著者

石川 一雄

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.67, pp.102-124,L5, 1981-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

77

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The American study of international relations since the '60s has been in confusion and disorder. There is no agreement on the future of scientific International Relations, no semblance of a theory nor hope of its development, no agreement about the accumulation of knowledge nor paradigm takeoff, no reliability in the methods nor the data, no credibility in the public domain nor relevance for the foreign policy practitioners.This is another “twenty years crisis” of confidence in the scientific study of International Relations. The crisis is not merely the result of methodological immaturity, but reflects something fundamental about the human world: it concerns the nature of scientific investigation itself.In the first part of this article, the state of the field, in confusion and disorder, is reviewed and described, and A. Lijphart's and J. Rosenau's arguments on the scientific revolution in IR are taken for criticism as a starting point for developing an alternative viewpoint, the focus of which is the intersubjective and common meanings of human behavior.In the latter part, the author looks from an interpretive angle at the study of international relations, refocusing attention on the concrete varieties of cultural meanings in their particularities and complex texture.The main thrust of the whole argument is, somehow, on the American mainstream of thought in International Relations which is pecuriarly scientistic and ethnocentric in its own way.

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.19, pp.102-118, 1962-04-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

著者

武者小路 公秀

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.42, pp.138-139, 1970-11-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

若林 千代

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.10-27,L5, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

73

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In contemporary Okinawan history studies, attention has largely focused on events in the political process of the reversion to Japan in 1972 and thus presenting the image that Okinawan postwar history can be neatly divided into two distinct eras. Recently, however, this premise has been questioned in light of the rape incident of 1995 and recent political issues, which show that pre-1972 problems remain almost three decades later. The U. S. -Japan military security regime has consistently been the main factor that fetters democracy and self-reliance in Okinawa throughout both periods.This thesis proceeds from the premise above, and the author maintain that the basic foundation of relations and issues in postwar Okinawa until the present day originates after the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The U. S. Forces inherited, occupied and developed the military air bases on Ie Island, central and south west coast of Okinawa Island (where U. S. Forces are based now) which the Japanese Army had constructed in the early 1940's. The surviving Okinawans interned in camps in the Northern area were not permitted to return to their homes and rebuild their villages.On 15 August, the U. S. military government established the Advisory Council of Okinawa to rebuild government functions, a body composed of fifteen Okinawan representatives chosen by the Okinawan leaders and the American authorities. Although the Council was an organization hand-picked by the U. S. military government from above and no more than a sup-port group for the occupation, the debates in the Council went beyond the implementation of administrative policies. According to the records, the Council sought “self-government” institutions including the separation of police powers, war reparation from the Japanese government, freedom of speech. and press, popular elections for the democratic governmental body, and the proposition of a constitution for Okinawa. These debates were primarily focused on the situation inherited from Japanese rule, in which the Okinawans became enmeshed in the modern Japanese state system not as a colony, yet as a marginalized group within an imperialist power.The demands for political change, however, did not last long. The events in the weeks after the surrender of Japan between August and October 1945 shuttered them. From late September to early October, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the military bases in Okinawa as a “primary base, ” for possible air base sites in the American overseas base system, and examined the possibility of exclusive rule. The U. S. Military Government in Okinawa changed the orientation of its “self-government” program and ignored the debates formerly discussed by the Advisory Council. Moreover, the military government suppressed freedom of speech and press, the Okinawans' demands to be allowed to return to their villages, and a general election for the governor and gubernatorial elections. The military government regarded the Okinawans as having no experience of living in a “democracy” and therefore the most appropriate form of government in Okinawa was the “prewar political institutions” with its strict controls from above. This, of course, reflected U. S. military strategy as it sought to use Okinawa as a “primary base” and develop a governing structure that would facilitate “exclusive rule” by U. S. Forces.The Okinawan political leaders in the Advisory Council reacted cautiously to the military government and attempted to avoid conflicts with its new ruler. In spite of pressure from the Okinawans for the return of their villages and agricultural land, the Council ignored the petition protests from the leaders of local districts. The Advisory Council finally recognized that the “Nimitz Proclamation”

著者

古田 元夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.99, pp.69-85,L10, 1992-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

