著者

大道寺 隆也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_98-182_110, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

69

---

This article examines why and how the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) introduced due process into targeted sanctions. The focus is on the relations between different international organizations, namely “inter-organizational relations”. Particular attention is paid to the relations between European regional organizations (ROs), such as the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE), and the UN. The UN SC introduced some procedures for delisting individuals or entities from the terrorists list in reaction to the political and legal resistance by the ROs against the possibility of the infringement of fundamental rights of those who are listed.Recently, international organizations have increasingly contact with each other. This trend began to be reflected in academic literature, but studies in inter-organizational relations are still embryonic. In order to contribute to this field, this article analyzes the case study on targeted sanctions, for, inter-organizational relations between the UN and the ROs are vertical ones, both politically and legally (Section 1). Nevertheless, existing literature has largely ignored, or at least underestimated, this vertical aspect. Thus,this article elaborates and presupposes vertical relations between the UN and the ROs and counters some existing researches on inter-organizational relations. Based upon the review of existing literature, the article suggests using the concept of resistance in the analysis of targeted sanctions, and hypothesizes that the political and legal resistance by the ROs urged the SC to introduce due process (Section 2). In order to prove this, the case study on targeted sanctions focuses on: (1) how did the ROs resist the SC? (2) how did the SC identify and accept the resistance? (Section 3)As for the first question, although the ROs have cooperated on the implementation of targeted sanctions, there are some instances of resistance against the SC. For instance, the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of Human Rights criticized the problems on the protection of human rights and raised the possibility of annulling the laws implementing targeted sanctions. As well, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE passed the resolutions on the problem. As for the second question, this article reveals that the SC became aware of the resistance through its subsidiary organs and member states. As a result, the procedures for delisting such as the “focal point” or the “Office of the Ombudsperson”were established and the wording of the resolutions was modified in favor of human rights protection.This study implies that the ROs may influence the decision-making of the UN that is legally superior to the ROs, and contribute to correcting the global injustice although they are only “regional” organizations.

著者

長谷川 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.90, pp.70-90,L10, 1989-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

---

Opinions vary as to whether the Soviet Union has accepted the concept of deterrence in formulating its national security policy. In the author's opinion, the Soviet Union may have in the past rejected deterrence theory as developed in the United States, but it has not only accepted the classical meaning of deterrence as defined by George and Smoke, but also such a concept has until recently become the foundation of its military policy. This article attempts to trace the evolution of Soviet deterrence policy since World War II.During the post-war Stalin period (1945-1953), Soviet deterrence policy was determined by two factors: belief in the inevitability of war and strategic inferiority. Stalin believed that the United States would start a war against the Soviet Union by launching a surprise nuclear attack, and that such a war could be prevented only by raising the cost that the US would have to pay in such an eventuality. Stalin thus took three specific measures to deter such war: he developed Soviet nuclear weapons, took an offensive strategy against Western Europe with the superior Soviet conventional forces, and strengthened strategic defense.The second period was a transitional period, in which Stalin's military doctrine was attacked from two directions. First, the theory of the inevitability of war was rejected by the political leadership. The rejection of this Marxist cannon was first proposed by Malenkov, but later taken up by Khrushchev. The long process of decimation of the Marxist approach to war had thus begun. Nevertheless, Khrushchev attempted to salvage Marxist orthodoxy by insisting on the Soviet quest for military superiority as the guarantee of peace and on belief in victory in nuclear war. Secondly, Stalinist military doctrine was attacked by military theorists who began to assess positively the role of a surprise attack with the use of nuclear weapons at the beginning of war.The crack created in Stalinist military doctrine in the transitional period led to the nuclear revolution in the third period (1959 to 1966/67). Nuclear weapons were recognized as the most decisive weapons in modern warfare, while the Strategic Rocket Force was created. During this period, however, Soviet deterrence policy moved in the opposite direction of that of the US, in a direction that emphasized deterrence through damage limitation by adopting a first-strike counterforce strategy.The Soviet recognition of the possibility of limited war around 1966/67 had a profound impact on the evolution of Soviet strategy. For the first time there emerged a possibility of sparing the Soviet homeland from a US attack even in case of a world war. This led to the idea of keeping its strategic weapons as strategic reserves to be used as second-strike retaliatory weapons. Also, this contributed to lowering the importance of strategic defence, leading to the Soviet acceptance of ABM ban. These factors set the stage for arms control with the US. At the same time, however, Soviet NATO strategy began to move in a more offensive direction. This time, Soviet strategy envisaged destruction of NATO theater nuclear weapons by conventional means, while leaving its own theater nuclear weapons as reserves in case NATO decided to go nuclear.In the last half of the 1970s, the Soviet leadership moved to accept mutual deterrence by removing the two pillars of Khrushchev's military doctrine: the quest for military superiority and the belief in victory in nuclear war. Yet, the notion that the correlation of forces was inexorably moving in favor of the Soviet Union led the Soviet Union to overemphasize the military factor in its foreign policy and to pursue an activist policy in the Third World, whereby contributing to the perception of a Soviet threat among its adversaries.Brezhnev's policy invited a backlash from the West. Particularly, the US decision to deploy INF in Europe and to launch SDI threatened what the Soviets had gained in the pr

