著者

Davin Didier

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.115-129, 2008-03-31

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In his anthology the Kyôun-shû, Ikkyû wrote four stanzas dedicated to the so-called four distinctions of Linji, a famous passage from the Record of Linji, which consists in suppressing the man (人) without suppressing the environment (境), suppressing the environment without suppressing the man, suppressing both the man and the environment, suppressing neither the man nor the environment. To examine these stanzas a thorough philological analysis is indispensable, and the precious commentaries on the Kyôun-shû, mainly by Yanagida Seizan and Hirano Sôjô, were the basis of our reading, even if we did not necessarily agree with all of their interpretations. We tried to reinterpret the poems as a whole by means of original research on their literal meaning. For these reasons, and because Ikkyû's thinking is only expressed in verses referring to Zen texts and Chinese poetry, mostly from the Tang, our article is mainly a philological reexamination of Ikkyû's stanzas in order to suggest a new reading of them. We aimed, by a concrete analysis of Ikkyû's use of citations, to bring out the primary but obviously not most important meaning of the verses and, by a contextualization with the theme of the four distinctions of Linji, to determine their doctrinal purpose. We thus reached the conclusion that Ikkyû unfolds in these stanzas a temporal process involving a double definition of terms. There is a "man" before the suppression different from the "man" after the suppression, and likewise for the "environment". Another originality of Ikkyû lies in the fact he illustrates the profane level, the level before suppression, by examples usually considered as belonging to the already enlightened world, famous Zen monks for "man" or a temple for the "environment". The level of enlightenment is then depicted as a new ideal whose very model of "man" is Ikkyû himself while the "environment" is the whole world, even in its crudest parts. Of course this conclusion needs to be refined by a wider examination of the Kyôun-shû, but we hope that we were able to demonstrate the pertinence of the method and the necessity of continuing in this way.

著者

Saito Akira

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.13-22, 2011-03-31

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初期サーンキヤ派が導入した学説の一つにpratibimba(影像)説がある。この学説は、原質(prakṛti)と純粋精神(puruṣa)との二元論に立脚する同学派にとって、いかにして、原質由来の非精神的な知性(buddhi)等が知覚という精神的ともいえる行為をなし、他方また、行為主体でないと規定された純粋精神が対象を知覚しその結果を享受する行為をなしうるのか、という根本問題への回答という文脈において導入された。じっさい同学派において純粋精神は、行為主体でなく、変化することがなく、遍在すると規定される一方、見る者、知る者、結果を享受する者等と伝統的に特徴づけられている。// サーンキヤ派のpratibimba 説については従来の研究も少なくない。『中観心論』Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā およびその注釈『論理炎論』Tarkajvālā を通して、バヴィヤによる同学説批判を論じた研究も複数ある。しかしながら、これらはいずれも『中観心論』のサンスクリット語写本の公開と本格的な校訂研究以前の成果であり、同写本とその校訂作業を基礎にした本論題に関する再検証が待たれていた。一方また、同派のpratibimba説は、イーシュヴァラクリシュナ(4–5世紀)作『サーンキヤ・カ-リカー』には見られず、伝説では第二祖のアースリ頌に帰せられるという。しかしながら、じっさいに同偈頌が引用されるのは、後代のヴァイシェーシカ派やジャイナ教徒等の手になる論典あるいは注釈文献であり、そのテキストと解釈についても今なお問題を残している。// このような意味で、『中観心論』およびその注釈『論理炎論』の第6 章「サーンキヤ派の真実[説への批判的]入門」は、サーンキヤ派による最初期のpratibimba 説を伝える資料としてきわめて重要である。本稿では、総計65偈からなる同章の中から、pratibimba 説の前主張を示す第2偈、および後主張にあたる第22,23両偈を、それぞれに対するバヴィヤの注釈内容とともに分析する。これと併せ、『中観心論』第3章「真実知の探求」第53偈と同偈に対する注釈を手掛かりとして考察し、以下のような結論を得た。// (1) バヴィヤが紹介するサーンキヤ派のpratibimba 説によれば、純粋精神は、その上に月の影像などが映し出される静かな水に喩えられる。すなわち、影像を映す水に喩えられるのは知性(buddhi)ではなく純粋精神(puruṣa)である。// (2) したがって、このばあい静かな水に喩えられる純粋精神は、知性によって確認された知覚対象を間接的に映し出すのであり、あたかもその映像の前後において水自体に変化がないように、純粋精神そのものに変化はないとサーンキヤ派は主張する。// (3) 以上のような前主張に対して、pratibimba 説は「他のものを生じる原因とはならない」「変化しない」等といわれる純粋精神の特質に矛盾する、とバヴィヤは批判する。// (4) バヴィヤはまた、初期のサーンキヤ派には、純粋精神が知性に似てはたらくことの理由を、pratibimba 説とならび、純粋精神の変異(pariṇāma)によると説く学説があったことを紹介する。この学説に対してバヴィヤは、精神性、非原因、遍在性という純粋精神本来の特質との矛盾を指摘して批判を加える。

