著者
川鍋 健
出版者
一橋大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.15, no.2, pp.799-853, 2016-07

While the great series of constitutional theory, We the People, written by Professor Bruce A. Ackerman, vividly describes what We the People in the U. S. has achieved in the constitutional canon without the form of the amendment, his historiography does not succeed in justifying why the existing We the People has to obey such an illegitimate Constitution. This article, firstly, clarifies his theory's failure with both the methodology of 'history of law' and 'history and law.' The evidence shows his methodology of 'historicism' cannot define what the constitutional canon should be or should have been although it can define what the constitutional canon is or was. Secondly, comparing Ackerman's recent fundamental idea, 'living Constitution,' with Professor D. Strauss's one, this article refers to the common expectation regarding court's activities creating the constitutional canon and promoting democracy. However, in conclusion, this article asserts the thought of 'living Constitution' still fails to justify the illegitimacy of the U. S. Constitution even though modern constitutional studies conceived the constitutional illegitimacy as a significant topic through his contribution.
著者
川鍋 健
出版者
一橋大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.16, no.1, pp.165-206, 2017-03

This article considers Professor Jack M. Balkin's text on the methodology of constitutional interpretation, Living Originalism, and his historical narrative of legitimating the U.S. Constitution, Constitutional Redemption. In both books, Balkin's commitment to equal citizenship of the U.S. Constitution and abundant reference to American history are influenced by Professor Bruce A. Ackerman's constitutional theory. This article recognizes that Balkin's dichotomy between "hard-wired" rules and abstract principles in constitutional interpretation succeeds in justifying a broad constitutional construction including apparently illegitimate constitutional changes such as Reconstruction and the New Deal. In addition, this article concedes that Balkin's acceptance and revision of constitutional historicism from Ackerman's theory are convincing because the dynamism of constitutional security, Living Constitutionalism, can be normatively controllable through historical reference even though Living Constitutionalism is frequently conceived of as approval of easy transition of the Constitution. This article also supports Balkin's implication that positive judgment of the Constitution by the judiciary contributes to promotion of democracy and popular sovereignty as establishment of equal citizenship. Finally, this article alludes to the applicability of Balkin's theory to the Japanese Constitution.
著者
丸山 政己
出版者
一橋大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17, no.3, pp.95-114, 2018-11-10

The balance between dynamic evolution and legal stability or fragmentation and integration of international legal order are always challenges for multilateral treaty regimes. This is partly related to the traditional debate on the status of the constituent instrument of international organizations(IOs)―particularly of IOs' own practice―in treaty interpretation. In this regard, the ILC adopted the Draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties(the Conclusions) in 2018. The Conclusions is relatively self-restraining and remains within consensualism in international law. However, there are some remarkable points: clarification of subsequent practice of not the all parties as a supplementary means under Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ; a broader concept of the IOs' practice(Conclusion 12- 3); and indication of controversial evolutive interpretation while revision by subsequent practice is generally excluded. An examination of the Conclusions and its commentaries suggests fundamental issues to be explored. First, while the inherent doctrine of interpretation of constituent instruments still has its rationale, we have faced increasing diversity shown by various IOs. Is it really possible of general doctrine for every IO? Second, how can the extent and conditions of de facto revision by subsequent practice be found from the perspective of global constitutionalism? Lastly, reconstructing the concept of IOs' practice including organs not composed of member states, can we pursue legal control mechanisms in IOs? The agreement of all the parties will remain pivotal unless these issues are seriously addressed.
著者
森村 進
出版者
一橋大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, no.2, pp.207-221, 2002-06

論文タイプ||研究ノート
著者
高橋 和也
出版者
一橋大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.17, no.3, pp.321-403, 2018-11-10

The German federal constitutional court says in its "communal decision law ruling (1979)" that it uses three measures for judging the validity of the legislature's prediction. But this theory, which is called a "three-step theory", has two obscure points. The first is how to divide these three measures' occasion of use. The second is how to interpret constitution in this theory. This article proposes to promote an understanding these two points. Part II analyses the contents of the "communal decision law ruling". What was fought in this ruling was the constitutionality of the law, which violates human rights moderately. The judge used mild measures in this ruling. Part III analyses two rulings quoted by the "communal decision law ruling". What was fought in the "pharmacist law ruling(1958)" was the constitutionality of the law, which violates human rights seriously. The judge used strict measures in this ruling. In the "basic treaty ruling(1973)", the constitutionality of the treaty, which did not violate human rights, was fought. In this ruling, extremely mild measures were used. Part IV analyses where these three rulings cross. These measures are used on the basis of the seriousness of the human rights violation("principle of proportionality"). The reason for this is that the court regards the function as "protection of human rights". So, behind this "three-step theory" is the way to interpret constitution, which attaches importance to the function of national facilities.
著者
権 容[ソク]
出版者
一橋大学
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, no.1, pp.71-91, 2007-03
著者
森村 進
出版者
一橋大学
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, no.1, pp.3-22, 2006-03
被引用文献数
1
著者
盛 誠吾
出版者
一橋大学
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, no.2, pp.356-388, 2002-06-30

論文タイプ||論説
著者
盛 誠吾
出版者
一橋大学
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, no.3, pp.565-640, 2002-11-10

論文タイプ||論説
著者
加藤 友佳
出版者
一橋大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, no.2, pp.515-532, 2015-07-10

In this paper, I discuss issues on same-sex marriage and inheritance tax, mainly based on the case of Burden v United Kingdom, Windsor v. United States of America. The Civil Partnership Act 2004 granted the same rights that married couples enjoy - including that for inheritance tax - to civil partnership couples but not to family members. In Burden's case, plaintiffs asked the European Court of Human Rights for the same tax rights as married and civil partnership couples, which do not apply to cohabiting siblings. On the other hand, in the United States, DOMA had a substantive provision : Section 3 provided that for all purposes under federal law, marriage would be defined only as the union of one man and one woman. Because of this provision, for same-sex couples exemption from the federal estate tax was denied, and therefore, the plaintiff challenged DOMA as unconstitutional. Nowadays, the controversy surrounding LGBT rights has become heated, especially about same-sex marriage. It would seem that the need to discuss LGBT rights in economic terms is becoming increasingly important.
著者
石田 剛
出版者
一橋大学大学院法学研究科
雑誌
一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.14, no.3, pp.957-983, 2015-11

In diesem Beitrag wird davon behandelt, ab wann der Eigenbesitz vom Verkäufer im Prozess der Erfüllung eines Kaufvertrags in Fremdbesitz umgewandelt wird. Es handelt sich hier darum, ob ein Besitzvermittlungsverhältnis zwischen Verkäufer und Käufer nach dem Kaufvertragabschluss automatisch entsteht oder, es dazu irgendeinen zusätzlichen Willensakt von Vertragsparteien (insbesondere vom Verkäufer) benötigt. Dabei muss man auf die Voraussetzung für die Entstehung des Besitzmittlungsverhältnisses sowie die Bedeutung eines Besitzkonsituts Rücksicht nehmen. Der Beitrag will die Beurteilungskriterien von der Natur des Besitzes des Verkäufers klar machen und dabei auf das subjektive Ellement (Besitzvermittlungswille) vom Verkäufer und die Umstände in Einzellfällen Gewicht legen.