28

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The 7th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party held in June 1991 declared that Vietnam would steadily maintain “the road to socialism” in the ongoing crisis of the socialist countries. The Congress emphasized that the Vietnamese should follow this road because this is the road already chosen in the recent history of Vietnam.In the modern history of international poltics, Vietnam has been always left out in the cold. This history of alienation urged the Vietnamese to choose socialism as the “dream” of a better tomorrow. In the era of the cold war, they fought as actual war for this choice. Therefore there is good reason for the Vietnamese not to accept any other road than that of socialism so long as this “memory of history” has not faded away.This view of socialism, however, had become a foundation of the “socialism of sharing poverty”, which broadly equated socialism with people's perseverance in today's poverty for the “dream” of a better tomorrow. Social crises in Vietnam after the Vietnam war resulted in the Vietnamese Communists clear depature from this type of sccialism, which manifested itself in the 6th congress of the Party in 1986 under the slogan of “doi moi”.After the 6th Congress the Vietnamese Communists seemed to sidetrack the problem of the yet-to-be “dream” for the time being and began to concentrate their efforts on reform in the real lives of the people. But this situation did not last long, because the collapse of the socialist regimes, in Eastern Europe has irritated the problem of “dream” among the Vietnamese and has revitalized their “memory of history”.The Vietnamese insistence on the road to socialism, however, seems to be based on much more realistic calculation. The most important task for the Vietnamese is to boost the economy through promoting foreign investment and this task requires political stability. Some of the Vietnamese reformists argue that there is no way other than maintaining the “leading role” of the Communist Party to keep political stability so that the Vietnamese should follow the road to socialism. According to them, maintaining the road to socialism is the most realistic way for the Vietnamese to participate in the capitalist world economy.Other radical reformists are afraid that this opinion equated socialism with the domination of the Communist Party. They advocate the introduction of a pluralistic political system and a much more humanistic type of socialism.

著者

楠 綾子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.174, pp.174_171-174_174, 2015-09-15 (Released:2015-07-28)

著者

進藤 榮一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.85, pp.55-72,L9, 1987

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The recent conservative trend in political science has been accompanied by the emergence of conservative interpretations of the occupation period. Among these revised views, the most conspicuous one is the high appraisal of Yoshida Shigeru, which elucidates Yoshida's politics as mainstream within the postwar Japanese conservative party. Yoshida is now seen as a main figure who contributed to the postwar political stability and economic prosperity of Japan.<br>My close examinations of the first-hand historical materials of the postwar occupation period, such as the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, however, have led me to question the validity of this conservative interpretation. Moreover, that interpretation contains the following theoretical defects. First, it has somewhat ignored the systemic approach of history. That is to say, this interpretation has underestimated the significance of discontinuity between prewar and postwar Japanese society. Consequently, feudalistic aspects of prewar Japanese society as well as the significance of the democratization of postwar Japanese society have been neglected. Naturally enough, this has led to the neglect of Yoshida's feudalistic values and a tendency to evaluate Yoshida as a liberal-conservative. The conservative interpretation has ignored the fact that Yoshida regarded the USSR as an expansionist state and his anti-communist stance has been somehow ignored.<br>These interpretations have brought about, on the other hand, an oversimplified appraisal of Ashida as an "ultra-nationalist." Accordingly, the importance of the Katayama-Ashida coalition government between the Japanese Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party has not been emphasized adequately in these evaluations of the occupation period. The objective of this article is to attempt a reappraisal of the occupation period, particularly in the period of the coalition government as well as the politics and diplomacy of Ashida. This article is closely based upon the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, which I recenty co-edited in seven volumes.<br>The article contains the following major points:<br>1. The conservative trend in interpretations of postwar history<br>2. Continuity and discontinuity: the meaning of democratization in the postwar period<br>3. Historian's interpretations of the "Konoye Memorial"<br>4. Ashida's views on world affairs prior to the surrender of Japan<br>5. The complexities of the Japanese constitution-making process<br>6. The rise and fall of the coalition government<br>7. The unknown battle over reform of the Imperial Household<br>8. The partisan struggle for national control of the coal industry<br>9. Economic recovery and the democratization of Japanese society<br>10. A gap in Japanese historiography: A dilemma within Japanese liberalism