著者

土田 龍太郎

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.17, pp.1-16, 2010-03

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シュンガ王朝没落の後に,四代四十五年にわたって續いたカーヌヴァーヤナ王朝の實態は不明である。プラーナ中のカリユガ王朝テキストによれば,第十代シュンガ王デーヴァブーミの大臣であったヴァスデーヴァが,主君を斃して創始した王朝がカーヌヴァーヤナ王朝である。// 同じカリユガ王朝テキストには,パウラヴァ王朝のジャナメージャヤ王のアシュヴァメーダ祭擧行の顛末がやや詳しく述べられてゐる。この叙述にはシュンガ王朝開祖たるプシュミトラ王の同祭擧行の實情が反映してゐると推測される。この推測に従へば,ヴァージャサネーイン派の支派たるカーヌヴァ派の婆羅門がブラフマン祭官としてプシャミトラの大祭祀の成功を助け,これをきつかけとしてかれの一族が政府宮廷内に勢力を扶植することをえ,つひには大臣となつたヴァスデーヴァがシュンガ王権を簒奪した,と考へられるのである

著者

丸井 浩

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, pp.19-59, 2012-03-31

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As the fourth of the Nyāya’s twelvefold prameya (the objects to be rightly known for the attainment of liberation), the “artha” is defined or simply described at the NS 1.1.14: gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇās tadarthāhḥ. According to Vātsyāyana, the sūtra seems simply to imply that smell, taste, colour, touch and sound, which are the qualities of earth, etc., are respectively the objects of the five (external) sense-organs. But the sūtra was interpreted differently by different scholars of Nyāya in later times. What attracts our attention, first of all, is a totally different way of analyzing the compound “pṛthivyādi-guṇāḥ.” Uddyotakara criticizes the interpretation of ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa (pṛthivyādīnāṃ guṇāḥ) as too narrow and strongly argues for dvandva (pṛthivyādīni ca gunṇāś ca), insisting that the sūtra should be taken to be the exhaustive presentation of all the perceptible entities as the artha or the indriyārtha, including three kinds of substances (pṛthivyādīni = pṛthivyaptejāṃsi), all the perceptible properties (the “guṇāḥ” in its proper sense) other than smell and the like, such as number, etc., along with motion, the higher or lower universals and even the principle of inherence, all of which are implied by the term “guṇāḥ” in its wider sense. Vācaspati clearly supports his view. On the other hand Jayanta definitely rejects the interpretation of dvandva and shows the relevance of tatpuruṣa analysis, whereas Bhāsarvajña tries to justify the dvandva interpretation. But it would be superficial to assume two lines of interpretation simply in terms of the two opposing ways of analyzing the compound. The fundamental difference lies in two divergent viewpoints of treating the concept of artha as a prameya. Both Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña emphasize the soteriological significance of valid cognition of the artha or the objects of sense-organs. Jayanta, in particular, refers to them as a cause of attachment (saktihetu) and states that those who seek liberation should contemplate them as the objects to be abandoned (heyatayā bhāvayitavyāḥ). Jayanta supports the tatpuruṣa analysis because the sūtra is meant to mention only the predominant causes of attachment. Bhāsarvajña, in contrast, insists on the dvandva interpretation because in his view it is necessary to read the sūtra as the exhaustive list of causes of “defects” (doṣa=rāgadveṣa-moha). In spite of the formal difference in the compound analysis, both of them share a soteriological viewpoint in the context of the artha as a prameya. It is difficult to conclude decisively the chronological order of their discussion, but Jayanta’s argument seems to represent a later stage. Uddyotakara’s explanation, on the other hand, concentrates on the epistemological aspect of the artha. He claims the irrelevance of tatpuruṣa interpretation on the ground that it would exclude, for instance, three substances (dravya) that should be admitted as perceptible by the authority of NS 3.1.1. He tries to justify the sūtra’s separate mention of five objects of sense from smell to sound by saying that it is specifically to show the particularity of the one-to-one relationship between each of them and its corresponding sense-organ. He never refers to the soteriological importance of the concept. Moreover, he evidently depends on the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of six categories for his enumeration of perceptible entities with a slight modification. Heavy dependence of his account of the artha upon Vaiśeṣika categories also provides a sharp contrast with Jayanta, who explicitly denied the relevance of six categories in the context of prameya, just as Vātsyāyana had done. It is relevant in this connection to examine the treatment of the artha in two representative compendiums of Nyāya System, probably written not long after Udayana (11th cent.), namely Varadarāja’s Tārkikarakṣā[-sārasaṃ graha] (12th cent.) and Keśavamiśra’s Tarkabhāṣā (around 1300 A.D.). Varadarāja defines the artha as “what can be grasped by senseorgans” (indriya-grāhya) and tries to make an exhaustive list of perceptible entities according to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories without reference to the soteriological implication of the artha. Thus, like Uddyotakara, he concentrates on its epistemological dimension. But he goes a little further by introducing the detailed account of the Vaiśeṣika doctirine of seven categories as an appendix to the description of Nyāya’s twelvefold prameya. Keśavamiśra, on the other hand, goes so far as to extend the conceptual sphere of the artha up to the whole six or seven categories of Vaiśeṣika, thus totally abandoning the soteriological meaning peculiar to the Nyāya’s idea of artha. Therefore it may safely be said that Nyāya’s concept of artha as a prameya was shifted toward the direction of diminishing emphasis on its soteriological relevance and at the same time toward the direction of a closer and closer relation with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories. Against this stream Jayanta tried to retain the traditional soteriological significance of the concept. This conclusion fits in well with the general observation that Jayanta’s account of Nyāya System generally represents its earlier phase. Incidentally, the Nyāyakalikā provides precisely the same soteriological account of the artha as we have seen above in the Nyāyamañjarī. The similarity in wording is also outstanding. These facts seem to speak for Jayanta’s authorship of the text. Even if we were to admit that someone else had composed it by extracting relevant sentences from NM with some modification, it is not likely that a compendium of such an archaic nature was written long after Udayana.

