著者

蓮見 雄

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.24, pp.125-143,315, 2004-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

参考文献数

33

被引用文献数

5 1

---

The Kaliningrad problems are the test of Europe after enlargement of the EU. The EU is confronted with the question how to realize the Eastward enlargement without creating a new dividing line between the enlarged EU and Russia. On one hand, it requests future Member States to tighten the control of their borders with external areas. On the other hand, it seeks for closer cooperation with Russia.Accession negotiations have been separated from external affairs over the years. Kaliningrad, —a Russian exclave—has been treated as if another mere Russian border. But the daily life of the people there depends on Visa-free transit between its borders of Poland and Lithuania, based on a historical heritage of the past Communist bloc. With the failure of the Special Economic Zone due to conflicts between Moscow and Kaliningrad, it brings about soft security problems (shadow economy, illegal activities, and pollutions), which pose a threat to the security of the whole Europe.Kaliningrad, which is located on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, will become a Russian enclave within the enlarged EU and find itself enclosed by Schengen borders causing access problems for outsiders. It might broaden the socio-economic gap between the EU and this region, and make Russia isolated. Eventually, it would threaten the sustainability of the region.Therefore, the prospect for getting rid of the gap is vital to solve the Kaliningrad problems. In other words, the future development of Kaliningrad is closely linked to building the Wider Europe, including the Common European Economic Space between the EU and Russia. Recently Russian government is making the development plan based on the national strategy to change Kaliningrad from Symbols of dividing to Footholds of cooperation, coming close to the EU system through the Common European Economic Space.Economy and social life in Kaliningrad are sensitive to external factors—EU and NATO expansion to the east. There is a need for favorable international relations and a stable legal and institutional environment of the market, which are based on the balance of various economic and political factors. Without cooperation of neighbouring countries, Kaliningrad is not an advantageous region as a Russian gateway to Europe. But its unique geographical location—enclave within the enlarged EU—offers opportunities for more cooperation and more prosperity for the people there. It could be able to play the role as a pilot region, where the EU and Russia discuss issues affecting common interests and work together to realize cooperation experimentally. Now the EU and Russia are Ever Closer partners in a Wider Europe.The Northern Dimension aims to intensify cross border cooperation between the EU and Northeast regions of Russia, creating security and stability and addressing the problems related to uneven development in the region. And its concept might be applied to the cooperation with European CIS (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) in the future. In the process of building Europe with no dividing, St. Petersburg could restore the traditional position—a Russian window to Europe—and Kaliningrad could play the role of its Satellite. The slogan—Russia in Europe—is an effective trademark for the Kaliningrad playing a major role in its closer ties with Europe.

著者

東野 篤子

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.20, pp.210-234,343, 2000-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

---

This paper analyses the process of the preparation for the EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Counties (CEECs) from the Madrid European Council in 1995 to the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. It sheds light on and compares roles played by main actors of the European Union, i. e. the European Commission, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. It also argue that there was a clear division of labour between the Commission and the Member Countries, before and after the publication of the Opinion for the Enlargement (‘Agenda 2000’).The agreement between France and Germany in the mid-November in 1995 created an important foundation for the EU to agree at the Madrid Summit to speed up the preparation for enlargement process. This enabled the Commission to launch the enormous task for preparing the Agenda 2000'. The role of the Commission was dominant and decisive, in processing huge data, contacting the applicants and diffusing information from time to time concerning technical evaluations by the Commission both to the applicants and Member States.In the meantime, the three main Member States were consolidating their positions toward enlargement issues, rather than committing the process actively. Partly as the result of the efforts for policy co-ordinations between Germany and France (especially in the framework of the “Weimer triangle”), the position of the French Government gradually shifted towards that of the German; it started to admit the possibilities to start the accession negotiation with the most prepared candidates (i. e. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic).The United Kingdom has always been a strong advocate for the EU enlargement Eastwards. Despite changes of government throughout this period, there seemed to be no major policy change between the Conservative and the Labour government; in favour of an early enlargement, with the most prepared CEECs, i. e. Vishgrads (and Baltic countries).Thus, when the Commission submitted the ‘Agenda 2000’ there were little difference in the positions of the three Member States. It means that there already exited a ground to admit the method proposed by the Commission (to start the accession negotiation with the 6 applicants) was created without harsh bargaining between the Member States, well before the Luxembourg Summit. Rather, the focus of the discussion was to keep the ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ of the entire negotiation process, without leaving the ‘second waves’ outsides. Here, the role played by the French government, advocating the idea of the European Conference, which is to gather all the applicants into one umbrella, is remarkable. And the British government, who determined to commit to the European Affairs stronger than its previous government, and tried to take an advantage of taking the next EU Presidency, committed actively to rap up the agreement for the Luxembourg.

