著者

石川 誠人

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.148, pp.118-132,L15, 2007-03-08 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

83

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The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, it examines Nationalist's attempts to implement the 1962 “Returning to the Mainland” plan. Secondly, it considers the Kennedy administration's response to this plan.After having retreated to Taiwan, Nationalist China placed the highest priority of the national policy on “Returning to the Mainland”. But the United States, the major benefactor of the Nationalists, tried to avoid an armed clash developed between Taipei and Beijing, and consistently restrained the Nationalists from invading mainland China. Following the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the U. S. and the Nationalist China exchanged notes in which Taipei, under Washington's pressure, agreed to withhold military action without holding prior consultation. Furthermore, at the time of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Washington urged Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his “Returning to the Mainland” ambition. As a result, in an October 1958 joint communiqué' Chiang promised that the “principal means” of regaining the mainland would “not (be) the use of force”. Yet, the Nationalists still continued to pursue the policy of reconquering the mainland.The Nationalists envisioned themselves accomplishing its mission through provoking a “revolution” in the mainland before initiating the invasion. In 1961, Chiang, judging that the post-“Great Leap Forward”-chaos in China, along with the Sino-Soviet dispute, had generated widespread anti-communist sentiments, ordered the military to prepare for an offensive campaign. In the following year, he requested Kennedy's blessing for this plan.While the Kennedy administration had no intention of consenting to Chiang's demands, it could not afford to let their already strained relations deteriorate further. Therefore, rather than offering a clear reply, the administration partially satisfied Taipei's desire by allowing the Taipei government to carry out small scale “probing operations”. At the same time, Washington monitored Taipei's preparation for an invasion through taking an active part in the operation planning; it also pressed Taipei to reduce its military budget. Taipei yielded to the U. S. position because the two nations had agreed in 1960 to set a ceiling on the Nationalists' military spending. These measures kept the Nationalists from starting an offensive operation without impairing the relationship with the U. S.. Only after their enthusiasm for “Returning to the Mainland” faded, did the Kennedy administration inform Taipei of its opposition to conducting an invasion under the current circumstances.Still the Kennedy administration's attitude toward the Nationalist's aspirations for “Returning to the Mainland” remained ambiguous. Kennedy never announced that such an operation would not be accepted in the future. It was not until Lyndon B. Johnson took office that a clear statement denying U. S. support for regaining the mainland was finally issued.

著者

宇野 重昭

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1972, no.45, pp.1-35, 1972-04-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

110

著者

畑田 重夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1972, no.45, pp.36-54, 1972-04-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

59

著者

山田 高敬

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.137, pp.45-65,L9, 2004-06-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

75

被引用文献数

1

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The challenges of global governance in the contemporary world are becoming increasingly complex in that solutions to many global issues ranging from poverty alleviation to environmental protection require the reformulation of the relationships among many competing policy goals. To the extent that such a reformulation of policy goals requires a change in a global public order (GPO), what makes the transformation of a GPO possible? More importantly, what kind of social mechanism is at work in creating a new “common knowledge” which integrates a new policy goal into the previous one? Is the same mechanism in effect for the entire process of GPO transformation?These are precisely the questions that this paper purports to answer. In so doing, it draws on the growing theoretical literature of constructivism with particular emphasis on the process of “socialization.” While “socialization” is generally believed to have two distinct mechanisms, namely “social influence” and “social persuasion, ” this paper argues that it is the combination and sequencing of these mechanisms that holds the key to the transformation of the existing GPO. It hypothesizes that a GPO is transformed in three evolutionary stages; at the first stage, a challenge is posed by a network of NGOs to the existing GPO through social influence; at the second stage, a new, more comprehensive GPO is germinated by stakeholder representatives through social persuasion, and at the final stage, the new GPO becomes propagated to the critical stakeholders through the mechanism of “social elucidation, ” which is a variant of social influence. Moreover, the paper argues that a different set of organizations is either used or created at each stage of development. For instance, at the second stage, a small, but inclusive organization is created to promote social learning among stakeholders' representatives.This evolutionary logic is then illustrated through a case study, which empirically traces the process that led to the formation of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), and to the creation of the Dams and Development Project (DDP) within UNEP. The former set the guidelines for the construction of large dams, and the latter “reinterpreted” them within each national context.The paper concludes with theoretical implications, which point to the fallacy of searching for a single covering law in explaining actors' behavior, often found in rational-choice theories, the fallacy of prescribing only one “optimal” organizational design, and also the myth of international anarchy in the world, which is increasingly characterized by various nongovernmental networks of “complex governance.”