著者

上田 昇

出版者

東京大学文学部印度哲学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.5-19, 1993-09-20

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"In this paper I elucidate some semantic issues related to the notions of “extension” and “intension” which appear in the Pramāņasamuccaya(-vrtti). The main issue is "extension" of the word "śabda" in the proposition "śabdo 'nityah(Word is non-eternal)". If we regard --and I do-- "śabda" in the proposition as "sarvah śabdah", a problem arises as to the meaning of "sarva(all)". Such an interpretation of a proposition through set as is usually made in predicate logic seems not to be valid for the logic of Dignāga. That is to say, "śrāvaņatva(audibility)" can be a valid logical sign for proof of propositions such as "ayam śabdo 'nityah (This word is non-eternal)", "asau śabdo 'nityah (That word is non-eternal)", etc., whereas it is not a valid sign for proof of the proposition "śabdo 'nityah" in the logic system of Dignāga. If we modified the system of Dignāga we might possibly interpret the "sarvah śabdah" as a set of all śabda(words) and the proposition "śabdo 'nityah" as a total of propositions such as "ayam śabdo 'nityah", "asau śabdo 'nityah", etc. However, I preserve the system of Dignāga, and propose a new kind of notion of "all", which may well be termed "analogical wholeness", to resolve the above-mentioned difficulty. This "wholeness" is obtained by analogy with the notion of set in a collective sense, as was proposed in a set-theory called mereology, which Polish logician Lesniewski invented in 1916. As for "intension", it plays, it seems to me, an important role in the hierarchical structure of words and meanings in the apoha-theory of Dignāga. This issue is touched on slightly in the first and final sections.

著者

He Huanhuan

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.23-37, 2011-03-31

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『思択炎論』Tarkajvālā を構成する全11章の中で、第7章「ヴァイシェーシカ派の真実[説]の確定」に関しては、従来、比較的研究が乏しかった。その主な理由は、同論が注釈対象とする根本偈、すなわち『中観心論』Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā のサンスクリット写本が、同章のほぼ全体を収める第18フォリオ(葉)を欠いているからである。総計で29偈からなる同章の中では、最後の2偈のみは第19フォリオの第1行目に置かれるため、サンスクリット語で入手可能であるが、それ以前の27偈は、残念ながらチベット語訳のみに拠らざるを得ないのが現況である。// 『思択炎論』の第7章における著者バヴィヤの主要な意図は、初期ヴァイシェーシカ派の典籍で主張されるアートマンおよび六原理(padārtha、句義)に対する批判的な分析を通して、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論を考察、批判することにあった。バヴィヤは、序説および第1偈においてヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論を紹介し、その前主張、とくに第1偈にとりまとめた解脱論を、第2偈以降に置かれた後主張の中の第23偈から第28偈において、句(pāda)ごとに批判を加える。バヴィヤによるヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論の紹介と批判は、初期ヴァーシェーシカ派の主要な思想を伝えるばかりでなく、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論に対する当時の仏教徒による批判の一端を示している点できわめて興味深く、貴重な資料である。// バヴィヤは、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論をいかに理解したのか。かれによるヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論の紹介は、はたして『ヴァイシェーシカ・スートラ』のみに依拠したのであろうか。あるいは、プラシャスタパーダ作の『パダールタダルマサングラハ(諸原理と法の綱要)』(Padārthadharmasaṃgraha)等のヴァイシェーシカ派の他の著作の影響があったのであろうか。さらにまた、かれは議論に際して、意図して仏教の教理を援用し、結果としてヴァイシェーシカ学説を歪曲するようなことはなかったと言えるであろうか。// 本論文では、とくにバヴィヤに伝えられたヴァイシェーシカ学説の典拠を探り、かれの批判の内容に分析を加えながら、以上のような関連する複数の問いに対する基礎的な回答を提示したい。