著者

長谷川 秀樹

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.20, pp.258-279,347, 2000

---

POSEI (Program of Special Options for Island Remoteness and Insular Nature in French) is founded in 1989 by an initiative of France which has some remote island oversea regions (so-called DOMs). And in 1991 EC council decided that three Atlantic island regions (Canary Islands, Madeira and Azores) are selected as a region covered by POSEI.<br>Different from PTOM (Oversea Island Countries and Territories in French) islands for example French TOMs, oversea British islands and Dependency which are excluded from European common policies, POSEI island regions are included into them. And in future these islands are to be completely integrated into European common policies. However because of some geographical handicaps, the Community took account of some exceptional options about application of the common policies into these regions from a viewpoint of social and economic cohesion.<br>POSEI is mainly composed of: 1) special supply adjustment that the EU makes a special financial aid to the agents which transport specified products in the Continent to the remote island regions and that the cost which risks to discourage these regions from creating new local productive activities and raise the local consumer price are cut down, 2) temporary prevention of the application of common custom policies, safeguard of traditional economic activities strongly linked with non-EU territories in the island regions, 3) exception of the application of European agricultural and fishery policies, European financial back up system for specified agriaquacultural fields that are unique in the region and needed for stability of the Common Market, and 4) creation of special taxation system, for example tax-free zone and special imposition for promoting local production and consumption.<br>Nowadays POSEI is needed as a European island region policies for the other island regions for example Mediterranean Area.

著者

宮本 光雄

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.26, pp.285-308,439, 2006

被引用文献数

7

---

Quo vadis Europa? When the Cold War ended and the EU accession of the East European countries seemed certain, it arose widely this very question in Europe. Now that the EU, having been enlarged eastwards and southwards, consists of twenty-five member states, everyone who is interested in European integration would give much consideration to what would result from the enlargement. This article does that through analysing the European and security policy of Poland, which is the most influential among the ten newcomers.<br>In Poland people regard the EU as a good organisation for Poland to get a chance for better future, in expectation that it would give Poland a lot, especially economic and financial benefits, so the support of the people for the EU is always wide and solid.<br>But there exists also a notion that the EU is dominated by two big member states, Germany and France. Accordingly the Polish government seeked in the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 to secure a &ldquo;strong position&rdquo; in the Union so as to be able to carry out its demand and not to be voted down easily, and succeeded in the end. Poland holds now a position of a &ldquo;not easy to handle partner in the Union&rdquo;, as foreign minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz formulated in the Sejm in January 2004. Consequently, a possibility is stronger than ever that a decision-making in the Council will become still more difficult, as a result of Polish sticking to its standpoint.<br>Polish security policy is based first and foremost on bilateral relations with and the firm loyalty towards the USA. Looking upon Washington as the only reliable power in the world, Warsaw prefers NATO to CSDP. This inclination roots not only in realism but in precautious mentality against so-called franco-german dominance. In particular Poland tends to look at Germany with suspicion, because of its memories of the past.<br>As for the future shape of Europe, the dominant Polish view is based on the intergovernmentalism. All the major political parties in Poland define the EU as the organisation of <i>solidarnosc narod&oacute;w</i> (solidarity of the nations). The definition reminding us of that of Charles de Gaulle implies little supranational integration, so there won't be much initiative or activeness in the deepening of European integration on the part of the Polish government.<br>That has been the case with the SLD government until recently, and so will be it with a new one led by PiS, the winner of the Sejm election in September 2005. Nevertheless, it must not be ignored that a geopolitical position could play a decisive role. Poland by self-definition, unlike Great Britain, is a European state and its future lies in Europe, which Poles themselves realize. Herein can be seen room for a chang of Warsaw's European policy.<br>And, what is a noteworthy thing, Polish public opinion on foreign and security policy has been undergoing a fundamental change since the Iraq war began, that is, from enthusiastic Atlanticism to pro-Europeanism. Polish people these days is in favour of an autonomous European security power and Europe's role of a world player. Taking into consideration all the factors mentioned above, a conclusion could be drawn: Poland's accession to the EU would not contribute much to the deepening of European integration in the short or medium terms, but in the long run Poland could help the construction of &ldquo;strong&rdquo; Europe, aligning itself with big powers like Germany and France.

