著者

粕谷 誠

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.4, pp.36-72, 1990-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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It has been commonly accepted that the Zaibatsu holding companies held control over its subsidiary companies by giving permission to appoint managers, to make a huge long-term investment, to establish branches, and so on. But we have few studies about Zaibatsu control over banking companies. The purpose of this paper is to make clear how Zaibatsu holding company (Mitsui Gomei) controlled its subsidiary bank (Mitsui Bank) in the 1910s.Without agreement of the directors board of Mitsui Bank, Managing Directors could not (a) make or revise rules or regulations of the bank, (b) establish branches and appoint managers of branches, (c) change the tacit cartel treatment on deposit interest rate among main banks, (d) change maximum amount of loans of each branch, (e) underwrote public and corporate bonds, (f) closed contracts with foreign banks, while they could change the preferred interest rate of deposits for special customers and make loans (except asked politically). The board of the bank needed the permission of Mitsui Gomei when it (a) made or revised important rules, (b) established branches and appointed managers of branches, (c) underwrote bonds.In 1917, the board meetings were held 57 times, of which 25 meetings could not make decisions because the number of those present didn't reach a quorum. The quorum is five of six members of the Board, into which Mitsui families sent two members. From this fact we can infer that the board meetings didn't play an important role in decision making.In 1919, Mitsui Bank issued new stock partly by public subscription, the Board added two members in it. The two were the new stock owners, and they had not been working for the companies controlled exclusively by Mitsui Gomei. It was the first time for the Board to accept the outsiders. After 1919 the Board could make any decisions without agreement of Mitsui Gomei formally. At this time the Board made some codes which empowered Managing Directors to make decisions in particular matters without agreement of the Board, but the codes consisted mainly of the customs which had prevailed in the Board.

著者

安岡 重明

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.1-18,i, 1990-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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By the end of the War, in 1945, a substantial part of the Japanese economy was controlled by many zaibatsu. When the war became serious, zaibatsu were compelled to change their character : the Mitsui and the Yasuda which had developed on the bases of banking and trade business entered such new fields as the heavy and the chemical industries, which were the main businesses of the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo zaibatsu; the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo had become more powerful just before the bombing by the U.S. Air Force. At the termination of the war, 35.2% of the total domestic paid-up capital was occupied by that of the companies of the ten biggest zaibatsu. The employed managers of the Mitsui and the Yasuda zaibatsu endeavored to adapt their business to the new environment in the 1930-40s, by shifting the main field of their businesses and by reforming the organizational structure of their firms. The headquarters of zaibatsu, which had been unlimited (Mitsui and Yasuda) or limited partnerships (Mitsubishi and Sumitomo), were obliged to be reorganized as joint-stock companies (corporations) in order to raise neccesary funds for new investments. By adopting the form of joint-stock company, the headquarters could offer their stocks for public subscription and could issue debentures. In the cases of the Mitsui and the Yasuda, however, zaibatsu owners were reluctant to invest in heavy industries because the center of their interest was in the preservation of their business entities. Therefore, the top-managers of the two zaibatsu made every effort to awake the owners, only to cause friction with the owners. On the other hand, the owners in the Mitsubishi usually held real power in the management. In the Sumitomo, it was an established practice that the owners delegate authority over management to the top-managers. On account of this practice, no severe conflict was ever seen between the owners and the managers in the two zaibatsu. After the war, main zaibatsu were dissolved according to the order of the GHQ; the headquarters of zaibatsu was broken up; the owners and managers of zaibatsu were purged; and the stocks of zaibatsu-affiliated companies were offered to the general public, and these companies became firms independent of each other. After the Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952, however, the former zaibatsu subsidiaries began to regather together and to reorganize their own financial groups respectively. These financial groups are called “Kigyo-shudan” instead of “zaibatsu.” Among Kigyo-shudan, the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo groups grew up most remarkably. On the other hand, the solidarity of the Mitsui and the Yasuda groups was weak because of the top-managers' reluctance to renew zaibatsu. Moreover, the top-managers opposed the former owners' comeback and involvement in the former subsidiaries. It may be argued from the above that the prewar pattern of owner-manager relations that developed in respective zaibatsu had a great influence upon the solidarity and potentiality of each Kigyo-shudan in the postwar period.