著者

徐 海基

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.46-59, 1999-03-30

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The central problem addressed in this paper is the explanation of the dharma-dhātu (法界) as it is presented by Cheng-guan (澄観, 738-839), the fourth patriarch of the Hua-yan (華厳) school of Chinese Buddhism. The Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit word dharma-dhātu developed into a central idea expressing the ultimate truth and the world view of the Hua-yan sūtra as presented by Zhi-yan (智儼, 602-668) of the Hua-yan school. After passing through the systemization of Hua-yan doctrine by Zhi-yan and Fa-zang (法蔵, 643-712), this Hua-yan view of the dharma-dhātu was completed by Cheng-guan, and it is called the four kinds of dharma-dhātu. The present paper focusses on the following points: How did Cheng-guan understand the dharmadhātu and how did he explain it? By considering all his commentaries related to Hua-yan thought, I will show that his predominant interest was focussed on the problem of the dharma-dhātu, and I will try to show that the explanation given by Cheng guan is divided into three parts: 1) The dharma-dhātu as characterized by non-obstruction of noumenon and phenomena (理事無碍). This is the basis of Cheng-guan's understanding of the dharma-dhātu, and he comprehends these two as inexhaustible and non-obstructed. He develops the concept further, culminating the "Four dharma-dhātus theory". Here he was influenced by the text "On the meditation of Hua-yan dharmadhātu (法界観門)" ascribed to Du-shun (杜順). 2) The dharma-dhātu of cause and effect (因果) and dependent origination (縁起). When discussing the principal chararcteristics of the Hua-yan sūtra, he explains cause and effect and dependent origination as being placed on one line. He does this because he analyzes the sūtra as consisting of sequences of cause and effect. Consequently, if one considers the relationship of this idea to Bodhisattva practices (菩薩行), then the Hua -yan sūtra itself takes the position of practice, and the sequence of practice expressed as the circularity of the five steps of cause and effect (五周因果) becomes a concept of great importance. 3) The dharma-dhātu as the origin (根源性) and the ultimate (究極性). This is an interpretation starting from the point of view of nature-origination (性気), meaning that the dharma-dhātu is not only the truth one has to attain finally, but is at the same time the origin that brings forth all things. Cheng guan says about the dharma-dhātu that from the ultimate viewpoint it is not only the basis of the Hua-yan sūtra but of all other sūtras and dharmas as well, and it is from a fimdamental viewpoint the basis of the delusion (迷) and enlightenment (悟) of beings, from which the Buddha as well as Bodhisattvas appear. Because it is further regarded as not being separate from the Pure One Mind, it is defined as the basis of Bodhisattva practices. The way Cheng-guan understood the concept of "the dharma-dhātu viz. the one mind" is basically founded on the traditional "Awakening of faith" - like understanding predominant in the Hua-yan school, but one can detect some influence of the meditation of śūnyatā (空観) as well. Further, the understanding of the "Ten mysterious gates (十玄門) " as being the concrete content of the dharma-dhātu is considered to be based on the concept of "cittamātra (唯心, consciousness-only)", and this had a big influence in giving direction to the further development of Hua-yan doctrine after Yan shou (永明延寿, 904-75) later in the Song period (宗代). As mentioned above, we can interpret Cheng-guan's understanding of the dharma-dhātu as having three forms and categories. In addition, by means of interpretation one would recognize more clearly and deeply that the dharma-dhātu is an important feature of Hua-yan thought.

著者

張 文良

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.10, pp.46-60, 2003-03

著者

張 文良

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.95-106, 2013-03-31

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According to Lü Cheng, the Consciousness-Only or Yogācāra School of Indian Buddhism claims that the essence of all sentient beings is “tathatā,” which is lack of cognitive ability, and therefore is a theory of what he calls“Primal Purity.” On the other hand, he claims that Chinese Buddhist philosophers believe that the nature of all sentient beings is pure and intelligent, by their theory of “Original Bodhi.” With these contrasting, Lü Cheng claims that there is a radical rupture between Chinese Buddhism and Indian Buddhism, and he regards Indian Buddhism as orthodox, Chinese Buddhism is therefore “pseudo-Buddhism.” Lü Cheng’s criticism of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism points out a difference between Chinese and Indian Buddhist theories, which may be valuable for understanding Chinese Buddhism. However, in contrast to Lü’s analysis, Buddha-nature and tathāgata-garbha theory are both found in Indian Buddhism originally, and in fact are both the source of the theory of “Original Bodhi” found in Chinese Buddhism. Furthermore, there is the tradition of “Original Bodhi” and “Primal Purity” in Chinese Buddhism as well, the latter is represented by the thought of Consciousness-only (weishi zong 唯識宗) school in Chinese Buddhism. Therefore, in contrast to Lü’s view, there is in fact both continuity and discontinuity between Chinese and Indian Buddhism, and Lü Cheng’s chracterization of Chinese Buddhism as “Original Bodhi” cannot be considered complete. Altogether, as for Lü Cheng’s Buddhist research methodology, he is unsatisfied with the current objective Buddhist research, and tries to put a value judgment on Buddhist thought from his standpoint of the Consciousness-Only or Yogācāra School of Indian Buddhism, criticizing what he considered “pseudo-buddhism.” With regard to his research method, further discussion is required.