著者

浜中 新吾

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.148, pp.43-58,L8, 2007

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A lot of dictatorship have collapsed and made a transition to democratic regimes late the Cold War. However, Middle Eastern states were never experienced with democratization wave. So that, there are scarcely any comparative democratization studies dealt with them. Today, we can understand some peculiar topics or indigenous logic of the Arab politics, because of being recently made advances in area studies of the Middle East. But we tend to think that comparative political research methods are not effective in understanding politics in the Middle East and do not help us to become familiar with it.<br>Lipset's thesis is revaluated and the most popular one that goes with relationship between economic development and democracy after Huntington's democratic third wave. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators tried to renew a modernization theory, then their works help restore confidence of general and comparative theory. However, there is still a paradox that even rich countries do not catch on the path of democratic transition in the Middle East.<br>The rentier state theory is used to explain this paradox why were not Middle Eastern countries democratized. This theory pays attention how much rent, natural resources like oil, natural gas, minerals with which states are able to ensure financial well being, gets support from many political economists. The rent also contains worker's remittance as well as official development assistance from foreign countries. So, a regime without resources may be categorized as a rentier state. A government with affluent rent does not have an incentive to liberalize own politics and societies because it needs not to impose a tax on its people, so the regime is easy to repress dissidents.<br>In this study, I formalize a model of the rentier state theory from Boix-Stokes Modernization model, and then attempt quantitative analyses. My formalized rentier model has a scope of rent seeking activity of governments with fertile natural resources. So the purpose of this research is to shed light on a general effectiveness of the theory as well as to deal with democratic transitions as time passed or not, the Large N Studies is adopt as my research design. The method of quantitative analysis is the Dynamic Probit Model, which Adam Przeworski developed.<br>The result of my study shows that enormous fuel rent tends to suppress democratic transition and promote stability of a dictatorship. But other natural resources and remittance rent have little to do with political transformation. The official development assistance dose not play a role of rent, seems to have a same effect of economic growth for democratization.

著者

菅原 健志

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_44-57, 2012

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After the Great War broke out, Japan's naval and military assistance was an important concern for the British government. Arthur Balfour was the only politician involved in this matter from the beginning to the end of the war. Until he became Foreign Secretary he had little expectation of Japan's assistance. However, the difficult circumstances of the war forced him to review his opinion about the value of Japan's help, as Britain was suffering badly from a shortage of manpower and munitions. As Foreign Secretary he had high hopes of Japan's assistance and did not hesitate to launch negotiations to secure her aid.<br>Balfour sought Japan's naval assistance and eventually succeeded in inducing her to despatch her destroyers to the Mediterranean. The price for this, namely guaranteeing Japanese rights in Shantung and the Pacific islands, was regarded as a permissible concession. The Japanese government, however, expressed disapproval at his request that they sell battle-cruisers to Britain. Balfour promptly put forward a new proposal to borrow the battlecruisers instead, based on his assumption that lending them would be more agreeable to Japan than selling them. He could not conceal his disappointment and dissatisfaction with the Japanese government's refusal to fulfil this modified request. He was not convinced by the reasons the Japanese government presented and criticised Japan's reluctance to help Britain.<br>In seeking Japan's military assistance, Balfour faced two obstacles. One was the difficulty of transporting Japanese troops to the European field. Many troopships would be needed to carry a large number of Japanese soldiers to the western or Salonica front. Britain and the Allied Powers, however, could not afford to allocate so many ships as they had a severe deficit of tonnage. The other obstacle was the need to harmonise the Japanese military campaign with the political interests of Britain and the Allied Powers. Russia did not want to receive Japanese soldiers on the eastern front due to her fear of massive territorial concessions to Japan. Although Balfour considered that Mesopotamia was the most promising theatre from which to deploy Japanese troops, he was obliged to renounce this idea due to strong opposition from the India Office and the Government of India. He continued to seek a location where transportation difficulties could be overcome and which was compatible with the interests of the other powers, and saw Siberia as the most favourable field. Henceforth Japan's military assistance was regarded as the Siberian Intervention, and Balfour continued to tackle this subject.

