著者

白石 昌也 古田 元夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.3, pp.1-37, 1976 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

坂田 正三

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.4, pp.72-84, 2021-10-31 (Released:2021-11-16)

参考文献数

36

---

Vietnam became a country the world praised for its successful control of the COVID-19 infection in 2020. The government’s information management was one of the key elements for curbing the spread of COVID-19 in Vietnam. The government proactively disclosed information to the public and the international community regarding the infection’s status, and called on the public through various media platforms to take actions to prevent infection and cope with coercive lockdown.Such postures of information management today are not new, but have descended from the strategies that the regimes have historically employed. The purpose of this paper is to examine the information management strategies in the event of epidemics in Vietnam. The paper first looks back on the history of epidemics and information management in Vietnam from the 19th century to the 2000s, and discusses how the present Communist Party and the government have shaped the strategies of information dissemination and propaganda. The paper then analyzes, focusing on the period of time during which COVID-19 spread in 2020, the contents and impacts of propaganda transmitted through various media platforms.The regimes in Vietnam have always endeavored to acquire scientific knowledge about epidemics because many of the epidemics that Vietnam has experienced were unknown diseases brought from abroad, or traditionally existed calamities whose causes and countermeasures were unknown. Since the outbreak of SARS in 2002, the Vietnamese government has applied strategies to acquire resources and scientific information from the international public health regimes, in exchange for disclosure of information about domestic infection. At the same time, the Communist Party and the government have taken multifaceted media control, utilizing traditional media such as propaganda posters and loud speakers on the streets to the modern information platforms on the Internet and SNS. These platforms are used to inform the population at large of the actions necessary to prevent infection.This paper also reveals that patriotic rhetoric and war-time analogies have often been used to mobilize the public to take actions, thereby representing the political aspects of the epidemic prevention measures. The strong slogans (e.g., “staying home is loving the nation”) conveyed to the public can be interpreted as messages to justify the presence of the Communist Party’s authoritarian regimes and its top-down policy implementation mechanism.

著者

加藤 寿延

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.3, pp.93-100, 1960

著者

張 雪斌

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.3, pp.18-37, 2015-07-31 (Released:2015-08-11)

参考文献数

86

---

After the end of the Cold War, many countries reviewed and reconsidered their public diplomacy (PD), recognizing the increasing importance of engagement with foreign nations and international opinion. With the rapid rise of China, public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao) became a very important concept in China’s national strategy and foreign policy during earlier periods of the 21st century. Recently, scholars within and outside China are paying attention to the purpose and features of China’s PD, due to the expanding presence of China’s PD and its soft power. However, questions such as “what are the factors that drive China to pursue PD?” or “how have the concept of China’s PD changed?” remain unanswered.
This article analyzed the discourses of Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts through the perspectives of realism, constructivism, and neo-classical realism. As many scholars have mentioned, PD has been recognized as an important asset to enhance soft power and influence for China in the competition with “rivals” such as the US and Japan. The concept of PD, however, did not exist in official documents nor foreign strategy discourses until the early 2000s. This suggests that the appearance and development of China’s PD cannot be described only in the context of balance of power. It is also difficult to explain the developments of China’s PD as a process of complex learning through the view of constructivism. It is clear that Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts are learning about PD and even the concept of “new PD” developed in developed countries, which emphasizes that the role and autonomy of non-governmental actors are essential to the effectiveness and credibility of PD in the era of globalization, and they already have full understanding of the implications of PD from the discourses outside China. Chinese political elites and foreign policy experts, however, refrain from allowing the autonomy of non-governmental actors despite their important role in China’s current PD. Therefore, the process of change in China’s concept of PD should be explained as “simple learning” rather than “complex learning.” This article argues that the view of neo-classical realism is the most effective to comprehend China’s PD. Chinese elites’ perceptions of the international and domestic environment are the essential factor that has changed the concept of China’s PD.

著者

斉藤 良衛

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.2, pp.1-21, 1957 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

