著者

見附 陽介

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.220-231, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

23

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.85, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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This paper investigates Rawls’s program of socializing Kant’s ethics developed in his theory of justice and ascertains the limitations of its will-oriented approach to freedom by focusing on the difference between Rawls’s and Sen’s interpretation of freedom. In addition, this paper thereby evaluates the significance of Sen’s critique of Rawls’s theory of justice. Rawls socializes Kant’s ethics by transforming Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative into intersubjective procedures in the original position. However, he inherits Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom without making any changes to it; in other words, the “inner freedom” that solely determines a rational being’s will and has no commitment to the physical process to achieve the will. Sen criticizes this interpretation of freedom as being based on a fetishism of goods, introducing the idea of capability to compensate for this lacuna in Rawls’s theory of justice. One feature of Sen’s interpretation of freedom is found in the theoretical accent that he places on the practical aspect of freedom; in other words, the freedom to achieve, which varies according to the diversity of people’s “utilization functions” converting goods into effective functions. Despite this criticism of the Kantian concept of freedom, Sen’s idea can also be seen as being based on Kant’s philosophy. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant attempts to bridge the gulf between freedom and nature(the physical world)derived from his own transcendental conception. We direct our attention particularly to Kant’s argument about rational being’s aptitude(Tauglichkeit)to have a purpose and achieve it because the argument shows a possible correspondence between Kant’s concept of culture and Sen’s concept of development concerning the practical aspect of freedom. On the basis of these arguments, we can understand the limitations of the will-oriented approach to freedom indicated in Rawls’s theory of justice and the significance of Sen’s critique, which not only clarifies such limitations but also proposes another possible way to inherit Kant’s philosophy of freedom.

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, pp.63-89, 2009

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In this paper, I examine the meaning of the concepts of "person" and "thing" in M. M. Bakhtin's theory of dialogue. Through this examination, I aim to clarify the similarities and differences between Bakhtin's and C. L. Frank's philosophy based on an ontological concept unique to traditional Russian philosophy, namely, "pan-unity" (всеединство). I begin by presenting a conceptual contrast between dialogue and reification, which play an important role in Bakhtin's seminal work Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. I demonstrate that this contrast between dialogue and reification derives from the contrast between person and thing. Dialogue, to Bakhtin, is the relationship between "I" and "Thou." We need to consider the other as "Thou" because he/she is not a thing but a person who has his/her "independence," "inner freedom," and "unfinalizability." Bakhtin says that only through dialogue can we properly deal with such characteristics of the other. If we have contact with the other without a dialogical attitude, he/she is reified as a thing that does not speak. He affirms that the main aim of his work is to elucidate the meaning of the artistic form of Dostoevsky's literary works, namely, "polyphony." According to Bakhtin, polyphony emancipates the person from such reification through a dialogical attitude. In this sense, we can infer that Bakhtin's theory of dialogue is based on the contrast between dialogue and reification, which derives from the fundamental contrast between person and thing. In addition, by comparing Bakhtin's concept of reification with A. F. Losev's, I demonstrate that Bakhtin utilized the word "reification" not in the manner of Russian Platonism, wherein it was considered as the incarnation of an "idea," but in the manner of Kantian argument, which ethically differentiated person from thing and criticized the idea of treating a person as a means. Next, I examine S. L. Frank's concepts of person and thing to compare them with Bakhtin's. Frank also developed the idea of "I" and "Thou." Moreover, like Bakhtin, he criticized the idea of treating a person as a thing. In this sense, I think that his philosophy is suitable for a comparison with Bakhtin's theory. However, there is a third category in Frank's argument, which he refers to as "We." This makes his idea of "I" and "Thou" distinct from others' idea. "We" is characterized as a primary state from which "I" and "Thou" are derived through differentiation, namely, as pan-unity. Frank ultimately places these categories in ontological unity under God. I show that in Frank's philosophy, encounter and association with the other as "Thou" is grounded in this ontological concept. On the basis of these theories, we can point out the similarities between Bakhtin's and Frank's philosophy. Both developed the idea of "I" and "Thou" on the basis of the contrast between person and thing. Moreover, it seems that Frank's definition of "We" as a "polycentric system" is similar to Bakhtin's idea of "polyphony." However, there is a decisive difference between them, namely, the ontological premise of the relationship between "I" and "Thou." As stated above, the relationship between "I" and "Thou" is ensured by the ontological concept of "We" as pan-unity in Frank's philosophy. On the other hand, the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogue is the idea of "outsideness" (вненаходимость). I conclude that this idea is incompatible with the idea of pan-unity. However, there seems to be a disagreement concerning the interpretation of Bakhtin's idea of outsideness. Some scholars, including me, think that there are some differences between the idea of outsideness and the idea of pan-unity. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be distinct from traditional Russian philosophy. Others think that there are some similarities or connections between them. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be influenced by traditional Russian philosophy. By considering the differentiation between "monological outsideness" and "polyphonic (dialogical) outsideness," which was proposed by Bakhtin, I intend to provide a solution for this seeming disagreement. Finally, on the basis of these arguments, I consider not only how Bakhtin's idea of person and thing can be appreciated in comparison with Frank's idea, but also how the idea of outsideness as the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogism can be appreciated in comparison with the ontological idea of pan-unity, unique to Russian philosophy.

