著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_59-195_74, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

70

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Termination of war is a “bridge” between war and peace. However, comparing with other research topics of the International Relations (IR) discipline, the subject of the end of war remains highly understudied in both qualitative and quantities terms. In fact “restoration” of interstate relationship presupposes “collapse” of them. War termination phenomena deserves more scholarly attentions if understanding the transition process from the collapse to restoration of interstate relations goes at the heart of the entire IR discipline.This paper purports to answer the question of how wars end. It presents the concept of “the dilemmas between the compromised peace and the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict” and argues that costs, future risks, and relative importance of them are an independent variable that shape the equilibrium point to solve these dilemmas. These are often malleable as an outcome of interactive processes among the belligerents. In order to advance this argument, the paper takes the following steps.First, in reviewing the existing theoretical literature on war termination, this paper categorizes them into four approaches as: power politics; rational choice; domestic politics; and cognitive psychology, and reviews them systematically.Second, it claims that the analytical frameworks of war termination as power politics and rational choice approach offer more useful analytical leverage than domestic politics and cognitive psychology approach. As such this article focuses on the relations between compromise and fundamental elimination of cause of conflict, on the top of power. Although the winning belligerent can eliminate fundamental cause of conflict in order to eradicate the root of future trouble by imposing unconditional surrender on its hostiles, entailed costs will increase. On the other hand, if it chooses the compromised peace to avoid increasing its warfighting costs, there would be a problem that it only postpones the rise of an unavoidable battle in the future. So this article presents the following hypotheses: (1) in the case that the level of warfighting cost is high and future risk will be low for winning side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the compromised peace; (2) in the case of the level of costs is low and future risk will be high for prevailing side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict; (3) in the case of the level of costs and future risk in ascendant side are balanced, the form of war termination would be indeterminate and strategic interactions among the belligerents would decide the equilibrium point to overcome this dilemmas.Third, this article provides the illustration of the above hypotheses through actual historical case studies such as termination of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Pacific War in 1945.

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

日本政治学会

雑誌

年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.1, pp.1_332-1_351, 2014 (Released:2017-07-01)

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This study points out that the limitation of the analytical framework of “Autonomous Defense (or jishu bōei) vs. the Japan-U.S. Alliance” that scholars on Japan's postwar national security policy often use. On previous researches, this framework is applied arbitrarily and “Autonomous Defense” is compatible with “Alliance” in some cases. Then this research adopts analysis by “Defense Force Building vs. Operation” as another angle of vision. And it explains that the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance (or gentei shōkibo shinryaku dokuryoku taisho)” which appeared in the “National Defense Program Outline (or bōei taikō) 1976” and the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation 1978.” This concept played the role as a measure for “Defense Force Building” in the two and then abandoned in the NDPO 1995 and the Guidelines 1997 by “Operational” request.

著者

千々和 泰明 佐々木 葉月 田口 千紗 チヂワ ヤスアキ ササキ ハヅキ タグチ チサ Chijiwa Yasuaki Sasaki Hazuki Taguchi Chisa

出版者

大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科

雑誌

国際公共政策研究 (ISSN:13428101)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, no.2, pp.145-159, 2008-03

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_62-154_78, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

96

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The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the “Concept of Basic Defense Capability” (kibanteki boeiryoku koso), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (boei taiko), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (shoyo boeiryoku koso) or modifying the schedule form (beppyo) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.1-19, 2019-09-30 (Released:2022-03-14)

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_62-154_78, 2008

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The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the &ldquo;Concept of Basic Defense Capability&rdquo; (<i>kibanteki boeiryoku koso</i>), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (<i>boei taiko</i>), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.<br>The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.<br>In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (<i>shoyo boeiryoku koso</i>) or modifying the schedule form (<i>beppyo</i>) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.<br>In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.4, pp.89-93, 2009-03-31 (Released:2022-04-20)

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.3, pp.113-135, 2007-12-31 (Released:2022-04-20)

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.50-54, 2020-03-31 (Released:2022-03-14)

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

防衛省防衛研究所

雑誌

戦史研究年報 = NIDS military history studies annual (ISSN:13455117)

巻号頁・発行日

no.23, pp.1-18, 2020-03

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_59-195_74, 2019

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<p>Termination of war is a "bridge" between war and peace. However, comparing with other research topics of the International Relations (IR) discipline, the subject of the end of war remains highly understudied in both qualitative and quantities terms. In fact "restoration" of interstate relationship presupposes "collapse" of them. War termination phenomena deserves more scholarly attentions if understanding the transition process from the collapse to restoration of interstate relations goes at the heart of the entire IR discipline.</p><p>This paper purports to answer the question of how wars end. It presents the concept of "the dilemmas between the compromised peace and the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict" and argues that costs, future risks, and relative importance of them are an independent variable that shape the equilibrium point to solve these dilemmas. These are often malleable as an outcome of interactive processes among the belligerents. In order to advance this argument, the paper takes the following steps.</p><p>First, in reviewing the existing theoretical literature on war termination, this paper categorizes them into four approaches as: power politics; rational choice; domestic politics; and cognitive psychology, and reviews them systematically.</p><p>Second, it claims that the analytical frameworks of war termination as power politics and rational choice approach offer more useful analytical leverage than domestic politics and cognitive psychology approach. As such this article focuses on the relations between compromise and fundamental elimination of cause of conflict, on the top of power. Although the winning belligerent can eliminate fundamental cause of conflict in order to eradicate the root of future trouble by imposing unconditional surrender on its hostiles, entailed costs will increase. On the other hand, if it chooses the compromised peace to avoid increasing its warfighting costs, there would be a problem that it only postpones the rise of an unavoidable battle in the future. So this article presents the following hypotheses: (1) in the case that the level of warfighting cost is high and future risk will be low for winning side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the compromised peace; (2) in the case of the level of costs is low and future risk will be high for prevailing side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict; (3) in the case of the level of costs and future risk in ascendant side are balanced, the form of war termination would be indeterminate and strategic interactions among the belligerents would decide the equilibrium point to overcome this dilemmas.</p><p>Third, this article provides the illustration of the above hypotheses through actual historical case studies such as termination of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Pacific War in 1945.</p>

著者

千々和 泰明 Chijiwa Yasuaki チヂワ ヤスアキ

出版者

大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科

雑誌

国際公共政策研究 (ISSN:13428101)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, no.1, pp.437-441, 2006-09

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Book Review

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

同志社大学

雑誌

同志社アメリカ研究 (ISSN:04200918)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.49-67, 2008-03