著者

八十田 博人

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.23, pp.140-161,301, 2003-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

---

Under the pressures of the criteria for the EMU, Italian administrative and fiscal reforms have been directed by the Center-Left governments and technocrats during the 1990s. They have obtained legitimacy through the tripartite agreements (“social pacts”) signed by the Government, the employers' federations and the labor unions.Despite many provocative statements made by “Eurosceptic” ministers, Berlusconi Government has syntonized the domestic labour market reforms to the EU's targets of occupation rate, following the “White Paper on Labour Market” drafted by the labour law experts including prof. Biagi, the assassinated “pro-Europe” consultant of the minister of Labour. The focus of the arguments is the Article 18 of Labour Rights Act, which guarantees rehiring and compensations to workers dismissed without just cause. The new social pact, the “Pact for Italy”, which partially loosens the rigidity of the Article 18, was signed by the Government and major social partners except the CGIL, Italy's largest left trade union. This means a partial collapse of the “concertation” of the 1990s.The “Pact for Italy” also demands to augment domestic investment especially to the Mezzogiorno, the less developed southern half of Italy. Between the domestic pressure to public spending and the external requirements of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, Italian Center-Right government must seek a difficult balance of public finance. The Center-Left opposition is missing the opportunities to indicate the alternative way for reforms by the internal split between the moderate center parties and the Left activists of the “girotondo” (human-chain demonstration) movement.

著者

長谷川 秀樹

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.20, pp.258-279,347, 2000-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

---

POSEI (Program of Special Options for Island Remoteness and Insular Nature in French) is founded in 1989 by an initiative of France which has some remote island oversea regions (so-called DOMs). And in 1991 EC council decided that three Atlantic island regions (Canary Islands, Madeira and Azores) are selected as a region covered by POSEI.Different from PTOM (Oversea Island Countries and Territories in French) islands for example French TOMs, oversea British islands and Dependency which are excluded from European common policies, POSEI island regions are included into them. And in future these islands are to be completely integrated into European common policies. However because of some geographical handicaps, the Community took account of some exceptional options about application of the common policies into these regions from a viewpoint of social and economic cohesion.POSEI is mainly composed of: 1) special supply adjustment that the EU makes a special financial aid to the agents which transport specified products in the Continent to the remote island regions and that the cost which risks to discourage these regions from creating new local productive activities and raise the local consumer price are cut down, 2) temporary prevention of the application of common custom policies, safeguard of traditional economic activities strongly linked with non-EU territories in the island regions, 3) exception of the application of European agricultural and fishery policies, European financial back up system for specified agriaquacultural fields that are unique in the region and needed for stability of the Common Market, and 4) creation of special taxation system, for example tax-free zone and special imposition for promoting local production and consumption.Nowadays POSEI is needed as a European island region policies for the other island regions for example Mediterranean Area.

著者

高倉 成男

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.36, pp.75-94, 2016-05-30 (Released:2018-05-30)

---

Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has been working to strengthen the protection of intellectual property (IP) in agriculture and related areas, and to integrate the relevant laws and regulations across its member states. The challenges ahead include accelerating technological transfer to farmers and supporting the creation of new agricultural businesses. In addition, another significant challenge is now emerging for the EU, that is, how to address the conflict between the need to protect IP and the need to protect the public interest. For instance, when the EU directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions was enacted in 1998, it came under fierce criticism for being detrimental to the environment and problematic from the perspective of bioethics. The criticism remains unresolved today. Meanwhile, the EU regulation for the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization prompted German and Dutch seed companies to file lawsuits seeking the annulment of the regulation, claiming that the regulation could undermine plant breeders’ rights and freedom to develop. How can the EU balance the need to enhance the competitiveness of agriculture and the need to safeguard non-economic public interest goals? That is another challenge inherent in the problem concerning agriculture and IP in the EU.In this article, I will first provide an overview of the key areas of agricultural innovation that are currently focused in the EU, and consider IP policy challenges ahead. Next, I will summarize the patent system and the plant variety protection system in Europe, explaining the background and current status of problems surrounding the ban on double protection under the two systems. I will also analyze how multilateral rules on trade, the environment, and other global public policy issues have been affecting the IP laws and regulations in the EU in terms of their relationship with agriculture. Lastly, I will consider the newly emerging problem, namely, the conflict between the need to protect IP and the need to safeguard non-economic public interest goals.

著者

中尾 将人

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.36, pp.169-195, 2016-05-30 (Released:2018-05-30)

参考文献数

22

---

This paper considers the significance of unconventional monetary policies, in particular, Quantitative Easing implemented by European Central Bank during the post-euro crisis. There are problems in Euro area such as disinflation, low economic growth and interest rate spread between core and periphery country. The ECB deal with these problems by lower interest rate, portfolio rebalance and signal effect caused by QE.There are some discussions about QE by the ECB. We can consider two types of typical discussions. The first type is the discussion on QE in general, and the second type is that on QE peculiar to Euro area. The discussions about the former include the problem of monetary finance and impediment to a structural reform. However, it is confirmed from the result of implements by Federal Reserve Bank and Bank of Japan that QE has a stimulative effect on the economy. The discussions about the later include the problem of fiscal burden transfer from core countries to periphery countries that have a vulnerable fiscal base. However, buying government bond by QE lead to interest payment from each country to the ECB, and lead to interest income to these. Thus, there is not the burden of core countries. In addition, QE is able to help periphery countries that suffer not only national government debt burden but also the above problems in Euro area. Some of these discussions have common characteristics, that is, they under-evaluate the roles of the central bank. In fact, however, in Euro area, the role of monetary policy by ECB is very important. By contrast, the use of expansionary fiscal policy in Euro area is limited. Thus, the importance of monetary policy as macroeconomic policy by supranational central bank such as ECB is increasing. In this paper, we investigate the problems and the solutions in Euro area, by considering the positive effect of QE as unconventional monetary policy.