著者

池本 大輔

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_84-173_97, 2013

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This article argues that we cannot explain the UK's changing stance on European integration without reference to the international monetary strategies pursued by successive British governments. The UK's European policy after the Second World War can be divided into three distinct phases. Immediately after the War, the UK stood aside when the ECSC and EEC were established in 1952 and in 1958 respectively, since maintenance of both the British Empire and the 'special relationship' with the US was regarded as the priority. In the second phase, by making a formal application to the EEC in 1961, the UK turned away from the Empire and drew closer to Europe; by the 1970s, the special relationship appeared to have disappeared. The UK's entry into the EEC in 1973, however, did not lead to her policy being aligned with that of the other member-states. To this day, the UK remains an awkward partner in the integration project, a fact most clearly evidenced by her opt-out from the single currency, the euro. Moreover, the special relationship with the US appeared to revive once Margaret Thatcher took office in 1979; and all recent British governments, regardless of their political composition, have claimed to serve as a bridge between the US and Europe.<br>These twists and turns in the UK's European policy can be at least partly explained by her changing strategy in international monetary affairs. After the War, the British government set out initially to restore the international status of the pound sterling worldwide, a policy that precluded participation in a scheme like the EEC, whose main purpose was trade liberalisation within Europe. Once this strategy ended in failure with the devaluation of the pound in 1967, the<b> </b>British government was faced with a choice. It could, within the framework of European monetary integration, end the reserve currency status of the pound, which was hampering the UK's economic growth and leaving her financially dependent on the US. If successful, this strategy would have obviated both the legacy of Empire and financial dependence on the US at one go, and made the UK very much a 'part of Europe'. The alternative was to sustain the international status of the US dollar and American hegemony in international finance by encouraging the development of the so-called Euro-dollar market in London. Both the Heath and Callaghan governments pursued the first strategy in the 1970s, but to no avail, due to a lack of domestic support. The Thatcher government subsequently chose the second route and restored a close partnership with the US; this strategy, however, precluded the UK's participation in the process of European monetary integration.

著者

大嶋 えり子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.184, pp.184_103-184_116, 2016

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<p>Recognising memories of past perpetrations or not is often an issue connected with responsibility and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This has been for a long time an issue vexing French authorities.</p><p>In the 1990's, French government and parliament began to recognise memories related to the colonisation and the independence war of Algeria. Although French authorities had kept silent on those dark events to which many fell victim on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, they started to recognise memories related to Algeria by erecting memorials, opening museums and making laws.</p><p>This article aims at elucidating why the French parliament made laws recognising memories related to Algeria. Making memory-related laws, called "memory laws (lois mémorielles)", is a particular way to France to recognise certain perceptions of the past, and is different from other memory recognitions as it has a binding force.</p><p>I thus considered two laws, made in respectively 1999 and 2005. The law passed in 1999, that I will call the "Algerian war law", replaces the term "the operations in North Africa" with "the Algerian war or the battles in Tunisia and Morocco" in the French legislative lexicon. It officially recognises that the conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was a war, whereas it has been long reckoned to be a domestic operation aiming at maintaining order. The law enacted in 2005, that I will call the "repatriate law", pays homage to former French settlers in Algeria for their achievements and emphasises the "positive role of the French presence abroad".</p><p>This study shows that those two laws were made in order to reinforce national cohesion among French people, instead of fostering dialogue between Algerians and French. By examining the wording and the law making processes of the two acts in question, especially the debates conducted at the National Assembly, it sheds light on how French elected representatives tried not to acknowledge France's responsibility for the damages caused during the colonisation and the independence war and how they attached little importance to reconciliation with Algeria. Both laws indeed do not contain memories of Algerian people harmed under French rule, except some parts of the memory of Harkis, who fought with the French army during the war.</p><p>The recognition of memories by official authorities of former perpetrators has significant repercussions and can encourage reconciliation between antagonists. It however tends to avert eyes from victims'memories in France when the past related to Algeria is in question. Issues connected with memory do not only concern relations between France and Algeria, but also involve the larger question of how to remember perpetrations caused by discriminatory policies and how to overcome them to accede to reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.</p>

著者

南山 淳

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.155-169,L16, 1999-02-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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“The Okinawa problem” has always been treated as a dependent variable of the U. S. -Japan alliance under the Cold War structure. This bilateral alliance being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems dne to the concentration of U. S. bases in Okinawa which are accepted as a “security cost.” In the field of security studies, the base problem in Okinawa has been considered exclusively a domestic problem which is confined in the context of domestic politics.After the end of the Cold War, however, the rape incident by U. S. soldiers in 1995, triggered, a burst of anti-base sentiment of the Okinawa people dramatically. It was the biggest protest held by the local people whose lives had been threatend in the name of “national security.” For the Okinawa people, the existence of the U. S. bases has been security threat to their lives.This essay is intended to examine, based on the development of security studies after the Cold War, a strained and conflicting relationship of the U. S. -Japan alliance between national security concept and individual/human security concept concerning Okinawa. The first Perspective is to clarify theoretically a strained relationship between national security and individual/human security by examining the debate on “Redefining Security.” The latter Perspective is to discuss “Critical Security Studies” which recently has been developed as a human-centred security studies interms of the correlation between subject and object.Consequently, from the view point of “Critical Security Studies, ” a theoretical framework in which security issues such as the Okinawa problem are disscussed will be presented. The central question is how “security as essentially contested concepts” should be grasped in the post-Cold war era.

