著者
萩原 優騎
出版者
国際基督教大学
雑誌
社会科学ジャーナル = The Journal of Social Science (ISSN:04542134)
巻号頁・発行日
no.82, pp.25-45, 2016-09-30

Resilience became a keyword to consider the situation after the GreatEast Japan Earthquake. However, defining resilience is not easy because of thevariety of its definitions. Therefore it is necessary to compare the definitionin one field with that in the other. It will be impossible to gain a deeperunderstanding of necessary conditions of resilience without such a review. Thepurpose of this paper is to form the foundation to design a resilient communitywith this kind of method mainly based on the views of sociology.One of the most famous definitions of resilience is the one by C. S.Holling. He tried to define resilience by comparing it with stability. Stabilityis the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporarydisturbance. On the other hand, resilience is the ability of a system to absorbchange and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships betweenpopulations or state variables. According to Andrew Zolli and Ann MarieHealy, many definitions of resilience rest on one of two essential aspects:continuity and recovery in the face of change. They defined resilience as thecapacity of a system to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face ofdramatically changed circumstances.Defining community is also indispensable. Junichi Saito definedcommunity as intermediate groups between individuals and nations.Community tended to be evaluated negatively because of its exclusivity andhomogeneity. However, today it means various relationships among peoplethrough the process of collaboration to rebuild their life. The other characterof the contemporary community is it is under the influence of globalization.There are many problems beyond the boundaries such as global environmentalproblems. Making much of plurality and individuality is important because thediscussion without going into specifics will not be useful to solve the problemsin each area. Besides, it is also necessary to consider how to connect theindividual efforts with one another to tackle global issues.However, such kind of efforts has some problems. Efforts of people maybe convenient for the government to reduce costs of their control. As a result,people will function as subcontractors of the government without knowingit. Another problem is the static views of people. They may think the presentsituation is self-evident. They do not assume the situation can change becauseof the lack of critical thinking. It is essential for them to be aware how thepresent situation has been formed to reconsider the actual state. The otherproblem is the difficulty of communication between the experts and the lay.The role of a transitional leader to mediate specialized knowledge of theexperts and local knowledge of the lay will be important to achieve a betterdecision-making.Considering these points is a necessary condition to design a resilientcommunity. They will be presented by the researchers who take part in adecision-making process to support to improve the situation. Moreover, it isalso important to be aware the participation of researchers itself may affect adecision-making process, as Niklas Luhmann pointed out.
著者
萩原 優騎
出版者
国際基督教大学
雑誌
社会科学ジャーナル = The Journal of Social Science (ISSN:04542134)
巻号頁・発行日
no.85, pp.23-43, 2018-03-31

It is difficult to share values and aims in the contemporary society, which is abackground of the difficulties of consensus building. The purpose of this paper isto consider the location of problems concerning the difficulties by referring toprevious researches on risks. Theories of Ulrich Beck, Slavoj Žižek and NiklasLuhmann will mainly be focused on.Beck is well known to his theory of risk society. He says that expert knowledgeis necessary to recognize risks in the contemporary situation, which is a result ofthe radicalization of modernity. A main character of a risk society is uncertainty.For example, not only the lay but also experts cannot predict the effects of theproblems caused by science and technology such as environmental problems.People share anxiety and seek safety, but it will not motivate them to change thesituation because their main interest is to avoid the worst. Moreover, the more thesituation becomes serious, the more they will be faced with what they do notknow. In spite of this paradoxical matter, they have to make a decision to avoidthe worst.Žižek's thought is based on Lacanian psychoanalysis. He tries to explainwhere the problems are in a risk society from the view of the structure of thepsychoanalytic subject. The imaginary is stable as long as the symbolic orderworks well. However, this function tends to become unstable in the contemporarysituation. Traditional values and ethics are not self-evident today because of therapid development of science and technology. Ethics committees are organized every time problems occur, but they cannot recover the obviousness of socialvalues. The disintegration of the symbolic order is a result of the radicalization ofreflexivity. The obviousness relies on non-reflexive acceptance of the symbolicinstitution.Luhmann distinguishes risks from dangers. Risks are the losses which arerecognized as the results of decisions, and dangers are the ones which arerecognized as what are provided from the outside. There is a gulf between risksand dangers, in other words, between the decision makers and those affected. Forexample, the decision makers may communicate with those affected. Even if theysucceed in building a consensus as a result of this communication, the structure ofthe conflicts among them itself continues to exist in the concerned society. It isusually said that communication, participation, ethics, and so on are importantelements when they try to build a consensus, but none of them can bridge the gap.Obviously these three theories have different premises and major concerns,though all of them try to analyze the problems of consensus building. It will bedifficult to bridge among them, but comparing their premises and major concernsis significant. Their characters and efficiency are clarified to some degree throughthis research. Knowing characters and efficiency of some theories is necessary inapproaching complex problems in the contemporary risk society, becauseexamining the various aspects is a key to grasp the entire image even if it may betentative.
著者
萩原 優騎
出版者
日本社会学理論学会
雑誌
現代社会学理論研究 (ISSN:18817467)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, pp.3-15, 2013 (Released:2020-03-09)

