著者

田村 祐一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.3, pp.1-26, 1986-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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This article deals with some important problems in the life insurance business in the late Nineteenth Century America, as follows;1. Fundamental structure of life insurance business.2. Expansive character of the American life insurance business, tipified by Henry B. Hyde, the Equitable Life. His aim was, first of all, to satisfy his own entrepreneurial wants, higher ranked than life insurance purpose.3. Tontine Policy, introduced by Hyde, was not only an ideal solution of the problem with which he was confronted, but also gave him a weapon to push his Equitable to the top of the industry.4. Manegement of Jacob Greene, the Connecticut Mutual, was in a marked contrast to that of Hyde. Being an early advocate of “Humane Life Value Theory”, and stubborn opponent of the Tontine, he had a distinct idea of life insurance business. His management, true to his principle, was inferior to Hyde, in quality. that is, growth of business, but much more superior in quality, both cost and returns to policyowners.

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.50-66, 1985-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

小林 惟司

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.3, pp.38-64, 1985-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

チェックランド S

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.3, pp.65-76, 1985-10-30 (Released:2010-05-07)

著者

鈴木 恒夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.4, pp.1-28, 1986-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is examine the circumstances under which Mitsui Mining Co. had established Miike Chisso Industries and Toyo Koatsu Industries, in three respects; (1) the relations of the dyestuff industry which Mitsui Mining Co. had developed, to the synthetic ammonia industry, (2) the reasons why it had established two companies of the same type, and (3) the meanings of the merger of Daiichi Chisso Kogyo Co.Mitsui Mining Co. started to produce in Taisho Era various dyestuffs using tar collected from coke ovens. In late 1920's, as the production of alizarin and sulphuric dyestuffs had increaced, the demand of the nitric acid, which is necessary for producing dyestuffs, also increased. So, it caused lack of nitric acid. This condition was critical to Mitsui Mining Co., because it had decided to start producing Indigo. Then, it had to make for itself the nitric acid from the synthetic ammonia.On the other hand, having established Miike Chisso Industries, Mitsui Mining Co. set up Toyo Koatsu Industries in order to introduce a new method of the synthetic ammonia, to produce the ammonium-sulphate which were then insufficient in Japan, and to supply Miike Senryo Kogyosho (Miike Dyestuff Works), which belonged to Mitsui Mining Co., with the ammonia to produce the nitric acid. The true reason why it didn't enlarge Miike Chisso Industries but established Toyo Koatsu Industries was to intend tax exemption. So, after the expiration of the special privilege, they were amalgamated.The most difficult and also important problems to produce the synthetic ammonia were to select the technology they shoud adopt and to obtain related skilled engineers, in those days. Mitsui Mining Co. solved these problems by merging Daiichi Chisso Kogyo.

著者

渡 哲郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.4, pp.29-54, 1986-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Nippon Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Nippon Denryoku) was founded after World War 1 as a subsidiary of Ujigawa Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Ujigawa Denryoku), with the intention that its main business would be the supply of wholesale electricity to Ujigawa.However, Ujigawa decided to go into partnership with, and to buy electricity from, Great Consolidated Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Daido Denryoku), which had completed electric power transmission facilities to Osaka before Nippon Electric, and so Nippon Electric lost its largest customer. It was forced to seek other purchasers for its electricity to replace Ujigawa and, undertaking a positive sales drive, found customers in Osaka, Hyogo, Kyoto, Aichi and Toyama Prefectures.As a result of this Nippon Electric was able to break away from its parent company and become independent. The main reasons for its growth were the low price of the electricity it supplied and the rapid expansion of the power supply market in the 1920s caused by the electrification of industry.However, in the process of becoming independent Nippon Electric practiced unrealistic financial management, letting for example its depreciation reserve become insufficient, and consequently in the Showa depression which followed, the company found itself in a serious crisis.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.4, pp.66-77, 1985-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

由井 常彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.1, pp.1-35,i, 1985-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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It is well known that Yasuda Zenjiro, founder of the Yasuda Zaibatsu, obtained a large amount of money from the Yasuda Shoten (Yasuda & Co.) during the early Meiji period, and this served as a first step in the formation of the fourth largest zaibatsu business combine. Neverthless, the business activities of the early Yasudas' enterprise as well as the process of capital accumulation have not been studied by any economic or business historians. Such a common assertion as “Yasuda built up a great fortune by speculation in Dajokan bills” does not seem to be verifiable.Based on the analysis of original records of the Yasuda Shoten, including accounting books, the main parts of this paper will clarify the nature of a wide variety of the business activities of Yasuda, such as real estate, retail selling of dry goods and banking, and examine the process of capital accumulation in the Yasuda businesses in detail.

