著者

井上 達夫

出版者

立教大学

雑誌

立教法学 (ISSN:04851250)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.83, pp.1-48, 2011-09-30

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

公益財団法人 日本学術協力財団

雑誌

学術の動向 (ISSN:13423363)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, no.5, pp.70-75, 2007-05-01 (Released:2012-02-15)

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

山形大学法学会

雑誌

山形大学法政論叢 = YAMAGATA UNIVERSITY THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, pp.43-88, 2016-03-31

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, pp.58-70,198, 2006-10-30 (Released:2010-02-15)

参考文献数

14

---

The present paper reconstructs the idea of rule of law as a response to the persistence of human conflicts and defends it against the criticism that it hides and speciously rationalizes the rule of men. It is pointed out that Hobbes, who correctly rejected Coke's perception of rule of law as a groundless defense of social tyranny of feudal powers including religious forces, provided a deep insight into the problem of human conflicts which even the Hobbesian social contract cannot overcome. This insight is developed by arguing that the establishment of the state as a collective decision making system and enforcement mechanism cannot prevent the persistent human con-flicts from degenerating into the violent clashes in the state of nature unless the state's power structure is subjected to the governance of the principles which enables the losers of the strife in political decision making process to accept its outcomes as something beyond the victor's justice and pay deference to the winners. The rule of law is reinterpreted and defended as constituting the governance of such principles. This implies that the rule of law constitutes the conditions of the legitimacy of law as distinguished form its rightness. A further elaboration of this point is given by showing that Jeremy Waldron's normative-positivist defense of the dignity of democratic legislation as a response to “the circumstances of politics” helps to clarify the distinction between the legitimacy and rightness of law although it fails to solve the question of what constitutes the conditions of legitimacy. It is concluded that an adequate answer to this question is provided by the “strong structural interpretation” of rule of law. The rule of law on this interpretation protects the proto-right to justice-review of the outcomes of constitutional as well as legislative strife and subjects them to the test of the universalizable and reversible justification which underlies competing conceptions of justice as their common conceptual core.

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.52, pp.14-17,312, 2001-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

---

Philosophical critics of the idea of justice have been motivated by a misperception of this idea: they depicted it as an ideological device for rationalizing our desire to castigate and dominate others in a pharisaic and self-righteous way. They "debunk" the hegemonic function of justice that reproduces and reinforces our self-centered will to power.I will correct this misperception by showing that the truth is the other way around. I argue that the test of reversibility implied by the universalistic idea of justice requires us to carry out a searching self-critical scrutiny of justifiability of our rights-claims and power-claims to others by imagining ourselves not just in their places but in their perspectives. This means that justice requires us to transcend our self-centeredness and seek for public reasons that are intelligible and acceptable both from our own and the others' viewpoints.I also argue that the idea of public justification inherent in the idea of justice guides us in designing a fair political decision-making system that accommodates and resolves the value conflicts about what constitutes public reasons. The political corollaries of the universalistic justice that serve this purpose are the liberal idea of the priority of jusitce over specific conceptions of the good life and the idea of critical democracy that integrates constitutional protection of minority rights on a fair and principled basis with the promotion of the public-spirited democratic deliberation that overcomes the vices of interest-group pluralism.

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, pp.68-80,233, 2004-10-20 (Released:2008-11-17)

参考文献数

21

---

In this paper I argue for two claims: that liberal feminism can adequately capture the critical insights of the second-wave feminism so as to rescue the latter from its own self-defeating tendencies; and that the internal tension between the liberal and feminist perspectives of liberal feminism generates important issues that must be addressed to reinforce feminism and to deepen liberalism. In the fist section I defend the first claim by showing the following points. The second -wave feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy is based on the doctrine that the personal is political, which must be complemented by the liberal tenet that the personal is personal for everyone, in order to protect against “private” and social pressures the autonomy and equal status that women have as individuals. The anti-essentialist deconstruction of gender, another secondwave feminist insight, must be coupled with the liberal commitment to critical morality based on justice and human rights to get out of the trap of comprehensive deconstructionism that undermines the feminist reformative vigor. In the second section I substantiate the second claim by comparing Ayako Nozaki's conception of liberal feminism and mine. Nozaki attempts to reconstruct liberalism from a feminist perspective by incorporating Hannah Arendt's conception of equality and Amartya Sen's capability-based approach to distributive justice into her theory. I argue that her feminist concerns can be more adequately captured and defended from a liberal perspective in which the universalistic idea of justice and resource-based approach to distributive

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

東京大学出版会

雑誌

UP (ISSN:09133291)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.5, pp.7-13, 2004-05

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

Japan Science Support Foundation

雑誌

学術の動向 (ISSN:13423363)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, no.5, pp.70-75, 2007

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

山形大学法学会

雑誌

山形大学法政論叢

巻号頁・発行日

no.65, pp.43-88, 2016

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, pp.73-103, 1984-10-20 (Released:2008-11-17)

