著者

安倍 里美

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.15-32, 2019-03-20 (Released:2020-04-28)

参考文献数

17

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This looks to examine how the relationship between obligation and reasons should be understood, on the assumption that normativity should be understood in terms of reasons. Though the analysis of obligation in terms of exclusionary reasons given by Joseph Raz fails as a reductive definition of duty in terms of reasons, it provides a significant suggestion. I argue that Raz's analysis can be modified by distinguishing between normativity and the framework of justification; and by doing this we can gain an outline of a non-reductive explanation of the concept of duty.

著者

安倍 里美

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.215-229, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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According to T.M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value(BPA), goodness is not a property that can provide a reason in itself, but is the purely formal, higher-order property of having some lower-order property that provides a reason. If this is correct, whenever we have reason to have a certain attitude toward something or to behave in a certain way, the object is valuable in some sense: that is, the relationship between reasons and values is biconditional. In addition, it implies the eliminativism of value, in the sense that it reduces the fact that something has value into a mere relationship between a reason-giving property and reasons, and it deprives value of its normative power to give reason. The present study attempts to defend the implications of the biconditonality of reasons and values. To undermine this, objectors need only establish one case where a reason does not bear on evaluations. We may have reason to respond to objects in favourable ways ─ for example, we might desire, respect, or recommend them ─ even though the objects are not at all valuable in themselves, or because we have reasons that have nothing to do with the objects’ value. Or, one may have a strong intuition that purely deontological reasons are completely separated from values. On the contrary, this study posits that we can affirm the consistency of BPA by introducing a distinction between derivative reasons and non-derivative reasons(what one might call “ultimate reasons”), or by clarifying the difference between the normativity of reasons and the normativity of deontology. In comparing the normative character of reasons and the deontic, I will also demonstrate the similarity between the normative feature of reasons and the evaluative function. In so doing, BPA becomes more plausible.

著者

安倍 里美

出版者

京都倫理学会

雑誌

実践哲学研究 = Studies for practical philosophy (ISSN:02876582)

巻号頁・発行日

no.38, pp.1-36, 2015-10

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許諾条件により本文は2016-10-30に公開

著者

安倍 里美

出版者

関西倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学研究 (ISSN:03877485)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.193, 2016 (Released:2018-03-15)

著者

安倍 里美

出版者

京都倫理学会

雑誌

実践哲学研究 = Studies for practical philosophy (ISSN:02876582)

巻号頁・発行日

no.38, pp.1-36, 2015-10

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許諾条件により本文は2016-10-30に公開

著者

齋藤 信也 児玉 聡 安倍 里美 白岩 健 下妻 晃二郎[翻訳]

出版者

国立保健医療科学院

雑誌

保健医療科学 (ISSN:13476459)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, pp.667-678, 2013-12

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本報告書は,ガイダンス(推奨)作成に用いるプロセスを設計する際,およびガイダンスの各項目を作成する際にNICEが従うべき諸原則についてまとめたものである.これは主として,介入の効果と費用対効果に関する決定を行う際,とくにそれらの決定がNHSの資源配分に影響を与える場合に,NICEおよびNICEの諮問機関(advisory body)が適用すべき判断に関するものである.本報告書はNICE理事会によって作成された.これは2005年に作成された「社会的価値判断(Social value judgements)」第一版に基づいている.すべてのNICEガイダンスおよびガイダンスの作成にNICEが用いるプロセスは,本研究所の法的義務,および本報告書で記述された社会的価値の諸原則と一致していなければならない.NICEガイダンスのいずれかの部分がこれらの諸原則に従っていない場合,NICEと諮問機関はそれらを特定し,その理由を説明しなければならない.