著者
橘川 武郎 長谷川 信 平沢 照雄 松村 敏弘 橋野 知子 高岡 美佳 平本 厚 中村 尚史
出版者
一橋大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2005

課題番号17330077基盤研究(B)「規制の経済史的研究-産業発展をめぐる企業と政府-」(平成17〜19年度)の研究成果は、2008(平成20)年3月に刊行した研究成果報告書(xii+270頁、総論+全12章)に集約されている。この研究成果報告書の各章は、19世紀後半の生糸貿易(1章、中林真幸執筆、以下同様)、明治期の鉄道業(2章、中村尚史)、第1次世界大戦期の染料工業(3章、橋野知子)、1920〜30年代のラジオ受信機工業(4章、平本厚)、戦前から戦後にかけての港湾運送業(5章、大島久幸)、1950〜60年代のクリスマス電球工業(6章、平沢照雄)、1960年前後の損害保険業(7章、齋藤直)、1960〜70年代の自動車排ガス規制(8章、板垣暁)、戦後復興期〜1980年代の重電機工業(9章、長谷川信)、1950年代後半から今日にかけての原子力発電(10章、橘川武郎)、1980年代後半から今日にかけてのネットワーク型公益事業をめぐる規制改革(11章、松村敏弘)、経済規制に関する理論研究の動向(12章、佐々木弾)を、検討対象としている。本研究は、(1)検討対象期間を長期(明治期から今日まで)にわたって設定する、(2)第2次産業および第3次産業に展開する幅広い業種を取り上げる、(3)大企業と政府との関係だけでなく、中小企業と政府との関係も視野に入れる、(4)歴史分析にもとづく実証研究と経済学に基盤をおく理論研究を結合する、という四つの特徴をもっているが、この点は、上記の報告書にも色濃く反映されている。(1)(2)の点は、1章〜11章の構成から明らかである。(3)に関しては、4〜6章が、中小企業と政府との関係を掘り下げている。(4)に関しては、1、11、12章が理論研究の成果を積極的にとり入れている。
著者
平本 厚
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, no.2, pp.22-45, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the process by which Matsushita Electric branched out into radio manufacturing in the first half of 1930s and the organizational reform the company undertook as a result. The originality of Matsushita's divisional restructuring of 1933 is well known, and it was the earliest one to take place in Japan.In 1930, Matsushita, which had succeeded in the electrical appliance industry, decided to expand into radio manufacturing. Its founder Kohnosuke Matsushita wished to produce trouble-free radio sets, which seemed a promising idea as the radio market at that time was flooded with inferior products.It was, however, not easy to make Matsushita's dream a reality. The resulting radios were too idealistic and consequently too expensive, and Matsushita's radio business showed a considerable deficit. It forced the company to reorganize its radio business on July 1933 by integrating the manufacturing and the sales sections.Following the reorganization, Matsushita was able to develop new models that were suitable to market needs, and its radio business expanded rapidly. Leaning from this success, Matsushita introduced its multidivisional structure on March 1934. It is clear that Matsushita's creation of a multidivisional structure was based on the same logic as that of Du Pont and GM in 1920-21 which were analyzed by A.D. Chandler.
著者
平本 厚
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.4, pp.3-32, 2008-03-25 (Released:2010-05-18)
参考文献数
78
著者
平本 厚
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, no.4, pp.3-27,98, 2006-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

The aim of this paper is to analyze how a mass production and distribution system for radio sets was built up and developed in prewar Japan. The companies that succeeded in building up the system would become the giant consumer electrical appliance companies after the war.The building up of the system was not easy for the companies, because the radio industry was comprised of many small companies, whose behavior tended to be opportunistic. Especially, distribution was in a state of disorder.Hayakawa (later Sharp) and Matsushita, whose sets were very successful, invested heavily in plants and introduced scientific management into the plants. Hayakawa was the first to introduce a belt conveyor system and Matsushita, partly influenced by the introduction of Hayakawa, followed close behind. In order to keep product quality, they had to integrate parts production.Both companies also tried to regulate the distribution system by establishing agencies, hopefully exclusive ones, to which retail stores were assigned. In pursuing this, they interacted with each other.In the long run, Matsushita was the best in building up a mass production and distribution system. It is also clear, however, that this institutional innovation was not a product of a company's originality but that of interaction of the companies.
著者
平本 厚
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.34, no.4, pp.56-79, 2000-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

