著者

大坪 玲子 Reiko Otsubo 高崎経済大学地域政策学部非常勤

雑誌

地域政策研究 = Studies of regional policy (ISSN:13443666)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.3「原田寛明教授退職記念号」, pp.115-133, 2014-02-01

著者

大坪 玲子

出版者

嗜好品文化研究会

雑誌

嗜好品文化研究 (ISSN:24320862)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.6, pp.137-147, 2021 (Released:2022-06-30)

著者

大坪 玲子

出版者

日本文化人類学会

雑誌

文化人類学 (ISSN:13490648)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.78, no.2, pp.157-176, 2013-09-30

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経済学やバザールを扱う諸学では、情報の非対称性が取引にもたらす非効率性を解消する方法として信頼関係が注目されてきた。本稿は、情報の非対称性下において、信頼関係よりもずっと不安定な一見関係や顔見知りの関係が経済主体に選択されるイエメン共和国のカート市場の事例を紹介する。新鮮な葉を噛むと軽い覚醒作用がもたらされるカートは、イエメンでは嗜好品として午後の集まりに嗜まれている。カートの流通には近代化が及んでいないものの、早朝収穫されたカートがその日の昼前に市場に並び、午後には消費されてしまうという非常に効率的な流通経路が確立されている。カートの流通に関わる経済主体にとって重要なのはカートの品質に関わる情報であるが、これは生産者>商人>購入者という不等号で表せる。生産者と商人、商人と購入者の関係を見ると、情報弱者(商人、購入者)は情報強者(生産者、商人)に対し顧客関係よりもむしろ多くの顔見知り程度の関係や一見の関係を維持しようとする「浮気性」であり、一方情報強者は可能であれば情報弱者と顧客関係を築きたいが、情報弱者の「浮気性」を知っているために自らも「浮気性」にならざるを得ない。もちろん「浮気性」だからといって何をしてもよいということではなく、経済主体はみなそれぞれの商売相手に誠実でなければならず、中でもカート商人は最も「浮気性」であり誠実でなければならない。カート市場において経済主体の間の関係は、一見関係、顔見知りの関係、顧客関係と変化している。従来のバザール研究は商人が圧倒的な情報強者であり、そのため長期的で安定的な信頼関係が注目されすぎてきたのではないかと、カート市場の事例を通して見ると思えるのである。

著者

大坪 玲子

出版者

嗜好品文化研究会

雑誌

嗜好品文化研究 (ISSN:24320862)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.1, pp.75-84, 2016 (Released:2022-09-30)

著者

大坪 玲子

出版者

日本文化人類学会

雑誌

文化人類学 (ISSN:13490648)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.85, no.1, pp.166-169, 2020 (Released:2020-10-08)

参考文献数

8

著者

大坪 玲子

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

no.10, pp.117-134, 1995-03-31

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There have been many political powers through the history of Yemen. Among them are the Zaydi tribes in the Upper Yemen who are still as powerful as they have ever been. The purpose of this paper is to argue that authority of a shaykh (a tribal leader) is based on his success in arbitration, commenting Dresch's papers. Tribesmen are farmers, who live in villages or village clusters and produce very largely for their own subsistence. Villages comprise a section, and sections comprise a tribe. Most of the tribes belong to one or the other of the two confederations: Hashid and Bakil. In this way, tribes have a segmentary system, but tribesmen do not remember detailed genealogical relations. A shaykh comes from a shaykhly family. It is not the rule for a tribe or a section to recognize a single shaykh. He seldom has rights over his tribesmen's land or tax collection. It is therefore by his ability of arbitration that a shaykh can establish and extend his influence. A tribesman has a concept of honour that he must defend himself and those under his protection and keep their peace. If the peace breaks, his honour will be lost. Therefore he will recover his loss by disputing. On the other hand, as a shaykh assimilates his honour to his tribe or section, he will lose his honour by the dispute; accordingly he will be involved in it and recover his honour by success in arbitration. The process of arbitration is as follows; 1) Men at odds choose whom they wish to judge the matter by themselves. They can go to any shaykh with a reputation as an arbitrator. Such a shaykh can extend his influence beyond his tribe and confederation. Men of religious learning can also be arbitrators. 2) Men at odds hand their rifles to the arbitrator, by which it is meant that they ask him to judge their matters and stop disputing themselves. 3) On the other hand, taking rifles as guarantee, the arbitrator takes responsibility for the peace of the arbitration and for the compensation, and is accorded authority to arbitrate the matter. If matters are complicated, he requires each disputing party guarantors to be responsible for the peace and compensation. A breach of the peace during arbitration by someone under guaranty is an insult to the guarantor, as well as to the arbitrator who demands due amends. The arbitrator dialogues with, not commands, men at odds, reaches a consensus, and persuades them to a ccept it. He should use his knowledge (shaykhs know customs and men of religious learning know the shari'a) and possess eloquence. 4) The ties among arbitrator, guarantors and men at odds, formed for a particular matter, is dissolved at the end of the arbitration, which accompanies the return of the rifles. There is an exception to this. Hijrah, a tribal enclave, has a fixed guarantor who is always responsible for the hijrah's peace. Shaykhs with reputations as arbitrators have arbitrated many matters out of their tribal territory. Today they are concerned with state politics and some of them behave as arbitrators. In Yemen, the peace is not coerced but produced through dialogue.