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.1-9,L5, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

10

---

This issue, comprising of eight research articles and one review article, is focused on “the Middle East in International Relations” and comes in the midst of another structural change in the international environment of the Middle East. The previous change resulted from the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level. Although the change affected globally, the Middle East was one of the first to experience its impact through the way the transregional actors reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current structural change, however, is more specific to the region and relates to the latter's relationship with the only remaining superpower, the United States. This time, the change followed the 9/11 attack, which is said to have forced the U. S. policy-makers to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the U. S. and the Middle Eastern states and societies. How this change in international relations will affect the Middle East as a whole and a multitude of state and subnational actors in the region remains to be seen. Yet the transformative processes apparently have already been under way.The articles assembled here differ from one another in their perspective on the Middle East. Some examine recent developments; others focus on historical relations. For the purpose of this introduction, three different perspectives can be identified.The first perspective concerns the relations between the only superpower and actors in the Middle East. The United States, as a transregional actor, stands out in its resources and capacity and is capable of entering into relations with a host of state and subnational actors in the region. Sakai's article adopts this perspective and examines the mutually collaborative relationships between the U. S. Government and a number of anti-Hussein Iraqi groups before and after the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.The second perspective concerns some types of intra-regional dynamics and developments. Tateyama examines the post-Oslo Accord Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Matsumoto assesses the state of democratization in the region by comparing the party systems in ten Arab states. Yamamoto examines nine Arab states in terms of their policies on controlling internet connections. Kashima's review article examines four theoretically-informed monographs on regional intra-state relations.The third perspective concerns the Middle East as a foreign policy issue. Three articles by Hanzawa, Takayasu, and Okuda, examine British foreign policy historically during separate time periods. All, however, focus on England's dealings with another foreign power of the time on the matters relating to the greater Middle East.

著者

高橋 博子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.150, pp.203-206, 2007

著者

山本 元

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.147, pp.132-148,L14, 2007

---

After the end of the Cold war era, domestic conflicts became a key issue facing international society. However, there exist cases actually left untouched for several years. Theorists of international politics also have not paid much attention to such cases as the subject of their research, with the result that we have not accumulated knowledge about &ldquo;pretermitted conflicts&rdquo; and the dynamics of the peace negotiation.<br>The purpose of this paper is to explain the sudden change in the behavior of a government in a peace negotiation even though international society sits still and watches. As Gurr points out, however, domestic conflicts have also occurred in quasi-states. This institutional character makes international intervention difficult and justifies the non-intervention of international society.<br>Making a point of being a quasi-state, the author characterizes the government as a player that tries to maximize public support. Inside the government organization, however, the army, which keeps the capability to overturn the peace agreement between the government and the proindependence militant, exists and opposes a move to the peace agreement. People not directly concerned with the domestic conflict determine support (or nonsupport) for their government after observing the will for peace and the ability to control the armed forces (civil-military relations). But the reality of civil-military relations is the private information of the government. Based upon this setting, the model on a peace negotiation was formulated as an incomplete information game.<br>After analyzing this model, the author derives two kinds of equilibrium paths to reach a peace agreement. One is a separating equilibrium, in which the government <i>H</i> aving control over the national military (<i>H</i>) proposes the peace plan, but the government <i>L</i>acking control over it (<i>L</i>) does not when the militant's belief that the government is <i>H</i> is high, and the militant will accept it. The other is a pooling equilibrium that both <i>H</i> and <i>L</i> propose when the belief is low and the militants will reject it. The first is a trivial outcome. However, <i>L</i> can propose it because <i>L</i> can appeal to the people's will for peace without exposing the low ascendancy of L on the separating equilibrium.<br>Finally, the author explains the dynamics of peace negotiations in Indonesia and the Philippines and points out that civil-military relations could be a useful explanatory variable. And as they are also policy implications for avoiding further humanitarian crisis, international society should not castigate <i>L</i> for a passive stance on the separating equilibrium, and it should notcastigate separates for it in regards to the pooling equilibrium. In this way, by seeing the effect of civil-military relations on the dynamics of a peace process, the optimal reply of international society to the government's and the militant's behavior must be changed to effect a prompt and appropriate response to avoid further massacre or the violation of human rights.