Nihon Musen Denshin Kabushikigaisha (Radio Corporation of Japan) was established in 1925 as a semigovernment corporation dedicated to the installation of radio equipment for the international telegraph business conducted by the government. The company's original plan was, however, quite different. Business circles had first intended to establish a company to integrate the international communications business and the manufacturing of radio apparatus, modeled on the giant radio monopolies of the advanced nations. This turned out to be a frustrated attempt, and unlike other advanced nations, a large company in the radio business was never established in Japan.This paper studies the process of the establishment of Nihon Musen and analyzes the reasons for its failure.From the 1910s to the 1920s, several companies entered the radio apparatus manufacturing industry mainly because of the rapid expansion in the market. In connection with the establishment plans for Nihon Musen, which had been supported by almost all influential business groups, Tokyo Electric Co., which was associated with GE, sought to form an organization similar to RCA in the United States, which all interested companies would join.The Ministry of Communications strongly opposed the foundation of such an organization on the grounds that the communications business was by law managed only by the government. Tokyo Electric failed to reach an agreement with Nippon Electric Co., and as a result, Radio Corporation of Japan was permitted only to install radio stations.This incident greatly influenced the Japanese radio industry. It resulted in an apparatus manufacturing industry composed of many small companies, an industrial structure far different from those of other advanced nations.
著者
平本 厚
出版者
経営史学会
雑誌
経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, no.2, pp.1-26, 1994-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

Japanese television industry greatly lagged behind the U.S. and the U.K. in technological development in the early 1950s. But the saturation rate of TV in Japan increased in the latter half of the 1950s at a higher rate than those of these two countries in their corresponding expansion periods. The aim of this paper is to make clear the supply side factors which promoted the rapid spread of TV in Japan.The view that standardizing a cheap model would make the spread of TV faster prevailed among those in the TV industry in the early 1950s. Denpa Gijutsu Kyôkai (Radio Engineering & Electronics Association) made a research study to establish what was the standard model and recommended from 10 in. to 14 in. models as popular ones. This affected the assessment of the Commodity Tax on TV, so that the rate on a set with under 14 in. screen was lowered. The proposal of the standard model, the lowered tax rate and market selection made TV production in the late 1950s concentrate on almost one type, namely the 14 in. model. Set makers vied in establishing mass production based on the U.S. technology so as to lower the set price. This concentration made more effective the mass production of, not only the set itself, but also various TV parts, especially picture tubes and glass bulbs which contributed much to reduce the TV cost. As a result, the TV market expanded rapidly in the latter half of the 1950s, so that the Japanese TV industry could develop its competitive power in a relatively short span of time.
著者
青木 洋 平本 厚
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.5, pp.501-522, 2003-01-25
被引用文献数
2

This article explores the activities of the Research Neighborhood Groups (kenkyu tonarigumi) in the context of the mobilization of science and technology during World War II, and throws light upon their influence on research collaboration in postwar Japan. Although research collaboration has recently attracted academic attention as a factor in the competitive ability of Japanese industry, its history has not yet been fully researched. The Research Neighborhood Groups scheme played a unique and symbolic role in research collaboration activities of various kinds during the War because the aim was to organize research collaboration over the length and breadth of the country. It was planned by the Cabinet Technology Agency and carried out by its extra-governmental organization. The groups were in principle organized by young and promising researchers on the same special subject. The total number of researchers enrolled rose to about 3,000. Three typical examples, the vacuum tube, and vitamin and statistical quality control groups, clearly had decisive influence on the research collaboration activities which took their place after the war. The activities of the Research Neighborhood Groups scheme built connections between researchers belonging to various institutions which went on to provide a secure basis for successful research collaboration in postwar Japan.