著者

金 京南

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.61-75, 2003-03-20

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In this paper, I examine how the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra 入法界品, the last chapter of the Hua-yen ching 華厳経, was interpreted in the Chinese Hua-yen school, specifically clarifying the differences between the interpretations of Chih-yen 智儼(602-668) and his disciple Fa-tsang 法蔵(643-712). Paying attention especially to their theories regarding the "division" of the sutra into smaller sections, I examine both their interpretations from two angles: 1) interpreting the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra within the Hua-yen ching, and 2) interpreting the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra by itself. Chih-yen advances a theory of three divisions in his Sou-hsuan chi 捜玄記, and therein he suggests two views on the liu-t'ung-fen 流通分. 1) The Hua-yen ching originally consisted of one hundred thousand gathas, of which only thirty-six thousand gathas now remain, and the liu-t'ung-fen is missing. This means that the liu-t'ung-fen never existed. 2) In the sutra, the last two gathas are considered to correspond to the liu-t'ung-fen. The first view is based on the assumption that the sutra consists of one hundred thousand gathas, excluding the liu-t'ung-fen, and the second, that the sutra consists of thirty-six thousand gathas which include the liu-t'ung-fen. This means that, in Chih-yen's three divisions, the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra either belongs to the cheng-tsung-fen 正宗分, or includes both the cheng-tsung-fen and the liu-t'ung-fen. Chih-yen, influenced by Chih-cheng 智正(559-639), also divided the cheng-tsung-fen into four parts, the last of which is the i-yuan hsiu-hsing cheng-te fen 依縁修行成徳分. To this belong the "Li-shih-chien p'in" 離世間品 and the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra. The latter is also called the i-jen ju-cheng fen 依人入証文. For Chih-yen, the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra represented a Buddhist teaching of realization (cheng 証) which perfects ascetic training through shan-chih-shih 善知識. This was the very chapter from which began the enlightenment of sentient beings. Fa-tsang's three divisions developed from his Wen-i kang-mu 文義網目, which does not admit the liu-t'ung-fen, to the T'an-hsuan chi 探玄記. In the meantime, he bolstered his arguments with the concept of dharmadhātu (fa-chieh 法界) and, furthermore, emphasized the One Vehicle character of the Hua-yen ching, taking the Three Vehicle character as the liu-t'ung-fen. In addition, basing himself on Chih-yen's four divisions, he suggested a theory of five divisions. He views the structure of the Hua-yen ching as being fully provided with hsin 信 (faith), chieh 解 (understanding), hsing 行 (practice), and cheng 証 (realization). The Gaņdavyūha-sūtra comes under the Buddhist teaching of cheng-ju 証入. Chih-yen put emphasis on the importance of shan-chih-shih in dividing the inner structure of the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra. He categorizes all shan-chih-shih into five types. This method of categorizing was taken over by Fa-tsang. The main characteristic of Fa-tsang's method of dividing the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra lies in his distinguishing of the essential assembly (pen-hui 本会) from the secondary assembly (mo-hui 末会). To sum up, the main difference between the two theories can be reduced to the way in which emphasis is put either on the concept of shan-chih-shih or on that of dharmadhātu. Chih-yen emphasized the former, Fa-tsang the latter. This difference shows the development of understanding the Gaņdavyūha-sūtra, from Chih-yen's practical interpretation to Fa-tsang's rather theoretical one.

著者

Giglio Emanuele D.

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.107-121, 2013-03-31 (Released:2013-09-24)

