- 著者
-
中嶋 優太
- 出版者
- 西田哲学会
- 雑誌
- 西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.8, pp.121-137, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)
When presented with some forms of nature and works of art, we feel they are beautiful. These kinds of experiences are generally believed to be quite different to cognitive experience and are called “aesthetic experience”. This paper aims to reveal what Nishida thought about aesthetic experience through his paper “Problems of consciousness”.
In his theory, aesthetic experience is different from cognition, and does not serve a cognitive purpose. However, it is not purely subjective ― it also has an objective aspect.
We think that the world of art is subjective and the world of experience is objective, but artists also have an objective world to discuss with each other(“Problems of consciousness”).
In his argument for the objectivity of aesthetic experience, he uses Kant’s argument for the objectivity of cognition to argue for the apriority of aesthetic experience. Cognition has its language of concepts as the base of its apriority and, in the same way, aesthetic experience has its language of senses as the base of its apriority. This is called‘pure seeing’ after Fiedler’s
theory of expression(“Über den Ursprung der künstlerischen Tätigkeit”). Nishida also argues that cognition and aesthetic experience represent the same reality in their own languages. By arguing in this way, he invokes the unity of apparently diverse experiences, which is one of the main theses of Nishida’s philosophy.