著者

田中 俊郎

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.27, pp.15-28,323, 2007-08-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

---

The year 2005 may be record in future as the European Union had turned a corner from the age of the Internal Market and the revival of new dynamism in European integration to the age of inward-looking and “enhanced cooperation”.The previous year, 2004 was full of rosy pictures on the developments of the EU. On May 1, ten states joined the EU and on October 29, the Treaty and the Final Act establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome.But, seven months later, the French and the Dutch voters rejected the European Constitutional Treaty. These events show that there are four dilemmas which the EU is now facing. The first is the dilemma between “neo-liberal Europe” and “social Europe”. The most important message of the “White Paper on Internal Market” of 1985 and “Single European Act” of 1986 was competition. However, the message of French voters and lesser extent in the case of Dutch voters was “no more social dumping with free movement of workers from less developed European countries” and more “social Europe”.The second is the dilemma of enlargement. To enlarge the area of peace, prosperity, stability and democracy to the rest of Europe will surely be good thing, but it will cost more for the existing members because rich countries like Switzerland and Norway stay away from the EU and possible candidates are relatively poorer. Bulgaria and Romania became member on January 1, 2007 to end the Fifth enlargement. But, further enlargement will be more delicate and more cautious issue especially for Turkey. With the rise of argument on the EU's absorption capacity, the EU may become less eager for enlargement in future.The Third is the dilemma of democracy. The more direct democracy for citizens, the more risk for the political leaders. Referendum is very democratic mean to hear voice of the citizens on the certain issue directly. But, at the same time, referendum is very risky mean, because the voters do not necessarily vote on the pros and cons of the specific issue. Once politicians rely on referendum, they cannot go forward without another referendum. France has to go to referendum on any European issue in future, including Turkey' entry to the EU.The fourth dilemma is unanimity or “enhanced cooperation”. There are some member states which want to deepen integration further but there are member states which do not want. The inclusions of “closer cooperation”, “enhanced cooperation” and “structured cooperation” seem to strengthen the deepening of integration but there are also tendency to strengthen national power by the mutual recognition of standards and use of Open Method of Coordination (OMC).

著者

渡辺 尚

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.22, pp.260-282,371, 2002-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

被引用文献数

1

---

As enlargement and deepening of the EU integration go on, the functions of the borders in Europe are gradually changing. Rapid increase of organizations for cross-border, interregional and transnational cooperation for the last decade shows clearly this new regional dynamics, which brings about a few questions: Is the dividing effect of the border on the economic sphere possively not overestimated, especially in the internal border regions of the EU? and how does the double structure of the border of a federal state effect on cross-border regional cooperation?First, on the one hand INTERREG for the internal border regions of the EU aims to remove the structural gap between core area and periphery within a nation, because there is not such deep gap in living standard between neighboring border regions as between both sides of an external border of the EU. In so far as this is the case, only removal of the dividing effect of the economic border is considered as the primary aim of INTERREG for the internal border regions. On the other hand the aim of Euregios is, just as illustrated by the activities of the Mozer Committee of EUREGIO, to remove the barriers in all dimensions of social life for true reconciliation and coexistence of Dutch-German neighboring inhabitants. In this meaning the removal of the border itself as “scar of history” is maybe considered as the end purpose of Euregios. Consequently there is a certain discrepancy in the understanding of the border between Euregios and INTERREG.Secondly, the operational programs of INTERREG I and II were carried out in accordance with each special agreement under the actors. On this occasion the both states (Länder) of Germany, Northrhine-Westfalia (NRW) and Lower Saxony (Nds) along with the Netherlands play supervisory role for the five Euregios on the Dutch-German border. Furthermore the co-finacing amount of the states in the section “space structure” of INTERREG II for EUREGIO exceeded that of the EU fincing and reached 48%, by far over the share limit of 30%. It suggests that the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany fuction at first as those of the states, not of the Federation. Maybe it is an example of the general understanding in Germany that the substantial unit of regions should be state, namely NUTS 1-level in the postulate of “Europe of the Regions”. On the other hand each Euregio endeavors to integrate the both sides of the border de facto into one unit, which will converge rather on NUTS 2-level. A certain tension may lurk, therefore, in understanding of “Europe of the Regions” between the German states as territorial governmental units and Euregios as organizations for cross-border cooperation.