著者

小泉 直美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_1-14, 2011

---

This article analyzes whether civilian control over the Russian military has been reestablished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civilian control had been firmly established under the communist regime by the Brezhnev era and functioned very well. It was a kind of division of labor based upon the common ideology, in which the Communist Party leadership decides the overall direction of foreign and security policy, while the General Staff with its exclusive military expertise provides option formation and implementation. The Party leadership gave the military everything they need and want, and the military in turn does not interfere into the politics.<br>With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this controlling system also ceased to function. The political leadership can no longer look after the military's interests, while the military got fully politicized in and outside the Duma. Then the former President Putin tried to reestablish the control system, although it was not a democratic one, but the control by the president. Putin wanted to transform the military into a small but highly efficient and usable one in the local and regional conflicts. Although Putin's plan did not frame well, in 2007 with the new defense minister Anatolii Serdyukov appointed the situation began to change.<br>This article examines the three aspects of Putin's (and Medvedev's) reform efforts, namely the reform of military bureaucracy, the fulfillment of the military's interests, and the change of the official threat perceptions. First, in terms of civilianization of the defense ministry and the subordination of the General Staff to the civilian defense ministry, much efforts has been made, but still not enough. Due to lack of civilian military experts, it will take some more time to overcome the General Staff's exclusive status and power inherited from the Soviet era. Second, the political leadership attaches a great emphasis to the modernization of military equipment and the improvement of material conditions for military service. Still, the lack of capital and an inefficient way of using it have impeded visible progress. Third, after long procrastination finally the new official strategic documents, the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, have been approved. They revised the official threat perception from a large scale attack from the West to local and regional conflicts along the borders. Nevertheless, we should notice that a deep distrust against the West, especially the U.S. and NATO, is rooted in the newly attained consensus.<br>In sum, civilian control in Russia is working far better than in the 1990's, but is still incomplete. There is much room for the military's dissatisfaction or distrust against the U.S. to exert its influence to the political decisions.

著者

小泉 直美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.100, pp.104-125,L12, 1992

---

The East European countries waged the Cold War as members of the Eastern block. But they also waged the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The Purpose of this paper is to analyze the beginning and end of this Cold War of East Europe from the viewpoint of the Soviet perception.<br>The Soviet rule over East Europe was the result of the Soviet threat perception, as well as the vacuume of power and Soviet capability to fill it up. In other words, the Soviets felt strong threat from the West and came to a conclusion that East Europe is a special and vital area for the Soviet national security through the experience over the Second World War. Then the end of this Cold War must be based upon the overcome of this perception by the new Russian leadership and the society. The paper will address to these processes.<br>As for the beginning of the Cold War of East Europe, we are going to pay attention to the period from August 1939 to June 1941, namely from the conclusion the Soviet-German Non-Agression Pact to the start of the Soviet-German War. This is because we think that these years got a decisive meaning for the formation of the Soviet security perception after WWII.<br>Then after fifty years, the time for change came with the <i>Perestroika</i> started by Gorbachev. The Soviet Union (then Russia) no longer has the capability to hold the East European nations as her protege nor alliance. Her threat perception is also being mitigated under the new post-Cold War situation in Europe. For all of this the paper will still give a suggestion for uncertainty over whether Russia has finally overcome her perception of vulneravility and of East Europe as her special zone.