阿部 純一

出版者

Japan Association for Asian Studies

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.4-24, 2007

---

Due to its adversarial relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union, China developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles during the 1960s and 1970s in order to have its own deterrent. By the beginning of the 1980s, China had completed a series of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, in particular the DF-5 ICBM, that covered all of the North American continent.Since then, China has begun to develop a second generation of ballistic missiles; these are powered by solid fuel and and can be moved by road, and so have enhanced responsiveness and survivability. By the end of 1980s, China had developed the JL-1 SLBM and its variant, the DF-21MRBM, although the Xia-class SSBN (Type 092), which was the platform of the JL-1, was unsuccessful and has never been a real strategic asset.<br>China is now attempting to develop the DF-31 ICBM and its variant, the JL-2 SLBM, which will be stable retaliatory forces. The Jin-class new generation SSBN (Type 094), which carries the JL-2, is also under development.<br>As a latecomer to the nuclear club, China resisted joining international non-proliferation regimes, especially the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which China accused the United States and the Soviet Union of being a" nuclear dictatorship." However, in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China joined the NPT and changed its position to support international non-proliferation.<br>In spite of its position, China has continuously exported nuclear technology and ballistic missiles and missile-related materials to Pakistan and other countries. This behavior of China has been regarded by the United States as causing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMDs).<br>Since late 1980s, the United States has organized a Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) with the G8 member countries and legislated domestic laws prohibiting proliferatiig behaviors by other countries. The United States has taken unilateral economic sanctions against countries violating US laws. And since 1991, China has been a main target of these US economic sanctions.<br>In the 1990s, China itself made efforts to legislate its domestic regulations controlling exports relating to WMDs, but since 2001, under the Bush administration, the United States has takensanctions against China as many as 19 times. Hence, it can be said that China's behavior in terms of nuclear proliferation has resulted in a bilateral dispute between the United States and China.

著者

板倉 和裕

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.3, pp.37-41, 2021-07-31 (Released:2021-08-12)

参考文献数

2

著者

小林 良樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.4, pp.87-108, 2008-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

21

被引用文献数

1

---

This paper examines the hypothesis that one of the possible reasons for the recent negative perception of Japan in China is the relatively low volume of mutual human exchange between the two countries.Based on an analysis of various opinion poll data, the characteristics of Chinese perceptions of Japan can be summarized as follows:(1) Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese perception of Japan has been consistently negative.(2) Such a negative perception of Japan is stronger in China than in other East Asian countries.(3) In terms of the medium- and long-term trend since the mid-1990s, Chinese perception of Japan has continued to worsen, which is a unique phenomenon unseen in other East Asian countries including South Korea.(4) Those Chinese who have experienced direct contact with the Japanese in general have a more moderate perception toward Japan than those Chinese who have not had such experience.Apart from the historical fact that Japan and China have fought against each other, such a uniquely negative perception toward Japan in China can be attributed to the following reasons:(1) The strengthening of patriotic education campaigns in China since the mid-1990s.(2) The upsurge in anti-China perceptions in Japan since the 1990s (which are reflected back to China).(3) Misperceptions and misunderstandings at an individual level in China, mainly due to the lack of objective knowledge about Japan as well as cultural differences.One of the possible reasons for the misperception and misunderstanding at the individual level in China could be the relatively low volume of human exchange between China and Japan, which is still relatively low compared with the volume of exchanges between Japan and other major Asian countries.For instance, Japan’s “visitor-population ratio” (ratio of the number of visitors to Japan compared to the nation’s population) in 2006 is as follows: China, 0.04% (one visitor per 2,500people); South Korea, 4.14% (one visitor per 24); Taiwan, 5.61% (one visitor per 18); Hong Kong, 5.04% (one visitor per 20); Singapore, 3.12% (one visitor per 32).Data analysis indicates that the current negative perception of Japan in China is unique compared with similar perceptions in other East Asian countries.There are several reasons for such a situation in China, and the current situation may not be due to only one reason.Nevertheless, the enhancement of human exchanges between the two countries could be useful to prevent any increase in mutual misunderstanding as well as for managing any outbursts of negative feelings.

著者

福岡 愛子

出版者

静岡大学人文社会科学部アジア研究センター

雑誌

アジア研究

巻号頁・発行日

vol.別冊4, pp.41-64, 2016-02

著者

木下 恵二

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.1.2, pp.18-32, 2012-04-30 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

43

---

This paper analyzes the objectives, content, and causes of the bankruptcy of the national policy practiced by the Sheng Shih-ts’ai regime in the 1930s, and examines how it influenced the identity of the Uygur people in south Xinjiang.Under the patronage of the Soviet Union, Sheng introduced ‘Soviet model’ national policies, which helped the development of each ethnic group’s culture in Xinjiang. These policies were based on the theory that the development of individual ethnic groups would eventually lead to the formation of a new unified nation. ‘Uygur reformers’ gave a degree of support to these policies, and education based on the native language developed.In Kashgar region, native inhabitants planned to establish autonomous power through an education movement. However, these attempts at political and cultural autonomy conflicted with the reinforcement of control by the provincial government in 1936. The provincial government permitted development of the culture of ethnic groups, but did not allow these groups to have any autonomy.Sheng’s political objective was to resist the Japanese invasion by relying on Soviet aid. After establishing his regime in Xinjiang, his principal political ambition was to become the political leader of the socialists in China, and if possible, the political leader of the whole of China.Therefore, he expressed his loyalty to Stalin from a relatively early stage. The purge that Sheng initiated in October 1937 was based on his fear of a coup, and was an imitation of Stalin’s purges. National policy, however, broke down because of it.The Uygur people in south Xinjiang, who faced oppression, were forced to participate in the campaign against Japan. Many of them, however, anticipated that outsiders, such as Japan and the Nanking nationalist government, would overthrow the provincial government. The least they hoped for was political and cultural autonomy. Sheng’s regime specified certain issues that needed to be settled in order for the central government of China to integrate Xinjiang.