著者

八十田 博人

出版者

The European Union Studies Association-Japan

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.23, pp.140-161,301, 2003

---

Under the pressures of the criteria for the EMU, Italian administrative and fiscal reforms have been directed by the Center-Left governments and technocrats during the 1990s. They have obtained legitimacy through the tripartite agreements ("social pacts") signed by the Government, the employers' federations and the labor unions.<br>Despite many provocative statements made by "Eurosceptic" ministers, Berlusconi Government has syntonized the domestic labour market reforms to the EU's targets of occupation rate, following the "White Paper on Labour Market" drafted by the labour law experts including prof. Biagi, the assassinated "pro-Europe" consultant of the minister of Labour. The focus of the arguments is the Article 18 of Labour Rights Act, which guarantees rehiring and compensations to workers dismissed without just cause. The new social pact, the "Pact for Italy", which partially loosens the rigidity of the Article 18, was signed by the Government and major social partners except the CGIL, Italy's largest left trade union. This means a partial collapse of the "concertation" of the 1990s.<br>The "Pact for Italy" also demands to augment domestic investment especially to the Mezzogiorno, the less developed southern half of Italy. Between the domestic pressure to public spending and the external requirements of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, Italian Center-Right government must seek a difficult balance of public finance. The Center-Left opposition is missing the opportunities to indicate the alternative way for reforms by the internal split between the moderate center parties and the Left activists of the "girotondo" (human-chain demonstration) movement.

著者

八十田 博人

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.21, pp.64-86,251, 2001-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

---

Italian European policy is often described as “federalistic”. Recent studies, however, have endeavored to explain the reason of the double language of Italian Europeanism; its federalist rhetoric and its pursuit of own national interest. These studies reveal how pragmatically the Italian government has used European Integration as an instrument of nation-building.The priorities of Italian foreign policy after the Second World War were to regain an equal status among other western European states and to resolve its domestic socio-economic problems at the European level. Postwar Italy was, however, compelled to confront the Cold War with scarce diplomatic resources. Military involvement was severely limited by the socalled “punitive” peace treaty and by domestic tendencies towards neutralism.The project of a comprehensive European political community by De Gasperi in the early years of the 1950s was an effort to incorporate the EDC into a more peaceful grand design rather than a military alliance. This coincided with another Italian insistence on the reinforcement of the OEEC with a hope for a resolution of its economic problems, such as unemployment and emigration. In both cases, Italy used the American support for European integration as a leverage to cover its unique and weak position.The exceptional treatments for fragile Italian steel industry under the ECSC were guaranteed mainly by France. Generally, Member states were so reluctant to accept other Italian demands, such as the subsidies for the Italian steel and the improvement of the working conditions of Italian miners in Belgium, that Italy needed the intervention of the High Authority. Italy's preference for a supranational community can be well explained by the fact.In the domestic process, the role of the technocrats of the Bank of Italy and the IRI and the influence of some leading figures of secular parties (PLI, PSDI, PRI) were decisive. This “centrist” era is highly marked as an age of technocrats, which has revived forty years later in the formation of “technocratic” governments of the 1990s.

著者

蓮見 雄

出版者

The European Union Studies Association-Japan

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.24, pp.125-143,315, 2004

被引用文献数

1

---

The Kaliningrad problems are the test of Europe after enlargement of the EU. The EU is confronted with the question how to realize the Eastward enlargement without creating a new dividing line between the enlarged EU and Russia. On one hand, it requests future Member States to tighten the control of their borders with external areas. On the other hand, it seeks for closer cooperation with Russia.<br>Accession negotiations have been separated from external affairs over the years. Kaliningrad, —a Russian <i>exclave</i>—has been treated as if another mere Russian border. But the daily life of the people there depends on Visa-free transit between its borders of Poland and Lithuania, based on a historical heritage of the past Communist bloc. With the failure of the Special Economic Zone due to conflicts between Moscow and Kaliningrad, it brings about <i>soft</i> security problems (shadow economy, illegal activities, and pollutions), which pose a threat to the security of the whole Europe.<br>Kaliningrad, which is located on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, will become a Russian <i>enclave</i> within the enlarged EU and find itself enclosed by Schengen borders causing access problems for outsiders. It might broaden the socio-economic gap between the EU and this region, and make Russia isolated. Eventually, it would threaten the sustainability of the region.<br>Therefore, the prospect for getting rid of the gap is vital to solve the Kaliningrad problems. In other words, the future development of Kaliningrad is closely linked to building the <i>Wider Europe</i>, including the <i>Common European Economic Space</i> between the EU and Russia. Recently Russian government is making the development plan based on the national strategy to change Kaliningrad <i>from Symbols of dividing to Footholds of cooperation</i>, coming close to the EU system through the <i>Common European Economic Space</i>.<br>Economy and social life in Kaliningrad are sensitive to external factors—EU and NATO expansion to the east. There is a need for favorable international relations and a stable legal and institutional environment of the market, which are based on the balance of various economic and political factors. Without cooperation of neighbouring countries, Kaliningrad is not an advantageous region as a Russian gateway to Europe. But its unique geographical location—<i>enclave</i> within the enlarged EU—offers opportunities for more cooperation and more prosperity for the people there. It could be able to play the role as a <i>pilot region</i>, where the EU and Russia discuss issues affecting common interests and work together to realize cooperation experimentally. Now the EU and Russia are <i>Ever Closer partners in a Wider Europe</i>.<br>The <i>Northern Dimension</i> aims to intensify cross border cooperation between the EU and Northeast regions of Russia, creating security and stability and addressing the problems related to uneven development in the region. And its concept might be applied to the cooperation with European CIS (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) in the future. In the process of building <i>Europe with no dividing</i>, St. Petersburg could restore the traditional position—<i>a Russian window to Europe</i>—and Kaliningrad could play the role of its Satellite. The slogan—<i>Russia in Europe</i>—is an effective trademark for the Kaliningrad playing a major role in its closer ties with Europe.