著者

西村 邦行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_34-47, 2012

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Political scientists have usually considered E. H. Carr as a pioneer of the academic field of International Relations (IR). Given this understanding is tenable, in which historical context did he establish a new discipline?<br>In the early twentieth century, Max Weber discerned in the emergence of bureaucratic institutions an idiosyncratic phase of modern instrumental rationalism. The currently acknowledged form of academic divisions was at best contestable when Carr wrote his monumental <i>The Twenty Years' Crisis</i> (1939). Indeed, Carr was a multifaceted scholar: sometimes, he was an advocate of political realism; other times, he was the author of the controversial historical studies on Soviet Russia; yet other times, he was a biographer of nineteenth century thinkers. It is a grave mistake to recognize Carr exclusively either as historian, political scientist, or biographer.<br>The chief objective of the present article is to situate Carr in the context of the emergence of professional intellectuals, and thus clarify the meaning of the popular understanding that he was one of the pioneering figures of IR. This author focuses on his early works: <i>Dostoevsky</i> (1931), <i>The Romantic Exiles</i> (1933), <i>Karl Marx</i> (1934) and <i>Michael Bakunin</i> (1937). Compared with his texts in the two decades around the middle of the twentieth century, these works have not occasioned much scholarly interest among IR researchers. One of the main reasons of this ignorance is probably their apparent irrelevance to the study of international relations. As I see it, however, Carr's inquiry into international relations was a continuation of his project he advanced in his biographical works. Through his exposure to the untraditional thoughts of nineteenth-century Russian (and Russia-related) intellectuals, Carr obtained a historical view that the modern western world was in radical transformation. On the other hand, Carr discerned various European elements within the apparently unfamiliar Russian thoughts. Carr's project was ultimately a remedial self-critique of Europe. Carr's search for alternative cultural value ended up reattaching him to his familiar liberal world.<br>By suggesting these points, the present article aims to add another contribution to the recent reinterpretations of Carr. It also directs our attentions to the issue of contexts in general for further advancing our knowledge about the history of international studies as well as Carr's relevance to the contemporary world.

著者

油井 大三郎

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.104, pp.183-186, 1993-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

稲生 典太郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.26, pp.72-87, 1964

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_156-159, 2011

著者

石田 勇治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.96, pp.51-68,L9, 1991

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The election of an avowed monarchist, seventy-seven-years old Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as the president of the Weimar Republic in April 1925 symbolizes the remarkable continuity in political attitude of the Germans from the time of empire to the republic. Many of them were uncritically attached to the old "Kaiserreich".<br>In spite of the total defeat and the revolution 1918-19 the aims and roles of imperial German policy in the outbreak of the World War had not yet been clarified. Every government during the Weimar period blocked full disclosure of the empire's war aims and engaged in a political cover up.<br>It was the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner, head of the revolutionary government in Munich, who released special reports in November 1918 showing the responsibility of the German Empire for the beginning of the World War. Eisner wished to discredit the old regime and persisted in purging the representatives of the "Kaiserreich".<br>Threatened by Eisner's revelation the foreign ministry insisted that such a free debate about the war guilt question would make the peace negotiations unfavorable to Germany. The new foreign minister Urlich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to take the lead and refute any charges that Germany had made preparations for the war in 1914 and was responsible for it. He was determined to exonerate the imperial German policy.<br>After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919 the foreign ministry planned an antiwar-guilt campaign. With the purpose of revising the treaty the foreign ministry mobilized the Germans beyond all classes and parties and lead a national movement ("Volksbewegung") against the Allies' verdict on Germany's war guilt. A War Guilt Section ("Schuldreferat") was established in the ministry which should direct research and discussion about this question at home and abroad in favour of German foreign policy.<br>The purpose of this paper is firstly to describe how the war guilt question was dealt with in the German foreign ministry at the first stage of the Weimar Republic. It will show the process how the antiwar-guilt campaign was formed and developed.<br>The second purpose is to analyze the meaning of this campaign for the Weimar political culture. Its influence on the radical-right thoughts and movements such as Nazism will be also discussed.

