著者
川島 真
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.63, no.1, pp.98-103, 2017-01-31 (Released:2017-03-24)
参考文献数
12

For China, H.K., Macau and Taiwan, discussed here, are not part of provincials/autonomous administrative divisions, but are special administrative regions. Articles in this feature, discuss new political trends in this specific region. In these three regions, we can find some similar phenomena and different situations. The first point is about national security and freedom/democracy. Chinese government strengthens the thread of cyber attack, and importance of national secret intelligences and social security. Such discourses lead the new regulations and acts to manage and sustain democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism, especially in Hong Kong. Facing with these new policy, Hong Kong people have so much negative behavior that they insist on deciding matters on Hong Kong by people there. However, such a situation is not found in Macau society where some matured social network is developed. And Taiwan’s case is also different from Hong Kong’s case, if the national government manages and sustains the democracy or constitutionalism, people would be against it by some activities like Sun Flowers movement, and express their opinions toward the administration by the vote at the elections. The second point is about social diversities and splits. As economic growth and democratization in these regions, both social diversities and splits are created so seriously among generations, genders, and between urban and rural areas. Such social diversities and splits influences the political activities, like Sun Flower movement in Taiwan and umbrella movement in H.K.. These movements had proposed strong objections to the government, but the activist couldn’t unify these movements and institutionalize them into a political power. On Taiwanese presidential and member of parliament election in 2016, most of Sun Flower activists vote for the DPP candidate on presidential election, but those were partly scattered on the member of parliament election. So it’s so difficult to find the great common divisor among small segments of the society, and the definition of “democracy” and “constitutionalism” in these societies. The final point is about Chinese stance to such phenomena in this region. As Hong Kong’s case, Chinese governments kept its authority to make interpretation on the situation and to decide the Yes or No on the problems, especially in Hong Kong and Macau. People in Hong Kong cannot decide their situation at present and in the future, in the contrast to people in Taiwan, where they can decide their future by themselves.
著者
水上 祐二
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.66-78, 2007-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)
参考文献数
23

The major cities in Southeast Asia have been greatly affected by the phenomenon of overurbanization, a result of rapid industrialization stemming from a surge in foreign direct investment starting in the 1980s. Despite an increase in labor demand in the modern industrial sector, the labor market in these Asian cities still continues to involve finding employment in an informal sector of small and independent businesses.The urban informal sector (UIS) has traditionally been interpreted as that part of the labor force not employed in the modern industrial sector. The existence of the UIS has been explained by external factors such as rural–urban labor migration. Citing the example of Thai stall keepers, this paper in contrast ascribes the continued existence of the UIS to internal factors including socio-economic conditions such as income.The paper’s author independently conducted an interview survey of stall keepers at five locations in Bangkok (Victory Monument, Pratunam, Wongwian Yai, Huai Khwang, andRamkhamhaeng) between August and September 2003. The survey sample consisted of a total of 115 individuals.According to this survey, the main characteristics of these stall keepers were that many were native to the city, and the younger generation in their 20s had a relatively high level of education.The average income of stall keepers was about 16,000 baht per month: this is higher than both the private average wage for Bangkok (9,500 baht) and the average income for Bangkok(10,000 baht). Analysis of the income distribution of stall keepers indicates a mixture of lowerincome earners (making less than 8,000 baht/month) and higher-income earners (making over30,000 baht/month).Factors determining the income of stall keepers were also analyzed. Income was not correlated with length of time in business, age, business hours, and amount of investment. The onlycorrelation in these data was between income and level of education.This analysis indicates that: (1) stall keepers have a relatively level of high income, and the ability to earn such a high income is a factor that perpetuates the UIS; and (2) stall keepers’ incomes are correlated to their level of education. Being able to earn a high income through ability facilitated by education is a reason why even highly educated people become stall keepers.This is a factor for individuals finding employment in the UIS regardless of whether the level of education in Thailand rises or the trend to obtaining higher academic credentials progresses.
著者
石塚 迅
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.66, no.3, pp.103-118, 2020-07-31 (Released:2020-09-12)
参考文献数
41