著者

瀬川 高央

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.163, pp.163_81-95, 2011-01-20 (Released:2013-05-10)

参考文献数

55

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This article examines the Japan–U.S. cooperation in the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) reduction negotiation. The first section considers the perception of Japanese Government to INF problem. In March 1983, President Reagan tried to agree to the movement of SS-20 that Secretary-General Andropov had proposed. Andropov was going to reduce SS-20 in front of Europe, and to move this to Siberia. It meant the threat to Japan of SS-20 increased. In May 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone insisted on global zero of the INF in the Williamsburg summit. And, he supported NATO's Pershing II deployment. In addition, he stressed that the security of Japan–U.S.–Euro was inseparability. The purpose of Nakasone's speech was to have discontinued the movement of SS-20 of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was not able to oppose the unity of G7 and abandoned the movement of SS-20. However, a more concrete settlement plan was necessary to remove SS-20 that had already been deployed from the Asia part.The second section explores a Japanese concrete reduction plan of SS-20 in the Asia part. In February 1986, Reagan informed Nakasone of INF reduction plan in the letter. Reagan was going to abolish SS-20 in the Europe part at the first stage. Moreover, Reagan described for it to reduce SS-20 in the Asia part by 50% at the first stage, and to aim at the further reduction at the second stage. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared the alternative proposal for Reagan. The alternative proposal was warned of that Reagan's plan caused the reduction negotiation between Asia part SS-20 and the U.S. forward-deployed force. That is, it meant danger of ruining the basis of the Japan–U.S. alliance. Reagan accepted the Nakasone's alternative proposal and promised Asia part SS-20 abolition.The third section discusses the background to which Nakasone supported INF deployment in Alaska. In June 1987, Western European leaders controverted the problem of denuclearization in Europe. In the Venice summit, Nakasone demanded the re-unity on the western countries to oppose the Soviet Union. And, he supported the deployment of INF with U.S. mainland. Nakasone understood INF of U.S. mainland did the balance to Asia part SS-20. These Nakasone's insistence promoted the re-unity on the western countries. The Secretary-General Gorbachev was confronted with the re-unity on the western countries and the potential pressures of Chinese Government. Consequently, he decided abolition of SS-20.A final section reexamines the cooperation of Japan–U.S. in the nuclear disarmament. INF reduction plan of Japan contributed to the achievement of INF abolition. However, it controlled a real discussion in Japan concerning the extended deterrence of the United States.

著者

今野 茂充

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_170-182, 2009-09-30 (Released:2011-11-30)

参考文献数

35

著者

福田 茂夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.53, pp.16-29,L2, 1975-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

25

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The debate on the origins of the cold war which reached a peak in the late 1960s in America had declined with the end of the Vietnam war. Now a new debate on the sources of American foreign policy seems to be discernable.It may be said that the cold war debate diminished under the heavy criticism from the revisionist school. However, why the revisionist school was able to achieve such an eminent position? The answer seems to lie in their determined advocacy of the American retreat from Vietnam. When the American Oligarchy decided to retreat from Vietnam then the position of the revisionist school was vindicated. The Pentagon Papers show that since 1968 this policy option was under discussion in the government. Therefore, the revisionist had been utilized by the government to make the national consensus for the retreat.The end of the cold war debate has not seen the solution to the problems under dispute. But, now there is a prevailing tendency, among the scholars of Establishment, to insist that it was a sterile exercise. And some of them have the opinion that it seems at present more useful to analize international relations since the end of the second world war in the style of professor Kissinger who conceptualized them on the pattern of the congress system after the Napoleonic war.On the other hand, the new Left theorists had also contributed to the end of the cold war debate. Their views insisted that the cold war debate had the unfair effect to justify the Yalta Agreement which was one accomplishment of F. D. Roosevelt's imperialistic diplomacy. Therefore, they avoided the use of the term “cold war” which would justify the Roosevelt position as an imperialist policy maker.We can find a new controversy now in America. The point at issue here seems to be the various possibilities of America's return to “normal diplomacy”. In this context the estimation of President Truman as being a rational politician or not is one focus of the debate.

