著者
欒 玉璽
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.54, no.1, pp.78-94, 2008

On the basis of the German-Chinese treaty of 1898 (Deutch-Chinesischer Vertrag betreffend die Überlassung Kiautschous an Deutschland) concerning the management of Qingdao, Germany invested about 200 million marks in military installations, city services, sea and land transportation, and educational installations. After 1914, Japan tried to expand the city of Qingdao. At the same time, they established modern factories and opened industrial zones. As a result, they laid the foundations for the industrialization of Qingdao. After 1923, Qingdao, which enjoyed particular status as a Chinese "Special City", had cultural centers and public entertainment amenities that served the upper classes and the staff of foreign financial institutions. By the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945, all functions were well established. It can be said that German and Japanese building prompted basic economic progress at Qingdao. In the 40 years after 1897, Qingdao changed from a rural area on Jiaozhou Bay with 60,000 people, to a modern industrial city with a population of 580,000. This paper shows how this formation and development had an effect on industrialization in Qingdao through the changing process. It focuses on Germany's and Japan's reasons and purpose for developing Qingdao, the establishment of the administration system along with a leased territory policy, and urban development and building from 1897 to 1945.
著者
鄭 成
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.1, pp.24-37, 2015-05-24 (Released:2015-06-04)
参考文献数
36

The cultural exchanges between China and the former Soviet Union in the 1950s include Chinese government’s effort in spreading the information of the advanced development of the Soviet Union as a socialist leader. In order to nurture a friendly atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relationship, Beijing utilized a series of advertisement tools from arts (such as literature and movies) to newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasting. This subject has become a well researched theme of Sino-Soviet relations.Relevant literature mainly focuses on the following two aspects. The first aims to illustrate a comprehensive picture of cultural exchanges, paying attention to Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, publications, advertisement and events. The other analyzes reception of the Soviet culture in the Chinese society, by looking at specific literature and art genres. Through analysis of the nation-wide Sino-Soviet Friendship Month Campaign in the end of 1952, the author hopes to shed light on the policy objectives, methods and some of the ensuing impacts of the Chinese government in its attempt to promote Sino-Soviet cultural exchanges.The Sino-Soviet Friendship Month Campaign lasted for one month. In addition to advertisement activities among the Chinese general public, the campaign also brought 300 Soviet representatives visiting Chinese cities and immediately contacting approximately 1 million Chinese people. Relevant institutes and organizations in the Chinese side highly regarded their political responsibilities in welcoming these representatives. In particular, the Chinese side mobilized large-scale public to create enthusiasm as a way to show compassion between the hosts and the guests. Together with other efforts and thorough advertisement, the Friendship Month Campaign significantly contributed to improving perception of the USSR among the Chinese general people.However, at a closer glance, we may also notice major shortcomings in the Chinese efforts. Regardless of the scale and enthusiasm, the exchanges between the Chinese people and the Soviet representatives remained only at the group level, leaving contacts at the individual level extremely limited. Needless to say, individual relation is a key factor in improving international relations. It is important that we understand this aspect in explaining Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s.
著者
岡 通太郎
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.1, pp.44-61, 2006

According to the <i>Agricultural Wage in India</i>, published yearly by the Indian Government, the agricultural wage rate in central Gujarat remains around Rs. 24–30 per day. This is much lower than the rates in other areas such as northern and peninsular Gujarat, where the rate has risen sharply, reaching Rs. 60 during the 1990s. It is also perhaps surprising that the agri cultural wage in central Gujarat remains low even after the recent increase in rural non-farm employment opportunities that provide wages of around Rs. 60–200 per day. This suggests that the 'trickledown' effect of economic development to the agricultural labor classes is not working well. Why does the agricultural wage rate in central Gujarat remain at such a low level despite the opportunities of high wage, non-farm employment? Why doesn't the' trickle-down' effect work well in central Gujarat? This paper aims to examine this question through an intensive field survey at a sample village in central Gujarat.<br>The paper addresses this question by considering two factors, one external the other in ternal.The external factor is the limitation of non-farm employment opportunities. If these opportunities are separated from agricultural labor markets by high barriers (e.g. high education requirements), the 'trickle-down' effect will not work well. The internal factor is the local informal credit institution. As K. Basu (1983) explained in his 'inter-linkage theory', if the agricultural laborer is in debt to his employer with a low interest rate, his wage will also be low because the employee gets the benefit of low interest.<br>Investigation showed that 44% of the agricultural laboring classes (landless and marginal farmers) are working in non-farm sectors, and 40% out of the 44% are employed in high-wage and low-education sectors. No clear segmentation is found. On the other hand, the internal factor has a stronger effect on low agricultural wages. There is a local informal credit institution called <i>Kaymi</i> that exists especially in rural areas of central Gujarat. Under this local institution, 22% of agricultural laborers are in debt to their employers free of interest. Evaluating the benefit of interest-free credit that is enjoyed by these laborers gives their 'effective wage' to be Rs. 48, which is close to the wage of non-farm employment. This local institution also affects low wages of the other 78% of agricultural labors. With restricted opportunities for the agricultural labor classes to get formal loans, this local informal institution is the only way for them to obtain credit and ease risk burdens associated with their livelihood. This paper also asserts that this kind of 'social institution' has been developed upon long-term social relationships that are based onland distribution inequity, which closely corresponds to caste segmentation.
著者
今村 祥子
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.65, no.3, pp.20-36, 2019