著者

福田 耕治

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.27, pp.75-97,329, 2007-08-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

---

It had long been realized that for the EU to fulfill its mission of creating a “citizen's Europe”, higher levels of transparency and accountability would be essential. European Commission administrative reforms of the mid 1990's were not directly modeled on New Public Management (NPM) thinking, they were affected by their member states' NPM reform practices. The eventual resignation of the Santer Commission made a radical reform effort virtually inevitable. In 1999, the succeeding President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi appointed the vice president, Neil Kinnock (the UK Commissioner), to take charge of “European Governancei” reform using NPM guidelines with the intention of achieving administrative reforms and encouraging greater accountabilityPolicy evaluation has already proved effective at eradicating bid rigging and political corruption and has helped to restore trust in the EU both among the Nation States' representative organs and the citizens themselves. Consequently the European Council's Laeken Declaration, 15 December 2001, stressed the need for the EU to create a Constitution as a way of achieving greater accountability and legitimacy. The policy evaluation element of NPM is considered to be another important method of enhancing democratization and efficiency in the policy-making processes of the EU. The specific objectives of this paper are as follows:Firstly, we will look at European governance reforms which have been introduced in the light of NPM thinking. Secondly, we will examine the history of the concept of Policy Evaluation and consider its definitions with regard to NPM reforms in the European Union. Thirdly, we will consider what kind of role is expected of policy evaluations in the EU, and the repercussions for accountability lines and links. We will analyze and summarize the EU's experiences of administrative reforms with regard to NPM and address the broader issues concerned with accountability, agencies and public management.

著者

土谷 岳史

出版者

The European Union Studies Association-Japan

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.25, pp.244-266,293, 2005

---

The enlarged EU has now entered on a new phase; ratification of Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The <i>Constitution</i>, which represents the will of EU to be more democratic political community, defines the EU citizens as one of the subjects of New Europe. The 'EU citizen' is every person holding the nationality of a member state. Consequently, the third-country national residents are excluded. Moreover, they are at a disadvantage by comparison with EU citizens. The EU citizen has a lot of rights which third-country nationals (TCNs) don't because the EU Citizenship is the membership both in EU and member states. In other words, the <i>Duality of EU Citizenship</i> disadvantages TCNs. However, the boundary of citizens cannot be determined by democratic processes because by definition, democratic decisions are made only by the citizen. Initially, at least, the boundary of citizens is given. However, there are immigrants crossing borders. In this sense, the democratic citizenship is defined as permanent re-demarcation of the boundary identifying citizens and subjects. Therefore in this paper, we explore the access of EU Citizenship in order to make EU Citizenship democratic, focusing on legal status of third-country national residents in the context of the 'integration' of TCNs in EU which has established 'progressively an area of freedom, security and justice' since the Treaty of Amsterdam. In this area, TCNs are now considered not only human resources, but also members of society. In 2003, EU established 'long-term resident status' of TCNs, which would be a core legal status in 'integration process'. The long-term residents have many rights including freedom of movement. However, the EU Citizenship is still linked to nationality of a member state, which is the final legal status in 'integration process' of TCNs. Paradoxically, if a long-term resident exercises her right to free movement, she and her family may not meet conditions of nationality acquisition because of the residency requirement. Therefore, the asymmetry of duality turns out to be a problem, and the EU Citizenship must have another criterion independent of member states nationality. Finally we would find the possibility of open membership in the <i>symmetrical Duality of EU Citizenship</i>, which could ensure integrity of memberships in EU.

