that the Vietnamese should follow this road because this is the road already chosen in the recent history of Vietnam.In the modern history of international poltics, Vietnam has been always left out in the cold. This history of alienation urged the Vietnamese to choose socialism as the “dream” of a better tomorrow. In the era of the cold war, they fought as actual war for this choice. Therefore there is good reason for the Vietnamese not to accept any other road than that of socialism so long as this “memory of history” has not faded away.This view of socialism, however, had become a foundation of the “socialism of sharing poverty”, which broadly equated socialism with people's perseverance in today's poverty for the “dream” of a better tomorrow. Social crises in Vietnam after the Vietnam war resulted in the Vietnamese Communists clear depature from this type of sccialism, which manifested itself in the 6th congress of the Party in 1986 under the slogan of “doi moi”.After the 6th Congress the Vietnamese Communists seemed to sidetrack the problem of the yet-to-be “dream” for the time being and began to concentrate their efforts on reform in the real lives of the people. But this situation did not last long, because the collapse of the socialist regimes, in Eastern Europe has irritated the problem of “dream” among the Vietnamese and has revitalized their “memory of history”.The Vietnamese insistence on the road to socialism, however, seems to be based on much more realistic calculation. The most important task for the Vietnamese is to boost the economy through promoting foreign investment and this task requires political stability. Some of the Vietnamese reformists argue that there is no way other than maintaining the “leading role” of the Communist Party to keep political stability so that the Vietnamese should follow the road to socialism. According to them, maintaining the road to socialism is the most realistic way for the Vietnamese to participate in the capitalist world economy.Other radical reformists are afraid that this opinion equated socialism with the domination of the Communist Party. They advocate the introduction of a pluralistic political system and a much more humanistic type of socialism.

著者

南山 淳

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.155-169,L16, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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“The Okinawa problem” has always been treated as a dependent variable of the U. S. -Japan alliance under the Cold War structure. This bilateral alliance being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems dne to the concentration of U. S. bases in Okinawa which are accepted as a “security cost.” In the field of security studies, the base problem in Okinawa has been considered exclusively a domestic problem which is confined in the context of domestic politics.After the end of the Cold War, however, the rape incident by U. S. soldiers in 1995, triggered, a burst of anti-base sentiment of the Okinawa people dramatically. It was the biggest protest held by the local people whose lives had been threatend in the name of “national security.” For the Okinawa people, the existence of the U. S. bases has been security threat to their lives.This essay is intended to examine, based on the development of security studies after the Cold War, a strained and conflicting relationship of the U. S. -Japan alliance between national security concept and individual/human security concept concerning Okinawa. The first Perspective is to clarify theoretically a strained relationship between national security and individual/human security by examining the debate on “Redefining Security.” The latter Perspective is to discuss “Critical Security Studies” which recently has been developed as a human-centred security studies interms of the correlation between subject and object.Consequently, from the view point of “Critical Security Studies, ” a theoretical framework in which security issues such as the Okinawa problem are disscussed will be presented. The central question is how “security as essentially contested concepts” should be grasped in the post-Cold war era.

著者

油井 大三郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.104, pp.183-186, 1993-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

金 栄鎬

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.132, pp.153-175,L14, 2003-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

84

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North Korea's foreign policy and its policy toward South Korea obviously wavered after the Cold War. Why did North Korea's policy toward the South seesaw between cooperation and conflict? The purpose of this article is to examine under what conditions North Korea cooperates with South Korea.Firstly, although during the Cold War North Korea had shown conflictive behavior toward the South, the U. S. and Japan, after the Cold War its policy distinctively shifted to cooperation. For balance of power on Korean peninsula in this period, South Korea was remarkably superior to the North. Was balance of power the causal element of North Korea's cooperation? An investigation of the article demonstrates that objective balance of power did not draw on the North's cooperative behavior. Change of South Korea's policy toward the North and cleavage in the South's domestic politics affected the North's policy, while the North reviewed its definition of “nation” and “nationalism” which could be seen as subjective element of the North's behavior toward the South.Secondly, North Korea's policy, in turn, shifted to conflict after its declaration of withdrawal from NPT. Strictly speaking, around its declaration of withdrawal North Korea explored cooperation with the South in contrast to confrontation against the U. S., but, as soon as the U. S. -North talk launched, the North intensified cooperation with the U. S. in reverse to conflict against the South. How can such a distortion of North Korea's policy be coherent? An examination of the article shows that South Korea's policy was reversed to a hard-line in terms of “legitimacy” of state, subsequently the North's policy also returned to conflictive and exclusive one. And here also balance of power did not necessarily affect the North's policy into cooperation as well as above-observation. Rather, above-mentioned subjective element produced the North's exclusive behavior against the South, which was regarded, according to a North Korean peculiar view, as “treacherous” or “a puppet of the American Imperialism”.Thirdly, there have been talks and agreements between North and South Korea, such as the North-South Joint Statement in July 1972, mutual visit of divided families in the mid 1980's, the basic Agreements between the South and the North in December 1991, and the North-South Summit Meeting in June 2000. A comparative analysis indicates the following: North Korea's policy and behavior in 1970's and the mid-1980's could not be seen cooperative in spite of some talks and agreements, because there had been prevailing view of “legitimacy” of state and “liberation of The South” with North Korea. After the Cold War, it was verified that North Korea's behavior and policy changed with the South's policy and their domestic politics, and more than anything-else, the North' cooperation with the South was conditioned under whether of appeasing “legitimacy” of state.