参考文献数

47

著者

井上 達夫 苅部 直

出版者

中央公論新社

雑誌

中央公論 (ISSN:05296838)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.132, no.1, pp.110-119, 2018-01

著者

井上達夫編

出版者

ナカニシヤ出版

巻号頁・発行日

2006

著者

井上 達夫 河合 幹雄 松原 芳博

出版者

岩波書店

雑誌

世界 (ISSN:05824532)

巻号頁・発行日

no.782, pp.141-153, 2008-09

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

朝日新聞社

雑誌

論座

巻号頁・発行日

no.154, pp.94-103, 2008-03

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

no.1989, pp.6-23, 1990

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.52, pp.14-17,312, 2001

---

Philosophical critics of the idea of justice have been motivated by a misperception of this idea: they depicted it as an ideological device for rationalizing our desire to castigate and dominate others in a pharisaic and self-righteous way. They "debunk" the hegemonic function of justice that reproduces and reinforces our self-centered will to power.<BR>I will correct this misperception by showing that the truth is the other way around. I argue that the test of reversibility implied by the universalistic idea of justice requires us to carry out a searching self-critical scrutiny of justifiability of our rights-claims and power-claims to others by imagining ourselves not just in their <I>places</I> but in their <I>perspectives</I>. This means that justice requires us to transcend our self-centeredness and seek for <I>public</I> reasons that are intelligible and acceptable both from our own and the others' viewpoints.<BR>I also argue that the idea of public justification inherent in the idea of justice guides us in designing a fair political decision-making system that accommodates and resolves the value conflicts about what constitutes public reasons. The political corollaries of the universalistic justice that serve this purpose are the liberal idea of the priority of jusitce over specific conceptions of the good life and the idea of critical democracy that integrates constitutional protection of minority rights on a fair and principled basis with the promotion of the public-spirited democratic deliberation that overcomes the vices of interest-group pluralism.

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

no.2003, pp.68-80,233, 2004

---

In this paper I argue for two claims: that liberal feminism can adequately capture the critical insights of the second-wave feminism so as to rescue the latter from its own self-defeating tendencies; and that the internal tension between the liberal and feminist perspectives of liberal feminism generates important issues that must be addressed to reinforce feminism and to deepen liberalism. In the fist section I defend the first claim by showing the following points. The second -wave feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy is based on the doctrine that the personal is political, which must be complemented by the liberal tenet that the personal is personal for <i>everyone</i>, in order to protect against &ldquo;private&rdquo; and social pressures the autonomy and equal status that women have as <i>individuals</i>. The anti-essentialist deconstruction of gender, another secondwave feminist insight, must be coupled with the liberal commitment to critical morality based on justice and human rights to get out of the trap of comprehensive deconstructionism that undermines the feminist reformative vigor. In the second section I substantiate the second claim by comparing Ayako Nozaki's conception of liberal feminism and mine. Nozaki attempts to reconstruct liberalism from a feminist perspective by incorporating Hannah Arendt's conception of equality and Amartya Sen's capability-based approach to distributive justice into her theory. I argue that her feminist concerns can be more adequately captured and defended from a liberal perspective in which the universalistic idea of justice and resource-based approach to distributive

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

no.2005, pp.58-70,198, 2006

---

The present paper reconstructs the idea of rule of law as a response to the persistence of human conflicts and defends it against the criticism that it hides and speciously rationalizes the rule of men. It is pointed out that Hobbes, who correctly rejected Coke's perception of rule of law as a groundless defense of social tyranny of feudal powers including religious forces, provided a deep insight into the problem of human conflicts which even the Hobbesian social contract cannot overcome. This insight is developed by arguing that the establishment of the state as a collective decision making system and enforcement mechanism cannot prevent the persistent human con-flicts from degenerating into the violent clashes in the state of nature unless the state's power structure is subjected to the governance of the principles which enables the losers of the strife in political decision making process to accept its outcomes as something beyond the victor's justice and pay deference to the winners. The rule of law is reinterpreted and defended as constituting the governance of such principles. This implies that the rule of law constitutes the conditions of the legitimacy of law as distinguished form its rightness. A further elaboration of this point is given by showing that Jeremy Waldron's normative-positivist defense of the dignity of democratic legislation as a response to &ldquo;the circumstances of politics&rdquo; helps to clarify the distinction between the legitimacy and rightness of law although it fails to solve the question of what constitutes the conditions of legitimacy. It is concluded that an adequate answer to this question is provided by the &ldquo;strong structural interpretation&rdquo; of rule of law. The rule of law on this interpretation protects the proto-right to justice-review of the outcomes of constitutional as well as legislative strife and subjects them to the test of the universalizable and reversible justification which underlies competing conceptions of justice as their common conceptual core.

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

no.1983, pp.73-103, 1984

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, pp.265-267, 1998-10-30 (Released:2009-02-12)