著者

上月 直人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.19-37, 1990-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

柴 孝夫 廣山 謙介 松本 貴典

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.38-57, 1990-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

加来 祥男 山口 一臣 和田 一夫 藤村 大時郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.58-76, 1990-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

著者

藤田 貞一郎 瀬岡 誠 上川 芳実

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.1, pp.56-80, 1989-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

坂本 倬志 済藤 友明 春見 濤子 中島 俊克

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.1, pp.81-99, 1989-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.1, pp.100-113, 1989-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

作道 潤

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.2, pp.1-32, 1989-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This article aims to examine two principal aspects of France's organic chemical industry from the second half of the 19th century to World War I ; the first is the declining process of France's tar dye industry, and the second is the formation of French pharmaceutical industry during this period.As for the first point, two cases will be investigated. Firstly, the Saint-Denis Company had to abandon the fabrication of synthetic alizarins in the 1880s, mainly because of stiff competition with German companies. Secondly, the Usines du Rhône Company discovered a new synthetic process of indigos at the turn of the century, and succeeded in licencing its patents to Hœchst Co.. But the adventure of the Usines du Rhône was doomed to fail, mainly because of the poor performance of this company's top management.The case of the Usines du Rhône will also be useful for clarifying the second point. In spite of the failure in the field of tar dye industry, this company had successfully commercialized the synthetic pharmaceutical products such as salicylates, antipyrine and synthetic anesthic, as well as the synthetic perfume and the cellulose acetate just before World War I. In talking about the factors contributed to this development, emphasis will be placed on two points ; the renovation of the managerial system by the Société Générale Bank and this company's traditional eagerness to establish and maintain R & D laboratories, which were commonly held to has been little developed in France before World War I.

著者

伊藤 孝

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.2, pp.33-67, 1989-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of business activities of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) -the present name is Exxon Corp.-in the United Kingdom from right after World War II through the late 1950's.The main characteristics were as follows : (1) The Company was able to make most products with its new refinery in the U.K.. At the first the Company hesitated to build and operate the refinery because of some problems, especially uncertainty as to use of fereign exchange for remitting profits to the U.S.A. and other payments. But it had no choice but to do that in order to keep its position in the British market.(2) The Company strenghened control over the retail market of gasoline, a main item among petroleum products, chiefly by extending network of exclusive outlets. But the primary motive to bring the network into its marketing channel did not directly come from marketing itself, but from refining. The Company needed enough and reliable outlets which helped to make operation of the refinery high level.(3) The Company's local rifining depended on its operations (producing and purchasing crude petroleum) in the Middle East. But on the other hand the operation in the U.K. influenced them in the Middle East. Under the dollar shortage in the U.K., the Company could hardly use crude petroleum produced by Aramco for the refining because of its so-called dollar oil. The Aramco crude development program had already been reduced in the late 1940's.

著者

日高 千景

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.2, pp.68-88, 1989-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

島田 昌和

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.3, pp.27-57, 1989-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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There have been few studies concerning the fact that the Industrial Club of Japan (ICJ) played a prominent role in the process of establishing the “Kyochokai”. A report by the ICJ formed the basic foundation of the “Kyochokai”. The business leaders in the ICJ assumed a vital role in collecting funds and making up its policies, and were elected as the main members in the “Kyochokai”. It is very important to analyze the role that the ICJ played in the establishment of the “Kyochokai” and to examine the business leaders' views of labor management relations which were founded upon the ethics of “Kyocho-shugi (the principle of harmony and conciliation)”.In 1919, the Hara government consulted the ICJ about the “Shin-ai-Kyokai” plan which the government itself had drafted. This plan reflected the paternalistic relationship between labor and management. Business leaders in the ICJ felt that they should deal with the increasing labor disputes after World War I in a way different from the paternalistic one. So, they adopted a strategy based on the “kyocho-sugi” including arbitration of labor disputes and various social policy programs.However, the social policy programs of the neutral foundation “The Kyochokai”, were not governmental programs. Actually they were industry-based voluntary programs which did facilitate labor management relations.Seijiro Miyajima is one of the persons who most heatedly argued the necessity of “Kyocho-shugi”. He recognized the gap between the classes of labor and management and the opposing nature of their interests, and he contributed to moving the views of the ICJ members closer to the spirit of “Kyocho-shugi”.