2011年3月11日に発生した大地震と原子力発電所事故以降、これまでの社会の前提を問い直そうという動きが活発になった。その中で、地域社会の再生が今後の重要課題として提示され、現状における復興の在り方を疑問視する主張も多い。一例として、ナオミ・クラインの言う「ショック・ドクトリン」への批判がある。この批判は、災害前のコミュニティを元通りに再生することの支持に等しいのだろうか。多元性を重視し、特定の基準を一律に適用する政策を批判するからといって、以前のコミュニティが当該地域の人々にとって最適のものであったということを、必ずしも意味するわけではないはずである。 八ッ場ダム問題は、地域の多元性の在り方を考えるための事例となる。この地域では、長年の対立を通じて、住民の人間関係は悪化の一途を辿り、人々は疲弊した。その末にダムを受け入れたにもかかわらず、最近になってダム建設の中止が宣言された。それに対して、地元からは多くの反発の声が上がった。ここには、環境保護という理念と、地域の個別的事情が対立するという困難が見られる。このような場合、当事者たちの多元性を無条件に認めてよいのだろうか。意思決定過程において、人々が自らの諸前提を問い直し、現状とは異なる選択肢を創出する可能性を支えるための参照枠として、社会学をはじめとする諸理論が機能し得ることを、本稿では提示する。
著者
萩原 優騎
出版者
日本共生科学会
雑誌
共生科学 (ISSN:21851638)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, no.9, pp.3-14, 2018 (Released:2019-06-17)
参考文献数
22

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between the global and local dimensions of environmental ethics. Pluralists criticize global totalitarianism as a typical example of universalism that makes little of the diversity of communities. However, an important question is how the local dimensions of decision-making in each community can be connected to the global dimensions to address common global issues. One view to consider is that of the reflexive modernization theory of Ulrich Beck. This theory shows reflexivity is a common element of modernization, while characters and results of community modernization are various. This clarifies the nature of the relationships between global and local issues. It then becomes possible to define the relationship between global and local dimensions of environmental ethics more clearly by referring to such a viewpoint.
著者
萩原 優騎
出版者
国際基督教大学 International Christian University
雑誌
社会科学ジャーナル = The Journal of Social Science (ISSN:04542134)
巻号頁・発行日
no.89, pp.165-185, 2022-03-31

“LCS: Less Conflictual Solutions” is a methodology of “functional tolerance” theory proposed by Yoichiro Murakami. Takeaki Komatsu regards the concept of “tolerance” defined by Murakami as the one which shows a necessary condition for information senders to understand the context of their communication with information receivers or to build a new context they will be able to share. This definition appears when Komatsu criticizes the premises of risk communication. This paper aims to reconsider LCS and functional tolerance theory by analyzing Komatsu’s argument based on Niklas Luhmann’s sociology. According to Komatsu, one of the main interests of risk communication is how to convince information receivers. It means that the success of risk communication for information senders is to gain information receivers’ trust in their risk management. However, such an assumption is not self-evident if referred to Luhmann’s comments on risk communication. He distinguishes risks from dangers. Risks belong to the decision-makers, and dangers belong to those affected. In other words, risks are the losses recognized as the results of a decision, and dangers are the ones recognized as what are provided from the outside. There is a gulf between the decision-makers and those affected. What Luhmann pointed out is important to reexamine LCS. Murakami says that it is impossible to achieve the unique solution as the least-conflictual one. Therefore, making a compromise is necessary to reach a less conflictual solution. However, LCS cannot be a methodology to overcome a gulf between the decision-makers and those affected. On the other hand, Murakami emphasizes the importance of seeking a possibility to find a better solution, not the best one. If a person places absolute trust in the option selected already, he/she will lose sight of the possibility of choosing a better solution. He/she should be conscious that their present choice is tentative. Murakami regards that such a person is functionally tolerant. Being functionally tolerant is necessary to improve a situation by recognizing a gulf between the decision-makers and those affected, though it will not be resolved completely. In this meaning, Komatsu’s definition of Murakami’s “tolerance” is incorrect. Komatsu’s criticism against risk communication can be applied to LCS, but not to functional tolerance theory itself. However, this does not mean that functional tolerance theory should be accepted uncritically. It will be possible to revise LCS and functional tolerance theory by referring to Luhmann’s view.
著者
萩原 優騎
出版者
国際基督教大学
雑誌
社会科学ジャーナル (ISSN:04542134)
巻号頁・発行日
no.64, pp.191-211[含 英語文要旨], 2008-03