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The True Characteristic of All Dharmas (Shohō Jissō-shō 諸法実相抄) is traditionally believed to be one of the twelve epistles sent by Nichiren (日蓮, 1222–1282) to the ex-Tendai monk Sairen-bō (最蓮房, 13th century) during their exile on Sado Island. Because the only surviving copy of this epistle is the one included in The Writings “Outside the Records” in Binded Fascicles (Rokuge-gappon 録外合本) from 1480 by Nicchō (日朝, 1422–1500), the eleventh abbot of Kuon-ji monastery (久遠寺), it is classified as one of Nichiren’s “nonautographical writings” (Shahon-ibun 写本遺文). The present study aims to introduce some relevant problems about the origin of The True Characteristic of All Dharmas, with due consideration given to the results of research realized by several scholars on the biography of Sairen-bō, and on the circumstances of the collection of Nichiren’s writings following his death. Clarifying the origin of this epistle can lead us to a deeper understanding of the relationship between Nichiren’s non-autographical writings and Medieval Tendai Thought (Chūko Tendai-gi 中古天台義). As I argue, upon his return from Sado Island, Sairen-bō brought the original text of The True Characteristic of All Dharmas, along with the other eleven epistles he received from Nichiren, to Kyoto, where he concluded his life. However, another collection of Nichiren’s writings, The Writings “Inside the Records” in Binded Fascicles (Rokunai-gappon 録内合本) compiled by Nicchō from 1479, includes four other epistles to Sairen-bō. This fact leads us to the hypothesis that the material that became the primary source of both The Writings “Inside” and “Outside the Records” in Binded Fascicles was delivered from Kyōto to Minobu respectively by the third abbot of Kuon-ji monastery, Nisshin (日進, 1271–1347), who copied epistles to Sairen-bō while in Kyoto, and by the twelfth abbot Nichi’i (日意, 1444–1519), disciple of Nicchō, during his mission in the capital between 1470 and 1479. I argue that considering that the primary sources for both The Writings “Inside” and “Outside the Records” in Binded Fascicles were still being transferred from Kyoto since the time of Nisshin, these two compilations by Nicchō were nothing more than a copy of what was already arranged earlier. Moreover, this fact makes plausible the hypothesis that the origin of The True Characteristic of All Dharmas arose before the second half of 15th century, and suggests the necessity of further verifying the movements not only of Sairen-bō but also of Nisshin and Nichi’i.

著者

酒井 真道

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.77-93, 2013-03-31

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For hundreds of years following the appearance of Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna i.e., the inference of momentariness from the existence of things, his successors were challenged to carefully analyze his argument. They did so by identifying its various parts and defending their formulation from a variety of opponents. Dharmottara is one such successor of Dharmakīrti. This paper focuses on Dharmottara’s contribution to the discussion of the inferential reason—existence (sattva)—and his attempts at resolving problems with it. In his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Dhamottara introduces and then argues against the view of his opponents that the inferential reason, ‘existence,’ is a pseudoreason. According to his opponents: 1) If this inferential reason were established by a source of knowledge (pramāṇa), it would be opposed (viruddha), since, according to them, existence has to be characterized by permanence (nityatva), which is opposed to the property to be proved i.e., momentariness. They argue that when a source of knowledge is used to ascertain that something is existent (sat), it also ascertains that that thing is permanent (nitya); 2) In contrast, if this inferential reason were not established by a source of knowledge, it would be unestablished (asiddha). Thus, in both cases, the inferential reason would be a pseudo-reason, since it would either be opposed or unestablished. Dharmottara responds to these objections by explaining the functioning of a source of knowledge (pramāṇavyāpāra). He argues that it is not possible for the same source of knowledge to be used to make two different judgments (adhyavasāya). This is because making a judgment can only consist in a single exclusion (ekavyāvr tti). Suppose that a source of knowledge e.g., perception is used to judge that something is existent. This source of knowledge leads to this judgment by excluding that thing from whatever is non-existent (asat)—that is, from things that do not fulfill a specific purpose (anarthakriyā) for the perceiver. The functioning of this source of knowledge is said to come to an end with this exclusion. Thus, it is impossible for this source of knowledge, which has already been used to judge, through exclusion, that something is existent, to itself generate the further judgment that this same thing is permanent. In his overall argument, Dharmottara explains the role that perception plays in ascertaining the existence of a thing, which then serves as the inferential reason from which a thing’s momentariness is inferred. In the intellectual history of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, Dharmottara’s explanation appears to be influential. For example, it seems to have influenced Jñānaśrīmitra when he discusses the issue of how to establish the “inferential reason in the site of the inference (pakṣadharmatā)” for the sattvānumāna. In concluding this paper, I explore Dharmottara’s influence on this aspect of Jñānaśrīmitra’s discussion.