著者

宇田 正

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.3, pp.62-92, 1988-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

千本 暁子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.4, pp.1-23,i, 1989-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

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The traditional years from the preindustrial Edo era in Japan to the Meiji era saw changes in employment relationship While not a few of the current practices can be traced back to the apprentice system of Edo merchant houses as, we recognize prototypes of our long-term employment in their live-out system and branch family system applied to executive employees.The apprenticeship system was essentially educational system whereby apprenticed children were disciplined until becoming full-fledged, independent merchants. Then, we have to ask why and how the merchant houses in the Edo era encouraged further long-term service from their fully qualified personnel long after their term of education. By the late Edo era, on the other hand, the word “apprentice” was often applied to petty servants and day laborers. What effect did this disintegration of the apprentice system have on the long-term service of highly skilled and potentially independent personnel? This article offers answers to these problems as it proceeds with the analysis of the sequential changes in the series of tactics the Mitsui House employed as it tried to secure long-term service of its high-ranking personnel.The Mitsui House apparently deliberated on and did deploy a succession of flexible stratagems in the face of changes within the House as well as in society. When the House underwent aggrandizement in the Edo era, the utmost effort went into securing the stable service of able personnel. Apprenticeship in any merchant house was a highly selective process and quite a few failed to fulfill their term of service and this competitiveness among the peers was quite a stimulus in the training of skilled personnel.As a result of Meiji restoration, the practice of having personnel changed in such way that the role of employees became stratified and they received their salary in cash according to the newly-introduced graded salary system. This new system worked as a good incentive to secure long-term service because loyalty and ability promised successive promotions with steady raise in salary.

著者

藤村 大時郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.4, pp.24-54,ii, 1989-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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After reviewing administrative structures of multi-unit enterprises in the mid-nineteenth century France, I examined that of Schneider et Cie which had been defined by its 1913 organizational rules. Like most advanced structures of contemporary american firms, it had a central office comprised of heads of functional departments-operating, financial, industrial accounting, personnel and legal departments. Into the first operating department, however, were integrated manufacturing, sales and engineering offices, and the line of authority between the major manufacturing and the other two units, and also between the operating and the other departments was defined on a line-and-staff basis. This contrast to the american integrated industrial enterprises can be explained by the similarity in the object of organization building, that is coordination of production and marketing activities, as well as the difference, lack of its own sales network in the french enterprise.Another and more important difference is found out in behavior at organization building. In contrast to american organization builders, Schneider's executives used data only for controling activities, so not for evaluating the performance of managers, and their range of authority and responsibility remained obscure in consequence. This discovery of another way of organization buildng suggests that creation of the general officers which constitute a major innovation in developing the decentralized, divisional structure was a result of the american way of organization building, because strictness in the delegation of authority to the division managers is assured by clearness of individual responsibility confined by objective figures. The schema of strategy and structure of A.D. Chandler, Jr., therefore, should be reconsidered.

著者

黄 孝春

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.4, pp.55-77, 1989-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

長沢 康昭

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.1, pp.1-31, 1989-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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After 1902, Mitsubishi Goshi opened branches in Hankou, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Peking, Vladivostok, and Singapore in order to export coal extracted from the company's mines. As these branches began in the 1910s to deal in commodities made by other companies, the character of the trading department of Mitsubishi Goshi changed from that of a sales department to that of a Sogo-shosha (general trading company). In this paper, I will try to outline reasons for the change by analyzing the business activities of the branches. In the 1910s, coal exports to China were unstable because of the severe fluctuations of the foreign exchange rate. As a result, the branches were unable to show stable profits. On the other hand, they had adopted an independent profit system. Thus, in order to obtain a profit, the manager and salesmen of each branch attempted to deal in goods produced by other companies. They sold the goods made by Mitsubishi-related companies, including beer, carbonated water, paper, and glassware, and traded commodities of unrelated companies, including raw cotton, cotton thread and fabrics, cement, paulownia oil, sesame, and so on. They succeeded only in dealing in paulownia oil and sesame-export goods of Chinese origin to Europe and America. This indicates that only those goods which do not suffer the instability of major goods (coal) are suitable for trade. From the above analysis, we can form a hypothesis that the Sogo-shosha is a mechanism for stabilizing foreign trade and that a sales department must transform its character to that of a Sogo-shosha in order to stay in operation when its main business becomes unstable.

著者

原 輝史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.1, pp.32-55, 1989-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

大塩 武

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.1, pp.67-76, 1988-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

岡山 礼子 田中 隆雄 作道 潤

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.1, pp.76-91, 1988-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)