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

北海道大学大学院文学研究科応用倫理研究教育センター

雑誌

応用倫理 (ISSN:18830110)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.26-29, 2017-11-30

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

日本倫理学会 ; 1952-

雑誌

倫理学年報 = Annuals of ethics (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.85-98, 2017

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

日本ロシア文学会

雑誌

ロシア語ロシア文学研究 (ISSN:03873277)

巻号頁・発行日

no.42, pp.41-48, 2010

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

日本ロシア文学会

雑誌

ロシア語ロシア文学研究 (ISSN:03873277)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.41-48, 2010

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.56, pp.63-89[含 英語文要旨], 2009

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In this paper, I examine the meaning of the concepts of "person" and "thing" in M. M. Bakhtin's theory of dialogue. Through this examination, I aim to clarify the similarities and differences between Bakhtin's and C. L. Frank's philosophy based on an ontological concept unique to traditional Russian philosophy, namely, "pan-unity" (всеединство). I begin by presenting a conceptual contrast between dialogue and reification, which play an important role in Bakhtin's seminal work Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. I demonstrate that this contrast between dialogue and reification derives from the contrast between person and thing. Dialogue, to Bakhtin, is the relationship between "I" and "Thou." We need to consider the other as "Thou" because he/she is not a thing but a person who has his/her "independence," "inner freedom," and "unfinalizability." Bakhtin says that only through dialogue can we properly deal with such characteristics of the other. If we have contact with the other without a dialogical attitude, he/she is reified as a thing that does not speak. He affirms that the main aim of his work is to elucidate the meaning of the artistic form of Dostoevsky's literary works, namely, "polyphony." According to Bakhtin, polyphony emancipates the person from such reification through a dialogical attitude. In this sense, we can infer that Bakhtin's theory of dialogue is based on the contrast between dialogue and reification, which derives from the fundamental contrast between person and thing. In addition, by comparing Bakhtin's concept of reification with A. F. Losev's, I demonstrate that Bakhtin utilized the word "reification" not in the manner of Russian Platonism, wherein it was considered as the incarnation of an "idea," but in the manner of Kantian argument, which ethically differentiated person from thing and criticized the idea of treating a person as a means. Next, I examine S. L. Frank's concepts of person and thing to compare them with Bakhtin's. Frank also developed the idea of "I" and "Thou." Moreover, like Bakhtin, he criticized the idea of treating a person as a thing. In this sense, I think that his philosophy is suitable for a comparison with Bakhtin's theory. However, there is a third category in Frank's argument, which he refers to as "We." This makes his idea of "I" and "Thou" distinct from others' idea. "We" is characterized as a primary state from which "I" and "Thou" are derived through differentiation, namely, as pan-unity. Frank ultimately places these categories in ontological unity under God. I show that in Frank's philosophy, encounter and association with the other as "Thou" is grounded in this ontological concept. On the basis of these theories, we can point out the similarities between Bakhtin's and Frank's philosophy. Both developed the idea of "I" and "Thou" on the basis of the contrast between person and thing. Moreover, it seems that Frank's definition of "We" as a "polycentric system" is similar to Bakhtin's idea of "polyphony." However, there is a decisive difference between them, namely, the ontological premise of the relationship between "I" and "Thou." As stated above, the relationship between "I" and "Thou" is ensured by the ontological concept of "We" as pan-unity in Frank's philosophy. On the other hand, the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogue is the idea of "outsideness" (вненаходимость). I conclude that this idea is incompatible with the idea of pan-unity. However, there seems to be a disagreement concerning the interpretation of Bakhtin's idea of outsideness. Some scholars, including me, think that there are some differences between the idea of outsideness and the idea of pan-unity. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be distinct from traditional Russian philosophy. Others think that there are some similarities or connections between them. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be influenced by traditional Russian philosophy. By considering the differentiation between "monological outsideness" and "polyphonic (dialogical) outsideness," which was proposed by Bakhtin, I intend to provide a solution for this seeming disagreement. Finally, on the basis of these arguments, I consider not only how Bakhtin's idea of person and thing can be appreciated in comparison with Frank's idea, but also how the idea of outsideness as the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogism can be appreciated in comparison with the ontological idea of pan-unity, unique to Russian philosophy.