<p>In the early 1980s, Indonesia witnessed the extrajudicial killings of thousands of hoodlums by security forces. The victims' bodies were left at prominent public places. Because the authorities did not admit to any involvement, the Indonesian media termed the killings "Petrus," which means "mysterious shootings." This thesis aims to analyze the ruling style of Suharto's regime by considering the mass killings. </p><p>From the beginning, the Suharto regime regarded Indonesian society as a legitimate target for intelligence activities and machinations, as symbolized by the existence of Operasi Khusus (Opsus); this was initially a team set up for the army's intelligence work in Malaysia, but later became institutionalized to rule over Indonesian society. Applying intelligence and machinations to maintain domestic rule may be considered a rational step for the authorities. Given that other strong political ideologies still had deep roots in society, it was extremely difficult to create the Golkar system based on the state-sponsored Pancasila ideology by means of repression alone. Thus, the government had to rely on intelligence operations, such as machinations, provocations, and propaganda that justified the repression of potential enemies. </p><p>This thesis, based on interviews, seeks to show that many victims of Petrus were hoodlums who had been recruited as agents for covert operations. They were organized under Ali Moertopo, the head of Opsus and Suharto's right-hand man in the early days of the regime. Though there has long been a speculation that the real target of Petrus was Moertopo's network, the rumors have not been substantiated. </p><p>My argument is as follows. The Suharto regime, in its effort to build up the Golkar system, often used intelligence machinations toward members of its own society to eliminate or weaken potential enemies. This ruling style naturally alienated a specific societal group and created social divisions. The target of Petrus (or in any case, one of the main targets) were the hoodlums who had been used as a tool for such machinations. After their mission was over, the hoodlums came to be seen as unnecessary and dangerous; they were eliminated themselves through another huge machination—Petrus. In this context, Petrus symbolized a fundamental contradiction in the Suharto regime, which sought the thorough permeation of "harmonious" Pancasila ideology, but, in reality, could not rule the country without dividing society. </p>
著者
周 敏
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.55, no.2, pp.23-41, 2009-04-30 (Released:2014-09-15)
参考文献数
60

International migration among Chinese-ancestry people is centuries old. Long before European colonists set foot on the Asian continent, the Chinese moved across sea and land, seasonally or permanently, to other parts of Asia and the rest of the world to pursue better economic opportunities or alternative means of livelihood. They have now spread to more than 150 countries across the globe, with nearly 80% in Asia and 15% in the Americas. This article aims to examine how long-standing migrant communities and social networks interact with broad structural factors—colonization, or decolonization, nation-state building, and changes of political regimes—to shape the characteristics, processes, and directions of international migration. I argue that the distinct streams of emigration from China, and remigration from Chinese immigrant communities, are contingent upon the history, economy, and policy of both sending and receiving societies, as well as social developments in the Chinese diaspora. It is not solely up to the state to manage and control international migration; the power of ethnic institutions and social networks must be considered in policymaking.
著者
金 恩貞
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.62, no.1, pp.9-23, 2016-01-31 (Released:2016-02-09)
参考文献数
29

This paper presents an historical analysis of the policy formation process within the Japanese government regarding the issues of claims between Japan and South Korea (below, “Korea”) for the period from February 1951, the start of the first round of Japan-Korea talks, to October 1953, when the talks were suspended. This paper aims at providing an overview of the Japan-Korea talks from a novel perspective via elucidation of the situation within the Japanese government during the early 1950s—a period mostly blank in previous research. The process of forming concrete policies for relations with Korea during this period in Japan was clarified as described below. The paper first presents its overview findings, while referencing previous research, of the Japanese government’s negotiation strategies regarding the Japan-Korea claims issue before the Japan-Korea talks officially began, specifically in regards to how these initial strategies impacted the first round of talks. It was during this period when differences in attitudes towards the claims issue surfaced between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and considerations are presented regarding the background for such. Described next is the formation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the “mutual abandonment of claims ‘plus alpha’” concept around the time that the negotiations became locked and had their first suspension. This included the concept of justifying Japan’s claims on Korea, with both sides then together abandoning their claims, and Japan agreeing to make monetary payments to Korea while avoiding the nomenclature of “claims.” Examination is made of how the processes of discussions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs converged on this idea, with focus on the interactions of the logic of the Asian Affairs Bureau, which viewed foreign relations with Korea as important, international circumstances at that time, and commitments Japan had to the United States. Finally, in the midst of opposition between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance regarding policy proposals for the Japan-Korea claims issue, clarification is made as to what kind of arguments were presented that led to the Japanese government’s adoption of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ plan as the official policy for negotiating with Korea. The flexible attitude toward Korea by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to its emphasis on international relations was taken up as part of the Japanese government’s initial Korean strategy, and made possible a conceptual framework for government policy proposals that were more suited for mutual agreement. Also, in tandem with the changing international circumstances on the Korean peninsula, Japan could not avoid improving its relations with Korea, and this served to soften the hardline policy stance that the Ministry of Finance had adopted towards Korea. When one considers the progression of the debates within the Japanese government, most worthy of notice is that Japan did not abandon its original perceptions towards Korea, but rather conceived a solution that had as its premise exclusion of the term “claims” (literally, “the right to make claims”). It is of deep interest that this concept was similar to that inclusive within the solution of the claims issue in 1965 with the adoption of the “economic cooperation” policy in the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.
著者
中岡 まり
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.57, no.2, pp.1-18, 2011-04-30 (Released:2014-09-15)
参考文献数
56