著者

藤原 豊司

出版者

The European Union Studies Association-Japan

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.23, pp.121-139,299, 2003

---

The EU is on the verge of revising, or at least making flexible the guiding principle of its unified currency. They are making, I'm afraid, a fatal error of judgement. The remarkable success, so far, of the euro was entirely due to the shift of macro-economic principles, from demand management to monetary targeting.<br>The guiding principle of the single currency, of which the most important is to contain budget deficit within 3% of the GDP, was certainly a kind of straight-jacket to many of the participating countries to the euro. The majority of the 12 participants, including such laggards as Ireland and Greece, managed to endure inflationary and other pressures, inflicted by the "one-size-fits-for-all" measures demanded by the stability and growth pact.<br>Ironically, it is Germany, France and Italy, the 3 largest and central countries of the euro zone, that are now crying for help. It is especially paradoxical that Germany, which has been demanding the strict application of the SGP principles, has now excessive budgetary deficit and is calling for flexibility in their applications.<br>As of the beginning of March, 2003, it is not decided yet whether the SGP should be revised or not, but judging from the report the Commission presented to the Ecofin Council, they are sure to make "flexible interpretations", if not revisions to the SGP. Are they right? I thnk not.<br>Ms. Kathleen McNamara, Assistant Professor at Princeton, produed a remarkable book on the euro, called "The Currency of Ideas" (1998). Based on the analysis of the world monetary history after the war, including the Bretton Woods system, she concluded that European monetary systems made a great success, because their guiding principles were shifted from Keynesian to Neoliberal theories. In European context, this meant that all the euro participants had virtually abandoned Keynesian demand management policies and converted to the monetarist approach, which the German Bundesbank had pursued since the end of the World War II.<br>World monetary authorities are now facing unprecedented pressures of world-wide deflation. It is understandable that European financial authorities are demanding flexibility in applying the SGP. But we must remind ourselves that in the colossalised economies, demand stimulus rarely works, as is shown by Japanese policies. Euro financial ministers should be patient.<br>Fortunately for the majority of euro-participants, the March Ecofin Council only produced a very short statement on the SPG that it "provides a robust and flexible framework within which any additional strains on public finances will be addressed". It was reported that Gordon Brown, British Chancellor of Exchequer, had tried to present a plan to make a flexible interpretation to the SGP, but Belgium, Spain, Italy and other small countries prevented the proposal, made in collaboration with France and Germany. The EU might have to endure some period of uncertainty over the euro. But it may turn out to be beneficial to the single currency after all.

著者

田中 素香

出版者

The European Union Studies Association-Japan

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.32, pp.29-52, 2012

被引用文献数

2

---

In 1985 the European Commission produced its White Paper to the European Council setting out its programme for the completion of the internal or single market in the European Community by the end of 1992. This programme consisted of some 300 legislative measures needed to guarantee the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the Community. The economic integration was truly the most advanced in the world and epoch-making in the history of the European Community/Union. The European Council agreed to the programme and decided to revise the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act, which came into force in July 1987.<br>Before the market integration, the Community economy stagnated for more than five years due to lacking competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. The single market integration stimulated international oligopolistic competition within the Community and beyond. The economic growth of the Community rose to more than 3% for three years from 1988 on. The economic structure of the Community was renewed and became much more competitive than before.<br>The single market became a fundamental driving force of the monetary union with the EMS. In the 21^st century, it contained Central and Eastern European countries, developing the pan-European production networks.<br>After the world economic crisis, when the demand-side stimulation of the economic growth in the European Union has been narrowly limited, the re-launch of the single market will be an effective measure to revitalize the economy. On the basis of the Monti Report of 2010, the Union is going towards the introduction of the European Market Act, which will be agreed until the end of 2012 according to today's plan of the European Commission.<br>The first single market integration, which was combined with the name of Jacques Delores, had a strategy to move oligopolistic giant companies of the Community. The second generation of the single market integration gives weight to socio-political legitimacy of the single market and seems to move consumers, workers or people of peripheral regions who could not realize benefits of the single market. At the same time, it aims to extract economic benefits from digital information technologies or other recent technical innovations. The single market is about credibility for market players including consumers etc. on the basis of hard competence and the Community method. If done properly, it can turn into a lever for higher growth in the EU following the crisis.

著者

中村 登志哉

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.29, pp.203-221, 2009 (Released:2011-12-01)