著者

樋口 敏広

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.163, pp.163_28-40, 2011-01-20 (Released:2013-05-10)

参考文献数

60

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In the 1950s, as the Cold War set in and nuclear arms race accelerated apace, the worldwide contamination by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests triggered a fierce controversy. The Eisenhower administration, whose pursuit of national security through nuclear superiority led to the production of environmental insecurity, sought to contain the latter through environmental monitoring and risk evaluation. Informed by the sociological theory of risk, this article interrogates Cold War America's nexus of scientific knowledge and political power that underpinned this first global environmental crisis of the Cold War.At the heart of the controversy was a much contested “proper perspective” of risk. Critics noted an absolute increase of harm by fallout and warned about the unknowns in its nature and scale. Washington, in contrast, emphasized the knowns, backed them up with its monopoly of monitoring data, and pushed the burden of proof upon the critics. It also adopted a comparative framework that mirrored the double-binding consensus of national security and high modernity, in which the risk from fallout appeared “negligible” compared to natural and artificial radiations, socially accepted risks, and benefits of atomic energy. The Eisenhower administration even pursued a technological solution of “cleaning up” nuclear bombs to justify the continuation of nuclear tests as well as to break an emerging taboo surrounding the use of nuclear explosives for war and peace.Cold War America's leadership in the risk evaluation in and out of the United States, however, proved to be far from absolute or static. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, an all-powerful national security state institution which underwrote the government's safety assurances, suffered much from the growing public mistrust due to the embedded conflict of interests between promotion and regulation. The commission of a risk review to the National Academy of Sciences hardly helped the government when the British counterpart issued a more conservative report. At the United Nations, the Soviet Union became assertive in challenging the logic of America's risk judgment as its scientists were rebuilding the knowledge basis of radiation biology and genetics and absorbing an alternative risk perspective through their transnational communication with Western experts. The resultant shift of consensus toward a more conservative risk assessment, in turn, increasingly narrowed the latitude of test ban policy for the Eisenhower administration, which eventually decided to abandon an option of atmospheric tests in 1959. Beyond the test ban, the transformed consensus also led Washington to reconsider the fundamental promise of “peace through nuclear superiority”, ironically, in a way to reinforce it. In short, the fallout controversy revealed the dynamic co-evolution of risk knowledge and nuclear policy for Cold War America.

著者

ビヤース B・F 入江 昭

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.17, pp.61-72, 1961-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

45

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_156-159, 2011-08-30 (Released:2013-09-19)

著者

鈴木 宏尚

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.89-104,L11, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

83

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This article explores the foreign policy of the Hayato Ikeda administration toward the “Free World” of the United States and its European allies. In July 1960 in the immediate aftermath of the controversy surrounding revision of the U. S. -Japan security treaty, the Ikeda cabinet found itself in the midst of domestic turmoil and felt the sense of losing credibility from the international liberal camp. Hence it was imperative for the cabinet to stabilize domestic politics and restore Western trust on balance.The Ikeda cabinet sought to unify the nation in the economic sphere by adopting the Doubling National Income Plan. The plan relied on Western markets as exclusively export-oriented destinations for economic growth leading to European powers, such as Britain and France, to invoke the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) Article XXXV to discriminate against Japanese imports. Improvement of relations with Europe was thus imminent for the sake of economic growth.This meant the Ikeda administration's effort to integrate Japan in the liberal camp via the deepening of its relations with the West. Subsequent diplomatic investment resulted in Japan's forging an “equal partnership” with Washington, gaining access to the meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and European states' discontinuation of discriminatory measures. Hence Japan established itself to be part of the Free World.One can consider the movement against the U. S. -Japan security treaty as an intensification of “domestic cold war” closely associated with the Japan's position in “international cold war.” Ikeda won the domestic cold war by way of economic growth, which required Japan to be part of the West during the international cold war. In other words, the success of the Ikeda administration in balancing its domestic economic agenda with international situations epitomizes the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy.