著者

岩坂 将充

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.190, pp.190_145-190_154, 2018-01-25 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

28

著者

奥薗 秀樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.65-80,L11, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

---

Since the outbreak of the Korean War, South Korean government had heavily depended on the U. S. government for their military and economic security as a frontline state during the Cold War. Park Chung Hee and his Revolutionary Government, which emerged as a bearer of Korean nationalism through the 1961 military coup d'état, faced a difficult question: how to strike a balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and excessive dependence on the U. S. government as a junior partner within the Cold War regime. The purpose of this paper is to examine how Park and his government struggled for Korean self-reliance while avoiding total dependence on the U. S.. To this end this paper focuses on the following three points.First, this paper examines Korean nationalism as a causal element of the 1961 Coup and an ideological basis of the Revolutionary Government there-after. Analysis of remarks which Park and the graduates of the Korean Military Academy, the main actors of the Revolutionary Government, made before and immediately after the coup, shows that their independence-orientedness and distrust of the big powers became the keynote when they formulated its foreign policy, at least for some time.Second, this paper examines how the Park Administration's perception of the U. S. at the beginning and how the perception transformed as time went on. The Revolutionary Government, in spite of their distrust of the U. S. government, came to conclude that the presence of the U. S. Forces in Korea and their economic assistance were important for preserving Korean independence amid the Cold War conflict. Because of the dilemma they faced, Park and his government had to re-define the balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and dependence on the U. S. in terms of the reality surrounded them.Finally, this paper examines actual policy steps which the Park Administration took as attempts to achieve Korean self-reliance. Among them, the Revolutionary Government regarded, as the most important steps, its developments in social-economic dimension and improvements of people's everyday life in addition to the build-up of its military power and completing of anti-communism. However, Park's attempts to achieve these things by itself reached a dead end after a while and they realized there was no way other than “temporary dependence” on the U. S. to preserve Korean independence.In the end, Park's struggle for self-reliance resulted in “temporary dependence” on the U. S. However, we have to notice that Park's quest for self-reliance did not end in spite of the acceptance of “temporary dependence.” His endeavour at acquiring Korean self-reliance carried on at all occasions and with his full energy. In this sense, the “temporary dependence” was literally temporal and did not mean “overall dependence” or “subordination” to the U. S. government.

著者

永野 隆行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.134, pp.86-102,L13, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

---

The purpose of this paper is to examine Australian attitudes towards international relations of South East Asia in the late 1960s. In this period, the British government under Harold Wilson began reviewing its defence commitment East of Suez, having in mind a drastic reduction or complete withdrawal of British troops. With domestic pressure to keep defence expenditure down increasing and uncertainty over the tenure of bases in Singapore becoming looming, Britain was leaning in the direction of relinquishing its military hold over Singapore/Malaysia region, which had long been a symbol of the British Empire. Separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, in particular, brought policy makers in the UK home to the vulnerability of the British military positions under the fluctuating Asian political scene. The US commitment to the region was also experiencing drastic changes. Prospect of the Vietnam War obscured the future United States attitudes towards its commitments in South East Asia.Since Britain expressed its intention to pull out its forces from Singapore/Malaysia, the concerned powers, Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States held quadripartite talks on several occasions, which gave the Australians to express their views on the issue. Australia, on the brink of losing ‘security blanket’ the British had provided in the South East Asian region, had strong concerns about the developments in the British thinking about their defence role in the region. Contending that Britain had and would play an important role in the security of the region, and that any British decision to withdraw would have a destabilising effect in the region, Australia argued that Britain should stay as long as possible. Moreover, Australians feared that the British withdrawal would precipitate American disengagement from the region.On the other hand, Australia sought to keep its options flexible and open as to its commitment in the region as long as possible. Although the Australians fully understood that the long-term security of Australia rested in the stability of the areas South East Asia, in the circumstances filled with unknown factors, Australia was not able to make a move forward.In this paper, a particular attention would be paid to the development of Australia's thinking as to its role in the security of the region for the 1970s. We would focus on the period between the British enunciation of its intention to review its defence posture in the region and the Australian government's announcement of its intention to maintain its forces beyond the British withdrawal.

著者

岩波 由香里

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_45-181_59, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

27

---

Since the late 1990s, the United Nations (UN) has begun to mount peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones where regional organizations had already deployed their peacekeepers. This paper employs a game-theoretic model to examine the reasons for the UN’s decision to intervene in such conflicts rather than choosing disengagement or devolution, and its reasons for allowing regional organizations to intervene first. The results suggest that regional organizations intervene in regional conflicts to signal their inability to resolve the conflicts single-handedly. By showing the ineffectiveness of regional arrangements, they try to elicit cooperation from the UN, a more resourceful organization. However, I also find that when the cost of intervention is high, the UN is not likely to intervene in the conflict even after a regional organization dispatches peacekeepers. Knowing this, disputants are more likely to violate a cease-fire agreement and increase the burden of regional countries. Finally, when a regional organization anticipates that the UN is likely to pass the buck, it would refrain from dispatching peacekeepers and wait until the UN is embroiled in the conflict. I illustrate these findings through an example of the conflicts in Africa.