---

This paper analyses German foreign and security policy under the Merkel government, especially Germany's role and involvement in European security architectures. By comparing NATO out-of-area deployment of Bundeswehr, German forces, in EU and NATO operations, the study discusses challenges and dilemmas that Germany has faced in cooperating with these organizations. As Europe's own security policies such as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have developed, Germany has been actively involved in operations in the framework of these policies. Germany has also participated in emerging EU operations; the Merkel government eventually led Operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. As European operations have evolved in the areas of peacekeeping and crisis management so far, Germany has not encountered dilemmas in dispatching armed forces overseas. It rather welcomed EU operations that have civilian character as German Basic Law sets a certain conditions in deploying its forces overseas. Because of this limitation, Germany is referred as ‘civilian power’ that has strategic culture of ‘anti-militarism’. Thus, Germany will actively support further evolution of the European security architecture with such a civilian character. On the contrary, Germany under the Merkel government has encountered dilemmas in dispatching forces to NATO operations. In particular, German behaviours in International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan have increasingly attracted criticism from other NATO member states after a failure in Operation Medusa in 2006. Since then, Germany has been under pressure of sending units to the southern area of Afghanistan that is considered to be more dangerous and of engaging in combat operations. So far, German government has expanded its military commitments in Afghanistan in a series of small steps. For example, Berlin has decided to dispatch Tornado jets to the south. Pressure for increasing presence of the German forces in the south has not halt, although Germany has avoided combat operations because of the Basic Law. While increased presence would highlight continued German engagement and thus mitigate criticism from NATO allies, it would prove unpopular among Germans who have registered significant public opposition to the Afghan campaign. Germany under the Merkel government confronts with the dilemmas between maintaining solidarity and credibility with the allies and managing domestic public opinion.

著者

細谷 雄一

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.21, pp.34-63,249, 2001-09-30 (Released:2010-05-21)

---

Since 1980s, “European integration history”, which has been developed mainly by the European Community Liason Committee of Historians with using newly opend archives, has revealed many new historical evidences. Research on the relations between the Schuman Plan and Britain is one of the biggest issues of that development. However, the study on the “Eden Plan” has been rarely mentioned in the hitherto studies. The study on the Schuman Plan has been usually explained with the development of the Franco-German reconciliation. In this article, it was argued that the relationship between Britain and France was the most important aspect of the beginning of the European integration between 1948 and 1950. The Schuman Plan can be best understood by seeing the Anglo-Franco cooperation and conflict in the period. The year 1948 was marked by several important events such as the establishment of the Brussels Treaty, the Congress of Europe at The Hague, and Georges Bidault's plan on the “European Assembly”. Then in this avricle, the “Eden Plan” was discussed.The “Eden Plan” tells us many important aspects of the relations between the Schuman Plan and Britain in the early 1950s. First, it can be said that Anthony Eden was much more constructive and supportive towards the Schuman Plan than Winston S. Churchill or Harold Macmillan, who were usually regarded as the eminent “Pro-European” Conservatives. Anthony Eden tried to save the Schuman Plan, while finding the best answer to link the British Commonwealth to the Schuman Plan. Eden's approach could be the best possible British plan to join the European integration movement planned by Monnet. However, because of the suspicion of Jean Monnet towards British Government's intention, Monnet refused this possible important contribution by British Foreign Secretary. With the failure of the two Monnet's plans of political integration, the European Defence Community and European Political Community, in 1954, Monnet faced the stalemate of his own approach without having Britain inside.Thus, it is important to see the history of the relations between Britain and France from 1948 to 1954 to understand the beginning of European integration. Too narrow approach to study the Schuman Plan often ignores the origins of the Schuman Plan and the possible Britain's close relation to the plan. If Monnet showed a little more tolerance to Britain's approach, and if Britain showed a little bolder advancement to the integration, the later history of European integration should have been developed through the Anglo-France cooperation.

著者

黒川 洋行

出版者

日本EU学会

雑誌

日本EU学会年報 (ISSN:18843123)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.31, pp.102-126, 2011-07-20 (Released:2013-07-20)

参考文献数

23

被引用文献数

1 1

---

The concept of the ‘Social Market Economy’ has been the main idea of the domestic economic governance during the post-war period in Germany. And it is also influenced by the Ordo-liberalism, which is mainly represented by Walter Eucken of the Freiburg School. This idea was first adopted as one of the purposes of the EU in the Treaty of Lisbon. But the meaning of this idea is not clearly defined in this treaty. Therefore, it might lead to the complicated discussion about the interpretation of this concept. This paper investigates possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’ in the Treaty of Lisbon. At first we take a close look at the exact definition and the theoretical framework of this thought on the original papers written by Alfred Müller-Armack, who was the initiator of this concept. The essential characteristic is the policy target, in which the balanced combination between the value of individual freedom and social fairness (or social security) should be found within the competitive market economic order. Several factors of this idea are transposed into the treaty. For example, economic policy of the member states must be made within the principles of the “open market” with “the free competition” (TFEU/Art. 119). And the independence of the ECB (TFEU/Art. 130) and “the stability of prices” (TEU/Art. 3-3) are so strictly established in the Union, that they build the important institutional framework from the view of the ordo-liberalism. To value the meanings of the concept of social market economy in the treaty, it is also important to point out, that we must consider the social aspects of the integration process. As the concluding remarks, we could say that the Social Market Economy is a ideal model or distinguishing marks for the economic system of the EU. But it depends on the practice by each of the member states, concerning the way, how they will approach the ideal goal of social market economy with their own policy measures.