This paper is a sequel to "Reconsidering Paradigm Theory - Philosophy of Science, Social Anthropology, and Lacanian Psychoanalysis -". The purpose of the last paper was to reconsider paradigm theory and deepen an understanding about it in relation with social anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In this paper, we will reflect on philosophy of science psychoanalytically again focusing on Jacques Lacan's concept "discourse of science". Kuhn says that paradigm change is like conversion. This means that paradigm change is a change of intersubjectivity. One of the functions of paradigm is to form a scientific community where scientists study based on knowledge shared intersubjectively. Norwood Russell Hanson also emphasizes the importance of intersubjectivity. He discusses it not only as a key of scientific observation but also as that of a basis of knowledge in Lebenswelt. For example, one may find a goblet in a picture, but the other may find faces of two persons in it. What we find there is determined by how perspective has been formed intersubjectively. To explain Hanson's theory from the view of Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is necessary to consider the structure of the psychoanalytic subject. According to Lacan, stability of the imaginary, which is especially related to the function of ego, is guaranteed by the symbolic. To enter the symbolic means he/she has a relation with language. Intersubjective relations based on language control the imaginary, and this is a necessary condition for the subject to be defined socially. However, it does not mean that symbolic order can perfectly give him/her a truism in his/her daily life. The imperfection of symbolization is usually covered with the imaginary, and the object of fantasy is called "object a". Paradoxically, this object can be evidence that his/her symbolization is imperfect when his/her current perspective loses its truism. Such a structure is characterized by its symbolic imperfection, but discourse of science tries to exclude it. In this discourse everything seems to go perfectly if a chain of signifier starts once. Lacan says that discourse of science is that of mathematical symbols, and it supposes that science always has its perfect objectivity. Scientists describe the world by mathematical symbols, and they prove its validity by experiments. Repeatability of experiments is a representation of object a, because it makes a truism in the concerned paradigm. This is the situation "normal science" named by Kuhn. In this situation they do not think of a possibility of paradigm change. An important question is why paradigm can change though scientists are in discourses of science where symbolic imperfection is not considered. The answer is that they can be in this discourse as long as they live in Lebenswelt which is a basis of their fantasy that the world is constant. The subject in Lebenswelt has a symbolic imperfection, which can bring the possibility of paradigm change. Lacan points out that constancy of the world is a fantasy. Moreover, we cannot find a unique law which explains how paradigm change occurs. The reason why the concerned paradigm is selected is only a rationalized explanation after paradigm change. Paul Feyerabend calls this groundlessness "anything goes", but it tends to be evaluated as an extreme relativism. As mentioned already, Lacanian psychoanalysis explains it as an imperfection of the symbolic. This is "the real", which is a structural groundlessness of the subject.
著者
萩原 優騎
出版者
国際基督教大学
雑誌
国際基督教大学学報. II-B, 社会科学ジャーナル (ISSN:04542134)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.60, pp.205-223, 2007-03

The concept "paradigm" has been used in many research areas since Thomas Kuhn used it in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. However, as this concept was applied to various areas, its critical meanings in philosophy of science tended to be lost. The aim of this paper is to reconsider paradigm theory and deepen an understanding about it in relation with social anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Paradigm is necessary to form a scientific community, where scientists study following shared models. It brings about the stable situation of community which Kuhn called normal science. Kenelm Burridge called the subject in this situation the person. According to Burridge, the person is a result of socialization, which is necessary for the subject to become a member of society. From a viewpoint of Lacanian psychoanalysis, it means to enter the symbolic order. The subject follows this order, and it makes him/her stable because the symbolic controls the imaginary which is a dimension of the identity of ego. The imaginary conceals the lack of a basis of the symbolic, and then the stability of daily life is maintained and reproduced. When this stability is shaken, a chance of paradigm change comes. However, paradigm does not change easily even if irregular cases which are not consistent with a given paradigm appear. Paradigm changes only when its instability reaches the limit where the balance of its system cannot be maintained. This deadlock of symbolization is the real. The person can become the individual who is a creative ignition to change a given tradition, when he/she meets the real. Conversely, the individual cannot come into existence without the person; the real cannot be recognized retroactively as a miss of perfect symbolization until symbolic order is formed. Paradigm change is a change of referent. The subject can compare different paradigms, but he/she cannot understand them perfectly. If he/she can do so, paradigm A which he/she belongs to should be equal to paradigm B which he/she recognizes as a different paradigm. He/she cannot avoid distortion of understanding, which is called incommensurability. When he/she recognizes something as an incommensurable object, this object is object a as a remainder of the real. It is a structural gap of his/her imaginary identity or a mirror of nothing where he/she meets the real. He/she as the individual can recognize this object as the real, but he/she as the person cannot do so because the imaginary usually conceals a structural lack of the symbolic by putting the object as an object of fantasy on the gap. The individual transcends a given paradigm through such processes, then he/she accepts the lack of a basis of the symbolic. However, he/she does not leave the symbolic because the subject cannot exist without the symbolic. Because of this psychoanalytic structure, he/she cannot help accepting his/her structural limit and trying to symbolize the real again. A new paradigm appears here through a process of symbolization. To symbolize consistently, theorization is necessary; he/she uses a theory as a frame of reference to see consistently. Even if he/she symbolizes successfully, this is not a goal. He/she has a lack of the symbolic, which guarantees him/her structurally to continue self-critical praxis.