著者

岡崎 哲二

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.1, pp.36-65,ii, 1985-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1934 Nippon Steel Co., the biggest iron and steel business at that time, was organized through the fusion of a state-owned enterprise (Yawata Iron Works) and six private enterprises. We shall study the background and the process of the fusion to make clear its implication for the development of the Japanese iron and steel industry.Our conclusions are as follows. Firstly, integrated production of iron and steel was not more profitable than discononected operation owing to the low price of steel scrap or pig iron and the high price of coal before 1932. However, after 1932 a fall in the exchange value of the yen changed this relation of raw material prices, which made integrated production more profitable than separate production.Secondly, the fusion plan made in 1930-31 lacked rational ground, .for the planned new enterprise, which was directed to expand integrated operations, would not contribute to reducing average costs in the iron and steel industry because of economic conditions before 1932, and would produce no commercial profit during the Showa Depression.Thirdly, on the other hand, the fusion plan made in 1932-33 had rational ground. The planned new enterprise would not only show a commercial profit but also was necessary to check the rise of average costs. For although integrated production would become more profitable as aforesaid, both Yawata Iron Works and the enterprises affiliated with the zaibatsu had financial difficulty in expanding it. The direct function of the fusion should be understood to solve that difficulty.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.1, pp.66-80, 1985-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

鈴木 良隆

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.1-21,i, 1985-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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To mention subcontract has been an answer to the question how the factories were operated in nineteenth century Britain. First, this article examines whether or to what extent this system was prevalent, and second, whether it played the same managerial functions in various industry branches. Finally, in place of subcontract, a different framework in interpretating the nineteenth century employment is proposed. Whether the subcontract system was prevalent or not can be measured by investigating the forms of wages paid to the foremen or skilled workers who were in charge of a group of workers. Some were paid by piece, but they were mostly paid by time. In the latter case, these workers were not subcontractors. More important still was the attitude of skilled workers to subcontract or 'piece-masters', and further to the forms of payment, which differed from industry to industry. These indicate that the subcontact did not carry out the same managerial function throughout all the industries. Further, in spite of these seemingly different attitudes to wages and employment, they have one motive in common, i.e., to maintain the autonomy of skilled workers. Various facts can be interpretated more successfully by using a different framework rather than by subcontract. That is to use the idea of internalisation of production function and the transaction of labour to the manufacturing firms. In these respects, autonomy of skilled workers lies in the intermediate areas between the systematically organised workshops since the end of the nineteenth century and the sequential spot contracts of labour before the Industrial Revolution.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.1, pp.68-78, 1984-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

藤村 大時郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.2, pp.1-37,i, 1984-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Schneider and Company, a leading industrial enterprise in France, instituted the Rules to establish principles of its internal organization in 1913. Based on these Rules, I attempt to suggest an explanation for its administrative structure on the eve of the World War I, focusing on its operating units.Schneider, like other French industrial enterprises in those days, made little use of mass-production techniques, providing nonstand-ardized goods for producers and governments. However, Schneider had a high reputation as a maker of large, precision products which required a highest level of technology at that time to be fabricated, such as locomotives, marine engines, artillery, armorplates, bridges. As most of its products were made by order and small-batch, Schneider had grown, since its establishment in 1836, by continuously diversifying its products, and by diversifying in a number of industries. According to the Rules, Schneider made industry the basis of the organization of its production units : iron mines, coal mines, pig iron and steel producing, rolling mill, machine construction, electric machine construction, field artillery, naval artillery, forging and armorplate finishing, shipbuilding, mine making, bridge and building. Each of these units had its manager as well as its accountant's and engineer's offices, and formed a separate unit of accounts. Therefore each formed the “operating unit”, to use the term of professor Chandler, Jr., though many of them were in the same site, Le Creusot. Organizational imperatives at Schneider, however, showed clear differences to those at the American “modern business enterprise”.As most of its products required several months or more to be accomplished, and were made by order and small batch, Schneider organized its operating units to administer individual orders from the acceptance to the deliery. Thus the unit's accounts were organized to perform estimating and recording costs of separate orders. The controller's office was also formed to apparaise the unit's performance by order. Since each of these orders formed an autonomous administrative unit, the operating units which administered them remained autonomous. Though large enterprise with more than 10, 000 employees, Schneider was composed of numerous administrative units of orders, and of autonomous operating units.Schneider did form, in Paris, headquarters and a central office headed by salaried managers, but by different ways from those at United States firms which integrated mass production with mass distribution. As Schneider's growth behavior was different from that of the American big business, its organizational growth pattern also different.

著者

市原 博

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.2, pp.38-64,iii, 1984-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The subject of this paper is what kind of policy the management took to counter the labour union movement at the Hokkaido Coal and Shipping Company, called Hokutan, after the First World War, and how industrial relations at Hokutan was reformed.Hokutan became a affiliated enterprise of Mitsui Zaibatsu in 1913, and then the paternalistic policies were enforced there. The labour union was organized at Hokutan in 1919, the peak of the post-war boom. It was based on the consciousness as producer of mine workers. To control the mine workers against the labour union, the management organized the organization of employees, Issinkai, which fulfilled the function of the roundtable conference of labour and management and mutual aid association according to the idea of corporation of labour and management.The management carried out the wage cuts because of the damage due to the post-war crise in 1921. So the labour union went on strike in opposition to the wage cuts. At last the issue of this dispute was whether the management approved the labour union as a bargaining body or not. After this strike, the labour union was ruined, and the authority of negotiation about labour conditions was given to Issinkai. And the management succeed to make use of Issinkai to control the mine workers according to the idea of corporation of labour and management.