In this paper, on the 30th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, I reexamined the connection and disconnection between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution (thought and system). The constitutional review was employed as the focal point in this discussion.First, the constitutional review has two meanings: the protection of human rights and the protection of constitutional order. The constitutional review is one of the crucial elements of constitutionalism. Its system and operation are a measure of realization and retention of the constitutionalism.Second, the Chinese constitution enacted in 1982 was based on the bitter experiences of the Cultural Revolution. In order to protect human rights and constitutional order, various discussions were held to decide what kind of constitutional review system was to be established. Furthermore, the Chinese government and CCP rejected the judicial review and chose their own version of constitutional review that is carried out by the People’s Congress.Finally, there is a gulf between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution. The Chinese constitution imposes the duty of upholding and abiding by the constitution not only to the government but also to its citizens. At the same time, it is reluctant to ensure the relativity of individuals’ values. At the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the Chinese government and CCP criticized the students and intellectuals for joining the protest and openly violating the constitution. This accusation symbolizes the gap between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution.
著者
SIDDIQA Ayesha
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.4, pp.32-46, 2022-10-31 (Released:2022-11-25)
参考文献数
19

The post-Cold War had appeared to Frances Fukayama as an age for ascendency of liberal democracy. Indeed, one could observe a change of mood around the world marked by lesser tolerance for military authoritarianism which is why military regimes were seen on a decline. In Pakistan, known for a politically powerful military, it took the generals a bit more than a decade after the end of the Cold War to realize that direct intervention was not welcomed. October 1999 was the last that a general took charge of the state. General Pervez Musharraf’s rule ended in 2008 dovetailing into return of democracy the same year. The change was far more significant—Pakistan’s electoral democracy got anchored as governments were removed through elections rather than use of non-Parliamentary methods. This shift cannot be termed as a transformation but a variation since non-Parliamentary institutional methods were used to not allow prime ministers from completing their terms. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani was removed from office by the higher judiciary in June 2012 followed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in July 2017, and later Prime Minister Imran Khan in March 2022.The army, which in 1997 lost its power to sack governments through constitutional means in the form of article 58(2)(b) of the 1973 Constitution that was revoked by the then civilian government, used the higher judiciary to keep governments unstable. It was not that after 2008 the army had learned a lesson and was willing to surrender power but that it found a new way to maximize control of state power and resources without undertaking direct intervention. The military shifted from control of government to managing governance. Stability in electoral democracy is a new benchmark. The status-quo will remain and political players will not gain more ground until and unless they build institutional capacity. So, while Fukayama could imagine that all players in Pakistan have accepted liberal democracy as a norm, such acceptance is primarily superficial. The military remains dominant in power politics and civilian forces still subservient. Pakistan, in fact, offers a model of hybrid military rule in which political governments provide cover to military’s de facto control of the state.
著者
周 俊
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, no.3, pp.19-36, 2021-07-31 (Released:2021-08-12)
参考文献数
78

Neibu Cankao (NC) is widely recognized as one of China’s classified internal bulletins, yet little is known about its functions and how it shaped the central-local relations in the country. NC began its publication by the Xinhua News Agency in 1949 as a daily bulletin, documenting sensitive domestic topics which were not suitable for public release, such as riots, cases of corruption, accidents, and outbreaks of infectious disease. Its circulation was limited, with only senior cadres of the CCP being granted access. Despite its similarity with the Soviet bulletin system, NC was a product of the CCP’s own attempt at solving the information dilemma of its dictatorship, and thus served as an important tool for gathering information. It also played a crucial role in the supervision of lower cadres, while at the same time providing the central committee of the CCP—and more importantly, Mao Zedong, with a way to exert influence on policymaking. However, the full realization of its functions faced several challenges. First, the Xinhua journalists responsible for NC were often mistrusted, as most of them were highly educated young people, who lacked revolutionary experience and came from bourgeois families. Second, NC’s independence was hampered by the increasing inferences of local party committees. Though the journalists could criticize local party committees and were backed by Hu Qiaomu (or more precisely—by Mao), in 1953 Liu Shaoqi granted the committees with permission to review NC manuscripts, because he believed them to be more trustworthy. These local interventions put journalists in a very risky position, especially when they disagreed with local authorities or made critical comments on local issues. This led to NC’s becoming a mouthpiece for local party committees, rather than a political tool of the central party committee. Finally, Mao used to constantly send instructions on policymaking to senior cadres via NC, reminding them of what they should focus on. This forced journalists to shift their attention from issues they considered important to what were essentially Mao’s concerns. In sum, NC was stuck between the pressures from both the central and the local committees of the party, which ended up putting it at a constant risk of disfunction. Ultimately, the plight of NC was a reflection of the structural problems in the CCP’s rule.