著者

曺 潤鎬

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.54-66, 1996-12-20

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The Yuan-chueh ching (圓覺經 Perfect Enlightenment Sutra, hereafter YCC) is one of the most important texts in studies of East Asian Buddhism from the 8th century onwards. This paper examines the age, background, and intellectual characteristics of this Sutra by analyzing from a historical perspective some concepts and theories which make up its intellectual framework. The main findings are as follows: 1. The subject of the Sutra is "Yuan-chueh" (圓覺). This concept has already being seen in the Jen-wang pan-jo po-lo-mi ching (仁王般若波羅密經), Ta-sheng chih-kuan fa-men (大乘止觀法門), and Shou leng-yen ching (首楞嚴經 Heroic Valour Sutra, hereafter SLC). However, this concept is presented for the first time in the YCC as "the Root and Absolute Truth" and "Ultimate Stage" at which the training person should aim. Therefore, it is clear that the "Yuan-chueh" of this Sutra developed from the examples in those earlier texts, and especially from the thought of "Yuan" (圓) of the SLC. In addition, We can guess that ideas such as "Harmony and Non-Obstruction" (圓融無礙) and "Non-Obstruction of Totality in Complete Freedom" (圓通無礙) of Hua-yen and Tien-t'ai Buddhism lie behind this "Yuan". 2. The theory that "Sentient beings are originally Buddha" (衆生本來成佛) which is explained in this Sutra tries to eliminate the stage between the sentient beings and Buddha. This does not mean that enlightenment is possible and potential but rather that enlightenment has been achieved originally in the present reality of the sentient being. This concept that "Sentient beings are originally Buddha" does not appear before the YCC. We can therefore say that this original theory concerning the Attainment of Buddhahood developed from the thought of Buddhahood (佛性) and Tath?gatagarbha explained in a series of past Sutra and Abhidharma. Furthermore, this theory is promoted aggressively from the Attainment of Buddhahood of Hua-yen and Ch'an Buddhism, where it is expressed in the idea that "Evil passions are themselves enlightenment and birth and death is itself Nirvana" (煩惱即菩提, 生死即涅槃). 3. The Tath?gata-garbha and Last Dharma (末法) theories of this sutra are inherited from the ideas which flourished in China around the 7th and 8th centuries. There is thus an obvious and direct relationship to the Heroic Valour Sutra. 4. An original theory of training is explained in the YCC. This Sutra stands basically on the concept of sudden enlightenment (頓悟), but on the other hand the theory of training is also preached. This coexistence of the ideas, that sudden enlightenment is united with gradual practice (漸修), and that the method of the training such as ?amatha, sam?patti and dhy?na, show a clear relationship between the YCC and the SLC. 5. This Sutra has the SLC as its intellectual foundation. On top of this foundation it builds up an original theory, keeping thoughts such as the "Awakening of Faith, Hua-yen, Tien-t'ai, Ch'an, Tath?gata-garbha, and Last Dharma" in view. 6. As for the purpose of the YCC, it can be said that this Sutra is made directly for general monks, and is arranged from a basic standpoint of Mahayana Buddhism. It aims to establish a doctrinal dependence place by arranging from an overall viewpoint the influential ideas in Chinese Buddhism at that time. 7. Concerning the age of the YCC, it is certain that it was composed after the SLC. Kiyotaka Kimura estimates that the latter was composed around 713 years at the very earliest. And he says that it does not go back to the age of writing of K'ai-yuan-shih-chiao-lu (開元釋教録). By extension, we can guess that the YCC was composed in the 720s, only a few years before it appeared in K'ai-yuan-shih-chiao-lu in 730.

著者

一色 大悟

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.39-54, 2009-03-31

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In early buddhist sūtra texts “asaṃskṛta” is a term used as a synonym for nirvāṇa, the ultimate purpose of buddhists. Disciples in Sarvāstivāda, one of the most influential buddhist sects in india, regarded asaṃskṛta as dharma, and in their abhidharma texts they classified three kinds of dharma, that is to say pratisaṃkhyānirodha, apratisaṃkhyānirodha and ākāśa, into asaṃskṛtadharma. According to the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy these three asaṃskṛtadharmas are real-entities ( dravyasat ); on the other hand scholars of Sautrāntika / Dārṣṭāntika denied the real-entityness of them. This article deals with the controversy about real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas appeared in abhidharma texts, in particular *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (『阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論』, MV ), *Tattvasiddhi (『成實論』, TS ), Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ( AKBh ) and *Nyāyānusāriṇī (『阿毘達磨順正理論』, NA ). The argument for acknowledging the real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas in TS, AKBh and NA is grounded on the possibility of cognizing intrinsic nature ( svabhāva ) of asaṃskṛtadharmas.And scholars who accepted this argument considered that the possibility can be reasoned from the possibility of cognizing results of activities of intrinsic nature. Saṅghabhadra, the author of NA, affirmed that ākāśa has an activity of receiving ākāṣadhātu and that apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha has an activity of constant obstruction to the arising of those factors whose nature is to arise ( 可生法, *utpattidharmaka ). On the other hand in TS, AKBh and NA pratisaṃkhyānirodha is considered as the dharma whose intrinsic nature and an activity can not be cognized by anybody except āryas. Then Vaibhāṣikas who appear in AKBk and Saṅghabhadra reinforced the argument of real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas with finding out their characteristics which are inherent only in beings. According to NA non-beings are neither distinguishable, cognizable, nor describable, but pratisaṃkhyānirodha is not accepted as such a thing, so it is a being. And furthermore, it is not a being as a provisional designation ( prajñaptisat ) by any possibility, therefore it must be a real-entity. From the viewpoint of those who denied the real-entityness of three asaṃskṛtadharmas each of them is a non-being. In TS ākāśa has an active influence on spatial beings with its non-beingness, but pratisaṃkhyānirodha is a mere non-being. And according to AKBh a statement that pratisaṃkhyānirodha exists is only a negation ( pratiṣedhamātra ) and indicate non-beings. Saṅghabhadra considered this “existence” is not only existence as a real entity, but also existence as a provisional designation.

