著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.62, pp.329-344, 2011-04

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.177-179, 2007-03-16 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.62, pp.329-344_L19, 2011

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In Plato's <i>Gorgias</i> 474c4-475e6, the issue of whether it is worse to do injustice or suffer it is considered. Socrates and Polus discuss this issue, regarding it as a problem in relation to their own choice of action and way of life. Polus thinks that suffering injustice is worse than doing it. He also thinks, on the other hand, that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. Socrates shows him that it is by exceeding in evil that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. As a result, Polus concedes that doing injustice is worse than suffering it.<br>Here, we can find a surface and a deeper significance in the judgment that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. At the surface level, (1) a &lsquo;fine or shameful&rsquo; judgment has no effect on a judgment of good or bad, and (2) a &lsquo;fine or shameful&lsquo; judgment is not linked to one's choices of action and way of life. However, the judgment that doing injustice is more shameful indicates, deep down, a truer sense of good and bad which are not equated with pleasure and pain, i. e., the judgment reveals what is good and bad for the soul. In this discussion, Polus is, at first, only aware of the surface meaning of his own judgment that doing injustice is more shameful. Socrates shows him the deeper meaning.<br>We can find, here, a fundamental problem with rhetoric: rhetoric concerns persuasion about what is just and unjust, and, faced with public opinion, orators cannot deny that what is just is fine and what is unjust is shameful; but rhetoric cannot make clear the true meaning of the fineness of justice and the shamefulness of injustice, because it aims at pleasure without regard for the good for the soul. Rather, the fineness of justice and the shamefulness of injustice are based on taking care of the soul by political <i>techne</i>.

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

早稲田大学哲学会

雑誌

フィロソフィア (ISSN:05540690)

巻号頁・発行日

no.104, pp.137-152, 2016

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

政治哲学研究会

雑誌

政治哲学 (ISSN:24324337)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.99-113, 2014

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

学習院大学

雑誌

人文 (ISSN:18817920)

巻号頁・発行日

no.13, pp.7-20, 2014

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本稿は、プラトン『リュシス』における友(φίλος)としての人がもつ意味を、特に友としての人の欲求と行為、またこれらと知との関係という点から検討するものである。ソクラテスとリュシスとの最初の対話(207d-210d)で語られる友としての人は、知者と思われることによって、有用なこともそうでないことも区別なく欲し、どんな欲求も無制限に充たしうるというものである。だが、こうした性格は、当対話篇中の以降の議論において、友としての人がもつべき欲求から悪しき欲求を除外するというかたちで修正されていく。そして、友としての人は、その人が欠いている知を愛し求めることをもとに、対話することを望み、おこなう人として捉えられる。こうした性格づけは、当対話篇で描かれるソクラテスと少年たち(リュシスとメネクセノス)との対話の実践のうちに示されている。こうして、無知を自覚し知を求める人同士の相互性のうちに、知を愛し求めること(φιλοσοφία)が見出される。This paper examines the meaning of the person as riend (φίλος) in Plato's Lysis, specially with regard to the rson's desires and actions, and how these relate to wisdom. The person as friend who is referred to in the first conversation between Socrates and Lysis (207d-210d) is someone who may, by virtue of being regarded as wise, indiscriminately desire both beneficial things and harmful ones, and infinitely satisfy every desire. In the subsequent arguments in this dialogue, however, the character of the person as friend is modified: harmful desires are excluded from the desires that such a person should have. Then, the concept of the person as friend is grasped as a person who wishes to have a conversation and performs it on the ground of loving and seeking the wisdom he lacks. This characterization is implied in the practice of the conversations between Socrates and the two young boys, Lysis and Menexenus, depicted in this dialogue. We then see the love of wisdom (φιλοσοφία) in the reciprocity among people who acknowledge their own ignorance and seek wisdom.

著者

宮崎 文典

出版者

早稲田大学大学院文学研究科

雑誌

早稲田大学大学院文学研究科紀要 第1分冊 (ISSN:13417517)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.3-12, 2006