著者

天野 健作

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.186, pp.186_146-186_158, 2017-01-30 (Released:2017-04-07)

参考文献数

41

---

This study considers the conflict-prevention mechanisms over international rivers between India and its neighboring countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal). India is a country where three important international rivers flow. The discussion concerns the Indus, the Ganges and the Mahakali rivers. Conflicts have taken place in the past over water resources between India and its neighboring countries, but India has presently signed treaties and Memorandum of Understandings and established mutually acceptable mechanisms for the development and management of the rivers. Furthermore, they have put in place permanent joint organizations, exchange of data, and river inspections.Previous studies have analyzed how the conflict-prevention mechanisms were established in the process; however, no one has examined their effectiveness and weaknesses. In addition, there are no studies comparing policies and diplomatic efforts for all three rivers.India and its neighbors have instituted permanent joint organizations to manage the water resources and have kept these organizations far from another politics. The role of mechanism’s factor is important and thus it was also investigated. For example, in the case of the Indus River, the mechanism does not specify the quantity of water allocated as shown in the Ganges River, but it effectively provides for a territorial type of sharing. It does not change the bounders between India and Pakistan, but traces a fictitious line that divides the basin and limits the sovereign rights of use of each state. In the case of the Mahakali River,which is at the border of India and Nepal, both countries benefited equally from the instituted irrigation and flood management policies.Finally, this study examined the weaknesses of the conflict-prevention mechanisms. In the case of the Indus River, Pakistan has filed complaints against India to the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning water resources for India to resolve the conflict. The court favored Pakistan on three out of four points, namely the restriction on India to maintain the minimum flow of the River, environmental protection and the diversion of water. However, the court ruled against and maintained that the instituted mechanisms function well.In conclusion, while water supply and demand across the world is tight, considering mechanisms to prevent conflicts over water resources between countries will be significant. Especially, water demand in Asia is even sharply increasing compared to the world. Among them, India is a unique example of a country that shares waterways with more than one country.

著者

土生 長穂

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1959, no.7, pp.35-50, 1959-01-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

35

著者

佐桑 健太郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_33-189_48, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

46

---

Why are some regions more peaceful than others? Some regions are particularly plagued by traditional power politics and political tensions, while the danger of war between major actors has significantly declined in other regions. The conventional literature would answer the question from a dyadic perspective—a region with many states with certain set of traits, such as democracy, should be peaceful. However, it is ultimately an empirical question whether the prevalence of power politics and conflict can be solely explained by the type of states and dyads in a region. I argue that the nature of international interactions is shaped by regional-level environment. Due to local security externalities, dyadic politics and conflict is dependent on conditions in a local neighborhood. More specifically, this study focuses on the role of regional-level alliance structure. A region can be situated in various types of alliance configuration depending on the climate of global geopolitics. I argue that conflict is unlikely in a region in which a global power establishes hegemonic domination through alliance ties with local states. The presence of an external global power dominating a region provides a local enforcement mechanism and reassurance for local states, which in turn reduces hostile interactions among local states. To examine how the regional-level conditions influence dyadic-level politics among local states, this paper empirical analyzes political events data (Integrated Data for Events Analysis) applying multilevel modeling, aiming at contributing to the literature by explicitly modeling the influence of regional-level variables on local politics beyond militarized disputes. Empirical analysis revealed that a regionally shared “patron” can promote peace between local states. However, the effect of regional hierarchy turned out to be indirect. Regional dominance structured by an external global power does not exert an overarching influence over an entire region by shifting the region-specific intercept. Rather, the regional-level global power domination in terms of defense pacts particularly influences powerful local states while not quite reducing hostility among minor local states. Thus, international conflict and hostility is indirectly constrained in a region under hegemonic domination by a global power. This study has empirically explored an argument that it is fruitful to go beyond a purely dyadic analysis of international conflict. The independent effect of a spatial environment means that even similar dyads may behave differently depending on the conditions surrounding them. It shows a need to reexamine some of the important findings about international conflict from a spatial perspective, taking into account macro-regional contexts within which states operate. Moreover, the introduction of regional contexts potentially would bridge a gap between quantitative studies of international conflict and area-specific studies.