著者

平岩 俊司

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.25-42, 2007-07-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

14

---

In October 2006, North Korea went ahead with nuclear tests in spite of international opposition.The international community had made every effort to stop North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, but these efforts ended in failure. This study seeks to look at the measures the international community had been taking to control North Korea’s nuclear program, analyze why the measures could not work effectively, and examine future problems in controlling North Korean nuclear activity.The first North Korean nuclear crisis took place in the early 1990s, and ended when the United States and North Korea signed a bilateral Agreed Framework following their negotiations in1994. North Korea agreed to abandon its original nuclear development program on the condition that the world community provided light-water reactors, which were considered to be relatively difficult to divert to military use. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization(KEDO) was formed with Japan, the United States and South Korea as the primary members to implement the supply of light-water reactors. These efforts paved the way for the rest of the world to control North Korea’s nuclear activities. In 2002, however, the second nuclear crisis occurred. North Korea made it known that it was proceeding with a program to produce highly enriched uranium. Subsequently, the international community launched six-party talks involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan, China and Russia, with the intention of preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. In October 2006, North Korea conducted nuclear tests in the face of worldwide opposition. The global society failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear activities.International efforts were not sufficient to deal with the first nuclear crisis, although North Korea’s nuclear activities were controlled to a certain extent via the agreement with the United States. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are intended to counter US threats. If the US–North Korean agreement had not been reached, North Korea’s nuclear activities would not have been controlled within any framework. The current ongoing six-party talks will not produce dramatic results unless bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea make remarkable progress. The six-party talks have the possibility of acting as an essential framework to maintain East Asian security, as well as managing North Korean nuclear issues. However, the immediate problem is controlling North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Given this situation, the six-party talks will function only when the bilateral framework between the United States and North Korea works. Once this development has taken place, the six-party talks will then be able to function as a broader framework for further negotiation.

著者

山本 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.128-137, 2020-07-31 (Released:2020-09-12)

参考文献数

19

著者

塩出 浩和

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.85-97, 2017-01-31 (Released:2017-03-24)

参考文献数

9

---

In Macau, on the 25th of May in 2014, more than 10,000 citizens marched in protest against government’s proposal to pay hefty amounts of retirement benefits to high-rank government officials. There were also citizens who supported the government’s proposal, about 1,000, marched through same route on the same day. Two hundred sixty police officers were dispatched. Despite the size of this political protest in the small Special Administrative Region, no violence took place. Between the night of 27th and the morning of 28th, 5,000 citizens sat-in surrounding the Legislative Committee Building. On the 29th, the government of Macau has submitted to the action of its citizens and withdrew its proposal. The movement was lead by non-communist labour union, anti-communist political parties and individual journalists. It was organized by SNS such as facebook. Why do this kind of non-violence movements succeed in Macau? One important factor is that the population at large in Macau forms a sort of ‘Intimate Sphere’ where people have little antagonistic or hostile feeling towards one another. Historically speaking, the police force of Macau has been reluctant to use physical power to control on-the-street political movements unless the movements are related to constitutional or ‘core interest of the nation’ matters. The court’s decision to support citizens’ freedom to express political opinions in public in 2013 has helped to reconfirm this tendency of police not to engage in political issues. In this small special administrative region, most of the community members have friends or relatives in both sides of political groups or in the police force. This sentiment inherently makes it difficult for political disputes escalate to physical violence. The representative system of Macau is not yet completely institutionalized. However, the several informal ways of soliciting public opinions are effective in this small administrative region. This can be taken as an example or experimental case of future democratization of entire China.