著者

金 栄鎬

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.132, pp.153-175,L14, 2003-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

84

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North Korea's foreign policy and its policy toward South Korea obviously wavered after the Cold War. Why did North Korea's policy toward the South seesaw between cooperation and conflict? The purpose of this article is to examine under what conditions North Korea cooperates with South Korea.Firstly, although during the Cold War North Korea had shown conflictive behavior toward the South, the U. S. and Japan, after the Cold War its policy distinctively shifted to cooperation. For balance of power on Korean peninsula in this period, South Korea was remarkably superior to the North. Was balance of power the causal element of North Korea's cooperation? An investigation of the article demonstrates that objective balance of power did not draw on the North's cooperative behavior. Change of South Korea's policy toward the North and cleavage in the South's domestic politics affected the North's policy, while the North reviewed its definition of “nation” and “nationalism” which could be seen as subjective element of the North's behavior toward the South.Secondly, North Korea's policy, in turn, shifted to conflict after its declaration of withdrawal from NPT. Strictly speaking, around its declaration of withdrawal North Korea explored cooperation with the South in contrast to confrontation against the U. S., but, as soon as the U. S. -North talk launched, the North intensified cooperation with the U. S. in reverse to conflict against the South. How can such a distortion of North Korea's policy be coherent? An examination of the article shows that South Korea's policy was reversed to a hard-line in terms of “legitimacy” of state, subsequently the North's policy also returned to conflictive and exclusive one. And here also balance of power did not necessarily affect the North's policy into cooperation as well as above-observation. Rather, above-mentioned subjective element produced the North's exclusive behavior against the South, which was regarded, according to a North Korean peculiar view, as “treacherous” or “a puppet of the American Imperialism”.Thirdly, there have been talks and agreements between North and South Korea, such as the North-South Joint Statement in July 1972, mutual visit of divided families in the mid 1980's, the basic Agreements between the South and the North in December 1991, and the North-South Summit Meeting in June 2000. A comparative analysis indicates the following: North Korea's policy and behavior in 1970's and the mid-1980's could not be seen cooperative in spite of some talks and agreements, because there had been prevailing view of “legitimacy” of state and “liberation of The South” with North Korea. After the Cold War, it was verified that North Korea's behavior and policy changed with the South's policy and their domestic politics, and more than anything-else, the North' cooperation with the South was conditioned under whether of appeasing “legitimacy” of state.

著者

神川 彦松

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1957, no.1, pp.1-18, 1957-04-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

17

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_74-87, 2012

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In Germany it is often said that cultural policy is the third pillar of foreign policy. That means culture, together with security and trade, constitutes an essential part of international relations. This concept was formulated during the Cold War period, mainly by Dieter Sattler, director of the Cultural Department of the Foreign Office (1959–66), and Willy Brandt, foreign minister of the Kiesinger administration (1966–69).<br>When the Federal Republic was founded, its government was reluctant of pursuing international cultural policy on its own. It was in the latter half of the 1950s that foreign policymakers, in the face of cultural offensive by the Eastern Bloc, thought they need a systematic cultural policy. Some cultural attachés, such as Sattler in Rome and Bruno E. Werner in Washington D.C., insisted that cultural policy must indeed be placed at the core of West German diplomacy.<br>Sattler regarded cultural policy as a tool of managing transnational relations in the contemporary world of interdependence. As a head of the Cultural Department in Bonn, he insisted that culture is the "third stage" of foreign policy, and strived to establish the organizational, financial, and conceptual bases of foreign cultural policy.<br>The thesis "culture is the third pillar of foreign policy" was formulated by Brandt, who headed the Foreign Office under the grand coalition. When the Cold War was locked in a stalemate, he thought that cultural policy was a suitable means to maintain the unity of German nation without legally admitting the existence of two German states. Though his plan of "all-German foreign cultural policy" was not realized, Brandt repeatedly stated in public that culture is one of the main pillars of foreign policy. The popular foreign minister regarded cultural policy as essential for making Germany a peacepursuing nation.<br>Sattler's "third-stage" argument and Brandt's "third-pillar" argument both see culture as an important field of international relations. The two theses differ, however, in time scope and worldview. While the "third-stage" argument is based on rather liberal vision focusing on interdependence and long-time, structural transformation of the nation-state system, the "thirdpillar" argument is more realistic, stressing the integrity and prosperity of the nation.<br>While the "third-pillar" argument became a cliché, German foreign policymakers could neither establish a firm principle nor execute consistent policy in the field of culture. Rather, foreign cultural policy got increasingly negative attention from politicians and the media, who thought that tax was not used in a proper form. The "third-pillar" argument could actually have created complications, since it did not clarify the content of "culture" while placing cultural policy as a priority.