著者
大串 敦
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.34, pp.62-76, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)
被引用文献数
2 2

The Soviet collapse was one of the most significant events in the 20th century. The reason for it is still a controversial issue. The party apparat has been regarded as one of the key aspects of the Soviet-type political regime. It is well known that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had controlled state (executive) organs before perestroika through the party apparat's intervention. In addition, it is also well known that the party lost most of its control under Gorbachev's reform. There were two reorganizations of the party apparat under Gorbachev in 1988 after the 19th Party Conference and in 1990 after the 28th Party Congress. Researching these reorganizations may help us consider the reason for the Soviet collapse.This article investigates the decision-making and implementation processes of the party apparat reorganizations, and also looks into the structure and work of the party apparat. Utilising party archives that became available after the Soviet collapse, this article makes clear the following findings. Firstly, the first attempt to reorganize the party apparat in late 1988 had created a “power vacuum, ” though the party leadership intended to activate the economy by preventing the substitution (podmena) of the executive organs by the party. When the party stopped intervening in the executive organs, these bodies, which had depended on the party for a long time, also stopped working. The presidency, which was created in March 1990 in order to manage the “power vacuum, ” did not properly function either. Secondly, such a situation complicated further reform efforts. The second party apparat reorganization prolonged and not far-reaching especially in relation to security organs, though the party apparat certainly lost most of its ties with other state organs. In addition, despite the party leadership's intention to strengthen “political activity” of the party, the theoretical or ideological work did not improve. Thus, the communist party failed to transform itself into a normal political (or parliamentary) party, partially because of the “power vacuum.” Thirdly, losing its traditional administrative function and failing to achieve a new function, the party lost its raison d'être. The party organizations were disintegrating well before Russian President Yeltsin's decree on the suspension of the party's activity that was issued immediately after the attempted coup in August 1991.
著者
松里 公孝 東島 雅昌 鳥飼 将雅 大串 敦 立花 優 吉村 貴之
出版者
東京大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2022-04-01

ソ連継承諸国の中で、安定的な支配党体制を建設したロシア、アゼルバイジャン、カザフスタンの政治が注目されてきたが、実は、短命な支配党が現れては消える脆弱支配党体制の方が多数派である。本研究は、ウクライナ、モルドヴァ、ジョージア、アルメニア、クルグズスタンにおいて、脆弱支配党体制が生まれたのはなぜかを明らかにする。