著者

鈴木 宏尚

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.140, pp.57-72,L8, 2005-03-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

79

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This article examines the diplomatic process of Japan's joining in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and illustrates that Japan's participating in the OECD should be regarded as its struggle for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World, searching for both political and economic interests.The OECD, which was reorganized from the Organization European Economic Corporation (OEEC) under the initiative of the United States in 1961, was a forum established with the purpose of coordinating economic, trade and foreign aid policy among its members. Almost all the developed countries in the so called the “Free Word” or the West, including the US, Western European nations and Canada joined the OECD as its original members, but Japan was not one of them. This caused Japan to hold serious concerns about its isolation from the Free World. Japan had already established bilateral relations between the US, through which Japan and the Free World were only linked together. In that situation, Japan had an aspiration for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World beyond its relations to the US, by participating in the OECD. Moreover, Hayato Ikeda administration, which wanted Japan to be equal footing with the US and European countries, considered that the membership of the OECD was essential to keep its economic growth. Thus it can be said that Japans' aim of joining in the organization was to pursue both economic and political interests.For the part of the US, Japan's participation in the OECD was regarded as its own interest, since it might enhance Japan's cooperation on economic assistance to the developing countries and strengthen its relation to the Free World stronger. Hence Japan was allowed its membership in the Development Assistance Group (DAG) of the OEEC in 1960. After OECD set on, the DAG was reorganized as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was one of the main committees of the OECD. The biggest obstacle to Japan's joining in the main body of OECD was that European countries, which were the majority of the organization, opposed to it.Japan made diplomatic efforts to gain the support from European countries with the assistance of the US. Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to the European countries including the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and so on paved the way for the membership of the OECD. Through the discussion with Ikeda, the heads of these countries agreed to Japan's joining in the OECD. In March 1963, the OECD ultimately accepted Japan's full membership.

著者

西田 敏宏

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_158-168, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

14

著者

川端 正久

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.119, pp.212-214, 1998 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

松浦 正孝

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.1-20,L5, 2006-11-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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Critics of Orientalism have pointed out that the concept of “Asia” lacks any real substance and that it was invented in opposition to the idea of “Europe.” Consequentially, by speaking of shared characteristics within Asia, one risks being dismissed as simply reproducing the foundations for either Euro-centric notions of “Asian despotism” and “Asiatic modes of production” or the ethnocentrism of modern Japan. Traditionally attempts to employ a politico-cultural approach that analyzes particularistic qualities of political phenomenon and systems different from Europe and America have been critiqued as tautological exercises fostering racism and stereotypes. However, while refraining from arguments based on innate particularities of a region or ethnicity, by looking at the diffusion and formation of shared systems of possible exchange, is it still not possible to historically consider a sort of political culture of the Asian region formed through path dependency? The birth of the EU brought us a greater focus on the leadership of politicians that initiated such a project, and at the same time highlighted the importance of common factors that accumulated in Europe such as the legacies of the Roman empire in the form of law and Christianity, post-medieval political unification, the history of tariff and monetary exchange, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.By employing a framework of broader regional Asian history, it may be possible to conceive of nations and regions in a new manner that corresponds to a globalization not bound by national borders. This trend was begun by pre-modern historians and has continued with recent research employing the notion of intellectual and cultural chains. However, attempts to historically analyze modern political, economic, and social conditions of a wider regional Asia as a whole have remained insufficient. To this end, this Introduction presents an historical model of six world orders that have come to exist in Asia over the course of history and thus hopes to relate events currently taking place in the greater Asian region during this century to earlier developments. The six imperial world orders elaborated include; 1) the imperial Chinese world order, 2) the Western imperial order (represented by the greater British empire), 3) the Japanese imperial order (The Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere), 4) the first American imperial order (from WW I to the end of the Cold War), 5) the Soviet imperial order, 6) and the second American imperial order (post-Cold War).This special issue has brought together both diplomatic historians and other specialists in order to historically analyze several phenomena unfolding on the stage of greater Asia between 1910 and 2000. Their articles all point to new possibilities for an Asian history that analyzes what traditional approaches based on unilateral and bilateral histories could not and, in their substantive quality, take a first step toward deconstructing the image of “Asia.”