Elections have performed a regime-legitimizing function for the Chinese Communist Party(CCP). Under CCP control, the electorate has been unilaterally forced to support the CCP, as questioning the content of the values of communism that the CCP sought has not been permitted. In recent years, however, the electorate has grown increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of values. For the continuing strengthening of its regime, the CCP has had to allow elections to serve to articulate interests. The greatest issue for the CCP is to what degree to allow the interests articulated and values expressed by citizens because either limiting them too much and permitting them too much could shake the existing regime.The direct election of Local People’s Congress delegates in Beijing in 2003 saw the entry of many independent candidates who aimed to be elected outside the influence of the CCP. This paper examines the career histories, motivations, and election campaigns of the independent candidates as well as the response of the CCP organization. The research reveals the following points regarding the limits of CCP permission on the proposal of values in the election process and the significance of those limits.The motivation of many independent candidates was not articulation of interests but participation in politics; however, the independent candidates who won were in the end charged with the articulation of interests as a result of their election. They told the electorate that there were options in terms of values. However, none of the independent candidates elected took an adversarial stance in relation to the CCP, and the value options that they presented were always within the range permitted by the CCP.The top echelon of the CCP seeks to incorporate a new conciliatory class in the CCP organization based on the policy of ‘improving the composition of delegates’ through elections. On the other hand, the response of CCP grassroots organizations reveals the imposition of the following three limits on the presentation of values. First, the presentation of values may not infringe on the power of the election management authorities in election operation. Second, the election campaigns of independent candidates may not have wide-ranging impact. Third, the values presented may not include criticism of the CCP.In the future, how the criteria for presenting values change needs to be examined as an issue related to the legitimacy of the CCP regime.
著者
衛藤 安奈
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.57, no.2, pp.35-51, 2011-04-30 (Released:2014-09-15)
参考文献数
42

The official history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has depicted the Guangzhou-Hong Kong strike of 1925–26 as a highly successful labor movement. During this period, armed labor organizations, called ‘pickets’ (jiuchadui), played an important role in maintaining this prolonged strike.This paper aims to offer a new perspective on the Chinese labor movement in the 1920s through a re-examination of the pickets using materials such as daily newspapers, publications by the Strike Committee, selected manifestos and articles, and also unpublished Kuomintang archives.Previous scholars, whether Chinese or not, have tended to adopt the CCP’s discourse, which was based on Deng Zhongxia’s text. However, by the 1990s, there was a marked change, and scholars, including Robert J. Horrocks and Michael Tsang-woon Tsin, attempted to approach the Guangdong labor movement during this period in perspective different to that of the CCP. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to claim that we have a decisive alternative to the CCP’s discourse.This article takes the middle ground between revisionist studies and the CCP’s official history, focusing on the fact, overlooked in previous studies, that the pickets probably helped to alleviate unemployment. Confiscation of Chouhuo, or enemy (i.e. British) products, might in fact have been one of the means of subsistence for unemployed workers. The pickets were taken with the idea of confiscating from not only British merchants but also Chinese society—actions that can be understood within the framework of the struggle against imperialism. As a result, many conflicts between pickets and other local groups occurred.In conclusion, I suggest that we should grasp the strikers’ behavior based on the image of a mixture of egoistic Homo economicus and ideal proletariat. While the former image of workers is found in revisionist studies, like those of Tsin, the latter is found in the CCP’s narrative. Further, we should note the organizational circumstance that made the strikes possible. The Strike Committee was centralized, and did not exert strong control over the lower echelons of the movement; this enabled people to ignore its direction. Moreover, paying attention to the armed civil conflict among Guangdong workers, I show the people who eagerly participated in and led the labor movement were young men, particularly those who tended to behave as brigand. Finally, I conclude that this labor movement structure might be to some extent common to the other Chinese popular movements in this period.