著者

塩出 浩和

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.85-97, 2017

---

<p>In Macau, on the 25th of May in 2014, more than 10,000 citizens marched in protest against government's proposal to pay hefty amounts of retirement benefits to high-rank government officials. There were also citizens who supported the government's proposal, about 1,000, marched through same route on the same day. Two hundred sixty police officers were dispatched. Despite the size of this political protest in the small Special Administrative Region, no violence took place. </p><p>Between the night of 27th and the morning of 28th, 5,000 citizens sat-in surrounding the Legislative Committee Building. On the 29th, the government of Macau has submitted to the action of its citizens and withdrew its proposal. The movement was lead by non-communist labour union, anti-communist political parties and individual journalists. It was organized by SNS such as facebook. </p><p>Why do this kind of non-violence movements succeed in Macau? One important factor is that the population at large in Macau forms a sort of 'Intimate Sphere' where people have little antagonistic or hostile feeling towards one another. </p><p>Historically speaking, the police force of Macau has been reluctant to use physical power to control on-the-street political movements unless the movements are related to constitutional or 'core interest of the nation' matters. The court's decision to support citizens' freedom to express political opinions in public in 2013 has helped to reconfirm this tendency of police not to engage in political issues. </p><p>In this small special administrative region, most of the community members have friends or relatives in both sides of political groups or in the police force. This sentiment inherently makes it difficult for political disputes escalate to physical violence. </p><p>The representative system of Macau is not yet completely institutionalized. However, the several informal ways of soliciting public opinions are effective in this small administrative region. This can be taken as an example or experimental case of future democratization of entire China. </p>

著者

野澤 知弘

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.40-61, 2008-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

33

---

This paper considers the various kinds of activity used to promote the development of Chinese language education in Cambodia. After first surveying the situation, focussing mainly on the rebuilding of Chinese immigrant education in Phnom Penh and the surrounding district, this report aims to consider the problem at various levels caused by other developments in Chinese language education, and the development of the Chinese language education in Cambodia where there is the largest Chinese immigrant school in Southeast Asia. The prosperity of this Chinese immigrant school with the development of Chinese language education is greatly influenced by the national political system, parts which are influenced by relations with China and the sensitive issues concerning anti-Chinese immigrant policy. Therefore, the writer thinks that the status of Cambodian Chinese language education is an important indicator of the current state of the mutual relations between the Chinese immigrant community of Cambodia and the Cambodian government.

著者

鄭 光敏

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.59-75, 2005-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

41

---

Although deaths in the North Korean famine of 1995–1997 are estimated to be roughly 600,000–1 million in the most recent surveys, only a few attempts have been made to analyze the famine. This paper aims to analyze the causes of the North Korean famine using Amartya Sen’s entitlement approach, which has been widely used in the study of modern famines.The unique aspect of the North Korean famine is that it happened during a drastic change in the entitlement system. As is well known, the main entitlement system in North Korea until the early 1990s was the public distribution system (PDS). However, following the collapse of the PDS, food was increasingly allocated through the informal sector, called the Changmadang in North Korea. After the collapse of the PDS, the food entitlement of the urban population relied mainly on market exchange, though there were other sources of food acquisition. Indeed, a new entitlement system emerged from the informal food market in the middle of the 1990s.However, North Korea had been undergoing a serious economic recession since the collapse of the socialist market in the early 1990s, and therefore many factories and firms could not operate normally. Many workers were threatened with unemployment or non-payment. Furthermore, people were severely restricted by the state not only in respect of private ownership but also with regards to free trade activity. Hence it was not easy for many laborers, especially in local urban areas, to acquire food through market exchange during the transitional stage.The main victims of the famine in North Korea were laborers in local urban areas, especially in North and South Hamgyung. Surprisingly, when the famine reached its peak at the end of 1996 the price index of rice rose to 1206 (taking the informal market price in 1992 as 100). While there was a sudden surge in food prices, the wage rate actually fell in absolute terms and the index of the exchange rate of labour vis-à-vis rice declined from 100 in 1992 to 5 in 1996. Indeed, the violent decline in rice-entitlement of wages that occurred in North Korea at this time was unprecedented in the modern history of famines.To understand the causes of the North Korean famine it is very important to appreciate that it occurred as a result of a number failures of entitlement. The first is the failure of the PDS by regional ‘triage’, etc. (i.e. the cause was not simply a decline in food availability), and the second is the collapse of the exchange entitlement in the informal market during the dramatic transition of the North Korean economy.

著者

岩武 照彦

出版者

Japan Association for Asian Studies

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.1, pp.61-82, 1980

著者

鎌田 文彦

出版者

Japan Association for Asian Studies

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.103-108, 1990

著者

黄 昭堂

出版者

アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.p121-129, 1988-10

著者

渡邊 武

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, no.3.4, pp.88-92, 2014-09-15 (Released:2014-09-26)