著者

鈴木 一敏

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_1-16, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)

参考文献数

40

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Threatening to retaliate is a common means of influence in trade conflicts. In most cases, retaliation is carried out either through the suspension of tariff concessions or through additional tariffs. The target of retaliations can be industries that were uninvolved in the original conflict. This article examines the use and effectiveness of such “cross-industry” threats.With a cross-industry threat, the compositions of domestic games tend to become more complicated with respect to both the threat's sender and target, as compared with intra-industry cases. Unrelated industries tend to have different industrial associations, fall under different bureaucratic jurisdictions, and be represented by different politicians. Thus, we can expect the decision-making process involving cross-industry threats to be more complicated and politically difficult than in intra-industry cases.However, the extensive literature on threat effectiveness has paid insufficient attention to whether retaliation threats are cross-industry or intra-industry. To compensate for this limitation, I examine cases involving U.S. unilateral trade actions and WTO dispute settlements, which yield several findings.First, the use of cross-industry threats by the United States has increased dramatically in 1980s.Second, a close examination of U.S. section 301 cases reveals that cross-industry threats are clearly more effective than intra-industry ones. The selection of targets (cross-or intra-industry) also exhibits a clear tendency. Cross-industry threats are used almost exclusively in attempts to open foreign markets (through the removal or modification of high tariffs, quantitative restrictions, patent protections, industrial standards, tax systems, etc.), and not in the cases of export subsidies, in which the purpose of the U.S. is to protect its own industries from import penetration.The increase in the use of cross-industry retaliation, this study argues, is caused by the changing nature of the negotiation process. After the 1980s, the principle source of trade conflicts shifted from foreign export penetrations (e.g., textile, steel, and auto) to foreign non-tariff barriers such as government regulation, copyright protection, market structure, and domestic institutions. The domestic group supporting trade barriers are not limited to the export industry, and therefore, are not always subject to trade retaliation. Since this renders threats of intra-industry retaliation ineffective, cross-industry threats are now used more frequently.This trend is not limited to the United States. Records from WTO dispute settlement cases demonstrate that most trade retaliations are now targeted at industries that are unrelated to the original conflict.Underlying this change is a dynamic process of liberalization and international harmonization. Trade liberalization begins with competitive industries, and uncompetitive industries tend to be left behind. Similarly, domestic systems of nontradable goods sectors are last to be harmonized. Therefore, as internationalization continues, supporters of alleged trade barriers are less likely to engage in export businesses, thereby decreasing their likelihood of becoming a target of direct trade retaliation.

著者

鈴木 基史

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_1-17, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

55

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The Westphalian norms of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, and noninterfbrence are under great pressure for change. To improve the normativity of the international system, significant empowerment has taken place within international human rights law, humanitarian law, and liberal economic law, each of which seeks to remedy moral and distributive injustice associated with the Westphalian system. However, the transformation to a post-Westphalian liberal norm system is incomplete at best: many states still give priority to state sovereignty over human rights, cultural relativism over universalism, and protectionism over liberalism to justify their nationalistic behavior. As a consequence, the current system remains confusingly complex and pluralistic, containing both Westphalian and post-Westphalian elements.In general, norm change is explainable by three principles of human behavior: the logic of appropriateness holds that norm change emerges along with change of social facts defined intersubjectively by states' political elites; the logic of consequences focuses on the coordinating function of norms in promoting states' joint interests; and the logic of coercion emphasizes the endogeneity of norms to international power structures. These principles constitute analytical cores of major international relations theories, including social constructivism, rational institutionalism, and political realism, respectively.Yet, scholars disagree on the current status of international norms and hold varying opinions on causes and consequences of norm change. Having outlined basic concepts and theoretical frameworks for analysis, this essay suggests that, unless carefully executed, analyses of norm change may suffer from methodological problems of underdetermination, selection bias, and fallacious attribution. Given the imperfect nature of theory and human society, researchers need to focus on the relative rather than absolute validity of competing theories, by finding the conditions under which theories are descriptively superior to their alternatives. The essay concludes by stressing the imperative to bridge theoretical divides to improve our understanding of contemporary global politics that has been undergoing major normative transformations.