著者

塩崎 弘明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.121, pp.33-53,L7, 1999-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

140

---

The dominant cause of Vatican Diplomacy and its position at the end of the Cold War, or at the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc, could be found not only in its Ostpolitik of 1963 to 1990, but also in its previous history of the secret contacts with the Soviet government from 1919 to 1929. To the promoters of the Vatican's Ostpolitik, the Cold War brought to conclusion a policy which had existed from the Russian Revolution to the Revolution of 1989.During the First and Second World Wars, the Holy See, the international spiritual and moral organization under the leadership of the Popes, resumed an active role in international affairs. The war unexpectedly increased the importance and extent of Vatican Diplomacy. Both World Wars coincidentally ended the Vatican's isolation and ushered in a new phase of Vatican Diplomacy, which dates lasted until reign of Pope John XXIII and encompasses the new enemy, Stalinist communism. This remained the clear and continuing enemy of the Holy See until the 1960's.John's “Opening to the East” and the subsequent policy of Ostpolitik developed by Agostino Casaroli in the 1960's and 1970's, illustrate the policy of equidistance between the communist world and the west that has characterized Vatican Diplomacy since early 1960's. The election of a Polish Pope, John Paul II, and the emergence of a new Soviet reformer, M. Gorbachev, contributed to accelerate the coming of the Revolution of 1989 that culminated in the end of the Cold War. Vatican Diplomacy, however, still faced great challenges.To the Far East, the Cold War is not yet over for the Holy See. The Vatican's Ostpolitik has signally failed to penetrate the “bamboo curtain” around China and some of its neighbors. However, Vatican Diplomacy is, more than anything else, expected to promote the spiritual and human values that will become crucial points in international relations in the near future.

著者

天川 晃

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.138, pp.181-184, 2004

著者

等松 春夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_1-187_15, 2017

---

<p>The present issue examines relations between memories of history and international politics. In recent years interpretation of history with political implication (<i>rekishi ninshiki</i>) became a serious subject in matters regarding the past of war and colonial rule between Japan and China/Korea. However, the questions of history and politics is not peculiar to East Asian countries. Similar problems are occurring in many parts of the world as shown by articles in the present issue.</p><p>History plays important and in some cases crucial role in domestic politics and international relations. In creating a nation-state a shared understanding of the past is a powerful vehicle to unite people for a common cause. Political actors therefore struggle over the monopoly of national history which is indispensable in gaining legitimacy of the government. However, such a narrative of nation-building is a double-edged sword. It is effective on one hand in maintaining the unity within the domestic community. On the other hand it fosters jingoism and causes frictions between other states. Typical of these are border disputes in which different stories of nation-building provide the confronting states with the basis for territorial claim. In recent years some states contest over registering historical sites and records in UNESCO World Heritage and Memory of the World schemes, thus opening a new battlefront of 'war of histories'. Official recognition of a specific edition of history by an international organization such as UNESCO has political impact on relations of states concerned.</p><p>A shared understanding of history often serves as a framework for post-war and post-colonial settlements. For example Germany and Japan's re-entry to the western democracies became possible only when the two states accepted critical edition of their past during the Second World War. History may serve politics in such a way, however, with the side effect of bringing about the clash between 'political correctness' and academic objectivity and impartiality. Serious academic attempts to reexamine fixed official interpretation of history are therefore often criticized as revisionism.</p><p>In an attempt to solve such a 'war of histories', bilateral/multilateral joint research projects were promoted by some states. European cases such as German-Polish and Franco-German projects on history studies were successful in forming certain degree of shared views of the past, and resulted in the publication of common school history textbooks. However, similar projects between Japan and China/Korea ended in confusion, widening the gap between different approaches to history by the three countries.</p><p>It is expected that articles in the present issue will shed new lights on the question of history and politics.</p>

著者

五野井 郁夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_159-187_170, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

参考文献数

16

著者

竹中 千春

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1984, no.76, pp.186-189, 1984-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

松川 克彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.72, pp.71-84,L9, 1982

---

The author intended to make clear the reason Poland was defenceless during the years prior to the Second World War.<br>The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck believed that total war would never break out, because he regarded Hitler's territorial and political demands <i>vis &agrave; vis</i> Poland as only a bluff. Beck's policies to settle the disputes with Germany were as follows; 1) to reply to Hitler with the same bluff, 2) to maintain closer contact with Britain in order to restrain Hitler, 3) to control Polish public opinion in order to carry out 1) and 2).<br>But Beck's plan turned out to be ineffective by the end of April, 1939, because his above-mentioned fundamental intentions from 1) to 3) all turned out to be false. Still remaining in office, he stirred up Poland to make better preparation for the War, though it seems that for Poland not many choices remained.