著者

吉次 通泰

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.18, pp.55-69, 2011-03

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The subject of ageing and lifespan was studied in ancient Indian medical texts, such as Carakasaṃhitā (CS), Suśrutasaṃhitā (SS), Aṣṭāṅgasaṃgraha (AS) and Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā (AHS). According to the 4 texts, age was defined as the state of body dependent on the length of time lived, and was broadly divided into three periods—childhood (–16 years), adulthood (16–60 or 70 years) and senescence (60 or 70 years and over). Further SS and AS subdivided the age into smaller stages as follows: childhood —kṣīrapa, kṣīrānnāda, and annāda; adulthood — vṛddhi, yauvana, sampūrṇatā, and parihāni. While taking up the management of the patient, the physician should examine the lifespan as a starting point in diagnosis. To determine the lifespan of the patient, his body was first measured as a whole and then each of the body parts were measured in terms of aṅgula (finger's breadth measurement) of his hand, and also his sāras were considered, depending upon the state (excellence, purity, and predominance) of each one of the dhātu and manas. The lifespan of the person depends on the interaction between the forces of daiva (deeds done in the previous life) and puruṣakāra (deeds done in the present life). There is considerable variation in the strength of both forces, with them possibly being mild, medium or intense. When both daiva and puruṣakāra are strong, the lifespan is long, happy and predetermined. while both are weak, the lifespan is short, unhappy and changeable. So the average human lifespan is clearly determined by both genetics and the environment in this view. A weak daiva can be subdued by a stronger puruṣakāra. Therefore a wholesome lifestyle is the basis of longevity and an unwholesome lifestyle will result in a short lifespan.We must understand that if we want to live longer, it is necessary to live properly.

著者

馬場 紀寿

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.17-31, 2003-03-20

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The Interpretation of the Paţiccasamuppādangas in the Mahāvihāra Theravāda tradition changed in the order of the "Vibhasigasutta", Vibhańga, VIsuddhimagga and the commentaries on the Vinaya and the four Nikāyas. In this paper, I examine the process of change in these different interpretations. (1) The "Vibhańgasutta" (Samyuttanikāyu Nidānavagga2) is the only sutta in the four Nikāyas that describes paţiccasamuppāda as having twelve ańgas and defines all twelve paţiccasamuppādańgas. (2) The "Suttantabhājaniya" section of the "Paccayākāravibhańga" chapter in the Vibhańga follows almost the same definitions of the paţiccasamuppādańgas as are found in the "Vibhańgasutta", but changes the definitions of sańkhārā, nāma, and bhava. "Vibhańgasutta" → Vibhańga (a) sańkhārā : kāya-, vacī-, mano-sańkhāra → puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-, kāya-, vacī-, mano-(abhi)sańkhāra (b) nāma : v edanā, sañña, cetanā, phassa, manasikāra → sañña-, sańkhāra-, viññāna-kkhandha (As a result of this change, viññāna and nāmarūpa came to mean pañcakkhandha) (c) bhava : kāma-, rūpa-, arūpa-bhava. → kamma-, uppatti-bhava These changes made both "sańkhārā ⇒ viññāna・nāmarūpa" and "bhava ⇒ jāti" common causation as follows. (a) sańkhārā ⇒ viññāna → nāmarūpa = puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra ⇒ khandhā kāya-, vaci-, mano-sańkhārā (b) bhava ⇒ jāti = kamma-bhava (including puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra) ⇒ khandhā uppatti-bhava ※jāti is defined as "khandhānam pātubhāvo" (the appearance of khandhā) in the Vibhanga. But in this text the standpoints of "kayia-, vaci-, mano-sańkhārā" and "uppatti-bhavia" are not yet clear. (3) The Visuddhimagga basically follows the same definition of the paţiccasamuppādańgas as found in the Vibhańga rather than those of the "Vibhańgasutta". Moreover, the Visuddhimagga interpretes the six sańkhāras as three sańkhāras, and restricts bhava as being the cause of jāti to only kammabhava. (a) sańkhārā ⇒ viññāna → nāmarūpa = puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra ⇒ khandhā (b) bhava ⇒ jāti = kamma-bhava (including puñña-, apuñña-, āneñja-abhisańkhāra) ⇒ khandhā Therefore, it is clear those the Vrsuddhimagga interpretes both "sańkhārā" ⇒ viññāna→nāmarūpa" and "bhava ⇒ jāti" as "kamma (action) ⇒ rebirth". With these interpretations, Paţiccasamuppāda theory came to explain the causation of the past, present, and future. (4) The commentary on the Vinaya (Samantapāsādikā) and the commentaries on the four Nikāyas (Sumańgalavilāsinī, Papañcasūdanī, Sāratthappakāsinī, Manorathapūranī) do not explain paţiccasamuppāda in detail and advise readers to study it by reading the Visuddhimagga. Thus, the Visuddhimagga represents the final stage in the interpretation of paţiccasamuppāda theory.