著者

荒井 政治

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.2, pp.65-79, 1984-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.3, pp.1-27,i, 1984-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to examine several plans for regulating the electric power industry which were proposed by managers of five big electric power companies, Toho Electric Power Co., Tokyo Electric Light Co., Ujigawa Electric Power Co., Great Consolidated Electric Power Co. and Nippon Electric Power Co., in the 1920's and the 1930's. The managers mentioned in this paper are Yasuzaemon Matsunaga, Shohachi Wakao, Seinosuke Go, Ichizo Kobayashi, Yasushige Hayashi, Senzaburo Kageyama, Momosuke Fukuzawa, Jiro Masuda, Shinnosuke Arimura, Yoshizo Ikeo, Sataro Fukunaka, Kumaki Naito and Yoshijiro Ishikawa.The commonly accepted theory asserts that the managers of five big electric power companies devoted themselves to gain maximum profits at the expense of the public interests in those days, and that therefore the electric power industry was inevitably to be put under government control in 1938. The conclusion of this paper is, however, fairly different from those assertions. In reality the managers of five big electric power companies were relatively aware of the responsibility of public utility enterprises, and made efforts to supply plenty and lowpriced electricity. To give an example Yasuzaemon Matsunaga who was the vice-president of Toho Electric Power Co. announced Denryoku Tosei Shiken (the Private Opinion for Regulating the Electric Power Industry) in May, 1928, in which he emphasized the necessity of improving electricity service through introducing a new system. The so-called Denryoku Saihensei (the Reorganization of the Electric Power Industry) in 1950 was enforced according to this Matsunaga's opinion.

著者

西川 登

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.3, pp.28-57,ii, 1984-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Early in the 18th century the House of Mitsui created a divisionalized administrative structure with a general office known as Omotokata in order to control many operating shops. By 1729, Mtsui's divisional structure came to consist of two major operating divisions-Hon-dana Ichimaki (the chain of silk fabric shops and a cotton fabric shop) and Ryogae-dana Ichimaki (the chain of exchange houses and silk commission houses). This paper focuses on the accounting systems in Ryogae-dana Ichimaki from 1729 through 1870.The research for this paper is based on many accounting reports that have survived and are preserved in the House of Mitsui Archives Collection at the Mitsui Research Institute for Social and Economic History (Mitsui Bunko), Tokyo.The structure of Mitsui under Omotokata resembled a divisional system as a whole, while Ryogae-dana Ichimaki may be characterized as a scaled down divisional structure. Each shop in Ryogae-dana Ichimaki had an independent accounting system, although Kyoto Ryogae-dana (Kyoto Exchange House) collected and distrubuted the residual profit of its affiliated shops.A part of the semiannual net income of the affiliates was set aside as reserves for their bad debts and building repairs. The residual profit of the affiliates was transferred to Kyoto Ryogaedana and added to its net income. A part of its total profit was set aside as reseves for its own bad debts and building repairs and reserves for employees' bonuses and retirement allowances of both its own and its affiliates.Although Omotokata was divided in a way like a spin-off of today in 1774, and reconsolidated in 1797, the accounting systems in Ryogae-dana Ichimaki were virtually unchanged till 1870.

著者

東條 正

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.4, pp.1-35,i, 1985-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The kyushu tetsudo kaikaku undo (the Movement for the Reform in the Kyushu Railroad Company) was believed to have resulted from the dispute between Mitsubishi and Mitsui over the hegemony of the Kyushu Railroad Company. Both Mitsubishi and Mitsui were seeking control over the coal industry of the Chikuho region, and to obtain hegemony of the Kyushu Railroad Company was important, for it was the leading company in the transportation of coal in the northern Kyushu region. By examining the kyushu tetsudo kaikaku undo in detail, this paper illustrates that the primary cause of this movement was not the dispute between Mitsubishi and Mitsui but was far more complex. Also, this paper shows the problems in management of the privately owned railroad companies after the Sino-Japanese War.The aggressive policy of the Kyushu Railroad Company played an important role in the formation of the kyushu tetsudo kaikaku undo. The company was forced to take this aggressive policy because of two main reasons. First, the company was established on limited capital; and second, the industrial growth after the Sino-Japanese War placed a great demand on transportation. These forced the railroad companies to upgrade their facilities. This upgrading was supported by various companies involved in the coal industry that held stocks in the Kyushu Railroad Company, while other stockholders were not so eager to support such upgrading because of the decreasing profits. Particularly, it was the stockholders who hoped for the nationalization of the Kyushu Railroad Company and the bankers who held stocks in this company that became the main opponents for the executives of the Kyushu Railroad Company.

著者

堀田 隆司

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.3, pp.29-49, 1983-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

斎藤 憲

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.3, pp.50-68, 1983-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)